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ABSTRACT AND SUMMARY
The thesis is based on fieldwork in one main and seven other villages 
in one area of Bangladesh. It examines patterns of resource accumulation by 
different household categories and changes in the form and meaning of agrarian
relations which occur with the introduction of STW irrigation. It is argued that
under present conditions of low non-agricultural incomes and declining per 
capita land resources in rural Bangladesh, a transformation towards a more 
expansionary, capitalist rationale of production and appropriation is taking 
place in agriculture. The fieldwork material shows how under more secure, 
higher-productivity conditions facilitated by irrigation, agrarian relations are 
being restructured by producers and appropriators to exploit the productivity 
potential of new technologies such as mechanised irrigation.
The comparison between the main and the seven other villages in this
research shows that such restructuring of agrarian relations towards output and 
productivity objectives takes different forms and has different development 
outcomes depending on m icro-level political economy conditions. The thesis uses
the distinction between "forms of market" (or exploitation) and "modes of 
production" to differentiate between common patterns of transformation and 
divergent m icro-level development outcomes of technologial change.
Chapter I poses the main questions addressed in the research, defines the major 
theoretical concepts used and examines the structural meanings and functions of 
different agrarian relationships through Bengali history. A discussion of 
contemporary agrarian change and an introduction to issues and institutions in 
the irrigation sector in Bangladesh are also given.
Chapter II addresses methodological issues, describes the fieldwork and 
introduces the fieldwork concepts and definitions.
Chapter III introduces the area and the main village where research was carried 
out. Local irrigation-related changes in cropping patterns are then introduced. 
The final two sections of the chapter discuss forms of informal locally 
initiated cooperation in the main research village.
Chapter IV focusses on the concept of "household category". It concentrates on 
11 case studies with a detailed description of how household structure and 
endowment with material and social resources interact to create overall 
household position. Some indicators of irrigation-related change in the main
research village are summarised at the end of the chapter.
Chapter V constitutes the core of the thesis. Firstly, it demonstrates how with
more secure, higher yields through irrigation, and with a continuing 
deterioration of per capita land availability, agrarian relations in the land, 
credit and labour markets are becoming more productivity-oriented and less 
subject to the productivity-reducing effects of market interlinkages. Secondly, 
it shows that the appearance of capitalist agrarian relations has not displaced 
market interlinkages and wider patron-client relations but that these have 
adapted to the needs of a capitalist production and appropriation rationale.
Chapter VI examines agrarian change in the seven other, "subsidiary" research 
villages and shows how irrigation-related changes in the agricultural production 
structure and their influence on household level accumulation processes can take 
very d ifferent forms in one small relatively uniform geographical area.
Chapter VII widens the focus to patterns o f accumulation and change beyond the
cultivation sector. The development effect at the m icro- and household level of
occupational diversification, in particular in the irrigation-related sectors is 
examined.
Chapter V III summarises findings and discusses their theoretical implications.
V  -
CONTENTS
Acknowl e dgemen t s i
Abstract and Summary iii
Contents V
Tables, Figures and Maps ix
CHAPTER I: AGRARIAN STRUCTURAL DYNAMISM 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 The Past 8
1.2.1 The Mughals 8
1.2.2 The British 11
1.2.3 Pakistan 17
1.2.4 Independence 19




1.3.2 Credit and Usury 29
1.3.3 Labour 33
1.4 Irrigation 36
1.4.1 Technological Choices 38
1.4.2 The Shallow Tubewell 41
1.4.3 The Institutional Framework 44
CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES 51
II.1 Methodological Concepts and Conflicts 51
II.2 Preparation and Setting up 53
II.3 The Fieldwork 57
II.3.1 The Village Survey 57
II.3.2 The Command Area Study 59
II.3.3 The Seven-Village Revisit 60
II.3.4 The Case Studies 60
II.3.5 Occupational Diversification 61
II.3.6 The State and Foreign Donors 62
II.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Data 62
II.4.1 Before and After 62
II.4.2 The Attribution of Change 63
II.4.3 The Female, Foreign Researcher 64
II.5 Definitions and Concepts 66
II.5.1 The Household 66
II.5.2 Household Categories 67
II.5.3 The Village 69
CHAPTER III: THE AREA AND THE VILLAGE 71
III.l Singra Upazila 71
III.2 The Main Research Village 72
III.3 The Crops and the Seasons 75
III.4 Samitigram: Cooperation and Conflict 84
- vi -
111.4.1 The Jubok Samiti 86
111.4.2 The TV Samiti 87
111.4.3 The Mosque Samiti 87
111.4.4 The School Samiti 88
111.4.5 The Jute Samiti 89
111.4.6 The Credit Samiti 90
111.4.7 The Krishi Samabaya Samitis (KSS) 91
111.4.8 The Mahila Samabaya Samitis (MSS) 92
111.4.9 The Pukur Groups 92
111.4.10 The Paddy Trading Group 93
III.5 Irrigation in Samitigram 94
111.5.1 History and Present Context 94
111.5.2 Command Area Differences 95
111.5.3 The Shallow Tubewell Groups 100
CHAPTER IV: VILLAGE PEOPLE 107
IV. 1 Household Categories 107
IV.1.1 The 'Rich' 107
IV. 1.2 The 'Well-Off' 109
IV. 1.3 The 'Coping' 111
IV.1.4 The 'Poor' 114
IV.2 Household Profiles 121
IV.2.1 The 'Rich': Malik and Saidur 122
IV.2.1.1 The 'Rich': Strategies and Change 129
IV.2.2 The 'Well-Off': Adorn and Mujibur 133
IV.2.2.1 The 'Well-Off' Strategies and Change 138
IV.2.3 The 'Coping': Ali and Toslin 141
IV.2.3.1 The 'Coping': Strategies and Change 145
IV.2.4 The 'Poor': Kamal and Yussuf's Sons 148
IV.2.4.1 The 'Poor': Strategies and Change 154
IV.2.5 ... and the Destitute: Sahera and her Children 157
IV.2.5.1 The Destitute: Strategies and Change 159
IV.3 Some Indicators of Change 160
CHAPTER V: IRRIGATED CULTIVATION AND ACCUMULATION 166
V.l The Land Market 167
V.1.1 Landholding and Household Category 167
V.1.2 Land Purchases and Sales 173
V.l.3 Land Prices 180
V . 1.4 Tenancy 183
V.l.4.1 'Traditional Sharecropping' 185
V.l.4.2 'New' Sharecropping 187
V.l.4.3 Fixed in-kind Rent 189
V.1.4.4 Tenancy, Distribution and Change 192
V.l. 5 Mortgaging 198
V.l.6 Land, Cultivation and Irrigation 207
V.2 The Credit Market 210
V.2.1 Credit, Distribution and Change 212
- vii -
V.3 The Labour Market 222
V.3.1 Organisational Forms of Labour 222
V.3.1.1 The Labour Groups (Dols) 223
V.3.1.2 Day Labour 227
V.3.1.3 Seasonal and Annual Labour 229
V.3.1.4 Household Labour and Labour Exchange (Gata) 231
V.3.2 Household Categories and the Labour Market 234
V.4 Cultivation Costs, Output and Accumulation 238
V.4.1 Yields 240
V.4.2 Cultivation Costs (All Cultivators) 240
V.4.3 Cultivation Cost (Tenants) 244
V.4.4 Net Output Values 245
CHAPTER VI: IRRIGATION AND CHANGE IN SEVEN OTHER VILLAGES 251
VI. 1 Village Profiles 252




VI.1.5 Shagarbari and Koyrabari 264
VI. 1.6 Mahashandrapur 268
VI.2 Irrigation: Alternative Trajectories of Change 272
VI.2.1 Organisational Forms of Irrigation 272
VI.2.1.1 Low-Lift-Pump Groups 273
VI.2.1.2 Water Sale 273
VI.2.1.3 Land Renting by STW Owners 274




VI.3 Modes of Irrigation and Distribution 282
CHAPTER VII: OCCUPATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION 294
VII.l Samitigram Income Source Diversification 295
VII.2 The Paddy Trade 301
VII.2.1 Paddy Sellers 302
VII.2.2 Paddy Processing 304
VII.2.3 Paddy Traders 308
VII.3 STW Supply and Services 310
VII.3.1 Supply 310
VII.3.2 Services 313
CHAPTER VIII: PEOPLE, TECHNOLOGY AND AGRARIAN CHANGE 319
VIII.1 Fieldwork Findings 319
VIII. 1.1 Patterns of Accumulation 319
VIII.1.2 Patronage and Productivity 322
VIII.1.3 Factor Markets: Change and Continuity 325
VIII.1.4 People, their Choices and Room for Manoeuvre 330
i
- Viii -
VIII.1.5 Limits to Diversification 335




Bibliography and References 350
1 . 1
- ix - 
TABLES
Effects of Irrigation and Modern Inputs on
Production and Labour Absorption 37
II.1 Fieldwork Elements - In Chronological Order 58
III.l Command Area Characteristics: Private and Group STWs 98
IV. 1 Composite Picture of Household Categories 119
V.l Land Transfers and Changes in Holding Sizes 173
V.2 Land Sharecropped in and out per Household Category (acres) 193
V.3 Land Sharecropped in and out per Household Category (%) 193
V.4 Land Mortgaged in and out by Household Category 202
V. 5 Owned, Operated and Effective Landholdings by Household
Category (acres per category) 207
V. 6 Owned, Operated and Effective Landholding by Household
Category (acres per household) 207
V.7 Landownership and Irrigation in Samitigram 209
V. 8 Credit Taken by Household Category (% of total category) 213
V. 9 Types of Informal Loans Taken by Household Category 218
V.10 Forms of Hired Labour in Samitigram 223
V.ll Use of Types of Hired Labour by Samitigram Households 235
V. 12 Types of Hired Labour Performed 237
V. 13 Cultivation Costs and Returns: Irrigated Boro 241
V. 14 Cultivation Costs and Returns: Rainfed Amon 241
V. 15 Market Cost of Labour for Boro 243
V. 16 Cost Breakdown of Boro Cultivation 246
VI. 1 Alternative Contexts of STW Irrigation and Water Prices 271
VI. 2 Income Distribution from Irrigated Boro Cultivation:
Samitigram and Baluabasua 285
VII.l Samitigram: Income Source Structure by Household Category 296
VII.2 Prices Received by 5 Sellers of Boro paddy in Samitigram 303




V.l Effective Landholding by Household Category 169
V.2 Owned Landholding by Household Category 169
V.3 Prices for STW Irrigated Land in Samitigram 1940-85 179
V.4 Seasonal Wage Variations by Labour Type (Samitigram) 232
VI.1 The Distribution of Households by Landholding Size 253
II.1
MAPS
Bangladesh Singra and the Research Area 55
III.l Samitigram and Environment 73
III.2 Samitigram Residential Area 74
III.3 Samitigram Agricultural Land and the STW Command Areas 97
- 1 -
CHAPTER I: AGRARIAN STRUCTURAL DYNAMISM
1.1 Introduction
This study is interdisciplinary and concerned with development. I 
examine development as a possible outcome of processes of economic growth and 
distributional change as far as they lead to the elimination of a basic "core of 
absolute deprivation" (Sen 1981)
Since in Bangladesh inequality and absolute deprivation are closely 
associated, development is connected to patterns of accumulation by households. 
Accumulation occurs through production and exchange processes which influence 
patterns of growth and distribution. The introduction of a new technology 
changes production and exchange relationships and affects the volume and 
direction of resource flows. Changed patterns of accumulation by different 
household types result. My research is concerned with the structural changes and 
development effects which arise from these dynamics.
The study analyses the micro-level changes which follow the 
introduction of a mechanised minor irrigation technology, the shallow tubewell 
(STW, see 1.4). In Bangladesh, the introduction of mechanised irrigation has 
increased agricultural productivity and output. New resource flows manifest 
themselves as patterns of accumulation - and disaccumulation - by households. 
The agrarian structure which mediates such patterns of accumulation, and the 
structural change which occurs with the introduction of STWs are the central 
concern of this thesis.
The analysis is undertaken in a ’political economy framework’ which 
takes into account the effect of concentrations of power and wealth on market 
behaviour and market interlinkages. The emphasis of the study is on market 
relationships and rather less on institutions such as kinship, religion and faction.
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However, the concern with patron-client relations throughout the study bears out
the connections between market and non-market sectors and indeed raises some
doubts as to the analytical usefulness of the conceptual separation of the two
sectors (see also VIII. 1.2).
My definition of agrarian structure is adopted from Boyce (1987) in a
slightly modified form;
The agr ar ian  s t r u c t u r e  i s  . . .  the subset  of i n s t i t u t i o n s  governing 
the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of r ig h ts  in a g r i c u l t u r a l  means of production,  
no tab ly  land.  These r i g h ts  include not only ownership but  a l so  such 
arrangements as tenancy and mortgaging (and c r e d i t  M.G.), which 
c r e a te  a divergence between ownership and ac tua l  ope ra t io n .
(Boyce 1987 p . 37)
This research is concerned with five sets of questions:
Firstly, it examines irrigation-related change for different household
categories. Households are seen to operate in a specific opportunity situation,
which is determined by a number of features of household position. Clusters of
household features determine household category The study investigates
patterns of accumulation from irrigated cultivation by household category.
Patterns of accumulation are seen as the manifestation of realised category-
specific household opportunities. The thesis focusses on the examination of the
constraints and the 'room for manoeuvre* (Clay & Schaffer 1984) of households
from different categories in relation to opportunities from irrigation.
Secondly, it is attempted to identify at the m icro-level the different
roles which one irrigation technology, the STW, can play in a variety of
environmental and political economy contexts. It is examined how a major
increase in potential agricultural productivity through the introduction of STWs
interacts with rural micro-level conditions and results in a variety of
accumulation and development patterns in eight villages in one region.
Specifically, the study compares the structural role of locally initiated and
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farmer-m anaged STW irrigation groups in the main research village (Samitigram, 
see Ch III) with that of private individual ownership of STWs in seven further 
’subsidiary* research villages (see Ch VI).
Thirdly, and centrally, the thesis considers agrarian production 
relations. Differences in the rationale with which households engage in 
production and exchange relationships are considered and the implications of 
changes in the structural meaning and/or contractual forms of agrarian relations 
which have occurred with the increased productivity potential from mechanised 
irrigation are discussed.
Differentiations in form and meaning of agrarian relations 
(sharecropping, mortgaging, employment and credit) over time, between 
households and between different relations engaged in by the same household, are 
examined for their effect on the position of households from different categories 
and on the agrarian structure as a whole.
Fourthly, the change in the effect of unequal relationships of power 
and dependence (patron-client relationships; see Wolf 1966; Scott 1972; Beteille 
1974), and in particular market interlinkages (see Bharadwaj 1974; Adnan 1984; 
Ellis 1988) on patterns of productivity and forms of exploitation with the 
introduction of irrigation into agriculture is examined. With reference to the 
rural land, labour credit and input markets, market interlinkages are here defined 
as
The c o n t r a c tu a l  t y in g  of terms of exchange in one market to  t h a t  in 
o th e r  markets .
( E l l i s  1988 p.  150)
Fifthly, more as a window onto future areas of investigation than as the 
centre of this research, irrigation-related change at the household- and village- 
level is set in the context of wider regional, national and international structures 
which affect patterns of accumulation and change at the m icro-level in
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Bangladesh.
The findings of the research reveal fundamental differences as well as 
common features of agrarian change in the eight villages where field research 
was carried out. Chapters III to V examine patterns of change with group 
irrigation in the main research village, Samitigram. A much briefer study in 
Chapter VI of seven ’subsidiary villages* examines patterns of change in the 
context of individually owned and operated STWs.
The main themes of the research connect to the debate on modes of 
production and structural transformation processes. While acknowledging the 
theoretical progress achieved by the ’mode of production debate* in the 1970s, I 
do not engage in the occasionally somewhat sterile terminological disputes which 
have erupted in the literature on the subcontinent However, questions of 
capitalist versus non-capitalist production relations are central here as far as they 
reflect the material dynamics of household development, political economy and 
agrarian change.
A line of theory which must be acknowledged here is that which stems 
from the writings on the diversity of possible meanings of formally similar 
agrarian relationships. Banaji (1971) distinguishes between "forms of exploitation" 
(such as wage labour, serfdom or sharecropping) and "relations of production" 
(such as capitalism, feudalism). This provides the conceptual apparatus to 
differentiate between ’form* and ’meaning* of agrarian relations in this thesis. 
Banaji (1971 p.2498) writes
. . .  c a p i t a l i sm  cannot be def ined in terms of the ex is tence  or non­
e x i s t e n c e  of wage labour ,  fo r  the l a t t e r  i s  only t ransformed in t o  a 
c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n  of p roduct ion under c e r t a i n  h i s t o r i c a l  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  in the f i r s t  place  i t s  i n s e r t i o n  in to  a framework of 
extended reproduction  where un limi ted  expansion,  perpe tual  p rogress ,  
becomes the law of p r o d u c t i o n . . .  wage labour as such, as a r e l a t i o n  
of e x p l o i t a t i o n  i s  po s s i b le  and has occurred h i s t o r i c a l l y  in a 
s imple reproduction  context
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Subsequent work (Wood 1981) develops the concept of ’meaning* in an 
account of the regional diversity and flexibility over time of agrarian relations in 
Bangladesh. Much more at the micro-level, this study examines changes in the 
structural meaning of agrarian production relations in rural land, labour and 
credit markets under technical change.
The conclusions of my work fit well into a more recent theoretical 
model of agrarian change formulated by Adnan (1984) which is partly based on 
earlier work by Bharadwaj (1974). One of Adnan’s central concerns is to free the 
concept of "transformation to capitalism" from ahistorical teleological 
determinism (1984 p.37 ^ ) .  He attempts this by showing the systematic 
"necessitating" factors which compel agrarian producers to adopt a capitalist mode 
of production. Adnan concentrates on the "phenomenal forms” through which 
capitalism "takes hold of production itself” rather than remaining "parasitic" (i.e. 
unproductive in mercantile or usurious forms in the circulation process).
Following Adnan (see also Banaji below), I distinguish capitalism by the 
expansionary rationale upon which continued appropriation relies. Under 
capitalism, capital assumes control over the production process while under other 
modes of production, appropriation is ’parasitic’ since it appropriates from 
outside the production process neither assuming "operational accountability", as 
Adnan puts it, nor basing continued appropriation on the improvement of the 
productive capacity of the actual producers. A transformation to capitalism thus 
means
a switch to e x p lo i t a t i o n  v ia expanded reproduction .
(Adnan 1984 p . 226)
A central concept in the thesis (see Bharadwaj 1974; Adnan 1984) is 
that of "interlinked" (or "interlocked") markets With interlinked markets, the 
relative strength of transacting partners depends on their overall class position
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rather than on supply and demand conditions in separate markets. Citing the
example of the employer-labourer relationship Rudra says
Dependence i s  based on the  unequal power of causing damage to  the  
o t her  p a r ty  by withdrawing cooperat ion in the  product ion process .
( i n  Desai ,  Rudolph & Rudra 1984 p . 254)
In the context of unequal power-dependence structures, market
relationships do not conform to the textbook type. The market is not
an i n s t i t u t i o n  in which purchasers and s e l l e r s  exchange a t  a 
s t and a rd  p r ic e  and with f u l l  freedom 
(Rudra 1984 p . 261)
Market participants from different classes face different market conditions in 
formally equal market positions.
Adnan (1984 p.108) convincingly states that the use of interlocked 
markets does not imply a particular form (or mode) of production but that 
interlocked markets can be found under capitalist and pre-capitalist forms of 
production (cf. also Banaji 1971; Wood 1981). Ellis (1988 pp.150-154) outlines 
how "interlocked" markets can be used by the productivity-maximising patron to 
overcome the inefficiencies of fragmented markets on the one hand and how, on 
the other hand, "interlocked" markets can be associated with the stagnant 
production conditions of semi-feudalism or antediluvian patterns of surplus use.In 
accordance with this, I found that market interlinkages can be associated with 
extractive antediluvian (see Patnaik 1972a&b; Wood 1981) forms of appropriation 
as well as with different forms of capitalist appropriation.
Depending on a variety of micro-level conditions, (most centrally the 
organisational form of irrigation), the introduction of STW irrigation is here 
found to either reduce or increase the incidence of market interlinkages in 
agricultural production. On the whole, under irrigated conditions market 
interlinkages are found to have become part of more capitalist forms of 
production and appropriation from agriculture.
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Beyond the overall change towards capitalist forms of production with 
STW irrigation, the organisational form of STW irrigation is found to affect 
micro-level outcomes.
With group irrigation in the main research village (Samitigram), 
extractive market interlinkages were found to have been partly displaced by 
single-market production relations under which appropriation centres on 
increases in productivity and output. At the same time, extractive market 
interlinkages, mainly for the production of rainfed crops, are retained.
Group irrigation has resulted in relatively favourable access conditions 
to water and in increased gains for all cultivators. However, due to higher gains 
by wealthier households, patterns of accumulation from group-irrigated 
cultivation also result in further polarisation of household positions.
With individually owned STWs in the seven subsidiary research villages, 
extractive market interlinkages were expanded and enforced. The establishment 
of new market interlinkages through control over water was linked to the 
assumption of increased control over the production process by the appropriating 
elites and to the adoption of productivity and output objectives as a tenet of 
production relations and market interlinkages. As under group irrigation, but in a 
less equitable manner, under individual STW ownership market interlinkages 
facilitated expansionary capitalist.
As will be shown in later chapters, despite the common background of a 
transformation toward capitalist forms of production, the micro-level resource 
accumulation and development outcomes of STW irrigation in Samitigram and the 
seven villages differed fundamentally. In contrast to the differently sized gains 
fo r all cultivators in Samitigram, the seven villages showed far less favourable 
outcomes for smaller landowners and poor tenants as a result of STW irrigation.
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1.2 The Past
To gain an idea of change, some examination of history is necessary. 
My account of agrarian structural change in Bengal concentrates on three topic 
areas. Firstly, changes in the structure of agricultural production and the 
relations of production are traced through the main periods of Bengal's history. 
In particular, changes in modes of appropriation and distribution of surplus from 
land are examined. Secondly, the interaction between changes in the structures of 
agricultural and non-agricultural production are considered. Thirdly, the effect 
of trade on Bengali agricultural production and the changing dynamics of 
producers' connections to wider regional and world systems are outlined. 
Rajshahi district and Natore division, where the field research for this study was 
conducted (see Ch III), are referred to whenever historical material was 
available.
The history of Bangladesh is usually divided into five periods: the early 
history; the Mughal period; the British period; the Pakistan period; independence. 
Relevant material from the early period was not available to me.
1.2.1 The Mughals
The invasion by Muslim turks in the 13th century found India with no 
central government and only a minimal tax-collecting administration. Rajshahi 
was conquered from the Hindu Sena dynasty by a Muslim ruler in 1204 and then 
governed by a series of sultans and nawabs. Bengal was only incorporated into 
the Mughal empire in 1576 by the most famous of the Mughal emperors, Akbar.
Land revenue collection existed in the Indian subcontinent even before 
the Mughals. It was traditionally a relationship between two parties, the ruler and 
the subject, in which the subject ceded a part of the crop in return for protection 
from  the ruler. The question of land ownership thus did not arise (see Moreland 
1962), as the distribution of agricultural surplus occurred entirely in the
-  9 -
conceptual framework of land occupancy and rule. The Mughals did not change
this but imposed a central bureaucracy on top of the old ruler-subject relations.
This constituted an extra layer of intermediary surplus extraction, but no systemic
change. There is no clear historical evidence on whether the degree of surplus
extraction from the agricultural producer increased under Mughal rule but the
reports on land revenue for the Mughal period point to ’extraordinarily heavy
demands’ (Moreland 1962 p.92). The Mughal bureaucracy rested on a class of
Muslim nobles, who were initially paid cash salaries but later awarded non-
hereditary (prebendary) rights of tax collection. The Mughal emperors claimed a
part of the collected land revenues. Under Akbar, revenues were said to amount
to one third of gross produce, of which half was paid to the emperor. The crop
was divided at harvest between cultivator and state. Spear (1981 p.42) comments
The Mughal n o b i l i t y  was thus an o f f i c i a l  a r i s to c ra c y  
which was h e r e d i t a r y  as a c l a s s  but not as ind iv idu a l s ,  
which was landholding,  but not feuda l .
During the Mughal period (1574-1756) Rajshahi had twenty-nine 
Mughal governors. The diwani (tax-collecting right) for Rajshahi was bestowed 
on the Natore ra jas , a line of Hindu Brahman rulers who amassed large estates 
through the appropriation of the tax-collecting rights of defaulting Muslim 
zamindars throughout the eighteenth century.
As village records of the Mughal period were destroyed (Islam 1977 
p. 128), only general statements about agrarian relations before the British are 
possible. The village economy probably approached the classic Chayanovian 
situation where labour availability determines the extent of land under cultivation 
per household. With labour rather than land as the scarce factor of production, an 
increase of operated area per household was less the ambition of the cultivator 
than that of the ruler. Large areas of Rajshahi remained uncultivated in this 
period (Siddique, 1976). After tax the cultivator was left with subsistence, but
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few reserves.
The original function of sharecropping in this period is outlined by 
Cooper (1983) as threefold. Firstly, sharecropping expanded cultivation into new 
’jungle* areas and brought waste lands back into cultivation after disasters such as 
the famine of 1770; secondly, it provided the food requirements o f the 
non-cultivating upper classes; and thirdly it allowed the appropriation of produce 
by non-cultivating landlord-cum-produce traders. In the Mughal period, a 
sharecropping relationship was thus not so much desired by a tenant as something 
he was forced into with a variety of means down to physical coercion.
Dasgupta (1984 A-129) claims that although forced labour existed on 
zamindari estates during the Mughal period, this was a form of part-tim e labour 
by cultivators and did not indicate the existence of a class of agricultural 
labourers in the period. Moreland (1962 p. 104/5), on the other hand, argues that 
landless labourers under predial slavery existed before Akbar’s rule. He also 
reports that in the British period it was common in some districts of Bengal to 
sell agricultural slaves with the land they were attached to under "claims subject 
to the laws of ancestral real property" (loc. cit.). The existence of a servile, 
landless labouring class before British and Mughal rule is also suggested by 
Patnaik and Dingwaney (1985) who argue that agrestic and domestic forms of 
slavery were later transformed into debt bondage in response to changed 
conditions of production. Chakravarti (1985) describes these newer forms of 
bondage as
the  s a l e  of a labourer through the purchase of debt  by 
the  new employer.
Spear describes extractive appropriation during the Mughal period as
follows:
The c u l t i v a t e d  land was recorded,  the  va lue  of the 
crops as sessed ,  and the share  of the  government 
f i x e d . . .  ac tua l  co l l ec t i o n  took the  form of a
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barga in ing  match with the  agents,  the one pleading 
pover ty ,  the  o ther  s t a t e  ne ces s i t y .  In u n s e t t le d  t imes,  
v i l l a g e s  would f o r t i f y  themselves with mud wall s  and 
scrub hedges and sometimes go for th  to b a t t l e  with the  
col l e c t o r s .
(Spear 1981 p . 42)
The agrarian situation until the arrival of the British is described by
Faaland and Hossain
. . .  low le v e ls  of i n t e rn a t i o n a l  exchange, lack of 
t echnol og ica l  advance and steady leve ls  of e x t r a c t io n  
of peasant  surp lus  meant th a t  rura l  l i v in g  s tandards  
were s t a t i c .  (1980 p . 284)
However, non-agricultural production was diverse. Most of it supplied a 
small segment of the upper classes with luxury goods (jewellery, muslin, silk, 
copper articles). Other articles like iron, cotton and wood products reached 
larger segments of the internal market and artisan production catered to largely 
self-reliant village economies (Dasgupta 1984).
Trade in the Mughal empire flourished on a regional basis relying 
mainly on water transport and some overland caravans as there were neither 
metalled roads nor railways. The richness and diversity of Bengal's products has 
been described in glowing terms by a number of travellers in the 13th to 17th 
century (see Nebelung 1986 p.5-6). Grain was provided to neighbouring 
kingdoms and the muslin produced by Bengal's weavers supplied the courts of the 
rulers throughout Asia. Sugar, saltpetre and bamboo for ship construction were 
exported from Bengal, and silk was produced and supplied to weaving centres in 
other parts of India.
1.2.2 The British
The British East India Company (BEIC) obtained the diwani tax- 
collecting right for Bengal from the Mughal Emperor in 1757. The district of 
Rajshahi came under British control as part of the Natore raj.
During the British period, agricultural production in Bengal was made
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to adjust to the demands of world markets. British traders used a variety of 
economic and coercive means to turn the Bengali cultivator towards production 
for the market. The production of cash crops was enforced by increasing 
demographic pressures and continued low productivity of food production which 
turned form er subsistence producers to the production of non-food crops for 
sale. Directed by British trading and imperial interests, cotton, jute and indigo 
became the new link between the East Bengali cultivators and the world market. 
Cultivators* economic fortunes thus became a function of world demand.
Initially, the British had left the land system untouched. With the
’Permanent Settlement* of 1793, the levels of land revenue payable to the
government by the zamindars were fixed and the zamindari status was made
dependent on revenue payment. No legal rights were given to the tenure holder
below the zamindars. The ’Permanent Settlement* was meant to create the
conditions for increased agricultural productivity through agricultural stability.
Its first result was a large expansion of cultivated area. While in 1790 one third
of Bengal was covered by trees, by the end of the British period less than one
tenth of area remained under forests. At the same time, there was an increase of
up to 300 percent in zamindari rental obligations between the last year of Mughal
rule and the first year of operation of the Permanent Settlement (Bhaduri 1976
p.45). The threat of expropriation to the old zamindars led to a commercialisation
of rights to land revenue so that
A large number of under*tenures became a fe a t u re  of the 
land*system of Bengal as a consequence of the Permanent 
Se t t lement .  Under*tenures enabled old zamindars to 
r e t a i n  a hold on property a f t e r  i t  has been s o l d . . .
Nearly a l l  the  zamindars and ta lukdars ( i n f e r i o r  
v i l l a g e  land revenue c o l l e c t o r s ,  M.G.) a l so  possessed 
subord ina te  r i g h t s  in t h e i r  e s t a t e s .
(Sinha 1968)
Spinatsch (1984 p.56) reports that the average number of levels of
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subinfeudation between talukdar and rayat (cultivator) in Barisal district were 4 
in 1871, 20 in 1911 and over 50 in 1947 (see also Bhaduri 1976 p .51) The 
Bangladesh District Gazetteer for Rajshahi (Siddique 1976) reports increasing 
subinfeudation of the estates of the Natore ra j and the eventual disintegration of 
the old Natore raj in the British period. The Permanent Settlement thus 
differentiated tenurial rights to land to suit the budgetary strength of growing 
numbers of rent-receiving intermediaries who retained a claim to a stagnating 
amount of agricultural surplus (see also Bhaduri 1976).
With the commercialisation of rights to land, the conditions for the 
emergence of labour markets were created. Ghose (1979 p.387) argues that since 
the early 20th century wage labour replaced peasant production in Bangladesh. 
Without subscribing to Ghose’s rather sweeping contention, Dasgupta (1984 A- 
133) finds that the proportion of labourers rose from 5% in the pre-British 
period to 20-30% by 1872. He presents historical evidence fo r the emerging 
linkages between factor markets under which, for example, agricultural labourers 
were also tenants of their employers so that labourers* room for manoeuvre in 
both factor markets was subject to additional constraints.
As a consequence of the escalation of subtenurial rights and in direct 
contrast to the original intentions of the Permanent Settlement, agricultural 
investment and productivity suffered.
. . .  i t  paid nobody to  inves t  i n d iv id u a l l y  in the 
improvements of land. For, gain from increased 
p r o d u c t i v i t y  of land has u su a l ly  to  be shared by the 
va r io us  layers  of in te rm ed ia r i es ,  while there  was no 
v ia b l e  mechanism of sharing  the  cos t  of land 
improvement c o l l e c t i v e l y .
(Bhaduri 1976 p . 48)
The Bengal Tenancy Act in 1885 attempted to amend the situation by 
giving a legal basis to some of the customary rights of tenants and cultivators. 
Very few rights were given to sharecroppers, the bottom rank of tenants and the
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actual cultivators, and none to wage labour. In the absence of any practical legal 
recourse for sharecroppers, local power relations determined the implementation 
of the Bengal Tenancy Act. It has been argued that the Bengal Tenancy Act is 
still reflected in the hierarchy of interests in land in present-day Bangladesh 
(Jannuzi and Peach 1980, Table 1.1 p.5).
The pressures of increased rental demands combined with demographic 
growth and stagnant agricultural productivity resulted in growing indebtedness of 
cultivators. One manifestation of this, the seasonal 'distress cycles' of cheap 
selling and expensive rebuying of food crops, is still fam iliar today (see BRAC 
1980). A number of writers argue convincingly that in this period debt relations 
replaced land revenue as the predominant means of surplus extraction from 
agriculture (Bhaduri 1976; Wood 1981; Dasgupta 1984; Bose 1986). This limited 
productivity potential and enforced involuntary links of the rural producer to the 
market economy. Although land rent continued as a demand on the cultivator 
through increasing layers of tenurial rights, usurious interest took its place as the 
main means of surplus extraction. Bose (1986 p. 169) argues that interest (rather 
than revenue from land) was the main form of income fo r moneylender-traders 
in the Mughal period, while the usufructary form of mortgage khaikalashi was 
uncommon (see V.1.5 fo r khaikalashi under the d ifferent conditions of present 
day irrigated agriculture in the research area). Bose fu rther argues that agrarian 
credit relations in the British period constituted the critical link to the world 
economy and an essential determinant of the content and volume of agricultural 
production. Bhaduri (1986) shows that due to seasonal distress cycles the process 
of market incorporation through debt relations took place fo r rice cultivators as 
much as for 'cash-crop* producers.
Throughout the British period decreasing holding sizes had to support 
increasing numbers of population. As a result, small cultivators in East Bengal
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turned to jute, which provided higher output values per unit of land but also 
demanded higher input costs. The incomes of those with the most inferior rights 
to land at the bottom of the tenurial hierarchy were falling below subsistence 
level. Through the emergence of labour-intensive jute cultivation, the incidence 
of hired labour in Bengal increased. Bose (1986) argues that the higher labour 
cost for jute production enforced the extractive function of the credit mechanism 
and drew even the small peasant cultivator into the market. Dasgupta (1984 p.A- 
140) states that while agricultural labourers of 1880 were not much worse o ff 
than non-labouring cultivators, by 1940 labourers* bargaining position and 
comparative real income level had decreased considerably.
Non-agricultural production in the British period falls into two phases. 
In the first phase Bengali manufactures, especially woven products, were 
redirected towards European and in particular British markets. Bengali cloth was 
in great demand in Europe at the time. A system of advances (dadnis) financed 
from Britain and passed via a hierarchy of Bengali intermediaries to producers, 
coupled with a variety of means of coercion, forced the weavers to sell at low 
prices to the European traders.
The second phase of the development of non-agricultural production in 
Bengal coincides with the industrial revolution in Britain and is best described as 
de-industrialisation and re-agriculturalisation leading to agrarian involution in 
Bengal. With the start of factory production of cloth in England, the local and 
foreign markets for Bengali cloth were systematically closed by the British. A fter 
a few decades the Bengali textile manufacturing sector was ruined. This period 
saw the demise of Dacca (present day Dhaka) as a growing manufacturing centre 
and the emergence of Calcutta as the centre for a new class of intermediaries in 
trade and agricultural processing.
Calcutta’s newly-rich traders increasingly displaced the traditional
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zamindars, who fell into rent arrears and lost their estates. The new trader- 
zamindars exerted great economic pressures on the cultivators while not 
reinvesting into their estates. East Bengal was transformed into the agricultural 
hinterland of Calcutta, connected by railways since 1870 and forced into cash 
crop production by fiscal and physical means. In 1900 East Bengal produced over 
half of world jute. The economy had undergone a structural change from a 
diversified manufacturing economy with an agricultural base to a provider of 
agricultural raw materials for production in foreign economies. With agricultural 
production thus externally oriented, the cultivator was exposed to the swings of 
the world market as never before.
The agrarian scene at the time is one of depressed poverty. Agricultural 
productivity and output were stagnant as the expansion of cultivated acreage had 
reached physical limits. A Technological barrier’ to production growth (see 
Chauduri 1984 in Desai et al) had been reached while pressure on land had 
increased further with the weavers’ reversal to agriculture. Attached agricultural 
labour was largely replaced by casual forms of landless labour (Dasgupta 1984). 
The position of tenants versus zamindars weakened. Reports of organised armed 
robbery by displaced tenants abound for Rajshahi (Siddique 1976 p.35/36) and 
other parts of the country (Spear 1981 Ch 7). Between 1883 and 1888 Rajshahi 
was the scene for a ’no-rent’ campaign of peasant cultivators and later of cases 
of organised peasant opposition to zamindars in Natore.
The monetisation of the agricultural sector and the indebtedness of the 
agricultural producer now bound an internally disarticulated and re- 
agriculturised Bengal to world markets. A new class of intermediaries based in 
Calcutta was the executor for Bengal’s new function as raw material procurer for 
the British empire. This class assumed an increasing hold over the countryside by 
buying up traditional zamindari holdings. In 1930 Bengal turned from net export
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to import of rice (Boyce 1987 p.6) while increasing numbers of cultivators were 
relying on the sale of non-food cash crops (jute) for export. These were obtained 
by the intermediary traders through the continuation and intensification of 
extractive practices rather than through increasing productivity of land or labour 
(see also Faaland and Hossain 1980 p. 286). For the purposes of the colonial 
rulers and their internal counterparts down to the village level, it was sufficient 
to rely on debt and usury to ensure continued surplus appropriation.
1.2.3 Pakistan
In 1947 East Bengal became part of Pakistan in many ways, 'a second 
colonial era* (see Faaland and Parkinson 1976) began. After most Hindu 
zamindars and moneylenders had fled to India in any case, the zamindari system 
was abolished in 1950. The elimination of the intermediary rent-collecting 
hierarchy by the ’East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act’ of 1950 brought 
the state into direct contact with rent-paying cultivators for the first time. 
However, other than totally eliminating the limited rights of sharecroppers 
(bargadars) which had been granted by the Bengal Tenancy of 1885, the 1950 Act 
did not touch on the hierarchy of interests in land. In many respects the 
zamindars were replaced by the top-level of Muslim surplus cultivators who 
tended to be form er rent-collecting talukdars, and who appropriated the old 
zamindari estates. A new land ceiling of 33 acres was rendered ineffective by a 
variety of circumventive practices and legal loopholes. This was to happen again 
in post-independence Bangladesh (see Jannuzzi & Peach 1980 pp. 11/14).
East Pakistani cultivators continued to produce cash crops (jute and 
cotton) for export. Through currency overvaluation, import licensing and a 
variety of other means, the agricultural surplus of East Pakistan built up West 
Pakistani industries (see Nations 1971). The survival margins of the East Pakistani 
cultivators narrowed as surplus was extracted through usury and unfavourable
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terms of trade rather than reinvested in agriculture. Demographic pressures 
increased and productivity increases were low. Although absolute levels of food 
production increased, per capita food production declined and food imports 
increased significantly during the Pakistani period. In 1968/69 only 2.6% of 
cultivated land in East Pakistan was under modem irrigation methods (Siddique 
1979 p.8/9).
Partition meant the exodus of a majority of Hindus, who prevailed in 
non-agricultural occupations. This meant that both non-agricultural production 
(handicrafts, jewellery and leather) and trade connections with India were 
dislocated. A further re-agriculturalisation of East Pakistan and a restructuring 
of trade towards West Pakistan was the result. During the Pakistani period, 
agricultural surplus from the East (present-day Bangladesh) financed industrial 
development in the West (present-day Pakistan). However, the separation of East 
Bengali jute production from West Bengali jute mills at partition meant that East 
Bengal, the world’s largest jute producer, now obtained some of its own jute 
mills.
The exodus of the Hindus left East Pakistan without a political, business 
or industrial elite. In an attempt to counter emerging Bengali separatism, the West 
Pakistani regime fostered a new East Pakistani Muslim elite through state 
patronage during the late sixties. The emerging educated East Pakistani elite was 
also given political office in East Pakistan and to a limited degree in West 
Pakistan. In 1971, 20 Bengali families owned 57% of all industrial investments in 
East Pakistan (Sobhan 1980 cited in Spinatsch 1984 p. 120). With the state playing 
an increasingly prominent role, economic success thus continued to depend on 
external patronage in East Pakistan. In the rural areas, the surplus peasants 
{talukdars/jotdars) cemented their position through the appropriation of political- 
bureaucratic networks, which were coming to determine marketing and input
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provision to an increasing extent. While state patronage was the vehicle through 
which the rural elites maintained their position, dyadic patron-client relationships 
aggregated into factional alliances retained the majority of agricultural producers 
in a dependent position at the end of the extractive chain.
1.2.4 Independence
Bangladesh was left with a legacy of destruction. Immediately after 
independence, international and national agencies and a large number of non­
governmental organisations set up offices in the capital and provided relief. 
Within three years of independence Bangladesh had received more resources 
through relief and aid than in her previous 24 years as East Pakistan (Boyce 
1987). Aid has since become part of Bangladeshi economy and society. Since 
1971, Bangladesh has met only a fraction of her foreign exchange needs through 
export earnings. Aid has strengthened the Bangladeshi state internally (but not 
internationally) and created an array of vested interests in the country. Aid also 
influences the degree and direction of Bangladeshi trade and industrial 
development and has created a class of 1 aid-contract1 importers in Bangladesh, 
whose fortunes rise and fall with donor decisions.
Van Schendel comments on the role of the state in independent 
Bangladesh
Whereas in most peasant  s o c i e t i e s  in recent  times we 
can observe an expansion,  a growing d i s t a n c e  between 
p easan t ry  and s t a t e  and a lengthening chain of 
in te r m e d ia r i e s ,  in Bangladesh the opposi te  i s  t r u e .  The 
s t a t e ,  in co lonia l  t imes almost obscured by layer upon 
laye r  of zamindari l andlords ,  came much c lo s e r  to the 
pe asant ry  in Pakis tan t imes,  and again a f t e r  the 
breaking  away of Bangladesh . . .  The d i s t a n c e  between 
pe asant ry  and s t a t e  decreased,  and the  power of 
dominant v i l l a g e  groups v i s - a - v i s  the  s t a t e  increased .
This process con t r ibu ted  to  the  s t reng then ing  of the 
p o s i t i o n  of these  groups within the peasant ry .
(van Schendel 1981 p . 278)
Through connection to or as part of state bureaucracies at local and
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higher levels, village elites appropriate and use aid and other public resources 
(see Wood 1976; Chisholm 1984; BRAC 1979; 1980). The state and the external 
forces behind it have thus become an integral part of agrarian relations (see also 
McGregor, forthcoming).
Industrial enterprises and banks, which had been owned by West 
Pakistanis to a large extent, were nationalised in 1971. As before, through the 
separation from West Bengal in 1947, the Bangladesh economy was disrupted in 
1971 by the loss of one of its main external market connections, West Pakistan.
Bangladeshi agriculture has witnessed the advent of the ’green 
revolution* since the sixties. In order to achieve the potential improvements in 
agricultural productivity and output, more water and fertiliser, high-yielding 
seeds and new cultivation methods were required. The utilisation of the country’s 
irrigation potential was estimated to treble agricultural yields (Faaland & 
Parkinson 1976). Bangladesh’s first Five Year Plan envisaged the achievement of 
food self-sufficiency by 1977/78 through the use of the new cultivation 
technologies. In 1988, with the country once again the scene of major floods and 
large national and foreign relief operations, Bangladesh is far from this goal.
1.3 The Present
This section introduces some of the current research and debates on 
agrarian relations in Bangladesh in order to set the context for the fieldwork- 
based part of the thesis (III-VII).
Land, labour, draught power, cultivation implements, water, seeds, 
fertilisers and pesticides are cultivation inputs in Bangladesh today. Land, labour 
and capital are the main factors of production The way in which factors of 
production are combined for cultivation determines agricultural output, 
productivity and household-level accumulation patterns.
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1.3.1 Land
The implicit assumption in much of the development literature is that
accumulation mainly derives from agricultural production, and that
Rural development in Bangladesh i s  v i r t u a l l y  synonymous with 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  development.
(I.Ahmed 1981 p .1)
In view of declining per capita land availability, this exclusive focus on 
land and cultivation is questionable. It prevails not only in mainstream 
development literature on Bangladesh (e.g. Jannuzzi & Peach 1980) but also in the 
efforts of some smaller non-governmental organisations to improve the position 
of the poor landless population by trying to provide access to increasingly scarce 
land. It is argued here that as a way of looking beyond land, the income 
generating potential of non-agricultural and agriculture-related production and 
exchange structures has to be examined, in particular for the most disadvantaged 
groups with little chance of access to land. While this thesis concentrates 
predominantly on cultivation, (see Chs III, V and VI), occupational 
diversification issues are taken up in chapter VII
The intensity of land use by farm size is a subject of interminable 
correlation exercises and discussions (Sen, 1962; Barbier 1984). Land productivity 
is often inversely related to farm size (e.g. Dayal & Elliot 1966; Berry & Cline 
1979; for Bangladesh, Hossain 1974; Ahmed 1981). The inverse farm size-land 
productivity relationship has been attributed to greater self-exploitation of 
household labour by smaller cultivators; to higher supervision cost for hired 
labour on larger farms (Boyce 1987); to better quality lands of smaller farms; to 
higher cropping intensities on smaller farms and to the concentration of larger 
landowners on antediluvian extractive uses of surplus rather than on productive 
uses (Patnaik 1979). Others have argued that, with the increasing prominence of 
externally provided inputs, we are witnessing the emergence of a "large but
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efficient kulak class" with higher per acre outputs than smaller landholders 
(Herring in Desai et al 1984; A. Rahman 1986 pp. 141). Theories like Lipton’s 
’survival algorithm* for the small cultivator under conditions of risk support this. 
On the other hand, Ahmed (1981) finds higher productivity of small farms under 
rainfed and irrigated conditions.
This study does not add to the proliferation of such absolute statements 
on the relative efficiency of large and small farms. However, it does outline 
some of the conditions under which large and small cultivators are able to realise 
productivity increases. The case studies of Chapter IV and the survey-based 
material of Chapter V outline the impact of factor market interlinkages on the 
agrarian relationships and agricultural productivity of different household 
categories.
1.3.1.1 Tenancy
A main point of debate is whether sharecropping constitutes an obstacle 
to productivity-enhancing agricultural investment, and whether, and in what way, 
it adjusts to changes in the conditions of production. This and the related question 
of how sharecropping and other forms of land tenancy affect the returns from 
cultivation to different household categories are the main issues which this thesis 
addresses.
In the classical (Smith 1961 ed.) and neo-classical view (Marshall, 1961 
ed.), investment into agriculture is constrained by sharecropping, as tenants will 
only invest when the return of the investment increases their crop share beyond 
the investment cost. It is assumed that the tenant bears the full investment cost. 
The investment constraint is overcome under the so-called ’ideal lease* where 
input costs are shared between landowner and tenant in proportion with their 
output shares (Rao 1967; Zaman 1973). Under irrigated HYV cultivation, the 
appearance of such ideal leases has been observed in Bangladesh (Zaman 1973 for
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Phulpur and Thakurgaon; McGregor forthcoming for Tangail)
Following Cheung (1969), the ’Chicago School’ assumes perfect 
competition and the ’choice to opt out* for landowner and sharecropper. The 
implication is that there are alternative income sources for both. This constitutes 
undue optimism about the employment situation in present-day rural Bangladesh 
(see Clay 1978; Hirashima & Muqtada 1986). Whether, as happens more 
commonly, a rich landowner sharecrops out to a poor tenant, or whether, under a 
less common and more recent form of ’reverse tenancy* (see Vyas 1970; Nadkarni 
1976; Herring 1978; Briscoe 1979, A. Rahman 1986), a poor landowner is forced 
to rent his land to a wealthy cultivator, an asymmetry of alternatives to the 
sharecropping agreement exists between the wealthy and the poor party. 
However, if sharecropping-in is becoming a domain for a wealthier 
’sharecropping elite* (as argued by Rahman 1984), these wealthier tenants will be 
more likely to have alternative income sources to sharecropping. As a 
consequence, tenants* rationale for sharecropping may lie more with the 
cultivation efficiency of the sharecropped land than with the retention of 
sharecropping rights and production ’at any cost* even under the productivity 
constraint which can be imposed by market interlinkages (see Adnan 1984 p. 
147/53). The investment behaviour of these wealthier tenants is thus likely to be 
more efficient than that of poor tenants.
The fieldwork-based section of the thesis (V.1.4 & VI.2), explores how 
the structural function of sharecropping and land renting under irrigated 
conditions can change. While, under rainfed conditions sharecropping combines 
the labour of the poor with the land of the wealthy, under irrigated conditions 
’reverse tenancy* tends to combine the land of the poor with the water of the 
wealthy (see Boyce 1987; Ghose 1979). In these instances, the description of 
sharecropping as
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A s t a t i c  symbiosis between e x p l o i t e r  and exp lo i ted  more or l e s s  
immune to  progress .
(Boserup 1965)
becomes clearly inappropriate.
As agricultural productivity potential increases, sharecropping is thus 
neither inflexible nor homogeneous in contractual form or function. On the one 
hand, sharecropping-in may be used by wealthy cultivator-tenants to increase 
their own cultivation efficiency, as it enables them to achieve increased irrigation 
command areas or land consolidation. On the other hand, sharecropping-out can 
be used by large landowners to take advantage of the productive efficiency of 
small and medium tenants. The flexibility of sharecropping terms (see Jansen 
1983) means that the distribution of cultivation returns between landowner and 
tenant varies with their relative power positions rather than with their formal 
position as landowner or tenant inside the sharecropping relationship. The central 
factor is power, which cannot be deduced from the form a relationship takes
Marxists argue that sharecropping is a transitional form of labour 
appropriation. Byres (1974) holds that an increase in the productive forces and 
thus in the potential to derive profit from capitalist forms of agricultural 
production will lead to the disappearance of sharecropping. Quasem’s findings 
(1987 p.57) of a decline in the numbers of sharecroppers after the introduction 
of STWs appear to confirm this prediction. However, Quasem provides no data on 
the amounts of sharecropped land so that it is possibly that sharecropped land had 
come to be distributed among fewer tenants rather than reduced in amount. 
Chisholm (1984 p.37) also finds a decline in tenancy in some of his case studies 
while Howes (1984 p. 66) finds a rapid fall in the number of households sharing 
out land after the introduction of mechanised irrigation. The transformation of 
sharecropping into fixed, in-kind rent as a corollary of increased productivity 
potential through technological change is found by Rahman (1979) for
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Bangladesh and Ghose (1979) for the Punjab in the context of an overall decline 
in tenancy.
Current research results are thus diverse. Another factor which has been 
linked with sharecropping is cultivation risk. Cultivation risk is a function of 
technical and environmental variables and of political economy factors which
I
affect access to inputs. Environmental, technical and access conditions change 
with the introduction of irrigated HYV cultivation. This alters cultivation risk 
and thus may affect the incidence of sharecropping. While the m ajority would 
argue that increased risk induces risk sharing through sharecropping (e.g. Alam 
1984; see also V. 1.4.3), the view that decreased risk will induce sharecropping 
also exists (Patnaik 1972b) Different access conditions to irrigation water and 
other HYV inputs lead to different levels of cultivation risk. This will affect 
agricultural production structures, patterns of accumulation at household level 
and the roles and meaning of land tenancy.
A change in the role of tenancy implies a change in the interaction of 
tenancy with other agrarian relationships. If the role of tenancy as part of a 
multi-stranded web of extractive patron-client connections is undermined, market 
interlinkages may cease to support extractive forms of appropriation and leave 
room for, or support other, more productivity-oriented forms of appropriation.
Rahman (1984) points out for the Faridpur area of Bangladesh that the 
absence of a land market turned sharecropping into the main mechanism to 
increase the size of operated holdings. Rudra (1978 p.964) states
Tenancy can be a f u l l - f l e d g e d  c a p i t a l i s t  i n s t i t u t i o n  when i t  i s  the  
te n a n t ,  who i s  the dominant p a r t y  and the lessor a small poor 
landowner.
Under Bangladeshi conditions of small, fragmented holdings, 
cooperation between owners of large and medium holdings, who rent land to each 
other, may be emerging. In the process, productivity may become a criterion for
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access to land, and more efficient cultivators may gain access to sharecropping
land. Tenancy relationships may replace land sales or serve to bring about
transfers of land ownership to wealthy tenants. It is clear that
. . .  a t enant  can no longer be s te reo typed  as a vu lne rab le  par tner  
with no bargaining power in r e l a t i o n  to  the  landowner . . .  the 
condi t ions  fo r  t h e i r  ( r ic h  tenants  N.G.) acqui r ing  land a re  very 
d i f f e r e n t  than those for  the poorer owner*cum-tenant c u l t i v a t o r s .
(Rahman 1984 p . 181)
Ray (1978) distinguishes between two forms of tenancy: ’entrepreneur 
renting* by wealthy tenants, especially when essential cultivation inputs such as 
water are inaccessible to the small landowner, and the more common small 
tenant/large landlord relationship.
This study investigates how tenancy can change with irrigated
cultivation. It presents a differentiated view of the dynamics of its possible
adaptations and transformations through productivity increases and in the process 
of technological change. It is shown that change does not necessarily mean the 
displacement of non-capitalist relations, but it may mean that their
complementarity with emerging capitalist relations has been argued by Rudra 
(1978 p.999) who talks of "a hybrid class" when the same individuals benefit 
simultaneously from capitalist and feudal relations (see also Bernstein 1979).
The findings of this research indicate an ongoing diversification of the 
meaning and form of agrarian relationships under which the wealthy take
advantage of both ’old* extractive and ’new* productivity-enhancing expansive 
modes of appropriation in production and exchange relationships in different 
parts of the annual crop cycle and outside cultivation. This implies a 
diversification in forms and functions, rather than the outright displacement, of 
traditional extractive agrarian relations such as usurious moneylending and 
mortgaging and ’traditional* sharecropping (see V. 1.4.1).
- 27 -
1.3.1.2 Mortgaging
Mortgaging in Bangladesh has been associated with a number of
functions in the agrarian structure of different regions. Under the girbi mortgage 
system in Mymensingh (Arn 1978, Wood 1981), rich households mortgage out 
land to poorer households in order to buy more and better land. Here the 
mortgage functions as an informal ’banking system* for richer households and 
achieves a redistribution of the more fertile land towards the wealthier classes 
(Arn 1978 p. 11). Which household classes raise money through mortgaging and 
the uses to which they put the money, constitute important determinants of the 
direction of agrarian change.
In Comilla and in Dhaka district land is mortgaged in bondhok from 
poor to rich households. There, the mortgage tends to precede the transfer of 
ownership of the mortgaged land as the poor mortgagor’s debts accumulate (see 
Wood’s Bondokgram 1978; Jahangir’s two villages 1981). In contrast to the girbi 
system of Mymensingh, here the terms of the bondhok mortgage (compound 
interest and full repayment of the loan while the land is cultivated by the
mortgagee) are themselves the mechanism which achieves the eventual transfer of 
land ownership to the mortgagee.
In other contexts mortgaging is better described as a ’rental system for 
agricultural land’ (Jansen’s khai-khalashi 1983 p. 129; Rahman’s shon korali 
1984 p. 165).
The flexibility of definitional boundaries for agrarian relations is shown
by Rahman who writes
Khaikalashi  . . .  i s  more of a mortgage than a t e n a n c y . . .  the  tenant  
pays ren t  to  the landowner in advance and enjoys r i g h t s  of 
c u l t i v a t i o n  on the land for  a spec i f ie d  number of years a f t e r  which 
the land has to be returned to i t s  owner.
(A. Rahman 1986 p. 153)
Van Schendel (1981 p.330) remarks on a village in Rangpur
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I t  would appear th a t  mortgage not  leading to s a l e  i s  a mechanism of 
f a r  g r ea t e r  weight than i s  u s u a l l y  r e a l i s e d .  Our data on Goborgari 
show tha t  land i s  sometimes kept in mortgage for  a genera t ion  or 
longer without lega l t r a n s f e r .
When mortgaging functions thus as ’a hidden form of tenancy*, its
effect on the structure and productivity of cultivation needs to be examined.
Under the khaikalashi and short korali forms of land mortgaging, a sum of money
is received by the mortgagor in exchange for which the mortgagee cultivates a
plot of land for a specified number of years. For each year of cultivation the
sum of the principal loan is reduced so that after a period of time (5-10 years in
Jansen’s Bhaimara in Dhaka district; 1 -5 years in Rahman’s Isharpur in Faridpur,
10-20 years in Samitigram; see V.1.5) the land reverts to its owner without any
cash repayments. Jansen comments on the khaikalashi mortgage
All poor people p r e f e r  t h i s  type of loan as they are c e r t a i n  to  get 
t h e i r  land re turned .  However, in  Bhaimara and the neighbouring 
v i l l a g e s  t h i s  type of mortgage was not common. This type of mortgage 
cont r ac t  seemed to occur in c ircumstances when well - to -do  people 
needed to help each o the r  with a loan for  a p a r t i c u l a r  pu rp o se . . .
(Jansen 1983 p. 130)
Howes (1985 p.64/5) finds a change from a less exploitative form of 
mortgage (like khaikalashi) to a more exploitative form (like bondhok) and an 
increase in the importance of the percentage of land transfers resulting from 
mortgage in the Islampur area during the seventies. A. Rahman (1986) finds a 
decline in the incidence of mortgaging with increased availability of modern 
inputs.
It is clear then that extractive usury as the main function of mortgaging 
relations is a regional, and possibly period-specific feature of changing agrarian 
structures. Under new production conditions, as with the introduction of 
mechanised irrigation, it has to be re-examined. The achievement of access to 
land through a mortgage under high-productivity conditions has different 
productivity and distributional implications than under low productivity
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conditions where usurious extraction remains the main income generation 
mechanism for a mortgagee. This thesis examines some of the roles land 
mortgages play in one area of Bangladesh as productivity and cultivation income 
increases through mechanised irrigation.
1.3.2 Credit and Usury
A recent literature survey (Hussein 1983) concluded that more than 60% 
of all rural loans in Bangladesh come from non-institutional sources. Although 
’friends and relations’ were the most important source of informal credit, 63% 
and 75% respectively of informal loans and loan contracts had some form of 
interest attached. Interest was highest (200%-400%) among moneylenders, 
shopkeepers and marketing intermediaries. Although these results "discard the 
stereotype that all informal credit is usurious" and show that "the market is 
basically dichotomous, having commercial and non-commercial sectors" (Gill in 
Hussein p. iv), they also underline the continued existence of usury. This thesis is 
concerned with credit as a production input and thus does not focus on non­
commercial (no-interest) informal lending which is "a form of social security and 
not investment-oriented" (loc. cit).
Usurious lending became a main mechanism of extraction from 
agricultural producers in the British period and made rural producers dependent 
on wider markets (see 1.2). Informal rural debt relations have been firmly 
connected with patron-client structures in much of the literature. Breman points 
out that for 19th century India
. . . t h e  master  d id  not want the debt repa id .  He d id  no t  make a loan 
to  p re ss  f o r  payment afterwards,  but r a th e r  to  be ab l e  subsequently 
to  a s s e r t  himse lf  as a p a t r o n . . .  Nor did the  ' h a l i '  work to  pay off  
h i s  d e b t . . .  fo r  to  be an unattached labourer  was the  l a s t  thing he 
wanted.
(Breman 1974 p . 59/60)
The intrinsic logic of usury within a patron-client relation is seen as
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equally valid today by studies which stress the extractive and productivity- 
inhibiting function of usurious credit (Bhaduri 1973; BRAC 1980). It is argued 
that rural moneylending diverts funds from investment and thus depresses 
agricultural productivity and output. As debtors remain in a poverty-and- 
dependence trap with recurrent consumption loans which are linked to labour and 
especially tenancy markets (see Bhaduri 1973), their chances of disengaging from 
dependence and retaining the production surplus is small. This, in turn reduces 
opportunity and incentive for debtors and lenders to increase productivity. It has 
been claimed that rural informal lenders refuse productive lending in order to 
safeguard their income from usurious lending (Bhaduri 1973). Myrdal (1968 
p. 1042) branded the rural moneylender as ’the enemy of the village economy*. 
Ray and Ray (1973) argue that ’peasant-cum-moneylenders* will improve 
agricultural productivity only if increases in income outweigh loss of interest 
from moneylending.
On the other hand, A. Rahman (1979a p.4) rightly states that if 
creditors have sufficient power to impede innovation they ought also to have the 
capacity to extract the extra surplus generated through innovation. Examples of 
informal lending for productive purposes exist in Bangladesh. A. Rahman (1979) 
reports informal loans from landlords to tenants for productive purposes at lower 
interest rates than for consumption loans. Jansen (1983) records the practice of 
informal lending for productive or business purposes in return for a share of the 
profits.
T. Rahman (1984 p. 194) finds the disintegration of credit ties between
large landowners and their poor tenants in a Faridpur village during the
seventies. She states
I t  would not be t r u e  to  say th a t  l andlords  use usury to e x t r a c t  the  
surp lus* labour  of t h e i r  t enan ts .
( i b i d  p . 194)
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In line with this, A. Rahman (1979) finds that in Comilla and Phulpur 
districts landlord/moneylenders derived 20-28% of their total income from land 
rent and only 4-5% from interest. He concludes that
. . .  the  surp lus  product  i s  p r im ar i ly  appropr iated through land rent  
and usury as a mode of surp lus  appropr ia t ion  i s  redundant.
This is an interesting inversion of Bose’s finding (1986, see also 1.2) 
that interest replaced land revenue as the main mechanism of surplus extraction 
during the British period.
In the last 15 to 20 years, two main factors may have channelled funds 
out of usurious moneylending into agricultural production in Bangladesh. The 
first is the emergence of formal credit. During the 1970s, the formal credit 
system in Bangladesh predominantly financed the public sector and trade (to 50% 
and 25% of total advances respectively; World Bank 1987) while the agricultural 
and industrial sector remained marginal in the allocation of formal credit. In the 
late 70s and early 80s agricultural credit (crop and minor investment loans) 
became a main policy instrument for agricultural growth. Thus credit outstanding 
to agriculture as a percentage of sectoral GDP increased from 2% in FY 1978 to 
11% in FY 1987.
Section Y.2 of the thesis looks at the role of formal credit in irrigated 
agriculture, the interaction of formal and informal rural credit types with social 
and household structures and at credit-related accumulation patterns by different 
household categories.
The second factor which may have channelled funds from usurious 
lending into agricultural production is that returns to agricultural investment and 
returns to usurious moneylending have moved closer together. A. Rahman (1979 
& 1979a) finds that although returns to high-interest moneylending still exceed 
those to agriculture, the gap has narrowed.
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It is argued in this thesis that due to an increase in formal credit and 
investment outlets in agriculture and trade there has been a displacement of debt 
relations and usury as mechanisms of surplus extraction in the cultivation sector. 
The productivity increases in irrigated HYY cultivation combined with the 
increased availability of labour make the use of land rent as a means of surplus 
extraction in contemporary Bangladesh a structurally and functionally different 
instrument than it was in colonial times of relative labour scarcity. With current 
pressures on land, extractive practices in the cultivation sector fail to provide 
increasing returns unless productivity is increased. Whether as direct operators or 
as non-operating appropriators of agricultural surplus, those able to exert control 
in the agrarian political economy are becoming structurally compelled to increase 
productivity and to employ agrarian structural elements such as sharecropping, 
land mortgaging, labour relations and credit for this purpose.
In this context, credit has been described as being "used to strengthen 
other markets" (Rahman 1979a) rather than constituting the predominant 
mechanism of appropriation. This would mean a fundamental change from the 
functions of credit in the colonial period. The question is taken up in Chapter 
V.2.
Irrigation offers itself for a test of these questions. If usury continues 
as a main extractive mechanism, investment into irrigation equipment and 
irrigated cultivation can be expected to be impeded by usurious practices. This 
study examines to what extent irrigation is in the process of becoming integrated 
into exploitative social relations of production in interlinked markets and to what 
extent, and under which conditions, it is opening the way for a more 




Siddiqui (1982) calculates that the daily wage equivalent in rural 
Bangladesh fell from 2.60 lbs in 1951 to 1.80 lbs of rice in 1977. Rahman (1986) 
finds this reduced to 1.60 lbs in the early eighties. The World Bank (1987 p. 131) 
finds that agricultural wages in 1982 were only 89% of their 1974 valuedespite a 
higher real per capita GDP. There were 4 million more poor and 13 million 
more ’hard core poor* in 1982 than in 1974. Since 1982, this trend is reported to 
have reversed with an increase in real agricultural wages by 20% in the 1974-86 
period - at least for those in full-tim e employment (see Wood et al forthcoming) 
- along with inflows of credit and off-seasonal Food for Work-type construction 
programmes (World Bank 1987 p. 131). Recent research indicates that the wage 
level in villages with a higher level of agricultural technology has stabilised 
(Rahman 1986 p. 185).
It has been disputed that the concept of ’labour market’ is appropriate to 
the rural situation on the subcontinent. Rudra (1984) argues that labour relations 
occur inside a ’self-contained village society’ in which, in a situation of ’unequal 
dependence’ neither labourers nor employers engage in the labour-wage 
relationship with full freedom of exchange. In Rudra’s study of 39 villages in 
West Bengal, a uniform intra-village wage rate uninfluenced by any interaction 
between villages emerges as a result of village-specific power balances between 
labourers and employers and as a result of ’extra-economic constraints’ for 
labourers and employers in their labour relations.
In some respects, Rudra’s ’unequal dependence’ between labourers and 
employers shows parallels to the concepts of the patron-client relationship (for 
Bangladesh see Arens and van Beurden 1977; Wood 1981; Jansen 1983, 1987) and 
to the concept of interlinked markets (Bharadwaj 1974; Adnan 1984). In contrast 
to Rudra, Jansen does find intra-village differences in wages around a ’reference
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wage rate*, which are related to quality of labour and supply and demand
conditions. In this thesis I distinguish labour market segments which are
integrated into the agrarian structure and linked to other markets in different
ways and to different degrees, and which are undergoing different types of
change with the introduction of STWs.
In the context of increasing HYV cultivation, the labour relationship
may cease to constitute an integral part of a wider patron-client relationship.
Rahman (1984) outlines the elimination of employment security for tied labourers
in a Faridpur village with the emergence of *boy labourer teams* for HYV boro
paddy transplantation. Dasgupta observes for West Bengal in the context of
irrigated HYV cultivation
even the  smal le r  farmers a re  being forced to supplement family 
labour with h i red  labour in some seasons and for  some opera t ions  . . .  
those  employing a g r i c u l t u r a l  l abourers  are not n e c e s s a r i ly  the large 
f a rmers . "
(Dasgupta 1984 p. A143)
In either case, employment ceases to be part of a multi-stranded 
patron-client relationship. Dasgupta argues that with increasing numbers of 
labourers the patron-client relationship disintegrates as employers no longer need 
to maintain special relations to secure labour. This has also been argued for 
Bangladesh by Jansen (1983; 1986). It may also be the case that, with a decrease 
in risks to economic survival and in the level of deprivation in some contexts of 
economic growth, dyadic patron-client relations, with their undeniable element 
of subservience, are less readily entered by the poor.
Another influence on local labour relations are migrant workers. Wood’s 
study in Comilla (1978a; see also Boer 1981) finds that the richer peasant who 
hires labour does so mostly on a non-permanent basis and prefers to hire migrant 
labourers. Dasgupta claims that
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. . .  migrants a re  not p rope r ly  in te gra t ed  in to  the  local  r u r a l  market 
. . .  t h i s  makes t h i s  body of workers r e l a t i v e l y  more d o c i l e  and 
compliant ,  although not n e c e s s a r i l y  cheaper 
(Dasgupta 1984 A145)
Thus larger employers may gain flexibility in their adjustment to local 
supply and demand conditions and to seasonal peaks in labour demand 
through migrant labour while containing the effects on local labour 
relations and wage levels.
Here I am concerned with changes in labour markets and labour 
relations with irrigated cultivation. In order to address irrigation- 
related growth and distribution issues as well as questions concerned 
with organisation and power at the micro-level, the labour market of the 
main research village is presented as a complex and differentiating 
structure of submarkets in section V.3. An analysis of the rationale and 
the constraints under which workers and employers engage in the labour 
relationship traces the room for manoeuvre gained by d ifferent labour 
market participants through recent changes in agricultural production 
techniques and productivity.
It is shown in the fieldwork-based part of the thesis how a 
shift of extractive market interlinkages out of parts of the agricultural 
production process has moderated wage-reducing pressures in those 
sectors. That this does not necessarily mean the disappearance of 
extractive market interlinkages but can mean their reappearance in a 
different, more productivity-focussed form, is one of the findings of this 
research. It leads to a questioning of uniform interpretations of patron- 




Irrigation has been singled out as ’the leading input’ for the 
agricultural performance of rice economies (Ishikawa 1967) and for 
Bangladesh in particular (Boyce 1987). Over the last decade, the expansion 
of minor irrigation has accounted for over 60% of crop production growth 
in Bangladesh (World Bank 1987 p.55).
It is not shortage but control of water which constitutes the 
main problem fo r agricultural production in Bangladesh. Seasonal floods 
are as much a problem for agriculture as are seasonal water shortages. 
Rivers, tanks and underground aquifers carry sufficient water for 
agriculture (see Boyce 1987 p. 162).
Widespread irrigation is a recent phenomenon in Bangladesh. In 
1942 only three districts (Mymensingh, Chittagong and Rajshahi) are 
recorded as having any irrigation at all and nowhere did irrigated area 
exceed 4% of gross cropped area (Gol 1949 in Boyce 1987 p. 166). From the 
1960s onwards Pakistan implemented some large scale irrigation, drainage 
and flood control and minor irrigation projects so that by 1973, 11.1% of 
the net cropped area was irrigated (Howes 1985 p.5). In 1985 22% of the 
cultivated area in Bangladesh was reported under irrigation and the Third 
Five Year Plan envisages an expansion of irrigated area by 1.5 Mio ha of 
land or 17% of cultivated land (World Bank 1987 p.54).
Table 1.1 illustrates two main points. Firstly, that yields and 
employment creation through irrigated HYV crops are significantly higher 
than through rainfed local variety crops. Secondly, that the effects of 
irrigation are connected to those of other HYV inputs (fertiliser, seeds, 
pesticides).
This research is concerned with the structural and developmental
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effects of this growth of agricultural productivity with special reference 
to the role of shallow tubewell (STW) irrigation (for the attributability 
issue see also II & VII).
Under resource constraints, there is a technical limit to the
intensity of exploitation compatible with the reproduction of exploiter
and exploited. With productivity increases, such as through irrigated HYV
cultivation, this technical limit shifts. What happens to development
under these circumstances is under debate. In the tradition of neo-
Malthusian pessimism Arthur and McNicholl (1978) argue that population
growth will increase and use up the ’slacks* created by productivity and
output increases. In contrast, Edwards et al (1978) envisage that


















































Source:  Hahabub Hossain September 1986 Reproduced in World Bank 1987 p . 55
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population growth will fall. Different patterns of distribution of the 
increased productive surplus are likely to be associated with different 
outcomes.
Irrigation-related increases in productivity and output could 
lead to an intensification of exploitative agrarian relations inside which 
the new resource, irrigation technology, enforces established power bases 
(see Jansen’s waterlords 1979; Bhuiyan 1984; Chisholm 1984). On the other 
hand, new methods of and attitudes towards production may be appearing 
in the context of technological change which create various degrees of 
room for manoeuvre for different household classes. This thesis shows 
that there is no uniform technology-determined ’path* of development. 
Rather, there are a number of alternatives. The choice between these is 
affected by environmental, socio-economic, political, and in the final 
analysis, personality factors
1.4.1 Technological Choices
A range of irrigation technologies exists in Bangladesh. Sources 
of irrigation water are distinguished by age and technology level 
(modern/traditional), by scale (major/minor), by origin of water supply 
(surf ace/ground water), or by source of power (manual/mechanised). The STW 
is a mechanised minor irrigation technology, which uses a centrifugal 
suction pump and can lift water from aquifers of up to 140 feet to a 
command area of around 20 acres. Other minor irrigation technologies are 
the deep tubewell (DTW), which pumps water by submersible turbine pump 
from  deeper aquifers (up to 200 feet) to a command area of about 60 
acres, the low -lift pump (LLP), which uses a suction pump to lift water 
from  surface sources, and various versions of the manually operated 
shallow tubewell (MOSTI), which usually tap aquifers to a depth of 20-30
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feet to a command area of less than an acre
No single irrigation technology can be described as ’most 
appropriate’ for Bangladesh. The availability of surface water and the 
level of aquifers in any particular location impose technical constraints 
on technology choice. With decreasing availability of surface water (see
Thomas in Timmer et al 1975), the importance of groundwater irrigation in 
Bangladesh has increased over the last two decades so that future
irrigation potential is mainly confined to groundwater sources.
However, Bottrall (1983) remarks that the sequence of 
technological development in Bangladesh has been the reverse of what 
could be expected from the country’s high labour and low capital
endowment. With increasing scale, capital intensity and technological
complexity, irrigation technologies have attracted greater financial 
support from donors and government agencies (see also Thomas 1975; 
Edwards et al 1978; Howes 1985; Biggs & Griffiths 1987). Among 
groundwater irrigation technologies the DTW first attracted support in 
the 60s and 70s, with up to 98% subsidies, followed by a greater emphasis 
on STWs in the early 80s. On the other hand, the MOSTI has only been the
subject of greater official attention over the last few years but has not
had a large impact on total irrigated area (see Howes 1985 p.9). Subsidies
have increased with the scale and technological complexity of the
technology and tend to be appropriated by rural elites.
In a comparison of groundwater technologies for Bangladesh 
Hannah (1978) finds that, at current prices, the STW is the cheapest
irrigation method. However, by assuming that the MOSTI is operated by 
household labour at a shadow price of zero, Hannah eventually presents 
the MOSTI as the most appropriate technology. In a somewhat more
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realistic approach, Small (1983) costs labour at the price of the
additional food consumption of otherwise unpaid household labour and
finds the MOSTI at 39.5 Tk/acre cheaper than the DTW (43.6 Tk/acre) but 
more expensive than the STW (28.8 Tk per acre). Biggs and Griffiths 
(1987) find that with labour costed at the market rate of TK 10/day, the 
total running cost of the MOSTI is over two and one-half times the
running cost of the STW. Applying equal market rates to hired, tenant and
household labour, Howes (1985 p. 107) finds that poorer households
appropriate a significantly higher share of total value from MOSTIs than 
from  DTWs. However, Howes* assumption that non-marketed labour is able to 
appropriate the equivalent of the market wage ignores the structural
undervaluation of household labour upon which the perceived advantage of 
the MOSTI relies Two of the central causes of deprivation among the 
landless in rural Bangladesh, high rice prices and low wages, are thus 
essential for the economic viability of the MOSTI (see Hannah 1976 pp. 
443-44).
The MOSTI relies on the maintenance or intensification of labour 
exploitation. At the present stage of technological development, it is
only a more economic proposal than the STW if labour receives subsistence 
or below subsistence returns. A concentration on the MOSTI in the
irrigation sector thus runs the danger of relying on the reproduction of 
poverty. Johnson (1985) finds 30 pumping hours per acre for DTWs, 90 for 
STWs and 1800 for HTWs. Labourers, the supposed main beneficiaries of 
MOSTIs, bear the burden of this backbreaking work without remuneration 
even at the market rate (see also Mandal 1978; Quasem 1987 p.3).
However, as a result of future research, positive features of the 
MOSTI with respect to poverty elimination, such as greater access to
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irrigation water for poorer cultivators, increase of land available under 
tenancy and higher yields per acre (in comparison with DTW; see Howes 
1985) may in the future be combined with a less ’labour-mining’ type of
technology. Various vested interests in high-cost, high-technology 
equipment impede this (see Biggs & Griffiths 1987 & 1.4.2). At present the 
MOSTI provides access to irrigation water in particular for poorer 
cultivators. This is important since water may not be available to them
from any other source. Bhuiyan (1984) reports that in Tangail, Tamapur 
and Bogra MOSTIs went out of operation as farmers experienced problems 
with the cost and availability of labour or, more importantly here, 
because access to a STW was gained.
An alternative approach to poverty elimination might adjust the 
capital intensity o f mechanised irrigation technologies on the one hand 
and increase the degree of control of disadvantaged rural groups over new 
productive resources on the other. There is a choice of material to
produce different tubewell components such as filters and strainers. More 
labour-intensive methods can be used to produce and install mechanised
irrigation technologies. The targeted allocation of ownership and control 
of new technologies such as STWs can direct some of the new productive 
surplus to groups of land/assetless (see Wood 1984; Wood, Palmer-Jones & 
Ahmed, forthcoming). The work of several NGOs (e.g. Proshika, BRAC) in 
Bangladesh is based on the expectation that control of new agricultural 
assets by poorer classes will decrease the rigidity of land-based 
agrarian power structures
1.4.2 The Shallow Tubewell
STWs irrigate about 16% of the total irrigated land in 
Bangladesh. In many ways the STW is an ’intermediate irrigation
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technology*. Its scale of operation, use of capital and labour and 
necessary degree of organisation of irrigators per irrigation unit places 
it between the DTW and the MOSTI among groundwater irrigation
technologies (see Haque 1975; Hamid 1982; Bhuiyan 1984; Howes 1985). It 
is also in the intermediate position in terms of sinking costs and 
operation and maintenance costs. However, Edwards et al (1978) report 
that despite consistently higher rates of return to low-technology models, 
a three-week World Bank appraisal mission in 1971 chose a high-technology 
STW from a range of available options as the basic model for forthcoming 
programmes in Bangladesh. This acted as a lead to other agencies so that 
contemporary models of STWs in Bangladesh adhere to the high-technology 
choice.
On these and other grounds, the STW may well be regarded ’an 
elite technology’ in Bangladesh. In contrast to DTWs which operate - at 
least nominally - for cooperatives, and to MOSTIs which are predominantly 
individually owned by poorer cultivators, STWs tend to be individually 
owned and used by wealthier cultivators. One study (Bhuiyan 1984; see 
also Howes 1985) found that STW irrigators own nearly twice as much land 
as LLP and DTW irrigators. Another, (Quasem 1987 p.52) reports higher 
levels of access of large farms to STWs. These last two findings are 
confirmed in the seven villages (see Ch VI) by this research.
It is important to note that elite control and ownership is not a 
characteristic inherent in STW technology. The STW offers itself to 
individual and group use. Bhuiyan comments
The STWs repre sen t  a sca le  th a t  b e f i t s  the  needs of individua l l arge
farmers or groups of small farmers tapping the shallow
groundwater . . .  The ex is tenc e  of a coopera t ive  environment i s  an 
economic n e c e s s i t y  fo r  investment in a STU by a farmer group.
(Bhuiyan 1984)
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In the main research village, Samitigram, this study finds
irrigation groups with positive implications for productivity and poverty
eradication (see III.5). Contrasting disadvantages for the poorer
population are found in the seven villages where STWs are owned and used 
on an individual basis. This divergent development effect is not a feature
of the technology as such, but results from a combination of ecological,
political economy and personality factors.
The development effect of alternative organisational solutions 
fo r the ownership, control and use of STWs is a major theme of the 
research. Rather than compare two or more irrigation technologies (as for 
example Howes 1985; Bhuiyan 1984), I concentrate on a single technology 
and examine its implications in different socio-political and physical 
conditions. This approach introduces a deliberate bias against the
assumption that patterns of change are ’technology inherent*.
In line with its intermediate position among groundwater
irrigation technologies, the ownership of STWs occurs under individual,
cooperative and corporate forms, while that of the DTW is mainly 
cooperative and that of the MOSTI mainly individual. However, the form of 
asset ownership does not allow direct conclusions about patterns of
technology use and control. The legal existence of a cooperative or a
water users’ association gives little indication of the actual use made of
irrigation equipment or the resultant patterns of resource accumulation
to different classes. These issues need to be examined in the context of 
the agrarian structure and political economy as a whole. Unless phenomena 
like Jansen’s "waterlords" (1979) are explained in the context of 
structures of political and economic control, they lead to technology-
centred arguments. It is proposed here that, beyond environmental and
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technical variables, historical, structural and personality factors
influence the development effect of a productivity-enhancing technological 
innovation. By concentrating on one irrigation technology, the focus on 
the influence of factors other than technology on patterns of agrarian 
change can be sharpened.
1.4.3 The Institutional Framework
A range of public and private, national and international
institutions are involved in the minor irrigation sector in Bangladesh. 
Only the main institutional actors are introduced here to set the context 
for this study and also to outline some of the contradictions between the 
interests of actors at the various levels of the irrigation supply and 
service networks and the needs of those "at the end of the line" who 
cultivate and irrigate the fields.
Irrigation is part of Bangladesh’s Five Year Plans (FYP) and
various shorter term plans which are formulated by the National Planning 
Commission of the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Irrigation-related
policy development takes place in three main ministries:
1) The Ministry of Agriculture (MOA).
2) The Ministry of Local Government Rural Development and Cooperatives 
(MLGRD).
3) The Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control 
(MIWDFC).
Several agencies of varying degrees of autonomy within these ministries
have executive functions in the irrigation sector.
The Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC) is 
semi-autonomous within the MOA. It is the largest and most important
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agency in the minor irrigation sector in Bangladesh.
BADC’s irrigation portfolio consists of supply and maintenance of 
pumps and engines, spare parts, fuel and lubricants. With 90% of DTWs and 
LLPs and 50% of STWs, BADC was the main procurer of minor irrigation 
equipment in Bangladesh until the early eighties. It also provided almost 
all maintenance services. BADCs internal structure extended over 4 
administrative levels down to the upazila with separate divisions for 
DTWs, STWs and LLPs. Of BADCs 26,000 employees 14,000 worked in 
irrigation-related fields in 1982 (GOB/World Bank 1982).
As a result of privatisation throughout the eighties, BADCs 
portfolio in the agricultural sector has been drastically reduced. The 
number of BADC employees in irrigation is reported to have fallen to 
12.000 (Lewis 1987) as procurement and maintenance of irrigation 
equipment has been transferred to the private sector. In practice, the 
dismantling of the BADC appears partial and slow, and BADC and the 
private commercial import and service sector tend to coexist with an 
uneasy overlap of functions.
For the period 1985 to 1990, the BADC will be involved in a 
number of major bilateral and multilateral government-funded irrigation 
projects with the IDA, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the EEC, the ODA 
(U.K.) and ADAB (Australia).
The Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) is part of MIWDFC. 
Its main functions are in flood control, drainage and large-scale 
irrigation but some minor irrigation projects have also been undertaken. 
These were supported by different donors and clashed in approach with 
those of the BADC. BWDB also collects, analyses and disseminates surface 
water data for the country. BWDB has two engineering wings, an extension
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wing and a cooperative wing to service its own projects.
The Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) is a semi- 
autonomous body within the MLGRDC. Its activities are based on the 
Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) which originated at the 
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) at Comilla in the 60s and 
was adopted as a national programme in 1971. By 1982 the IRDP covered 
260 of Bangladesh’s 450 thanas (now upazilas). BRDB has offices in Dhaka 
and at district and upazila level.
The IRDP (BRDB) approach consists of three basic elements:
1) A structure of primary village cooperatives (KSS for cultivators; MSS 
fo r women and BSS for landless) federated into Upazila Central 
Cooperatives (UCCAs). Agricultural input, service and credit provision and 
organisational assistance are the UCCA’s main tasks.
2) Upazila Training and Development Centres (UTDC) to coordinate all the 
agencies involved in the programme and act as focal instruction points 
fo r ’model farmers* from KSS groups.
3) An Upazila Irrigation Programme (UIP) to increase the uptake of 
modern irrigation methods, ensure the efficient use of equipment and to 
provide group and scheme management training.
BRDB assumes the organisational (non-technical) functions in 
BADC’s irrigation projects. The formation of farmers’ groups (KSS) is the 
core of these activities. Since 1983 BRDB has focussed on irrigation in 
particular through the Word Bank funded RDII programme, through its new 
Irrigation Management Cell and through the Irrigation Management 
Programme (IMP) which aims at increasing the efficiency of existing 
irrigation facilities. Other donors to BRDB are ADB, DANIDA and the IDA.
The Directorate of Agricultural Extension (DAE) is also part of
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the MOA. Since 1978 a ’train and visit* (T&V) scheme has operated in which 
individual farm  households are visited by extension workers on a 
fortnightly basis. DAE is the only public agency which employs staff below 
the upazila  level. Irrigation extension and data collection are part of 
DAE’s portfolio.
The Water Master Plan Organisation (MPO) is administratively 
under the MIWDFC. MPO was set up to work out a multi-sectoral national 
water plan (NWP) in order to facilitate coordinated national water 
resource strategies.
Several banks operate irrigation-related credit programmes. 
Bangladesh’s central bank, the Bangladesh Bank (BB) has financed STWs 
under its rural credit programme (BB-RCP) since 1981. In its first two 
years of operation the BB-RCP financed one third of the total STW sales 
in Bangladesh. This amounts to 200% and 70% of the sales of the much 
older programmes of the BKB and BADC.
The Bangladesh Krishi Bank (BKB) provides STW equipment and 
credit. By 1982 BKB had supplied half of the recorded installed STW 
capacity in Bangladesh (GOB/World Bank 1982). BKB functions through 18 
regional offices and about 415 branches. Despite the official 
privatisation policy, BKB opened an irrigation wing in the early eighties 
to ensure repair and maintenance of BKB financed equipment. The 
installation of BKB financed equipment takes place through private 
contractors.
STW technology is mainly imported into Bangladesh. In 1986 there 
was only one producer (Deutz) and two assemblers (Mitsubishi & Kirloskar) 
fo r STWs in the country. Private supply and service networks have thus 
formed around the import of STWs. These networks stretch from production
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sites and administrative centres in foreign industrialised nations (Japan,
West Germany, Korea, India) across a number of intermediary trade and
administration levels in Bangladesh to the end user in the village. A
variety of national and foreign interests thus affect the product which 
arrives at village level and the conditions attached to its delivery.
The privatisation of STW supply and services has intensified
marketing and distribution efforts by commercial suppliers who obtain 
STWs from Dhaka-based importers. Marketing strategies vary between 
brands and by region but, in contrast to the public agencies, commercial
suppliers tend to establish direct communication with the cultivator
through, for example, fieldmen who tour the villages on bicycles, or local 
mechanics who receive commission from town-based traders (see Lewis 1987 
P.22).
In the wake of privatisation, the public sector has been weakened 
and a local level private sector now constitutes the final link to the 
cultivator. In Bangladesh, this has not brought the development of self-
sustaining marketing structures in the private sector. The STW importers
in the capital and their branches or contractors in districts and upazilas 
depend on government and foreign donors who determine both the technical 
content and the location of irrigation programmes. Under privatisation, 
STW importers are allocated regional quotas and import licenses to import 
equipment for the large foreign-funded irrigation projects. The 
discontinuation of an aid programme means the demise of the associated 
private sector supplier. A dispute between a donor or foreign company and 
the Bangladeshi authorities means that internal private sector supply and 
service structures fall into decline. This will be further explored in 
section VII. 3.
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In their European headquarters, the director for South Asia of
one of the leading STW brands in Bangladesh explained to me
For us Bangladesh Is only a n e g l i g i b l e  p a r t  of the world market.  Ue 
moved in to  STU imports and in*country product ion in the  context  of 
our g loba l  marketing s t r a t e g i e s .  Engine production  in Bangladesh may 
serve  as a springboard in t o  o th er  markets or  o ther  count r i es  in the 
a r e a .  Ue a re  cu r r e n t l y  employing a team of in t e rn a t i o n a l  exper t s  to 
improve our marketing s t r a t e g i e s  in  the a r e a .
In te rv iew,  January 1987
A further manifestation of foreign interests has been identified
by Lewis who discusses a "spare parts mentality" which
. . .  led the  BADC to become one of the  la rges t  consumers of
i r r i g a t i o n  spare  p a r t s  in the  world,  in  s p i t e  of the fac t  th a t  only
about 30X of the  land of Bangladesh i s  i r r i g a t e d .  Some of the  
engines suppl ied  by the BADC, such as Yanmar are comparatively cheap 
to  buy but very expensive to  main ta in ,  s i nce  the t o t a l  spares for  an 
engine might cos t  as much as 20 t imes i t s  o r ig in a l  co s t .  Because the 
te nd er s  fo r  spare  pa r t s  do not have to  go through the Minist ry,  the  
way the  engine purchases have t o ,  the  i s sue  of the p r i ce  of spare
p a r t s  i s  not given adequate a t t e n t i o n . . .
(Lewis 1987)
Some of the leading foreign suppliers of tubewell engines to 
Bangladesh have their own training colleges for mechanics. Phenomena like
the "spare parts mentality” may thus be implanted and maintained easily.
Clearly, the involvement of foreign donors and foreign capital creates
constraints for national STW supply, service and marketing development,
and more importantly here, for the end users* capacity to exploit
irrigation potentials fully. Recent privatisation efforts have resulted in 
a more direct dependence of the Bangladeshi private sector on foreign 
capital, and in a weakening of the Bangladeshi state, but not in the
development of self-sustaining STW supply structures. However, despite
the apparent failure to develop viable national production or marketing 
structures for STWs, it is argued that there is a range of STW-related
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activities, such as village mechanic, spare parts producer and equipment 
trader (see VII.3) which provide some scope for development.
NOTES
1) This recognises  the  non-materia l  aspec ts  of development and th e  connect ions between 
growth, environmental de pr iv a t i o n  and poverty ( see Re dc l i f t  1984; 1987; Bla ik ie  1986; 
Brundt landt  1987).
2) Household c a t e g o r i e s  in t h i s  s tudy are d i s t i nguis hed  by n ine  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  ( see 
Table IV.1 t  I I . 4 . 3 ) .
3) On models of c a p i t a l i s t ,  feuda l ,  semi-feudal ,  c o lo n ia l ,  A s i a t i c  and peasant  mode of 
product ion  see Pa tna ik  1972 a & b; Bhaduri 1973 & 1983; Alavi 1975; Taylor 1979; 
Harr ison 1977; Shanin 1972.
4) For a p a r t i c u l a r l y  s t r i k i n g  example of the t e le o lo g ic a l  tendency see Warren (1982).
5) Both authors use " i n t e r l i n k e d "  and " in te r locked" in te rchange ably .  Bharadwaj a l so  
t a l k s  of "co n jo in t"  markets .  Here " in te r l i n k in g "  i s  used to  to  ind ic a te  the 
v a r i a b i l i t y  in the degree of market connection.
6) Despi te  the f u n g i b i l i t y  of product ion c red i t  within the  c u l t i v a t o r  household and 
the  r e s u l t a n t  a t t r i b u t i o n  problem (see  David & Meyer 1980 p . 205) which haunts the 
c r e d i t  l i t e r a t u r e ,  c r e d i t  i s  in cr ea s in g ly  es sen t ia l  for  c u l t i v a t i o n  ( see  V.4) .  I t  i s  
th e r e f o r e  t r e a t e d  here as a f a c t o r  of production and as a proxy fo r  c a p i t a l .
7) For the  networks around new a g r i c u l t u r a l  technologies see Lewis ( for thcoming) .
8) Chisholm (1984) r e p o r t s  sharing  of non-labour input  c o s t s  between tenant  and 
landowner for  one DTW group in Bogra.
9) See a l s o  White (1988) who comes to t h i s  conclusion in a d i s c u s s i o n  of women's work.
10) The term ' p e r s o n a l i t y  f a c t o r s '  subsumes some aspects which t h i s  research  did not 
cover ( e . g .  the  way 'p e r s o n a l '  prefe rences re su l t  from c a s t e  background, upbringing 
e t c ) .  These aspec ts  f a l l  more i n to  the realm of psychological  s c ie n ces  which i s  beyond 
t h i s  s t u d y ' s  i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  focus on themes from so c io lo gy ,  anthropology and 
economics.
11) For f u r t h e r  t e chn ic a l  d e t a i l s  see Dutta t  Mandal (1985) and Asaduzzaman (1985).
12) Although i t  i s  mentioned in Howes 1985 p .99. See a l s o  Adnan 1984 fo r  a model of 
the  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  in  which d i f f e r e n t  pr ic ing ru les  apply in  the  household and in 
the  market .
13) For a d i s cu ss io n  of some of the problems of these approaches ( e . g .  the  c l a ss  
homogeneity of l and les s  groups and the  danger of new s t r u c t u r e s  of dependence between 
group ' an im a to rs '  and members) see Nebelung (1988), McGregor ( for thcomi ng) .
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CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES
II. 1 Methodological Concepts and Conflicts
I went to Bangladesh with a number of ideas as to what my rural 
fieldwork was to achieve and how I was to go about it. I intended to ask 
questions with as few preconceived ideas as possible and to look at data from the 
viewpoint of the villagers. This needed a conceptualisation of the rural 
environment and its inhabitants through categories derived from the local 
understanding of unity and separateness. The definition of my research Village* 
and my derivation of household categories (see II.3 below) are influenced by this. 
The research was to be "grounded" (see Glaser & Strauss 1975, Glaser 1978) in 
the collection of data and subsequent induction supplemented by deductive 
theory-building. Most importantly, processes of change important to the actors in 
the research environment were to be identified by induction, i.e. by the analytical 
evaluation of observations.
Participant observation as the means to make sense of local relations 
was to be one of the central research strategies. I expected to be investigating 
new forms of exploitation which further enriched the wealthy and impoverished 
the poor. In view of my research agenda I expected to interact with the rural 
poor in particular. On the other hand, I anticipated that a certain amount of 
circumspection in contact with the rural elites would be needed since I was to 
investigate how to use new rural resources to increase the opportunities for the 
poor.
Two main methodological strategies formed the basis of my approach to 
the field research. Firstly, the anthropological approach of immersing myself into 
the research environment and letting research directions be determined by the 
data. The snappy little phrase "1*11 live in a mud hut", joyfully used as a response 
to pre-departure enquiries of European friends as to what I was going to do in a
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village in Bangladesh embodied my expectations to integrate myself in some way 
into village life and understand it from the inside. This was to be combined with 
a second aspect of fieldwork, the collection of comprehensive survey information 
on issues such as household size and structure, wealth and type and quantity of 
incomes and similar concepts used in sociology, economics and the policy debate. 
Through this two-fold approach I intended to obtain a view on the qualitative 
changes in agrarian relations and their meaning in a particular micro­
environment as well as a quantitative picture of accumulation processes as they 
affect different household types under irrigated and non-irrigated conditions. 
While an understanding of the meaning of agrarian relations is one of the central 
elements of the thesis (cf. Ch V), an indication of the quantitative incidence of 
qualitative changes was necessary, not least in order to convey academic 
credibility and policy relevance to the work.
In the course of the fieldwork, the quantitative ’survey* approach and 
the anthropological ’understanding of meanings and functions of relationships* 
clashed repeatedly. To obtain anthropological data I needed to be ’part of* the 
village. To obtain comparable quantitative data I needed to act as an outsider, 
conduct directed interviews, ’write things down’ on long questionnaires and check 
inconsistent information. This double role sometimes created distrust and 
insecurity among villagers in their evaluation of my doings. The outcome is a 
compromise. The collection of quantitative data, which I recorded and cross­
checked during formal interviewing, and of anthropological information on 
meanings and functions of relationships which I absorbed in a much more 
informal setting interfered with each other. As a result, neither set of data is as 
complete as it might have been in isolation. The combination of both types of 
data, however, gives a more comprehensive picture than would have been 
possible by a more elaborate collection of either type of data alone.
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I I .2 Preparation and Setting Up
After nine months of preparing a series of papers and acquiring some 
very basic Bengali, the next ten weeks consisted of intensive language training at 
the Oriental Institute, Barisal, in the South of Bangladesh. Through residence with 
Bengali families, my colleague Sacra White (White 1988) and I gained a basic 
knowledge of how to survive and live in a Bangladeshi environment. At the end 
of this period I had acquired a degree of familiarity with customs and habits. I 
was able to discuss my research plan in standard Bengali and I had gained a 
strong sense of how I was different from my Bengali host family and how my 
attempts to integrate myself into their way of life were hampered by the threat to 
my own cultural norms and sense of identity.
The next step was to choose an area and a village fo r the field research. 
The presence of great numbers of STWs, the relative closeness of the local dialect 
to standard Bengali, the distance of the region from well-researched areas around 
Dhaka and Comilla and the attractions of the regional specialities (mango and 
silk) led me to Rajshahi in the North-West of the country. The availability of a 
set of uniquely detailed data on the distribution and use of irrigation technologies 
fo r two upazilas in Rajshahi ^  pointed to Singra upazila.
One late morning at the end of September 1985 I got off the bus in 
Singra upazila  and made my way, letters of introduction in hand, to the desks of 
the local officials. The idea of village research was fam iliar to several people in 
Singra because a group of researchers (Qadir, Chowdury, Emmert & Dey, 1978; 
see Ch VI) had conducted research in Singra. Nonetheless the arrival of a single 
female with a rucksack and the stated intention of staying fo r a year to study the 
effects o f irrigation was somewhat surprising and uncomfortable to the 
incumbents of the Singra male officialdom.
A period of visits to villages in the upazila followed. My village choice 
criteria combined academic and practical considerations. In order to achieve
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greater depth in my investigations, I was looking for a relatively small village. 
As I intended to compare organisational alternatives for irrigated agriculture I 
was especially interested to have some irrigation groups in the research village. I 
also wanted a village with a resident mechanic in order to follow up the 
relationships around this. Moreover, the village was to have irrigators and 
non-irrigators so that cross-sectional and time series data could be compared. 
Last, but not least, there had to be accommodation available for me.
I started on daily excursions to villages in the area. At the time of the 
year, October, most fields were still flooded and even residential areas were 
’swampy* My eventual village choice was as much intuitive as led by the long 
list of criteria. I was introduced to Samitigram (see Ch III) by the wife of an 
absentee landowner, who lived in Singra town (Faruque, see III.4.7- 8).
Some of my criteria for village choice were met. There were irrigation 
groups, there was a local STW mechanic, a family was willing to put me up, 
although they seemed somewhat confused by my intention to "learn how village 
life works and how irrigation has changed your lives and then write a book about 
it". There was also a separate abandoned hut as an alternative more independent 
form of accommodation. The village was small enough to be manageable by a 
lone, linguistically handicapped foreign researcher.
Other village choice criteria had to be abandoned. There were few, if 
any, non-irrigating cultivators. It appeared that irrigation groups only existed 
under conditions of relatively intensive irrigation. I therefore abandoned the 
intention to compare irrigators and non-irrigators in order to be able to work on 
irrigation groups. For the first time I was able to engage village people in more 
extended discussions on my research. I liked the village.
I moved into the house of my host family a few days later. After a year 
of preparation I had finally arrived in ’my village*.
Map II. 1 indicates the location of the research area and of the seven
angladesh' Map n.l
Bangladesh,Singra and the Research Area 




adapted fron Qadir, Chowdury, Enhert & Dey 1978 p. 6
- 56 -
villages where I worked later on. In order to protect the anonymity of its people, 
Samitigram, (a pseudonym for the village I lived in), is not shown.
Accommodation and research assistance were the first issues to be 
tackled. My intention not to associate myself too closely with one village 
’factions’ initially made me want to set up my own household. Since I was in no 
way equipped to manage the technicalities of everyday village life on my own, I 
would have needed to find an assistant immediately. Working with an assistant 
from the beginning would have made me crucially dependent on his or her 
mediation. To set up an independent unit inside the village also appeared to run 
counter to the objective of participant observation. Living with a village 
household, on the other hand promised to provide me with opportunities to get to 
know people far better than through visiting and interviewing with an employee 
on whose mediation I depended. I decided to live with a family and to look 
forresearch assistance from the area, if  and when I required it. Eventually about 
3 months of my research work were undertaken with the assistance of a local 
temporarily unemployed primary school teacher.
My hosts were a wealthier village family of 17 resident members (see 
IV.2.1 Saidur). Back in England I had wanted to live with a poor family. I now 
found that poor people had no space in their one-roomed mud houses. Those who 
made the decisions, the men, were too embarrassed to speak to a foreign woman. 
When they did speak to me during the initial period, I could hardly understand 
their strong dialect. My relatively wealthy host family were able to speak 
standard Bengali and they had space for me. I stayed.
Now clearly associated with one of the wealthy families of the village, 
I had gained a degree of insideness in a household which I felt would also meet 
my most elementary needs for mental and physical space.
My research results have undoubtedly been coloured by my close
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contact with my host household which was part of the ’new* village elite. 
Through them I understood much of the rationale of change. I understood less, 
maybe of the rationale of non-change of their more conservative neighbours and 
also less of the opportunity situations of the poorest sections of the population. 
The choice was a conscious trade-off between less than perfect options. I 
attempted to counteract my strong association with one village faction by a 
variety of regular formal and informal contacts (visiting, eating, employment for 
research assistance, boat transport) with other sections of the village.
II.3 The Fieldwork
"Ers tens  s ind  d i e  Dinge immer anders und zweitens a l s  man de nkt . "  ^
The main components of the field research are summarized in Table 
II. 1. Although fieldwork elements were focussed on in the order they are 
presented below, all research components, but in particular the village survey and 
the command area study (II.3.1 & II.3.2), were continuously updated and added to 
during my time in the field.
II.3.1 The Village Survey
This was the first, longest and most continuous part of the fieldwork. I 
added to and checked the data on my survey questionnaires until the very end of 
my fieldwork but spent the first nine weeks conducting a complete house-to- 
house survey. This, and the command area study (see Table II. 1) are the elements 
upon which some of the major arguments of the thesis, in particular Chapter V, 
are based.
The village survey conveyed to me a sense of the village as the spatial 
expression of social and economic relationships and a strong impression of a 
range of systematic differences between households which combine into an
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Table I I .1: Fieldwork Components (In Chronological Order)
1. Village Survey Interviews with all household heads (9 weeks/continuous) 
two follow-up surveys of all sharecropping and mortgage relationships in the 
village (2 weeks)
Themes: family size, age & gender structure, household occupations & income 
sources, landholding size and history, other assets, tenancy, labour & credit 
relationships, irrigation activities, rice self-sufficiency, political party 
membership
Particular emphasis on production and exchange relationships
2. The Command Area Study Interviews with all STW group managers and owners 
and some irrigators in 31 STW command areas (8 weeks)
Themes: Owners, tenants and sizes of all owned or rented plots in 31 C.As on 
Samitigram lands, map of C.A, type & age of STW, loan source, location of STW, 
water & capital charges and costs, C.A. history and social and economic dynamics 
among STW owners, managers and users
3. The 7-V illage Revisit Interviews with key informants (teachers, prominent 
locals, imams) and all or a selection of members of the landless and highest 
landowning households (7 weeks)
Themes: history of household landholding, income sources, involvement in 
irrigation, village irrigation history
4. Case Studies Visits and interviews with 15 households of the primary research 
village (8 weeks)
Themes: relative importance and interdependence of different elements of 
individual households* resource strategies
S. Occupational Diversification Interviews at local ricemills and parboiling 
business and with STW agents and traders in and beyond the locality (occasional, 
about 5 weeks)
Themes: Structures and opportunities in trade, processing and non-cultivation 
production, types and origins of occupational diversification and connections with 
national and international institutions
6. The State and Foreign Donors
Interviews with government officials, traders, donors and foreign suppliers in the 
STW sector (6 weeks)
Themes: Structure of the STW sector, objectives and constraints of actors and 
decision-makers and their ’rebound* effect in the village
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overall household position. My household categorisation (see II.5 & IV. 1) relies 
on a review of the survey data.
I placed strong emphasis on agrarian relations. All interviewees were 
asked whom they had credit, mortgage, labour or tenancy relations with. This 
gave me a first idea of the clusters of relationships, and of the relative power 
positions of different households. It frequently raised the issue of market 
inter linkages and has come to form the base for the discussion of the possible 
diversity of meanings of agrarian relationships in Chapter V of this thesis. The 
emphasis on agrarian relations also enabled me to cross-check the information 
given by one party (e.g. the landlord or employer) with that provided by the 
other party (e.g. the tenant or labourer) to a relationship. I complemented the 
complete village survey by a more detailed follow-up of all sharecropping and 
mortgaging relations for which both parties to the agreement were re­
interviewed. The arguments of Chapter V are based on the complete survey and 
the two related follow-up surveys which covered over 70% of all village 
households. Since the nature of the argument requires a full contextual 
understanding of household situations, some of the explanation of the arguments 
of chapter V is undertaken with the help of the case studies (see II.3.4 & IV).
II.3 .2  The Command Area Study
This involved interviews with the managers of all STW groups, the 
owners of all individually owned STWs on Samitigram agricultural lands, and 
with a number of irrigators of each command area. I also attended meetings of 
most irrigation groups and discussed the written proceedings of previous group 
meetings with managers and members. Particular emphasis was laid on the 
investigation of organisation and operation of group irrigation. Interviews 
covered the issues summarised in Table II. 1. The use of mouza maps attracted a 
great deal of attention and prompted farmers to point out their plots and to
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recount command area development.
The command area study gave me a sense of the history, extent and 
organisation of irrigation in Samitigram. With the plot size data of all irrigators 
from STW owners and group managers, I was able to cross-check the survey 
information given previously by household heads. The most important set of data 
from the command area study is a 2**1* chart which covers all 31 STW command 
areas on village lands and contains the size, owner and tenancy and mortgaging 
relations connected with every plot in the command area. The discussions with 
group managers and cultivators during data collection for the chart provided 
much of the material on the changes in agrarian relations with irrigation in 
Samitigram (see Ch. V) and of the development of the character of market 
interlinkages under irrigated conditions in particular.
11.3.3 The Seven-Village Revisit
This revisit of an area covered by a previous study (Qadir et al 1978) 
was undertaken in order to escape from the limitations of the one-village 
framework and to be able to identify variables which affect the structural role of 
STW irrigation. Although interviews with household members from the top and 
bottom landholding categories were conducted in all villages, much of the data 
for the seven villages was obtained from key informants (e.g. teachers, imams, 
shopkeepers). The main value of the seven village revisit lies in the identification 
of strongly contrasting meanings and development effects of agrarian relations 
surrounding STW irrigation.
11.3.4 The Case Studies
Fifteen case studies chosen by selective stratified sampling from the 
four household categories (see II.5.3) were visited and interviewed at least three 
times. Extended periods of undirected interaction were spent with households 
(accompanying household members to ricemills, markets, visits to relations, a
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wedding etc). During these visits, three questionnaires were worked through with 
each case study household. Questionnaires focussed on overall income generation 
and resource management strategies, and on the variety of roles STW irrigation 
played in this. Two questionnaires dealt in particular with non-cultivation income 
sources, farm management issues, cultivation costs for irrigated boro and rainfed 
wheat and amon crops, with the households* involvement in irrigation and other 
groups and with the role of social and kin relations for household strategies. The 
third questionnaire ^  examines the role of women in household advancement 
strategies.
Sometimes I was indubitably somewhat annoying to those who found 
themselves repeatedly visited as "my case studies". Sometimes, people were glad to 
explain "the whys and hows" of their lives. The detailed interviews and closer 
involvement with case study households had two main positive effects on the 
research. Firstly, I gained an understanding of the interdependence of various 
strands of household strategies and of the different types of rationale which 
could underlie household strategies. Secondly, by tracing the social relations of 
the case study households (e.g. marriage and other kin relations) I obtained a 
picture of the density and function of social networks in the village.
Only 11 of the 15 case studies, for which the most complete data was 
obtained, are presented here (Ch.IV).
I I .3.5 Occupational Diversification
My research on the implications of STW irrigation outside the 
cultivation sector consisted of a range of informal interviews. Each of the nine 
mechanics who serviced the STWs around Samitigram, local ricemill owners, 
parboiling operators, paddy traders, transport operators (trucks, oxcarts and 
ricksaws) and STW agents and traders were interviewed. Interviews concentrated 
on the relation of cultivation and non-cultivation activities in total household
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strategies and the relative amounts of income derived from different activities.
II.3.6 The State and Foreign Donors
Interviews with officials (BADC, BRDB, DAE, BKB and commercial 
banks) at union, upazila, district and divisional level were conducted. These 
explored institutional programmes in the STW sector and their implementation, 
particularly with reference to the research area.
The final six weeks of the fieldwork period were spent in Dhaka where 
interviews with major institutions and donors in the irrigation sector and with 
commercial importers of STWs were conducted. An interview with a director of 
one of the main producers of STWs for Bangladesh was conducted later in West 
Germany.
The objective of my focus on public and private institutions beyond the 
village and the national boundaries was to gain an impression of the objectives 
and constraints of actors at the different levels of STW supply and service 
networks in order to assess their effect on irrigation-related rural development 
potential.
II.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Data
A number of points need to be noted on the fieldwork process and the 
resultant information base for this research.
II.4.1 Before and After
One limiting factor for the research is the scarcity of quantitative 
benchmark data for the period before mechanised irrigation upon which to base 
comparisons to the irrigated period.
Official land records, the transcription of which taught me much about 
Bengali script and semi-legal land registration practices, proved hopelessly 
inaccurate so that I eventually abandoned the attempt to use them.
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People’s recall of dates and time periods was often less than accurate. 
The majority of people used very general indicators of time such as "in the 
Pakistan Period" or "after the gondogol" ( [lit trouble]; describes the 1971 
independence war).
Willingness to provide information differed widely depending on the 
issues concerned. While it was surprisingly easy to obtain data on the 
development of land prices for a period of over 40 years (cf. Figure V.3), it was 
nearly impossible to obtain any quantitative information on the incidence of 
tenancy, credit or mortgaging relations in the period before STWs. Similarly, the 
recall information about the level of agricultural wages over time appeared to be 
much more guided by the interests of the interviewee in relation to the perceived 
role of the interviewer than by recall ability.
On the other hand, a great deal of information was available in 
response to questions about "how tenancy, mortgaging or employment relations 
were regarded and operated before irrigation". As a result, a strong qualitative 
before-and-after picture emerges from the survey interviews. This more 
qualitative than quantitative picture is part of the arguments on the direction of 
agrarian change proposed here.
II.4 .2  The Attribution of Change
Any attempt to assess the impact of a single factor in a m ulti-variate 
environment faces an attribution problem. This is exacerbated since the total 
effect of several factors is different from the sum of their individual effects. 
Once processes of change have been identified as having followed the 
introduction of any new factor, such as a technology, they cannot easily be 
attributed to that single factor.
Irrigation is clearly not the only reason for contemporary agrarian 
change in Bangladesh. The character of rural change is affected by factors other
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than mechanised irrigation, and the full extent of the output increases achieved 
under irrigated conditions relies on the presence of a range of supplementary 
inputs (see Table 1.1). Nonetheless, agrarian change in Bangladesh (Hossain 
1988), as in many Asian countries (cf. Ishikawa 1967), can be regarded as 
irrigation-led in so far as output increases would not have occurred without 
irrigation but could have occurred, although to a lesser extent, without the 
presence of other supplementary inputs.
Recent research on Bangladesh and West Bengal confirms this. Boyce 
(1987) concludes that water control variables (irrigation and flood control) 
explain approximately 80% of inter-district variations in yields in Bengal.
II.4.3 The Female, Foreign Researcher
A final point concerns the influence of the female researcher on the 
data collected in a predominantly Islamic society segregated by gender. In 
Bangladesh, male and female spheres of activity are relatively separate (for 
qualifications see White 1988). In the villages there are rules for interaction 
between men and women in the household and women avoid communications with 
male outsiders.
Initially, men were shy of me, a foreign woman, and extremely 
monosyllabic when I tried to discuss agriculture, irrigation or anything else 
connected with ’their world*. At one most disheartening occasion a man, having 
asked me about my family remarked enthusiastically:
I f  your bro ther  came here  we could explain everything 
to  him. We could take  him to  the f i e l d s  and f i sh in g  and 
we could expla in  a l l  about i r r i g a t i o n  to  him.
At my suggestion that all this could be undertaken with me, he turned away in
embarrassment.
At another, early occasion, a country boat containing about 20 village
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men and myself on the way back from the market almost capsized as all the men 
crowded into one half of the boat leaving the other half for me.
1 began to wonder how I would understand anything about irrigation if 
those who were engaged in it would hardly talk to me. Something needed to 
change. I gradually gave up many of my early attempts to fit in with the 
conventional female role models, most of which in case attracted more criticism 
of my ignorance of the "right" way of doing things than approval. I stopped 
wearing a sari, started to attend the weekly hat, an almost exclusively male 
occasion, to chat in the tea stalls, waded through muddy fields to talk to farmers 
and went out late at night. My explanation that "in my country women can do 
this" combined with repeated enquiries of whether I was giving offence was 
usually we 11-received and countered with many questions about "my country". 
Barriers seemed to break down.
To the benefit of the research, if  not to my self-image, I had become 
genderless, or even an "honorary male" in the company of men (cf. Papanek 
1964). Now, in the heat of a discussion in exclusively male company, I would 
occasionally be addressed with a male kinship term Thus, although certain 
spheres such as the social 'get togethers' after Friday prayers in the mosque 
obviously remained closed to me, my position had become one of advantage. As 
first became obvious to me at a village festival where I was made a frequent 
messenger between the women assembled behind a bamboo screen and their men 
outside, I was now the only adult in the village who moved freely between male 
and female spheres.
As I did not belong to either male or female sphere exclusively, I could 
determine my own code of conduct to a large extent. I moved freely around 
homesteads and fields and talked to both men and women. In Bangladesh men can 
only communicate freely with their wives, sisters and mothers ^  and female
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Bangladeshi researchers find it very difficult due to greater pressure on them to 
conform to Bengali ideals of female behaviour.
Clearly, I hardly ever learnt anything by unobtrusive immersion into 
the research environment. Especially in the initial weeks all my actions attracted 
crowds and caused discussions among the onlookers.
II.5 Definitions and Concepts
The thesis is based on three central concepts. T h e  household*, 
’household categories* and ’the village*. These are presented below.
II.5.1 The Household
The economic unit of the household, rather than the kin unit of the 
family is the relevant concept for this research.
Villagers distinguished two types of households:
Firstly, "Jara ekoutre boshabosh thake" ("those who sit together"). These are 
m ulti-nuclear households from the same family which keep accounts jointly and 
eat together (joint households).
Secondly, "Jader prithok hoe gieche" (literally "those to whom separation has 
happened) These are nuclear household units which eat and keep accounts 
separately from other nuclear or joint households of their family (nuclear 
households).
A household is distinguished by the keeping of jo int accounts and joint 
provision of food for all household members who are not employed and fed 
elsewhere as part of their pay. There was only one exception to this, where an 
old widow was fed by each of her three landless sons* nuclear households in turn 
but kept her own accounts. A distinction of households by joint or separate 
residence did not prove useful as some residentially joint households kept 
separate accounts (particularly the ’poor*; see Table IV. 1). Villagers considered
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such households as nuclear.
II.5.2 Household Categories
The four household categories developed in this research were explored 
and refined in an iterative manner throughout my time in the village. Household 
categories relate to villagers* concepts as well as to the survey data. The 
categories are meant to capture the essential distinctions between households in 
the eyes of their members. Through an understanding of how differences are 
perceived from the inside, I explored which changes are most important to people 
in that society. Questions like "What type of people are there here?" or "How is 
this household different from yours?" provided some initial understanding of 
local concepts. Thus, although household categorisation was clearly affected by 
the research agenda and is therefore not entirely the product of undirected 
communication, villagers* perceptions were included into the conceptual
framework of the research.
Other concerns also informed the final categorisation of households. 
Firstly, both descriptive and relational aspects were to be included. Households 
were to have both comparable formal attributes as well as stand in similar 
relations to members of their own and other household categories. Secondly, the 
particular concerns of this research with resource flows and accumulation 
patterns influenced the final choice of criteria for household categorisation. 
Eventually, households were differentiated according to nine points (see Table 
IV. 1). The four household categories which result, could be described as
"resource-status categories" ^  when resources are understood to encompass
material and social (relational) aspects.
Irrigation is then examined in its interaction with the composite
elements, which form the four household categories.
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After household categories had been developed, the following two 
values were calculated for each household:
1) Effective land owned
landholding - + h land sharecropped in
(e.l.) - *s land sharecropped out
+ land mortgaged in (or h according to
land mortgaged out type of mortgage)
2) e.l. per head - e.l / number of household members
Effective landholding indicates household income from land, while 
operated holding is useful to derive cultivation expenditure, and owned land 
points to household wealth. The comparison of operated and effective landholding 
(see Tables V.5 & V.6) indicates patterns of accumulation from cultivation. ’Per 
head' measures of landholding take household size into account. The large 
household/large landholding bias, which tends to lead to overestimates of the 
importance of land for wealthier households with more members (see Table V.7 
line 6) is thus avoided.
There are at least two shortcomings to the land-based approach to the 
categorisation of rural households. Firstly, it does not take into account 
inter-household differences in production costs (see V.4) or quality of land. 
Secondly and more importantly, non-land incomes are not taken into account. As 
is argued throughout the thesis (cf. especially V .l), it is increasingly inadequate 
to express the economic position of households in rural Bangladesh through 
landholding only The composite household categories used here attempt to 
overcome the shortcomings of land as the sole indicator.
A main distinction between the 'coping' and the 'poor' is their position 
in the labour market. The 'poor' sell their labour. The great m ajority of the 
'coping' do not. It is likely that in a few years' time some of the labour-selling 
'poor* households will be better off than their contemporaries who still operate as 
small owner-cum-tenant cultivators. This underlines the temporary nature of the
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factors which determine household categories. The categories themselves and 
people’s positions within categories are changing continuously. The best that can 
be done is to outline a ’snapshot* of a situation and to complement it with 
historical information and speculations about the future to gain some idea of the
type of change and degree of development an agrarian structure is undergoing.
II.5.3 The Village
In order to understand change as it appeared to the actors meant that 
’the village*, my primary research universe, had to be delineated according to the 
perceptions of its inhabitants. Using villagers* notions of "us and them" or "our 
people and other people" 103 households were eventually included in the primary, 
complete survey (see Table II. 1). The village of Samitigram neither conformed to 
the official delineation of the mouza for tax purposes nor to the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics* (BBS, 1974; 1986) village delineation. Samitigram village is 
best described as the spatial expression of those economic, social and kinship 
relations which were considered most central by the villagers themselves
NOTES
1) Provided by Mr K.Pitman, MPO Dhaka.
2) There were moments when the  idea of studying the  impact of i r r i g a t i o n  in a 'swamp'
seemed humorous. Beyond the  p a r t i c u l a r l y  wet condi t ions  in the  Singra beeI,  most of 
d e l t a i c  Bangladesh turns  wet and muddy during the monsoon. The t h e s i s  t i t l e  c a r r ie s  a 
mark of my d e l i b e r a t i o n s  on t h i s ,  es pe c ia l ly  dur ing the  r a in y  per iods  of v i l l a g e  
f ie ldwork.
3) " F i r s t l y ,  th in gs  a re  always d i f f e r e n t  and secondly,  more d i f f e r e n t  than you th in k . "  
One of my f a t h e r ' s  f a v o u r i t e  mottos of which I was reminded more than once during the 
f ie ldwork .
4) Designed and ' ad m in i s te re d '  by S. Uhite (White 1988) as a comparative exerc ise to 
her own work in Tanore up az i l a ,  Rajshahi.
5) Only c h i l d r e n  and people considered junior  or i n f e r i o r  by the  speaker a re addressed 
by name in Bangladesh.  General ly kinship terminology i s  used.
6) A male western co l league  once remarked to  me t h a t  during  h i s  f i e l d  research in 
Bangladesh he d id  not  see a s ing le  woman for  weeks a t  a t ime.
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7) A term re t r o s p e c t i v e l y  borrowed from Bharaduaj (1985 p . 335).
8) Wood 1978, van Schendel 1981, McGregor (forthcoming) and Lewis ( forthcoming) employ 
the  concept .
9) With the  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of a g r i c u l t u r a l  and a g r i c u l t u r e - r e l a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  ( see  
Lewis forthcoming),  p a t te r n s  of occupat iona l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  wi l l  d i f f e r  by household 
category ( see  Wood's 1978 f ind ings  on a v i l l a g e  in Comilla and Chapter VII ) .
10) See Bertocci  1970 & 1975 for  s i m i l a r  concepts of ' v i l l a g e '  and ' r e g i o n ' .
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CHAPTER III: THE AREA AND THE VILLAGE
II I . l  Singra Upazila
With 204 square miles Singra is the largest upazila in Rajshahi 
division. It is in Natore district and consists of 12 unions and 446 
mauzas. Singra contains the country’s largest beel (marshy area), the 
Chalan Beel. Since most beel land is flooded for several months of the 
year, Singra’s population density is below average with 1102 people per 
square mile compared to 1557 for Bangladesh. Per capita land availability 
is also above the national average with 0.57 acres (0.33 for Bangladesh). 
The yields of Singra’s main crops are slightly above average with 0.49 
tons per acre for amon (Bangladesh 0.48 tons per acre) and 1.1 tons per 
acre fo r boro (Bangladesh 0.97 tons per acre). Singra is the only upazila 
with a surplus of foodgrain production over requirements in Natore 
district. In 1982/83 cropping intensity ^  was 115 for Singra and 153 for 
all Bangladesh The Chalan Beel is a low-lying area with only one 
rainfed monsoon paddy crop (amon) on land without irrigation.
On the whole, Singra is now a relatively prosperous upazila. The 
country’s main North-South road passes through its centre. This road 
connects Bogra, Rangpur and Dinajpur in the North with Dhaka, the capital 
and Jessore, Kusthia and Khulna in the South. It is a main artery of 
national road traffic.
Singra is the upazila with the greatest number of STWs in 
Bangladesh The total irrigated area in Singra upazila was 23908.18 
acres in 1985. This is about 66% of the upazila 's total net cultivated 
area. Of the irrigated area 99% is cultivated with boro paddy and 1% with 
wheat. About 88 % of total irrigated area is served by STWs. Of this 97%
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is single cropped and about 3% double cropped. 87% of STWs in Singra are 
privately sunk and 11% through BADC. 81% of STWs in Singra are privately 
repaired
Singra has a large percentage cf lew land This land dries up 
later and thus needs less water per irrigation season. This means that 
pumping costs are lower per unit of land and command areas can be larger 
than on higher land.
II I .2 The Main Research Village
The village, Samitigram lies about a mile from the metalled road 
and the union headquarters Borogram. It is connected to the road by a mud 
embankment. During the rainy season the embankment becomes impassable. 
Then, wooden country boats run from the village to the road through 
flooded fields. Notunbazar, a row of four or five stalls selling tea, 
biscuits and dry goods, where the embankment joins the road, marks the 
bus stop. Here, the men rest after they return from their marketing, 
exchange their news and start out together to return to the village. In 
recent years, several new shops have been opened here by people from 
Samitigram, and the road junction acquired its name notun bazar (new 
market). Notunbazar is becoming a new focus of local trading activity as 
more villagers from Samitigram open shops there.
Samitigram is not a village according to any of the official 
definitions (e.g. BBS 1974 & 1985 and Land Revenue Statistics). It is 
located in three mauzas (tax revenue villages) and consists of four 
neighbourhoods (paras; see Map III.2). All inhabitants of Samitigram are 
Muslim and belong to the same samaj. Part of one of the paras (Uttorpara) 
is Hindu. The Hindus of Uttorpara are not part of Samitigram in terms of






peoples* perceptions and the density of economic and social relationships 
(cf.II.5.3). Among the four paras, Purbopara and Poscimpara contain all but 
one of the richer households of the village whereas Uttorpara and 
Dokkhinpara have the majority of the landless and agricultural labourers. 
STW irrigation and electricity arrived several years later in Uttorpara 
and Dokkhinpara than in Purbopara and Poscimpara.
Samitigram had 103 households at the time of the basic survey 
for this research. During the year of fieldwork, four further households, 
all poor and landless, moved to the village and one poor household moved 
away.
Samitigram’s agricultural land is mainly to the east of the 
residential area (see Map III. 1). Like all the beel villages, Samitigram is 
built on raised land. Although population density is below the national
average, living conditions villages are more crowded because the regularly 
flooded low beel is unsuitable as residential land.
III.3 The Crops and the Seasons
There is a sense of stability and security in the annual
completion of the agricultural cycle. The actual changes which have
occurred in Singra with the introduction of mechanised irrigation over 
the last fifteen years contradict this impression. A fundamentally 
different annual cycle now determines rural life. Village life no longer 
revolves around rainfed amon paddy, but around the irrigated boro crop.
Fluctuations of paddy sales, labour demand, the disbursement and
repayment of form al and informal loans and most households' annual
budgets have come to be determined by the boro crop. Even the timing of
(Muslim) weddings in the Singra beel has changed from the pleasantly cool
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and dry post-amon period into the hot and wet period after the boro 
harvest period when households now have more cash available.
New types of agricultural work have appeared with boro 
cultivation:
- field preparation (land levelling and extra ploughing)
- preparation of boro seedbeds
- transplantation of boro seedlings (the previous main crop amon is 
broadcast)
- fertilizer application and pest control
- more intensive weeding (impossible for deep water amon)
- the annual re-excavation of irrigation trenches
- the operation an maintenance of STW engines and pumps
All this has meant more work in Samitigram. Ahmed (1973) 
estimates that a 93% increase in labour requirements is created with the 
replacement of a local paddy variety by the HYV IR8, which is one of the 
common boro varieties in Samitigram. Clay & Khan (1977) calculate that if, 
as on most Samitigram lands, HYV boro constitutes an additional rather 
than a replacement crop, there will be a 143% increase in labour 
requirements. Clearly, changes in labour requirements due to the 
introduction of HYV will vary with the amount of labour used for the 
rainfed crops which serve as a base for the comparison. Also, as noted by
Bartsch (1977), the capital used per acre for the cultivation of the same
crop may d iffer between areas. Different rates of increase in labour 
demand as a result of the introduction of mechanised irrigation are thus 
due to regional diversities in cropping patterns and cultivation methods. 
Available research results for Bangladesh show very clearly though that 
labour requirements increase substantially through HYV cultivation (see
Table 1.1) and through STWs (see Hamid 1982).
Increases in labour demand and changed seasonal patterns have
changed the rhythm of the agricultural year. Between late December and
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February the beel dries out and new muddy paths appear almost daily 
between the boro seedbeds, the occasional wheat patch and newly 
transplanted paddy fields. At this time, the fields become dotted with 
small bamboo and straw huts. These are the shelters for the shallow 
tubewells and their operators throughout the irrigation season from 
February to early June. As the beel areas have been silting up over 
recent years and as the region’s two main rivers (Atrai and Gurnai) dry 
up in mid-April to May when water is most crucial for the boro crop, most 
low -lift pumps in the area have gone out of operation over the the last 
five years. Samitigram’s main crop {boro) has thus come to depend almost 
exclusively on shallow tubewells. The number of shallow tubewells per 
acre in Singra is one of the highest in the country (Asaduzzaman, 1984). 
Mechanised irrigation, first in the form of LLPs and later of STWs, has 
transformed the village’s production and exchange cycles over the last 
10-15 years.
In 1978 Qadir et. al. (p. 7) still wrote
Broadcast  amon i s  the  most commonly grown type of paddy in Singra.
. . .  I t  i s  grown in the beel areas which a re subje c t  to f looding 
dur ing the  monsoon season.  The seeds are s c a t t e r e d  (broadcas t )  in 
Apr il  or  May before  the bee ls  begin to f lood . . .  deep water amon is  
not  very produc t iv e ,  al though the ex t r a  straw produced (by the 
longer s t a l k  M.G.) i s  of some value.  There i s  l i t t l e  p o t e n t i a l  for  
the  a p p l i c a t i o n  of f e r t i l i z e r  as i t  would simply be washed away by 
f lood  water.
In 1986, STW-irrigated high-yield boro paddy varieties (locally 
called ’irri tom’, ’irri 76*, ’irri 8* and ’Chinese’) are grown on 75 to 80% 
of Samitigram lands. On lower land, which dries up later and floods 
earlier, this has meant a total displacement of the amon crop since boro 
pushes the sowing of amon too far into the rainy season for the young 
seedlings to grow out of the water. On slightly higher land, amon is
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sometimes still sown either after a wheat crop has been harvested in late 
March, or later in the year after the boro harvest in late May to early 
June. The latter increases the risk of amon failure through early monsoon 
flooding. With STW irrigation, the majority of cultivators now regard 
b.amon as an additional "bonus crop" with low production costs, low yields 
(24-30 maunds per acre) and a high risk of crop failure whereas irrigated 
boro is the centre of their cultivation strategies. However, b.amon does
form the mainstay of some poor households’ economic strategies (see Kamal
IV.2.3). On the whole, it is mainly consumed by the producing households 
with smaller surpluses sold locally in hats (weekly markets) and bazars.
The role of irrigated high yield boro paddy in the local economy 
is very d ifferent from that of amon. While Qadir et al (1978) report a 
net deficit of rice in the area in 1976, Singra upazila has turned into a 
surplus, rice-exporting area over the last ten years. Irrigated boro has
taken over the agricultural cycle and now determines most household 
budget allocations over the year. Land buying and selling transactions
tend to plummet when the boro crop cycle starts and money is needed to 
finance cultivation and to pick up after the harvest in June and July 
when crops have been sold and cash is available. Boro seedbeds are
prepared in November and December as soon as sufficient land has dried
up. During this time, the cultivating households apply for formal
cultivation credit with the banks in the union and upazila headquarters 
and through the Singra BRDB-KSS system to finance the transplanting, 
weeding, irrigation and harvesting costs of next year’s boro crop.
Boro cultivation has further monetised agricultural production. 
As a result of an almost six-fold increase in cash cultivation costs for
boro compared with amon (cf. Tables V.13 and V.14), cultivators* credit
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needs have therefore increased drastically. Cultivation loans from the 
banks have become part of the annual cycle. In December, before the boro 
is transplanted, the farmers work out their credit applications. Until 
deep into the night KSS meetings draw up bank applications and allocate 
loans to members. The KSS managers then spend days in the upazila offices 
of the BRDB in order to lobby for their groups* loan applications. 
Wealthier household heads flock to the district town in order to get
photos for their individual bank loan applications for which they are busy
conducting negotiations with the local bank manager.
Transplantation of the boro seedlings takes places when the sun 
has has dried the flooded fields to the right consistency of mud. Boro
transplantation is organised in various ways. Groups of women or small 
boys are employed to pull up the rice seedlings. The seedlings are then 
planted into the ploughed fields by adult male labour groups (dols, see
V.3.1.1). Transplantation is also often carried out by households 
practising labour exchange (gata , see V.3.1.4), a custom carried over from 
the sowing and harvesting of amon in the pre-irrigation period. Wealthier 
households with larger landholdings combine hired labour with household 
labour within the gata labour exchange system or hire a labour group.
Transplantation is staggered over several weeks in accordance 
with paddy varieties and with the cultivation timetable of individual
farms. Although irrigation command areas now play a decisive role for 
agricultural production decisions, the individual cultivator household in 
Samitigram still makes cultivation decisions in line with the constraints 
and objectives of the farm unit. In other areas of Bangladesh, such as 
Bogra STW owners* control over water has conveyed control over the 
production decisions of cultivator households
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As soon as the boro seedlings are transplanted, the irrigation 
season begins. Pumps are repaired and new pump shelters are built in the
rapidly drying fields, drains are repaired, electricity lines, where they 
exist, are reconnected to pumps, pump operators are employed and the
pumps are brought from the houses and sited in the fields.
All transplanting is usually finished by the end of February. As 
the weather gets hotter, the boro paddy needs more water. Until the 
harvest in May to early June, weeding and irrigation are the main
agricultural activities. Jute, potatoes, some lentil varieties, mustard 
seed and sesame seed are the minor crops of larger landowners. Wheat is 
used as an alternative to winter boro paddy on high and intermediate land 
although the wheat season is somewhat earlier in the year than the boro 
paddy season. Wheat cultivation is only possible on higher land. On lands 
where wheat cultivation is possible, irrigation groups (see III.5) tend to
break up more easily than on low land where the absence of irrigation 
facilities within the command area of a STW makes cultivation impossible 
when water from irrigated plots interferes with unirrigated plots.
The boro harvest from May till early June is a time of extreme 
heat and hard work. The village fills with groups of migrant labourers 
(dols) from  areas of the country with different cropping cycles (e.g.
Kusthia where sugar cane is the main crop). Migrant labourers clamber off 
the tops of buses and trains in the district town and arrive in 
Notunbazar with mathals (big bamboo hats for protection against the sun) 
on their heads and bundles and sickles in their hands. Dols have a leader 
(sardar) who conducts negotiations with prospective employers at the time 
of the dols arrival in Samitigram or some weeks before. Some of the local 
labour force also form dols for the boro harvest. Now the women of the
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cultivator households in Samitigram have to provide food for up to 30
harvest labourers and at the same time parboil and dry the new paddy 
before it is sold or taken to the rice mills. Women of non-cultivating 
labourer households, on the other hand, find themselves with less work.
Paddy trading peaks immediately after the harvest as many 
cultivators sell to finance their cultivation costs. Richer village
households buy paddy now in order to sell it later on during the year at 
a higher price. Haystacks grow to enormous heights as the new paddy is 
threshed. At this time of the year, the size of the haystack outside a
homestead gives a good indication of household wealth. At the end of the 
boro harvest there is a feast of meat and sweets. Then migrant labourers 
disburse to their home villages taking with them bags of paddy as their 
payment. Labour groups often get together to hire a lorry to take home
their paddy.
Towards the end of the boro harvest, sesame is cut and brought 
in from the fields. Depending on when the first monsoon rains arrive and 
on land elevation amon is sown between June and July on some of the boro 
land. If the rains arrive early, the young seedlings are in danger of
being submerged and spoilt by floods. In a year with a very late monsoon 
like 1985, additional irrigation water may be required to soften the 
sun-dried soil in order to sow and maintain the amon seedlings until the 
rains arrive. Amon is now only sown on medium and high beel land because 
after the introduction of HYV boro, its sowing time has been pushed 
further into the monsoon so that low beel land is usually flooded before 
the amon seedling can take root.
After amon is in the ground the village changes gear. An 
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married women go to visit their parents* houses as their work load at 
home is least. Negotiations for the weddings of the year start. Wealthier 
shopkeepers and traders now hold little feasts of sweets (halkatas) for 
their clients, during which debts, which have accumulated over the year 
are collected. Men are involved in paddy trading but can often be found 
in shacks and tea stalls playing cards. The STWs and their shelters have
been removed from the fields and stored until the next transplanting of 
boro in January and February. Agricultural work consists primarily of 
amon weeding now. People start to recover their boats from the bottom of 
pools and tanks to repair them in time for the coming rainy season. There 
is not much paid work at this time of the year. Construction work on 
programmes run by the U.S. American organisation CARE provides some
employment to the poor and landless. Fishing in the flooded beel is the 
main income source for most of the poor and landless of the village and 
many village households eat fish from the beel at this time of the year.
As the climate gets hot and wet, many people suffer from fevers and 
diarrhoeal diseases. Jute is harvested in late July and August and the 
smell o f retting fills the air for several weeks. Most Samitigram jute is 
used fo r home consumption. September and October are the months for 
handicrafts. Ropes and baskets are made, quilts and pillow covers are
sown and embroidered for the winter and fishing nets are made and
repaired.
By late October the rains stop. It is time to harvest the amon.
Depending on how deep the fields are under water, the crop is either cut
from  a boat or standing in water to the hips or more. The amon paddy is
brought to the homesteads and the grain separated from the paddy stalk 
as cattle is driven over it repeatedly. The harvest of the new amon and
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the arrival of the cool season is celebrated with the preparation of many 
types of rice cake eaten with the khejur date syrup of the cold season.
While the village is waiting for the flood waters to recede, the 
preparations for the next boro season begin. Seeds are removed from 
storage and sprouted, cultivation loans are applied for and fertilizer is 
procured. As soon as there is dry land, it is put to use. Very high land 
is used for onions, garlic, potatoes and water melon. The earliest boro 
seedbeds are also prepared on high land. This gives farmers a choice 
between vegetable production and an early, and therefore more secure boro 
crop. According to many villagers, Samitigram vegetable production 
declined as a result.
After the boro seedlings have been in the seedbed for two to 
three weeks they are pulled up and transplanted into the ploughed fields 
which have reappeared from beneath the flood waters. Gradually the paths 
in the fields start reappearing and the village becomes accessible by 
foot again. The wheel has come full circle. An agricultural year has 
passed.
III.4  Samitigram: Cooperation and Conflict
Samitigram is a small village. Most of the inhabitants are 
related, and kin relations are part of economic and social relations.
However, over the last 15 years a new element has entered economic life. 
Organised cooperation on a group basis has changed the village’s
production and exchange relations. My pseudonym for the village, 
Samitigram, reflects the extraordinarily high incidence of groups
(samitis) and the way these samitis have come to play a major role in 
village life. As will be shown in VI.2, the distribution of income from
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irrigated agriculture has been significantly affected by irrigation groups
(samitis). Samitigram is locally renowned for its people’s cooperation in 
the pursuit of their economic interests. When questioned about their 
cooperation, villagers often said that they cooperated in agriculture but 
fought over everything else.
There was clearly more of an economic than an ideological base 
to cooperation in groups in Samitigram. There is no other village in the
area where groups play as important a role for resource flows as in 
Samitigram. Chapter VI underlines this through a comparison of Samitigram 
with seven other villages.
Most Samitigram groups were formally unconstituted, some were 
officially initiated and supported cooperatives, and some bore more
resemblance to joint business ventures. The majority of were formed in 
the immediate post-independence period between 1971 and 1976. At that
time, a generational changeover of the village leadership brought a shift 
in village political and economic life. Cooperation in groups became a
strategy to expand agricultural output and profits whereas earlier, and
at the time of the research in the seven villages (see VI), cooperation 
tended to be maintained only until economic pressures undermined it.
In 1985/6, samiti meetings were an integral part of everyday life 
in the village. Procedures like keeping accounts and writing minutes had
become familiar to the younger generation of villagers. Men older than 
the ’jubok samiti generation* tended to have less, if any, formal education 
and thus to play a marginal role in samiti meetings. There were about 
eight ’samiti office holders* in the village, all men in their early to 
m id-thirties, relatively well educated (to about class 10) and with one 
exception from the ’rich* and ’well-off* household category (see Table
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IV. 1). Managers were sufficiently large in number to exercise mutual 
control over samiti management practices. Despite some recognized 
misappropriation, the conduct of samiti managers tended to be controlled 
by the fact that other managers, who could not be taken advantage of 
easily, were members of almost every group.
The link of the samitis to resources administered outside the 
village by state and parastatal organisations, existed through an absentee 
landowner, Faruque and his wife, resident in the Singra upazila 
headquarters. Faruque is the chairman of the committee, which allocates 
KSS loans, and his wife is the chair of the larger MSS in Samitigram. 
Their position in the upazila headquarters worked back into Samitigram 
through connections with people of the jubok samiti circle like Saidur 
(see IV.2.1). They channelled resources from the various parts of the 
bureaucracy towards the village. In cases of conflict or in order to 
support one of the numerous dorkastos (applications) to a bureaucratic 
institution, Faruque or his wife were the brokers for many Samitigram 
households.
Points 1-10 introduce the village’s various samitis with the 
exception of the irrigation samitis. These are introduced separately in 
section III.5.
III .4.1 The Jubok Samiti
In the late 1960s, the people who are today Samitigram’s 
’retired rich old men’ were the village leaders. Stories about conflict and 
factional fighting during this time abound. The present village leaders 
were then at the end of their teens, and most of them attended the 
secondary school at the union headquarters, Borogram. There was then no 
embankment between Samitigram and Borogram (see Map III.l). The Union
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Chairman therefore asked the older secondary school students, many of 
whom lived in Samitigram, to form a jubok samiti (youth cooperative) in 
order to build an embankment to connect Samitigram and the union 
headquarters. In return, he promised a television. The story goes that the 
students built the embankment but were refused their reward. Upon this 
provocation the jubok samiti rallied. Descriptions of how the chairman was 
forced to keep his promise are colourful today. Eventually, half the value 
of a television was rendered by the chairman. The jubok samiti was the 
first village samiti and became the initiator of a number of other groups 
in Samitigram. This happened in the early seventies, shortly after 
Bangladesh independence and apparently in the context of a great deal of 
idealism and drive for change among the youth of the village.
111.4.2 The TV Samiti
In order to raise the remaining cost of the television, the
jubok samiti formed a group in which villagers could acquire a share in 
the television in return for the right to keep it in their homestead for
some period of time at regular intervals throughout the year.
Shareholders took turns in keeping the television and everyone in the
village goes to watch it in courtyards, under palm trees or in bamboo
groves as it makes the rounds through the village houses. The television
brought information and impressions to Samitigram which have widened 
people’s perspectives and made them aware of other parts of the world, of 
alternative ways of life and - in a hazy manner - of issues in current 
national and world politics.
111.4.3 The Mosque Samiti
The mosque samiti is the executive committee for the religious
community of Samitigram, the samaj. The construction of a mosque and of a
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madrassah for the village was undertaken by this group. This appears to 
have had a considerable unifying effect as all the households of 
Samitigram belong to the same samaj (group of Muslim households, which 
belongs to the same Mosque). Today the mosque has a steady income from 
its land which is sharecropped in turns by poorer Samitigram villagers, 
from  a fishpond and a number of fruit trees, which were donated to the 
mosque by wealthier villagers. The mosque holds religious functions and 
maintains an ’emergency fund* for distressed villagers. The mosque samiti 
fulfils a rudimentary social welfare function for the village. As such it 
contributes to the atmosphere of relative social harmony, which 
distinguishes present-day Samitigram from the neighbouring villages.
III.4 .4  The School Samiti
In 1980, about the time when the children of the original jubok
samiti members reached school age, the village primary school became a 
focus of attention. The school samiti was formed to monitor teachers’ 
attendance and to buy books and basic equipment. One villager gave some
land from which a regular small income went to the school. The school
samiti activities reflect the new importance education is recognised to 
have for the economic prospects of a household. The adoption of new
cropping technologies and occupational diversification out of agriculture 
require an educational level beyond that needed fo r traditional 
cultivation methods. Access to bureaucratically administered resources 
requires knowledge of the written and unwritten rules of interaction with 
bureaucratic institutions and of the techniques for their manipulation. 
Thus lack of formal education has become a major obstacle to economic 
improvement in an environment so pervaded by resource flows from the 
outside that most things are assumed available by dorkasto (application)
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by the villagers.
III.4.5 The Jute Samiti
Saidurt one of the founders of the jubok samiti (see IV.2.1) is
the chairman o f the jute samiti, which was formed between eight villages
in order to obtain jute loans and seeds from the upazila office of the
Department of Agricultural Extension (DAE). Although the samiti officially
covers eight villages, some of the member-villages are not included in
anything except the official membership list of the samiti. In an
investigation of the economic conditions for collective action in South
India Wade (1988 p.87) remarks that there is no village-to-village
interaction in any field of activity. All the central positions in the jute
samiti are occupied by people from Samitigram and the agricultural inputs
obtained are distributed by two dealers from Samitigram. The jute samiti
shows the same limits of effective cooperation as Wade's study.
Households from  other villages are outside the boundaries where trust and
common interests are the basis of economic cooperation. The exclusion of
households from  other villages is recounted by Samitigram leaders with
the same degree of satisfaction and pride as the intra-village
cooperation of Samitigram groups. It appears that cooperation or
collective action are only feasible at a very localised level within the
moral and interactional boundaries of the immediate community, samaj or
village. Beyond the confines of the village, Bailey's comment (1966 in
Shanin 1984 p .308) rings true
Outsiders  cannot  e f f e c t i v e l y  ask for  cooperat ion from 
the p e a s a n t s . . .  to  the  v i l l a g e r s  t h i s  seems e i t h e r  a 
joke or  something to  be very worried about,  as a
f o ot ba l l  p la y e r  would be i f  he heard himself being
urged on and urged to  cooperate by the cap tain of the 
opposing team.
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The jute samiti demonstrates how new cultivation technologies 
change interactional principles within the confines of old interactional 
boundaries.
III.4.6 The Credit Samiti
The credit samiti has had a major impact on the village’s
production structure and its exchange relations. It was started in 1980 
with 37 members who all made a weekly deposit of ten Taka. When savings 
reached 10.000 Taka, a fixed deposit bank account was opened with the
local commercial bank. Now, loans on the deposited savings are taken out 
annually. These loans are recycled to Samitigram villagers at a reported 
30 to 35% interest and to group members at 25% interest for the boro
season without collateral requirements. Credit samiti profits are then
deposited in the bank and in the following year an even greater loan is
recycled to the villagers.
Loans from the credit samiti have enabled a number of 
cultivators to engage in irrigated cultivation. Other households, some of 
them landless, have received business loans. The credit samitVs loan 
recovery rates are 100% as I found out in the process of teaching this
samitVs manager how to calculate the group’s annual profits. The
influence . of the jubok samiti, which was described as "guaranteeing" 
villagers’ repayment of dues to other groups such as the irrigation 
samitist appeared to prevent defaults. The samiti was also called 
samajkolen samiti (social welfare group) in the village. This may
exaggerate its actual effect on the poorer sections of the village 
population. Nonetheless the economic strategies of many landless and 
land-poor households crucially depended on loans from the credit samiti. 
Despite the credit samiti, usurious 100-230% p.a. interest loans, which
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previously were the only access to finance for small cultivators, still 
constituted an element of economic and social control in the hands of the 
wealthy. Those in control of the credit samiti in the village tended to 
use their position as a source of income and influence and also continued 
to pursue individual usurious lending. The credit samiti did, however, 
create a new resource for a number of poorer households and enabled them 
to engage in irrigated cultivation (c.f. IV.2.3).
In 1986, the credit samiti made a 32% profit on its loan 
operations and increased its assets to Taka 40.000. Members planned to 
buy a bus and run a service from the road junction at Notunbazar to the 
district and upazila towns in a few years1 time when assets are large 
enough. This idea was adopted from the example of some Comilla KSS about 
which some rumours got to Samitigram via a well-respected neighbouring 
villager.
III.4 .7  The Krishi Samabaya Samitis (KSS)
The KSS (Farmers’ Cooperatives) are village farm er associations
supported by the BRDB. Most Bangladeshi villages have at least one KSS.
There were KSS in Samitigram in the early 70s under the leadership of
the prior generation of village leaders. These KSSs were defunct in 1986.
One member of the present jubok samiti leadership commented laughingly:
"They ha ven ' t  repa id t h e i r  loans y e t .  They are not able 
to  do anything."
The four KSS in the village today were mainly involved in obtaining 
cultivation loans and collecting dues from members after the harvest. The 
managers of the KSSs were all members of the jubok samiti and cooperate 
closely in most agricultural matters and in running the KSSs. The KSSs 
appeared to constitute a considerable material resource fo r their leaders
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in various legal and illegal ways. This is generally known and tolerated 
in Samitigram.
111.4.8 The Mahila Samabaya Samitis (MSS)
There are two MSSs (Women’s Cooperatives) in Samitigram (MSS1 
and MSS 2). Like the KSSs they have a Chair’man’, a manager and several
directors. The first MSS in Samitigram was formed in 1973. Its main
function is to obtain loans for its members. MSS1 had 90 members.
Membership applications from further women were refused so that in 1983 
a second MSS was formed. MSS 2 had 30 members of which some members and 
the chairwoman were Hindu. The women received loans officially intended 
for poultry raising. However, almost all of these loans were used for
other purposes by the MSS women’s husbands. Some poorer households’ 
cultivation activities depend on the MSS loans. Most MSS loans were used 
by the male household members but some of the women from wealthier 
households did use them for poultry business and to lend to poorer
households at higher interest rates.
Two or three of the MSS officeholders went to the upazila
headquarters every week in order to attend meetings and receive
information on health, family planning and household production.
111.4.9 The Pukur Groups
At least two ponds on Samitigram lands were owned by groups. One 
pond was owned by six ’well-off* and ’rich* households. About half this 
pond’s annual proceeds from fish-breeding were given to the mosque and 
the remainder distributed among the pond owners. One of the major bathing 
and washing ponds fo r the village was owned by a group of 12 households.
In 1986 this pond was re-excavated and new concrete steps down to the 
water were constructed. The cost for this work was borne by the richer
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households among those who owned a share in the pond.
The mere fact that ponds have several owners in a country as 
densely populated as Bangladesh is not remarkable.The cooperation between 
people in Samitigram to maintain and use ponds productively for fish 
breeding is. It is one feature of the present predominance of samiti 
activities in the village and an example of how Samitigram groups work to 
increase both productivity and distributional equity in comparison with 
no-group situations (see VI.2).
III .4.10 The Paddy Trading Group
In the early 1980s, four ’well-off* households of Samitigram and 
two of Borogram union headquarters formed a business association in 
order to engage in paddy trading. Sometimes group members sell their own 
crops and those of other villagers to long-distance traders who come to 
the road junction with their lorries. At other times they rent lorries and 
take their rice to be processed in a Natore rice mill and then to other 
parts of the country where produce prices are higher. Through the 
formation of the paddy trading group, some Samitigram households extended 
their income sources beyond cultivation and beyond the village into the 
towns and into other areas of the country. They have linked into 
transport networks and national systems of paddy price information and 
have established contacts to areas which were far beyond their horizon 
only a few years ago. A households* involvement into these widening 
networks is influenced by its class position. However, not only class 
position but also a mixture of personality traits and education affect 
the degree and economic success of a household’s use of wider networks.
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III .5 Irrigation in Samitigram
III.5.1 History and Present Context
Traditional irrigation devices, such as the doon (canoe-shaped
water lifting instrument) and the seti (swing-bucket) have been used in 
Samitigram for many generations to irrigate winter vegetables and local 
variety boro paddy on low land. Today, these traditional irrigation 
devices only remain in use on one piece of Samitigram land (STW No. 14,
Map III.3), where a STW is sited but its owner, who is from another
village, refuses to sell water to other parties.
The first mechanical irrigation device in Samitigram was a LLP in 
1964. Soon after inception, the irrigation group around this LLP
quarrelled and broke up, and LLP irrigation ceased. For a few years there 
was no further mechanical irrigation in the village. In the late sixties, 
STWs started appearing under private ownership. The first STWs in 
Samitigram were bought privately "from the bazar" by a few wealthier 
people before any of the large government and donor schemes for the 
distribution of STW equipment had started (cf. 1.4.3).
Today, from the point of view of the Samitigram villager, there 
are four sources of STWs. The offices of the BADC in Singra upazila 
headquarters, the BRDB, the private STW dealers and agents, and the 
second-hand market.
Samitigram villagers were acquiring STWs from town-based private 
dealers and agents at least 5 years before official agencies made the 
equipment available in Singra. Since the mid-seventies and during the 
attempt to privatise the provision of agricultural inputs over the last 
5-6 years, the BADC has become a major source of supply.
Another way of obtaining STWs is through the BRDB in Singra,
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which operates the IDA 1147 programme under which village farmers’ 
associations (KSS) can obtain STWs through a complicated procedure of 
application, verification, sanctioning and eventual delivery, which involves 
the KSS manager, BRDB upazila level staff, at least two bank officials and 
a private equipment supplier.
The majority of farmers and irrigation groups arranged a bank 
loan with the BKB and purchased a STW from a private supplier. Elaborate 
marketing networks, which reach down to the village and field (see VII.3), 
and assistance to the farmer with loan application procedures distinguish 
Singra’s commercial STW suppliers from the public agencies.
Whether acquired through BRDB, BADC or directly from a commercial 
supplier with a bank loan, the supply of new STWs always involved 
bureaucratised, non-market access conditions for the villager. This is not 
the case fo r the second-hand market which operates on a cash basis. In 
recent years, the secondhand market has expanded partly as a result of 
increasing default rates on bank STW loans. Although obviously difficult 
to trace in individual cases, the practice of acquiring a STW through a 
bank loan, reselling it and defaulting on the loan was clearly a common 
method of raising finance for households with access to bank loans (see 
also V.2).
III .5.2 Command Area Differences
Every STW irrigator’s land forms part of a command area. There 
were important differences between the 31 STW command areas ^  around 
Samitigram in terms of productivity and distributional implications. Map
III.3 shows all 31 command areas on Samitigram lands and conveys an 
impression of the density of irrigation in the village (agricultural land
irrigated). At least 75% to 80% of the village's agricultural lands were
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under STW irrigation.
Of the total of 103 surveyed households in Samitigram, 96 were 
involved in STW irrigation as landowners or tenants in the surveyed 
command areas. The households not involved were either landless labourers 
without own cattle or female-headed households where cultivation had 
passed entirely into the hands of a male relative.
There were 25 irrigation groups and 6 privately owned STWs on 
village lands. As shown throughout the thesis, the distinction between 
STW groups and individually owned STWs is the most important for the 
productivity and distributional implications of STW irrigated cultivation.
Originally, STW irrigation in Samitigram had started on the basis 
of individual STW ownership. In 1985, the five individually owned STWs 
belonged to the members of the top two household categories (the ’rich’ 
and the *well-ofP; see Table IV. 1). STW owning households were also 
involved in irrigation groups but tended to have consolidated a large 
amount of land around their own STW. Individually owned STWs irrigated 
mainly or even exclusively the land of the STW owner. If water was sold, 
the recipients were either rich kin or poor households for whom
irrigation formed part of a multi-stranded patronage relationship with
the wealthier STW owner. The richest household of Samitigram (Malik
IV.2.1) refused to sell water when the formation of irrigation groups 
lowered Samitigram water charges to between 20% and 60% of those in the 
surrounding area.
Table III.2 indicates the different effects of Samitigram’s 
irrigation groups and individually owned STWs. Private command areas were 
considerably smaller than group command areas and served fewer and 
wealthier households. Poorer households who did receive water from
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TABLE III.l: Command Area Characteristics: Private and Group STffs
Private STWs
Irrigating Households per STW 2
Average Command Area Size (Acres) 5.7
Irrigating Households from the 30%
two Poorest Household Categories a'
a) see  Ch IV, es pec i a l l y  Table IV.1
private STWs usually enjoyed less favourable conditions than in the group 
command areas. Irrigation charges were higher and agreements with
individual STW owners of a very temporary and arbitrary nature. In 
contrast, the membership of an irrigation group was stable over time. The 
fact that the distributional impact of private STWs is less regressive in 
Samitigram than in the seven villages (see VI) is to a large extent 
attributable to the influence of the irrigation groups. With the
appearance of the groups, water prices even for water from individually 
owned STWs fell to a level lower than in any other village in the
surrounding beel and access to irrigation water increased particularly for 
poorer households.
Although the distinction between private individual and group
command areas remains major in terms of household level accumulation 
from  cultivation, other differences between STWs highlight further 
distributional issues.






electrical pumps. At 1986 prices, electrical STWs operated at half the 
pumping costs of diesel STWs in Samitigram. When asked about the most 
important distinction between command areas, the majority o f cultivators 
mentioned the cost difference between electricity and diesel. Diesel pumps 
were regarded as a second choice by all interviewees. Operation and 
maintenance costs are higher, the carrying of fuel from the bazar to the
fields is tedious and time-consuming, and locally available supplies of 
fuel tended to be of inferior quality thus shortening the life span of 
the diesel engine.
Electricity lines in Samitigram concentrated on the lands of the 
two richer paras, Purbopara and Poscimpara (see Map III.2). The lands of 
the poorest parat U ttorpara, were not connected. During a survey of the 
impact of electrification which was conducted during my own fieldwork and 
which covered Samitigram (see Timberg, July 1986), village interviewees 
constantly asserted that the most striking improvements due to
electrification lie in the irrigation field. The construction of better 
housing, the purchase of radios, bicycles, watches and even televisions
was attributed to the impact of electrification on returns from 
agriculture. Investments into new income sources such as shops and fish 
breeding ponds were also reported as post-electrification results.
However, cross-research interference may have somewhat 
overemphasized the electrification issue in interviewees* responses. Also 
the direction of the cause - effect relationship is unclear. Irrigation 
and electricity may have occurred later in U ttorpara because it was a 
poorer area; or U ttorpara is poorer today because of the later
introduction of these productivity-enhancing innovations. Either way, it is 
clear that the presence of electricity lines conveys material advantages
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on to the irrigator and that these accrue predominantly to the lands of 
wealthier households in Samitigram.
The average command area of diesel driven STWs was 8.97 acres 
while electric STWs had an average command area of 10.77 acres. All the 
larger command areas in the village had electric pumps. Furthermore, land 
connected to electricity lines appeared to be more intensively irrigated 
^  than unconnected land, which had to rely on diesel pumps only. All the 
command areas which suffered reductions in size or the total breakdown of 
the irrigation group were irrigated by diesel-powered engines.
III.5.3 The Shallow Tubewell Groups
The formation of irrigation groups was part of the general drive 
towards group-based economic activities in Samitigram. After some wealthy 
villagers had used STWs on an individual basis, the landowners in the 
potential command area of private STWs started to form groups shortly 
after 1971. STW owners sold their wells to these groups. This happened at 
the initiative of the jubok samiti, the members of which were the first 
STW owners to sell their equipment to groups (e.g. Saidur, IV.2.1). Later, 
the owners of other unirrigated blocks of land also formed groups and 
bought STWs. Some of these group STWs were bought for cash on the 
second hand market, but most were obtained with a BKB bank loan in the 
name of one group member but repaid by the whole group in annual 
instalments.
Although legally, group ownership of these STWs is insecure at 
best, Samitigram villagers had no doubts about its de facto validity. 
There was no strong tendency for richer households to obtain group loans 
in their name. In one case, a rather poor household mortgaged land to the 
bank for a group loan. The son of this household was then employed as
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pump operator by the group.
It is important to note that Samitigram’s irrigation groups were
privately initiated and not assisted in their operation by any external
state institution, foreign donor or NGO. Wade’s (1988b p. 107) comment 
that to the state institutions which have internal sanction mechanisms
only, are invisible, applies fully to the Samitigram case.
Samitigram groups evolved over time and remain flexible in 
functions and procedures. Rules are devised and altered in meetings as
problems arise. This stands in contrast to externally initiated "water- 
users groups where constitutions and regulations tend to be developed and 
introduced by outsiders. In Samitigram, irrigation groups members argued
about and took votes on procedures such as the keeping and signing of
minutes and the charging of interest on overdue payments. These
procedures were thus understood and backed by group members.
Although groups had no formal constitutions, the rules by which 
they operated could be traced in the minute book which many groups had 
maintained since their inception. Group meetings decided on issues such 
as who is employed as their STW operator, on the operator’s salary, on 
the annual instalments to be repaid to the bank by the landowner/group 
members and on the water fee which is payable by owner cultivators and 
tenants.
Group command areas were irrigated by rotation through a network 
of earth trenches (drains) excavated by group members or hired labour at 
the beginning of the irrigation season in February/M arch when paddy
seedlings are transplanted into the fields. The rotational system largely 
avoided ’tailender problems’ and achieved relatively equal water 
distribution between command area plots. A STW operator (locally called
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"driver") is employed from mid-February to June to run the pump,
distribute water between command area plots and guard the equipment at 
night.
Cultivators (owner-cultivators and tenants) paid for irrigation
water on a seasonal basis according to irrigated land area. For STWs not 
yet paid for, group members (owner cultivators and landlords) paid an 
additional seasonal capital instalment.
Groups managers kept accounts, called and led group meetings and 
maintained external connections for the group such as with the
electricity company and with dealers of spare parts and mechanics. The
village's 25 irrigation groups were managed by a total of 13 people. All
group managers belonged to the top two household categories (see Table
IV. 1) and managed between one and four groups each. The majority of
irrigation group managers belonged to the circle of early jubok samiti 
founders (see III.4.1). Two irrigation groups broke up during the 
fieldwork period and one manager lost his position. None of the managers 
of these failed groups were part of the jubok samiti whereas all
successful group managers were.
The group manager has considerable power to decide which land to 
include in the command area. Although group command areas were larger 
than private command areas, and although there was a significantly larger 
percentage of poorer households in group command areas than in private
command areas (see Table III.2), there were some water access problems 
for poorer cultivators. If water runs short, such as when in 1986 a late
monsoon required initial irrigation of the early amon seedlings, many
small cultivators did not sow amon because they expected to bear the
brunt o f the water shortage. In one case, an irrigation group manager did
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not give water to the land of several poor households in a command area 
even though the capacity of the STW was not fully used. The irrigation 
group in question had originally been formed to counteract a rich land- 
cum-STW-owner’s attempts to charge high water prices 10). Now, however, 
the manager of the ’new* group refused water to several cultivators 
within the potential command area. His water refusal made the cultivation 
of those plots less profitable and increased the likelihood of land sale. 
Due to their greater control over command area composition, STW managers 
are thus in a better position to buy land in their groups* command areas. 
They can use the threat of water refusal to deter other prospective 
buyers. This, and a number of other ways of extracting economic benefit 
from the position of irrigation group manager (overreporting of costs and 
of irrigated land of others, underreporting of own irrigated land) made 
the position of irrigation group manager attractive even though it 
carried no direct remuneration.
There were a number of differences between the 25 group command 
areas in the village. The socio-economic composition of an irrigation 
group influenced the type of group management and the distribution of 
income from irrigated cultivation. This was most clearly revealed by two 
groups (Nos 1 & 6, Map III.3) which were managed by the richest household 
in the village. The membership of these ’pseudo-groups* consisted mainly 
of sharecroppers and poorer cultivators with little land, many of whom 
depended on Malik’s household. These groups rarely held meetings, and it 
was common knowledge that the manager misappropriated the members* bank 
loan repayments. Sharecroppers were forced to pay not only the water fee 
but also instalments for the STWs although this contravened accepted 
group regulations. Multiple links of power and dependency connected group
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manager and cultivators in these two command areas. Many sharecropped in 
the manager’s land in the command area or elsewhere, were employed by 
the manager’s household or in debt to them. As a result, members were 
hardly ever able to insist on the implementation of group rules. These 
two ’pseudogroups* directly reproduced and enforced existing relations of 
domination and dependency.
In contrast, irrigation groups with a more even internal 
distribution of wealth or formal education contained a stronger element 
of mutual control between manager and group members, some of whom were 
themselves managers of irrigation or other groups in the village. A 
relatively high level of education among group members, growing
fam iliarity with group management procedures, and the confidence which 
the jubok samiti generally inspired in the village, maintained groups
which appeared to enforce their rules largely irrespective of the socio­
economic standing of the individual members concerned. The loan repayment 
records of these irrigation groups were far above the national average
and better than the repayment records of Samitigram’s individual, private 
STW owners
With 75% to 80% of agricultural land under irrigation, irrigable
land is running short in Samitigram. The more recently formed irrigation
groups (1-3 years) tend to have smaller command areas than the older 
groups (4-10 years). In 1986, the management of an irrigation group with 
one of the largest command areas (over 16 acres) initiated the formation
of a new group to irrigate some of the original group’s land and some
previously unirrigated land in the same area. The formation of the new 
irrigation group was agreed on by the managers of the adjoining command 
areas and some other jubok samiti notables. The majority of landowners in
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the command area were merely told afterwards to which STW their land now 
belonged.
STW groups involved a larger number of landowners, larger 
command areas and lower water costs than individually owned STWs. Water 
charges had fallen as a result of group formation in the seventies, so 
that Samitigram water charges in 1985/86 were only 20% to 60% of those 
in ’the seven villages* (see Ch.VI) and other villages in the area. Lower 
irrigation charges are only partly explained by the lower level and higher 
fertility of the Samitigram agricultural lands. Although Samitigram lands 
required less water and yielded more crops than most of the surrounding
beel lands, examples like that of Malik’s failure to sell water at inflated 
charges (IV.2.1 point 10) show that the irrigation groups have clearly
reduced the scope for private STW owners in Samitigram to charge
extractive water rates. In contrast, in villages with individual STW 
ownership (cf. Baluabasua VI. 1) private STW owners were able to inflate 
water charges to and beyond the point where irrigated cultivation
remained profitable to water purchasers. In Samitigram, the availability 
of water through irrigation groups reduced such extractive practices.
Irrigation groups influenced the distribution of direct gains 
from irrigated cultivation to the advantage of poorer cultivators. The 
groups reduced the extractive power of the rich STW owners and thus gave 
poorer cultivators some access to new economic opportunities. The rise of 
a ’new elite* of younger village leaders, who have control over groups is 
a concurrent development. These young leaders* reliance on village groups 
partly arises from  a generational conflict fo r leadership. From this arose 
a new form of patronage which aggregates clients in groups and which is 
therefore more adapted to the requirements of new agricultural
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technology, production methods and to an expanded population. The groups 
of Samitigram and the attendant socio-economic changes may indicate a 
new way of adapting socio-economic incorporation mechanisms to a changed 
technological and demographic context. This stands in contrast to the
impoverishing effect of market mechanisms in situations such as in the
seven villages (see Ch VI) where diverging degrees of power for different 
rural classes are enforced by the introduction of a new technology.
NOTES
1) Cropped a rea  per annum /  c u l t i v a t e d  land.
2) All s t a t i s t i c a l  informat ion above from Bangladesh Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s  (BBS), 
January 1985 and May 1986.
3) Asaduzzaman, 1984.
4) Master Plan Off ice  (MPO), December 1985.
5) Lou land i s  flooded to  more than 6 fe e t  dur ing the ra iny season.
6) Personal  communication dur ing v i l l a g e  f ieldwork from H.P. Muller P.h.D.  Gott ingen,  
forthcoming.
7) The que s t i on  of the ' v i a b i l i t y  of the  family farm' under new product ion  condi t ions  
in rur a l  Bangladesh was f i r s t  r a i s e d  by Wood (1986); see a l s o  Lewis (forthcoming)  on 
the  new networks around a number of a g r i c u l t u r a l  t echnologies .
8) Also found in ongoing research  by Jabbar (1988 May 6 Univer s i ty  of Bath Seminar)
9) 31 STUs (Nos 1-4; 6-20 & 22-33 on Map 111.3) were surveyed in Samitigram.
10) No.32 Map I I I . 3; see the  s t r u c t u r e  of the  C.A., complementary to  the  r ich  p r i v a t e  
C.A. (no 22) which r e s u l t s .
11) Information from union and u paz i la  level  bank managers.
12) I r r i g a t i o n  i n t e n s i t y  i s  here  understood as t o t a l  i r r i g a t e d  l a n d / t o t a l  c u l t i v a t e d  
land.
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CHAPTER IV: VILLAGE PEOPLE
IV. 1 Household Categories
The household categories used here to distinguish Samitigram households 
attempt to capture the essential distinctions between village households in the eyes 
of household members. Section IV.2 introduces 11 village households using 9 
points identified as crucial distinctions between households (see Table IV. 1). This 
is done in order to achieve comparability between household situations, and to 
demonstrate the rationale behind my household categorisation. The case studies 
are referred to in the discussion of agrarian relations throughout the rest of the 
thesis in order to make use of the contextual knowledge gained by the reader. 
This should not be misunderstood as a limitation of the argument to the case 
studies.
IV.1.1 The ’Rich*
Of 103 surveyed households, 5 (4.9%) were ’rich’. Families with several 
married sons and their children resided in the same homestead. Household 
division before the death of the father of the extended family is rare. The 
household is headed by the oldest male although his eldest son may eventually 
take the decisions in the household and represent it to the outside. Land is 
registered in the names of several household members including senior women so 
that land taxes are avoided and access to bank loans is increased. Marriage links 
are formed with the government bureaucracy and the business circles of the 
nearby towns. Families often include a haji (Muslim devotee who has undertaken 
the pilgrimage to Mecca).
Families live in large mud and brick buildings with tiled or tin roofs. A 
number of cattle (water buffaloes, cows and oxen) is owned and the residential 
area contains several animal sheds as well as storage space for crops. A variety 
of consumer durables (bicycle, watches, television, electric fan, radio cassette)
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and a STW or a small LLP are owned.
’Rich’ households buy land annually, often during the post-^oro harvest 
period for the winter boro paddy. All households reported that they were better 
off with more land than under the previous household head. Some land is 
sharecropped out to a number of local poorer tenants in small plots. These tenants 
usually rely on the landowner in several ways such as for credit, mortgages, 
contacts to government bureaucracy or employment.
At least one household member, normally male and from the younger 
generation, is educated up to SSC standard or beyond. For younger sons the 
Bachelor of Commerce acquired at Rajshahi University often leads to business 
activities or a job in local government. Pressure on land is thus reduced and 
important links to business and state are formed. Agriculture is a main occupation 
in which the household head or his oldest son usually takes a supervisory function 
while also occasionally providing his own labour in the fields. ’The Rich’ are also 
usually engaged in some trading such as in a roadside shop, paddy trading, fish 
farming and sale. This may employ another one or two of the sons of an 
extended family. While the land keeps the family together in one economic unit, 
business and government service prevent the exclusive reliance on land as an 
income source.
The ’rich’ own a total of 114.8 acres (34 % of operated land) but only 
operate 81.5 acres (22% of operated land). Average owned land per household is 
22.97 acres but only 16.3 acres are operated. The average effective landholding 
(see II.4) per household is 19.4 acres and the per head effective landholding 
varies between 0.74 and 1.90 acres with an average of 1.57 acres per household 
member.
Households employ at least one all-year-round permanent labourer and 
several seasonal labourers for agricultural work. Day labourers are called in for
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specific extra tasks in the fields or the homestead. Female labour may be 
employed for household work and post-harvest processing. Migrant labour gangs 
from other areas of the country are employed to harvest the winter boro in May 
to June.
Bank loans are readily accessible to the ’rich’ and are taken up eagerly. 
Some of these bank loans may be recycled as short-term high interest loans to the 
poorer households of the village. Closely related poorer village households may 
be supported with temporary interest-free loans.
The political affiliations of the ’rich* tend to be well-known and extend 
to a group of poorer followers. Frequent business is conducted in government 
offices at union and upazila level. T he rich’ (and some of the ’w ell-o fF , see 
below) are the window to the wider world for the rest of the village in more 
than one sense. They provide the point of contact to the officers of government 
and parastatal organisations such as the BADC, BRDB, DAE and the banks. They 
bring, or at their choice do not bring, information about opportunities and 
developments in the rest of the country to the village. They hold key positions in 
the local political structure such as that of union parishad member or chairman.
IV.1.2 The ’W ell-O ff
25% of households (26 households) in Samitigram were ’w e ll-o ff . The 
prominent feature of these households is the variety of occupations and income 
sources through which any one household maintains itself.
There is no established household structure. Extended families may live 
together and keep joint accounts or families may be nuclear both economically 
and residentially. Often one or several sons have separated from  their parental 
household and sharecrop their father’s land. Although brick houses are rare, 
homesteads are substantial. A family usually owns enough cattle fo r cultivation
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purposes, a country boat and maybe a cart or a bicycle. Assets necessary for the 
non-cultivation occupations of the household such as for example a shop, a 
sewing machine or tools belong to the household.
Most of the ’w e ll-o ff households take some land (0.3-0.6 acres) in 
mortgage while a few also mortgage out some land to raise money to buy other 
land.
64% of ’w e ll-o ff  household heads stated that their fathers had had 
more land than themselves. Of these 73% reported to have bought land during 
their own time as household head and 33% reported to have sold land (land sale 
and purchase categories are not exclusive). A total of 62% of the ’w ell-o ff stated 
to have bought land under the current household head and not sold any. Only just 
over 10% of the ’w e ll-o ff (3 households) had sold land but not bought any. 
Among these, one household sold land in order to invest in a shop for electrical 
spare parts. Another main reason for land sale in this category were crop failures 
before the introduction of irrigated winter boro (on this see also III.3).
Households usually have one male family member educated up to SSC
level.
The occupational structure of the ’w e ll-o ff  is the most varied among 
the four household types. One household combined 6 different income-generation 
occupations inside it. (farming, biscuit and tea stall, village defence force leader, 
mosque caller, date palm juice sale, madrassah teacher). Other common non­
farming occupations among the ’w ell-off’ are STW operator, paddy parboiling 
and trading, mechanic, tailor and storekeeper (dry goods, electrical spare parts). 
Due to these multiple occupations there is no fixed pattern to the relation 
between operated and owned land and the crop basis among the ’well-off*. A 
household may derive a major part of its income from activities other than 
cultivation and sharecrop out some of its cultivable land or it may concentrate on
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cultivation and sharecrop in land in addition to owned household land.
The ’w ell-off’ own 142.23 acres, (42% of operated land) and operate 
152.8 acres (41% of operated land). Their average owned area is 5.47 acres, 
operated area 5.87 acres and the average effective landholding is 5.73 acres. As 
outlined above these values hide large differences as some households either 
sharecrop out most or all of their land and others make the sharecropping-in of 
large amounts of land one of their economic strategies (see also V.3). The per 
head crop basis for the ’w ell-o ff varies between 0.3 and 1.55 acres with an 
average of 0.72 acres per head.
The ’w e ll-o ff employ seasonal workers and family labour for amon 
cultivation and pre-harvest boro cultivation activities. During the rainy season 
resident labour is very rarely employed. Migrant labour gangs are hired to 
harvest the boro. Female labour is not hired for post-harvest crop processing but 
done by the women in the household.
Formal loans are taken for cultivation purposes as well as for recycling 
to the poorer households of Samitigram. Several households engage in high- 
interest moneylending.
The union parishad member is among the ’w e ll-o ff. Several other 
household heads from this category are among the usual faces in the union and 
upazila headquarters. An active but not necessarily leading role in local politics 
based on an understanding of access strategies to the resources disbursed by the 
state perhaps best describes the role of these households in regional politics.
IV.1.3 The ’Coping*
30% (31) of households in Samitigram were in this category, best 
described as "those who can just make ends meet". Nuclear households reside and 
keep accounts separately. Only 2 of the 31 households ’coping’ live as joint 
families. Usually a son’s marriage is soon followed by the division of the family
- 1 1 2 -
into nuclear residential and economic units.
’Coping* households live in mud houses in contrast to the prominence of 
brick amon the wealthier and of straw and jute stick constructions among the 
poorer categories, with often only one or two rooms. 84% of the ’coping* (all but 
5 households) own a country boat and a hal. Of those households who do not own 
a hal one is headed by a woman who does not cultivate herself, one household 
bought fishing equipment with the proceeds of a land sale and two sold their hal 
to redeem some mortgaged land. One household had just taken a bank loan to 
purchase a hal.
67% of ’coping’ household heads stated that they had less land now than 
in the previous generation, 30% stated that they had gained land over the last 
generation and 2% reported no change. As many as 59% reported having bought 
land in the last generation but 22% of these were involved in a circular buying 
and selling process in accordance with the life-cycle of their family (e.g. sale for 
daughters* weddings or to feed young children,land purchase with received dowry 
from sons’ wedding). 48% of the ’coping’ households reported land sales. The 
main reasons for land sales were floods and consequent food shortages and 
diseases in the family. The disaccumulation of land over the generations, which is 
prevalent among households in this category must thus be attributed at least as 
much to multiple inheritance as to land sales.
When it can be obtained, land is sharecropped-in according to family 
labour availability. 69% of ’coping* households sharecropped-in land. For some 
households long-term sharecropping contracts with outsiders (absentee 
landowners) helped to avoid sale of family labour. Two household heads said they 
occasionally sold their labour when sharecropping land was not available. The 
degree of security of a household’s sharecropping contracts often indicated a 
’coping* household’s economic security in general. Households with short-term
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sharecropping contracts tended to own and operate less land and were 
economically more vulnerable. They often sold or mortgaged out their land in 
order to compensate for lost sharecropping land.
32% of households gave some of their land in mortgage and 29% took 
some land in mortgage. 39% had no involvement in the mortgage market at the 
time of fieldwork. With the nuclear family as the standard household type in this 
category, sharecropping and mortgaging often serve as a means of income 
redistribution between close relatives. Sons sharecrop the land of their widowed 
mothers, or sisters mortgage in the land of their poorer brothers and then 
sharecrop the same land out to them. Among 'coping* households the mortgaging 
in of land owned by poorer households is desired as an avenue to possible 
eventual ownership of the land.
Only in one case was a household member in this category educated 
beyond primary school level. Adult men tend to leave primary school after 1-3 
years. Children of these households are often needed as family labour and 
therefore not sent to school. Generally girls attend school somewhat longer than 
boys, who are employed to herd cattle or work for wealthier families. In other 
areas of Bangladesh (compare White, 1987 on Tanore) the restrictions on female 
labour apply less strongly. As a consequence in those areas young girls of poorer 
households do not obtain longer periods of primary education than boys.
Outside the rainy season young sons of 'coping' and 'poor' households 
(see below) often work for richer village households. Grown males are usually 
engaged in cultivating their own and sharecropped land. During the rainy season 
household income is often supplemented by fishing. 'Rice business’, the purchase 
of paddy, its husking and resale of the rice is undertaken by a few families (see 
Chapter VII). There are also two tailors in this category and some STW operators. 
One household head, an old form er teacher, sharecropped out all his land and
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relied on sign-painting and the repair of radios, watches and similar for his 
family’s daily income. Agriculture is the main and often the only occupation of 
this type of ’the coping*. Other income sources have supplementary character. 
Especially for the households who are annual net purchasers of paddy (48% of 
category) and have to finance 2-6 months of their family’s rice needs, non­
cultivation income is an essential supplement.
The ’coping* own a total of 62.44 acres (18% of reported owned land). 
They operate 97.5 acres (26% of operated land). The average owned land per 
household is 2.01 acres but 3.15 acres are cultivated. Effective landholding is 
3.01 acres, i.e. slightly less than the operated land per household as it reflects the 
incidence of sharecropping. Per head effective landholding varies between 0.1 
and 0.83 acres with an average of 0.42 acres of land per head from which crops 
are received.
Family labour is relied on for most agricultural operations outside the 
harvest. Planting and weeding are often undertaken inside the local system of 
inter-fam ily labour exchange, gata (see V.3). During the boro harvest, one 
migrant labour gang harvests several ’Coping’ households’ land in succession.
Although all households in the category are members of the farmers’ 
cooperatives (KSS) few of them take part in local politics. From an almost 
violent denial of participation in party politics to the vague reply that ’at election 
time I might follow a political party* the indications are that political 
involvement is slight. Four members of the category stated to belong to BNP 
(Bangladesh National Party).
IV.1.4 The ’Poor*
40% (41) of Samitigram’s households were ’poor*. Unable to obtain 
further residential land or to afford house construction materials, extended 
families often live in the same homestead (bari) but are economically separate. A
-  115 -
widowed mother or a divorced sister may form a separate subunit fo r cooking 
and eating but live in the same house as the rest of the family.
Houses are small and made from mud or, among the very poorest, from 
jute sticks with straw roofs. In slightly better-o ff households, houses may have 
tin roofs. The homestead land is not always owned by the household, but may 
sometimes belong to a richer neighbour or may be khas (government) land. 
Households do not usually own a hal, although the renting out of a pair of water 
buffaloes constituted one household's main income source. Fishing boats, a main 
income-generating asset, are often rented in from wealthier village households. 
The monthly cost of this is equivalent to 7 to 10 days* average fishing income.
68% of 'poor' households had not sold any land under the present 
household head. As 65% also said that there was more land in the household 
under the previous head it is clear that land sales were not a predominant cause 
of reduction in sizes of owned holdings among 'the poor'. Multiple subdivisions 
through inheritance and splitting up of joint families into nuclear households 
were the main cause of reductions in owned land per 'poor* household. The 
long-term landless, who had no more land to lose, formed the majority among 
those 25% of the 'poor* who said that their land situation had not changed over 
the last generation. Among the 10% who stated that they had more land than in 
the previous generation, no-one had gained land through cultivation. There were 
two ghor jam ais who had received land through their wives, one full-tim e 
fisherman and one operator for small diesel surface pumps. All had bought very 
small plots of land from the proceeds of these occupations. Agricultural land, 
once lost, is very rarely regained by the 'poor*.
The main reasons for land sale by the 'poor' were food shortage and 
daughters* weddings. Land was also sold to undertake house repairs and in one 
case to buy a fishing boat as the household moved out of cultivation as its main
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income generation strategy. As indicated above, however, multiple inheritance 
rather than land sales is the main reason for the reduction of landholding size 
among ’the poor*
62% of the ’poor’ sharecropped-in some land at the time of the survey. 
Several households reported that they had lost their sharecropping land after the 
previous season. The ownership of a hal was a main precondition to obtain 
sharecropping land. Many sharecropping contracts were entered between relatives 
of unequal economic standing. In some cases, a sum of money ("security") was 
demanded by the landowner in return for the provision of sharecropping land 
(also noted by Rahman 1986 p. 162). Sharecropping contracts were mostly 
short-term  and insecure. Often a sharecropping contract was only one part of a 
more complex relationship between the owner and cultivator of a piece of land. 
Among the ’poor’ who sharecropped in, 32% of households owned a hal. None of 
those who failed to obtain any sharecropping land owned a hal.
One ’poor’ household mortgaged in with the proceeds of a small biscuit 
stall by the road. Those who mortgaged out did so for consumption needs and 
tended to mortgage their land in small parcels to several different mortgagees 
over time. This pattern was especially noticeable in households with generally 
downward economic development.
The great majority of adults were illiterate and children were only sent 
to school for one or two years if  their labour is not required. Boys from the age 
of about nine were in annual employment with richer village households or 
earned a small amount of money for cow herding.
All ’poor’ households had an annual deficit of paddy consumption over 
requirements. Many had to buy rice for all or most of the year. Those who are 
able to eat their own produce for some of the year are forced to purchase paddy 
or rice during the pre-harvest high-price period. All but one household (who
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recently opened a roadside biscuit stall and was probably upwardly mobile 
through this), sold the labour of their adult males for agricultural work. The very 
poorest sold female and child labour also.
The income sources of the ’poor* show a high degree of seasonal 
variation. Fishing in the bee! for at least part of the year occupies an important 
place in annual household budgeting. Most of ’the poor* households engage in 
fishing and fish sale in the local hats and bazars. Netmaking for sale is also 
common. The m ajority of men spend the autumn and cool season (September to 
January) with occasional day labour in the village (house improvement and 
construction, digging up of bamboo roots for sale as firewood, the excavation of 
ponds) or they work for the Food For Work programme and supplement this 
income by some fishing. The demand for full-tim e day labour from January 
onwards when boro transplantation begins and agricultural work continues until 
after the boro harvest in early June. ’Poor’ women may do occasional work in 
richer households such as preparing murri (puffed rice), cooking for large 
occasions and crop processing. Only the old women of the poorest households and 
divorced or widowed women work outside their own homesteads.
The ’poor*, 40% of Samitigram households, own a total of 20.06 acres 
of land. This is less than the 23 acres, which are owned on average by each 
household of the ’rich* of the village and under 6% of reported owned land. With 
a total of 41.53 acres the ’poor* operate more than twice the area they own. This 
reflects the considerable importance of sharecropping-in fo r ’poor’ households. 
Also, for the ’poor* the difference between effective holding (indicator of income 
from  land) and operated holding (indicator of expenditure on cultivation; see
II.5.2) is greatest. Their total effective landholding of 31.25 acres is about 50% 
less than total operated land. This is caused by the i / i  sharecropping 
arrangements under which over 50% of ’poor* households* operated land was
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cultivated. Per head effective landholding varies between 0 and 0.37 acres with 
an average of 0.11 acres per household member. This is a clear indication that 
cultivation cannot be the main basis for the ’poor’s* survival in Samitigram any 
more.
Household labour is the mainstay of agricultural production by the 
’poor*. The gata labour exchange system between families of similar labour 
endowment is used during the pre-harvest season. Unlike the wealthier 
categories, ’poor* households did not substitute household labour with hired 
labour inside the gata arrangements. Some of ’the Poor* cultivators shared 
migrant labour gangs for the boro harvest. Others harvested their crops with 
household labour supplemented by locally hired day labour at peak periods of 
agricultural activity.
With a recurrent annual paddy deficit and the need for cultivation 
credit for boro cultivation, many ’poor* households are locked into a dependence 
on consumption and production loans. Most households who have a little land 
received or had in the past received cultivation loans from the local commercial 
bank. A greater number received loans from the Farmers* Cooperative (KSS) and 
especially the Womens* Cooperative (MSS). Formal bank loans are used to cover 
cultivation costs. A great number of households rely on informal loans from 
village sources. While some of these loans are no-interest between relatives or 
friends, most of of them involve interest rates of up to 230% per annum. A 
common practice is to loan 100 Taka in the pre-harvest season and then to 
demand 1 maund of paddy in return after the harvest three months later which 
sells for between up to 200 Taka. Another practice is to loan 1 maund of paddy 
and demand 1± maunds back three months later (see V.2).
The ’poor* enter the picture of regional politics at election time mainly. 
They then tend to join the followers of one of the powerful local figures.
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Table IV.1: Composite P i c tu re  of Household Categories  (Samitigram)
THE RICH THE WELL OFF THE COPING THE POOR
_____________________________ 1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE________________________ ______
j o i n t  r e s i d e n t i a l l y mixed nuclear  resi* j o i n t  re s i d e n ­
& economically
2. MAIN ASSETS
d e n t i a l l y  & eco­
nomically
t i a l l y  I  nuclear  
economically
b r ic k  house mud or br ick mud house mud or ju te
s ev e ra l  c a t t l e house boat shop boat s t i c k  house
s t o ra g e  bu i Id ings c a t t l e
s t a b l e s  shop STU
3.  LAND
annual land purchase f requent  land land s a l e  and l i t t l e  land
no s a l e p u r c h a s e , l i t t l e  
s a l e
purchase s a l e  or purchase
increa se  in increase or disaccumula tion disaccumulation
holding over l a s t decrease  in through through
genera t ion holding over 
l a s t  genera tion
in her i ta nce inhe r i tance
sharecrop out to sharecrop in sharecrop  in may sharecrop in
la rge  number of la rg e r  p lo t s  on according to small p l o t s  on
tenan ts longer cont rac t s household labour shor t  agreements
give  and take take mortgages take  mortgages
give mortgages mortgages 
A. EDUCATION
for  l i f e - c y c l e  
needs
fo r  consumption
beyond c l a s s  10 up to  c la s s  10 mixed mostly i l l i t e r a t e
of te n  B.A.Commerce
5. OCCUPATIONS/INCOME
c l a s s  1-3 
GENERATION
superv isory mu l t ip le a g r i c u l t u r a l day labour (men
a g r i c u l t u r a l  t rade a g r i c u l t u r a l  I p e t t y  t ra de & women) ch i ld
local  admi ni s t r a t ion non-ag r ic u l t ur a l ( f i s h  & paddy) labour f i sh  sa le
& government
6.  CULTIVATION
occas iona l  labour
operated land less opera ted land opera ted land operated land
than owned land more or less more than owned more than owned
than owned land land land
e . l  a) more than e . l .m ore  or e . l .  more than e . l .m ore  than
opera ted  land les s  than op. land owned land owned land
7. LABOUR USE ( i r r i g a t e d  c u l t i v a t i o n )
annual & seasonal seasonal  family family exchange fami ly exchange
migrant  groups labour exchange 
migrant  groups 
8. CREDIT
groups & day labour
poor repayment take  formal loans dependent on dependent on
of formal loans fo r  investment & c u l t i v a t i o n c u l t i v a t i o n  &
give  h i g h - i n t e r e s t re*lending loans consumption
loans loans
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
prominent in a c t i v e  in s h i f t i n g  or  no may jo in  p o l i ­
local  p o l i t i c s local  p o l i t i c s a l l e g ia n c es t i c a l  following
e . l .  * e f f e c t i v e landholding fo r  d e f in i t io n  see 11.4.3
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When asked about their political affiliations more than one householder in this 
group replied "What is X’s party? I support that". Political affiliation is commonly 
seen as a means to achieve economic benefits.
Table IV. 1 summarizes household categories by the nine major
characteristics which were worked out as the main distinction between household 
types. With the help of these nine points a classification of the 103 households in 
the initial survey of Samitigram was undertaken.
Classification was an ongoing process throughout my fieldwork in the 
village. It involved countless discussions with the villagers during which I was 
able to check how relevant my categories were to village concepts. Thus
household categories here represent an intermediate research finding and, at the 
same time, the basis for further, more specific investigations into the role of 
irrigation. The question of how different composite situations of ’rich*, ’well- 
off1, ’coping’ and ’poor’ interact with the irrigation factor can only be tackled 
after complex household situations have been identified and reduced to
manageable categories.
A few households changed to a different category as I got to know 
more about them. In borderline cases, where there was no obvious cluster of 
attributes locating a household into one category, I decided on an eventually 
intuitive basis. This was the case for 3 households where my information
remained incomplete. The great majority of ’poor’ households hired out adult 
male agricultural labour whereas only one or two ’coping’ and no ’w ell-off’ and 
’rich’ households did so. There was also little variation in the type of credit and 
land market involvement inside categories. Other aspects such as ’assets’ (2), 
’education (4) and ’relation to regional politics (9) formed a continuum across 
household categories with some intra-category variation but combined into very 
different opportunity situations for households of different categories.
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IV.2 Household Profiles
In the following sections (IV.2.1-5) specific households (case studies) 
are introduced along the lines of the above household categorisation, analysed for 
their resource strategies and for the specific role irrigation plays in this.
In order to understand the complexity of factors, which affect the 
rationale behind a household’s economic strategies a more detailed description 
and analysis of 11 households from  the four categories introduced above is given 
in this section. It outlines the differences between household types and shows how 
and why an individual household differs from its category in some points (see 
Table IV. 1) without actually falling outside it.
D ifferent types of relationships, such as economic, political and kinship 
are outlined in their significance for the individual household. Where possible, 
income sources have been quantified. In order to calculate income from paddy 
sales the season's average price of Taka 175 was used unless specific information 
about sales of the household at different points in time throughout the season was 
available. In cases where information was not available this leads to an 
underestimate of the profits of larger sellers who are able to speculate, take 
advantage of seasonal market price fluctuations and sell to government stores at 
fixed above market prices during the low-price periods. It also overestimates 
small cultivators’ profits who are often forced to sell at very low post-harvest 
prices to repay loans and finance their cultivation costs and are mostly denied the 
opportunity to sell to government stores.
This research takes the household level as the smallest unit of analysis. 
The resource strategies of the household unit and the way the household relates to 
its socio-economic environment are the prime focus. Although this reflects the 
male bias of Bangladeshi society and of a lot of research, households are here 
introduced through their heads who are mostly male. Irrigation in Bangladesh is
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part of male territory. It is introduced and executed by men in an environment 
where women are hardly ever seen. This does not mean that women do not have 
an effect or are not affected (see White, 1988). But it does mean that the 
strategies and processes, with which this research is concerned, originate 
primarily in ’the men’s world’ (see II.3.1) and are thus introduced.
The household ’story* is first introduced along the nine points which 
make up the composite picture, thus it is clarified why the household was 
considered part of its category. Each case study is complemented by an 
assessment of how the household situation changed after the introduction of STW 
irrigation. The case studies of each household category are followed by an 
analysis of strategies and change among households of the category and of the 
general effect of this on the village’s agrarian structure and political economy. 
IV.2.1 The ’Rich’: Malik and Saidur 
MALIK
1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
Malik is about 55 years old. He, his wife, three married sons with their 
wives and children and one young, unmarried daughter form a joint household of 
16 members. They live together in one homestead and keep joint accounts for 
everything.
All of Malik’s daughters-in-law come from other villages of houses of 
lesser wealth than Malik’s. One of his own daughters is married into a rich 
household in a village nearby. Malik irrigates some of his land from the STW 
owned by his son-in-law ’s father. One of his daughters is married to an officer 
of the BADC at the district level in Rajshahi. This connection is much 
emphasized by the family and the son-in-law often comes to visit as an especially 
honoured guest.
2. ASSE TS
Malik is the richest man in the village. He and his family live in a large 
brick house, the first of its kind in the village, built only a few years ago. It 
includes grain storage spaces and a central courtyard around which the rooms for 
the nuclear families are grouped. There the household life goes on. The women 
of the household hardly ever leave the compound. The youngest wife, married 
for three years had not even visited the neighbours yet.
Malik owns two water buffaloes, eight cows and four calves. There are 
also two sheep, six ducks and a number of chickens in the household. One of the 
six privately owned and operated STW’s on Samitigram land belongs to Malik’s 
family. There is also a bicycle, a radio and a television set and a sewing machine 
in the household. They opened a dry goods store by the metalled road in 1982. In
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1986 there were rumours in the village that Malik was planning to install a rice 
mill.
3. LAND
With over 44 acres, Malik owns the largest amount of land in 
Samitigram. The household’s per head crop basis is with 5.78 acres also the 
highest in the village. Malik inherited 28.5 acres from his father about 25 years 
ago and has bought land almost every year since then. Before the appearance of 
irrigated HYV boro many village households had to sell land if an amon crop 
failed. More often than not it was Malik who bought this land. He never sold any 
land.
Malik has about 35 sharecroppers from Samitigram and from other 
villages where he owns land. About 21 of his 44 acres are sharecropped out. His 
sharecropping contracts with Samitigram households are usually short-term and 
rarely last longer than one or two years. He sharecrops out small plots of land 
rarely larger than 0.33 acres (1 bigha according to the local unit of 
measurement). Even where he owns a continuous, larger plot of land, he 
sharecrops it out to several households in smaller pieces rather than as one plot. 
Many of Malik’s sharecroppers are from poor households and most are 
connected with him in several other ways, such as employment, kinship, political 
support.
When questioned about mortgages Malik says: "I don’t bother with 
mortgages. I just buy the land directly." It is known in the village though that 
during his politically active time he used to give small pieces of his own land in 
temporary mortgage to poor village households in return for their votes and 
political support (see Hanif, point 3.).
4. EDUCATION
Malik went to school up to class 8. His youngest son now holds a B.A. 
Commerce degree and is studying for a Masters degree at the nearest university 
in Rajshahi town. This son will not return to live in the village but plans to take 
up government service. The three sons who live in the village have not studied 
beyond class 10. All the women of the household have less formal education than 
the men. All the children are sent to school.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
At 55 years of age Malik now spends his days running a korbiraj 
(homoeopathic) practice from one room of his house. He can be found there most 
of the day either treating people from Samitigram and the surrounding villages or 
spending his time sewing for his family on their sewing machine. Along with a 
few other less educated ’rich old men' he retired from local politics several years 
ago when the jubok samiti (see III.4) took over most of the leading roles in the 
village. His oldest son Ashraf now runs the affairs of the household assisted by 
the third son and represents the household to the outside. The second son operates 
the shop by the road which sells dry goods and STW fuel. He does only 
occasional farming work.
6. CULTIVATION
In 1985/86 Malik cultivated 13 acres of HYV boro and sharecropped 
out at least another 13 acres of boro land. With an average yield of 26 maunds 
per bigha this gave him about 1100 maunds of paddy from own cultivation. A 
further 500 maunds were received from sharecroppers. About 13 acres of amon 
were also sown from which 400 to 500 maunds of paddy will be harvested if the 
crop is successful. The household consumes about 150 maunds of paddy annually.
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This leaves between 1450 and 1950 maunds of paddy for sale every year. 
Cultivation costs come to about 1140 Taka per bigha for boro and 215 Taka per 
bigha fo r amon which comes to total cultivation expenses of about 55.000 Taka. 
Malik can expect a total return of 260.000 to 350.000 Taka from the sale of his 
paddy. If he stores until the prices rise later in the season he may realize up to
400.000 Taka return. His minimum profit will thus be 200.000 Taka but he may 
reach up to 350.000 Taka. This is equivalent to the price of 6 - 10 acres of 
irrigated land. These calculations do not include any paddy that may have been 
obtained through loan transactions.
On some of his other land Malik grows jute, sesame, wheat and 
sometimes potatoes and vegetables for home consumption.
7. LABOUR USE
The household employs two male and one female live-in workers. 
Poorer, local women are employed for specific tasks in the house such as sowing 
and murri (puffed rice) preparation (e.g. Sahera, V.2.5). Male local day labour is 
called in for specific one-off tasks which overtax the capacity of the permanent 
labourers. Malik's household is not involved in the local labour exchange system 
{gata). Throughout the year the household employs different kinds of hired 
labour fo r various cultivation and crop processing tasks. Seedbed-making, 
transplanting and weeding of the boro is done by the permanent labourers and 
local labour gangs. The boro is harvested by migrant labour gangs of up to 50 
people. Poor women (often divorced or widowed) from Samitigram and other 
villages are employed fo r parboiling and drying the paddy. Malik is the largest 
employer in Samitigram.
The amon is broadcast with household and permanent labour and 
weeded and harvested by local labour gangs.
8. CREDIT
Malik has taken loans from his Farmers* Cooperative (KSS) and several 
local banks. He has defaulted on the KSS loan and at least one of the bank loans. 
With his annual income he is not dependent on recurrent cultivation loans and he 
tends to regard the repayment of bank loans as an unnecessary extra. He derives 
an income,- difficult to quantify for the outsider in a society where the taking of 
interest is considered illegitim ate,- from giving loans of money and paddy to 
poorer villagers at high interest rates.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
Together with his adopted brother, who is now also his brother-in-law  
and the village’s *ex-member* of the union parishad, Malik used to form the 
leadership of a powerful faction in the village. This faction lost its influence 
with the rise of the jubok samiti (see III.4). Today Malik can still command a 
sizable following, the poorer members of which profess political support to ’his* 
party often without even being able to name the party. He is always called to 
attend a shalish (village court) but neither he nor his sons play a central role in 
the proceedings of shalish or other samiti meetings. Malik’s family has lost its 
local power to the group around Saidur (see IV.2.2 below).
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
Malik owns an electric STW which irrigates about 7 acres of his own 
land. He neither sells water nor sharecrops land in or out there. The command 
area is broken up into several disjointed plots (No. 22 Map III.3). Malik also 
owns land in 18 of the 31 surveyed command areas. Some years ago he was 
manager of four irrigation groups. At that time he appropriated a STW which he
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had bought with a loan obtained through his Farmers* Cooperative without the 
members* consent. He then defaulted on the loan. When this became known the 
jubok samiti took action and Malik and his son were divested of their leading 
positions in the irrigation groups and various other village samitis by a village 
shalish. Since then some of his attempts to exercise power in the village have 
failed. When he refused to let one irrigation group*s channel pass through his 
land in 1985, he was threatened with water refusal from all irrigation groups and 
finally had to give in. His attempt to sell water from his private STW to 
surrounding cultivators at inflated rates was countered by the formation of a new 
irrigation group by Saidur, which now complements his command area into a 
continuous block of land (see C.A.S Nos. 22 & 33 Map III.3). The water charges 
in the new command area formed by Saidur are about half the level Malik had 
attempted to charge.
The irrigation groups in Samitigram have cost Malik some of his power. 
The villagers, organized in groups and led by a younger generation of 
better-educated men are no longer helpless in the face of his family’s attempts at 
extractive exploitation. However, new advantages have also arisen for Malik. 
Ashraf, his oldest son is the manager of two irrigation groups (Nos 1 & 6, Map
III.3), which irrigate 13 and 15 acres respectively. It is widely known in the 
village and confirmed by the bank that the instalments, collected by Ashraf 
annually to repay the loan for the STW never reach the bank. Malik’s family 
gains about 5000 Taka per year in this way. As a large number of the cultivators 
in these two command areas are dependent on Malik for employment and 
sharecropping land the instalments continue to be paid - even by the 
sharecroppers who should not have to pay according to group rules.
Malik also owns land some land in a village two miles down the road 
and irrigates it from a STW which is owned by his son-in-law ’s father, who lives 
there. Malik is the only party who receives water from this STW as its owner, in 




Saidur is the second oldest among five brothers who live in a joint 
household. He is the household head and controls its finances apart from the 
dowries which his brothers* nuclear families received from their in-laws and the 
income the women make through poultry and egg sale. With Saidur’s mother, his 
youngest unmarried brother and the four married brothers* wives and children, 
the family has 17 resident members. Saidur’s father lives in poorer circumstances 
elsewhere in the village since he married a second wife. He is partly maintained 
by the household’s land, which belongs to Saidur’s mother. Saidur’s father has 
exercised no control over family affairs since he moved out with his second wife.
Saidur had a ’village wedding*. His wife’s parents live in Samitigram 
and are much poorer than Saidur’s family. Through his marriage Saidur has 
acquired a large following of poorer relations in the village who rely on the 
kinship connection to him for economic support, access to land and agricultural 
inputs, help with dealings with the bureaucracy and the banks and similar matters. 
In return his position in the village is very strong. In his early thirties he is one 
of the most respected men in Samitigram. Two of Saidur’s brothers are married to 
women from neighbouring villages in the beel and one of his sisters-in-law 
comes from Natore, the district headquarters where her father is employed in a 
government department. Saidur’s two sisters are married to teachers and live in 
their husband’s villages.
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2. A SSE TS
The present brick and mud-made family house was built only a year 
ago with a number of grain storage spaces made from mud and jute sticks it 
forms a courtyard which is enclosed on all sides. The household also owns two 
ponds, a share in a third one and they planned to excavate a further fish pond. 
There are two country boats in the household used for fishing and transport. One 
of Saidur’s brothers bought a radio-tape recorder with his dowry and another 
bought an electric fan. There is a small low -lift pump (LLP) which is used to 
pump the fish ponds dry, to extract all the fish and to irrigate the surrounding 
fields at the same time. Four bullocks, two cows and three calves are kept in 
stables outside the homestead, two goats roam through the courtyard and 31 ducks 
and 18 chickens, which are owned by the women of the family, complement the 
picture.
3. LAND
Saidur’s mother originally inherited 19.5 acres from her father, who 
had no sons. While her husband ran household affairs, large amounts of land 
were sold and some economic decline set in. Land was sold before the 
introduction of irrigated HYV boro when the amon crop failed through flooding. 
For Saidur’s grandfather’s haj (pilgrimage to Mecca) in 1970 more land was sold. 
Now, ten years after Saidur took over as household head, the family has 18.5 
acres again, almost its former landholding size. There is a vegetable garden of
0.7 acres and almost 2 acres of fishponds. Saidur bought land annually whenever 
there were no other large expenses such as the excavation of a new fish pond or 
the construction of the new house. In 1986 Saidur bought 1.3 acres of land and 
also built and equipped a shop for homoeopathic medicines and a dry goods store 
which two of his brothers will run by the road.
About 4 acres of their land are sharecropped out. This land is mainly 
marginal land either irrigated by traditional means or unirrigated and merely 
used for amon cultivation. Some small plots of very fertile irrigated land are also 
sharecropped out. Saidur sharecrops out and mortgages in land from his wife’s 
poorer relatives (e.g. Kamal, G below).
One of Saidur’s younger brothers bought some land with the proceeds 
from the sale of his wife’s jewellery. This land is not held jointly and its 
proceeds go to this brothers nuclear family only. Another of Saidur’s brothers 
took some land in mortgage with the money from the sale of his wife’s jewellery 
and is cultivating it for his own nuclear family.
4. EDUCATION
Saidur and one of his brothers have studied up to SSC level (class 10). 
As his older brother is disabled Saidur, left school to take charge of household 
affairs when his father left the household. Although everyone including Saidur’s 
60-year-old mother went to school at least up to class 4 noone in the family has 
studied beyond class 10. This is a source of some discontent in the family and all 
the children are sent to school and continuously encouraged to study. Saidur’s 
oldest son in particular is expected to succeed at school and his family hopes to 
see him at university one day.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
The four grown-up brothers all farm for at least part of their time. 
Each of them has their own particular further occupation. The oldest brother 
produces homoeopathic medicines and sells them in the hats and from the house. 
The small income he realizes from this he keeps for himself. Because of his 
disability he does not work in the fields much and tends to incur the wrath of his
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brothers with this and his general loquaciousness.
A lot of Saidur’s time is spent in village and regional politics and 
dealings with the bureaucracy (see point 9. below). In the post-harvest period he 
is involved in buying paddy from Samitigram and the neighbouring hats and 
villages and selling it through the paddy trading group, of which he is a member 
(see III.4.10). For several months after the boro harvest he spends a few hours 
every evening in the teastall by the road selling paddy to traders who arrive with 
lorries or settling accounts with the other members of the paddy trading group. 
He earns around 25.000 Taka per year through the paddy trade. Saidur’s 
immediate younger brother, also a member of the paddy trading group, takes 
charge of transporting the paddy to a rice mill in the district town for processing 
and also does the work connected with the fishponds such as putting fry in, 
guarding the fish, fishing and selling the catch. The youngest of the married 
brothers works in the fields for most of the time and also supervises the hired 
agricultural labourers. During the irrigation season he operates the family’s small 
LLP, which is rented out in order to pump fish ponds empty and so to irrigate
the surrounding fields and to extract all the fish. Their average income from fish
sale is 30.000 to 35.000 Taka annually.
The five women of the family sell eggs and vegetables in the village 
and through children or male relations in the hat and bazar whenever there is a 
surplus over household requirements. In this way they have an independent 
income of a few hundred Taka per year.
6. CULTIVATION
The household harvested 600 maunds of boro paddy from the
cultivation of 8 acres in 1986. They achieved an average yield of 75 maunds per 
acre with large variations between plots (20-30 maunds). From the 4 acres of 
boro land, which was sharecropped out, another 150 maunds of paddy were 
received. This gave the household a total of 750 maunds. With an annual
consumption of about 125 maunds, 625 maunds of paddy remained for sale. This 
is less than half of what Malik’s household could sell. A total cultivation cost of
32.000 Taka (1330 Taka per bigha) leaves a net profit of about 109.000 Taka per 
winter season from boro paddy not taking into account the additional gains from 
sale during high-price periods (see Table VII.3). With a successful b.amon crop 
there will be a further 180 maunds of paddy at an average cultivation cost of 145 
Taka per bigha. The sale of this will yield a further profit of 29.000 to 30.000 
Taka. This makes a total annual profit of 128.000 to 129.000 Taka from paddy 
sale even if gains made from storage and speculation are discounted.
The household also grows 3.5 acres of wheat and some sesame, jute and 
mustard for their own consumption.
7. LABOUR USE
There is usually a live-in worker who stays for a year at a time and 
receives food, clothing and a monthly salary of 250 Taka. Two to three workers 
stay in the household for eight months returning to their own homes for the rainy 
season. No female labour is hired. The boro is transplanted in labour exchange 
with Adom’s family, (see IV.2.2 below). Inside the labour exchange arrangement 
with his neighbours Saidur sometimes uses hired rather than household labour. 
Boro weeding is done with family and live-in hired labour. Day labour is 
occasionally employed. For the harvest, a migrant labour gang of 20-25 members 
stays for about a month. The b.amon is sown by household and permanent labour 
and weeded and harvested by live-in labourers.
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8. CREDIT
Saidur takes six-monthly cultivation loans from the local commercial 
bank and has taken several loans from the Krishi Bank in the nearest upazila 
headquarters. He repays these loans quite regularly. With two other households 
from Samitigram, Saidur formed the credit samiti (see III.4.6), which recycles an 
annual bank loan on a fixed deposit account to Samitigram villagers at a higher 
interest rate. Saidur also gives loans of money and paddy sometimes interest-free 
and sometimes using the village’s current usurious rates of up to 100% interest 
for three months.
The women of the family recycle loans which they receive through the 
Women’s Cooperative (MSS) to poorer village households since they themselves do 
not require the loans for their poultry raising any more.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
Saidur is a central figure in local politics. He is a well-known face in 
the upazila offices of the BRDB, BADC and DAE. He is a ’model farm er’ in the 
DAE’s ’Train & Visit* scheme and has gone to their training programmes in other 
areas of the district. Recently elected ’block director* by the KSS, he has gained 
influence on the BRDB loan allocations for several unions including his own. In 
collaboration with an absentee landowner from Samitigram, Faruque, who is also 
on the BRDB loan allocation committee, Saidur has thus the possibility to channel 
considerable funds towards the KSS* of his village. Saidur is involved in most of 
the connections of his village with the state bureaucracy. He was one of those 
who started the jubok samiti, the school samiti, the credit samiti, the jute samiti 
and the new KSSs (see III.4-5). He is also a prominent member of the mosque 
samiti and is always called to the sittings of the shalish. He is the manager of 
five irrigation samitis.
Saidur’s sense of national history and politics is strong and he can spend 
long evenings talking about the independence struggle in 1971, the history of the 
village or criticising the present government. Although he gains both materially 
and in status from his political involvements, it is also a certain amount of 
idealistic desire to achieve improvements for his village that motivates his and his 
friends* activities in the samitis.
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
Saidur was manager of two irrigation groups at the beginning of the 
fieldwork for this research and took over a further three groups during my time 
in the village. Because of his close connections with the other founding members 
of the early jubok samiti, he exercises influence over at least another nine 
irrigation groups. His family’s land is spread over nine command areas, three of 
which Saidur manages. The family used to own a STW about eight years ago from  
which they only irrigated their private land. Saidur then sold the STW to a newly 
formed irrigation group and command area expanded.
Saidur does not appear to derive direct financial benefit from his 
manager position. An incident around the sale of a plot of land illustrated how 
his potential for gain is nonetheless increased: - The sale of a bigha of land (0.33 
acres) in one of the command areas managed by Saidur had been agreed at a 
price of 12.000 Taka. It then became known that Saidur was interested in the land 
himself and might refuse irrigation water to anyone who bought it. At this point, 
the original offer was withdrawn and neither the villagers of Samitigram nor of 
any of the neighbouring villages made any further offers although many were 
interested in the land. The owner of the land offered it to Saidur for 10.000 
Taka. After a long period of hesitation Saidur made it known that he did not wish 
to buy the land after all. His decision may well have been prompted by my
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friendly relations with the seller of the land and consequent knowledge of the 
case. A fter repeated checking with Saidur a poorer villager from Samitigram 
(Ali’s son IV.2.3) eventually bought the land fo r 11.000 Taka. The whole affair 
lasted several weeks and caused considerable distress to the person who sold the 
land, a Hindu from an adjacent village. It indicates how control over a group 
command area can bring considerable economic benefits to the manager even if 
he neither owns the equipment nor engages in underhand ’accounting 
manoeuvres’. Saidur’s enthusiasm for the irrigation samitis and his plan of 
forming a new samiti to include some of the neighbouring villagers must also be 
seen from this angle.
IV .2.1.1 The ’Rich': Strategies and Change
Malik and Saidur’s households are probably the two most different cases among 
the ’rich’ of the village. Malik is an example of the old ’exploitative’ approach to 
production and appropriation while Saidur has a much more productivity-oriented 
attitude, which allows others to gain in the process of increasing productivity and 
output. However, differences are relative. Both families relate to a common great 
grandfather and beyond their struggles for power and the dissimilarity in outlook 
and strategies there is the common background of being part of the elite of the 
same village and in the same position towards the outside world.
For both households the joint family is the mainstay of their social 
position and economic and political strategies. In Malik’s household strict control 
of individual family members in terms of ownership of assets is exercised. The 
diverse occupations of Malik’s sons and his own early retirement are only 
possible on the basis of the joint family household. Labour is divided inside the 
household and individuals can specialize in different areas. The diversification 
into trade and bureaucracy of some of the men in the household provides 
important connections for the household. The marriages of Malik’s daughters 
fulfil the same function, the extension of the kinship network to include people 
and professions useful to the household as whole.
Saidur’s family, though it is joint residentially and economically, is 
much more obviously marked by the indicators of household division than
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Malik’s. Both male and female members of the household have income sources 
which flow towards their nuclear families rather than the common household 
fund. The women buy jewellery and household effects from their income and the 
men buy or mortgage in land on their own account. There are quarrels among the 
brothers as to who does more work and who contributes most towards the 
economic improvement of the household. All of Samitigram’s ’rich* households 
are joint and through this they are able to engage in various activities 
simultaneously and so to realize economies of scale and to keep the resource 
flows, which are usually involved in the interaction between business, trade and 
bureaucracy, inside the household unit.
Both Malik and Saidur have only seen improvement for their households 
during their time as household heads. For Malik it has been a continuous 
expansion of land and other assets since he was born. Saidur, on the other hand, 
had to take over the leadership in his family when things were deteriorating. A 
lot of land had been sold and a definite change in strategy was needed to save the 
household from further decline and to recover its former position of economic 
strength.
Malik and Saidur are central figures in the ’old* and ’new* village elites. 
A comparison of their economic strategies - and the concurrent ideology and 
terminology > shows some fundamental differences. Malik has based his gains on 
the weakness of others. He has taken advantage of lean periods and failed 
harvests to buy more land. His use of sharecropping and mortgaging relationships 
displays all the marks of a textbook ’traditional patron*, who uses multiple strands 
of influence to cement his overall position in the locality in disregard of direct 
economic returns to his productive assets. Malik’s behaviour in the credit market 
Shows the so-called ’zero-sum game mentality*. He uses exploitative terms of 
credit and keeps his hold over poorer farm  households. On the other hand he
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does not sell irrigation water at prices which could ensure gains for him and the 
water buyer.
Like Malik, Saidur also has a village following of poorer 'clients’ who 
depend on him in various ways. But the principles and the rationality behind 
Saidur's activities are different. The mortgaged land Saidur takes from poorer 
village households is usually returned to its owner. Saidur is the initiator of the 
credit samiti, which has decreased the cost of informal loans in Samitigram and 
enabled a larger number of poorer households to engage in irrigated cultivation 
(e.g. Ali IV.2.3). He is also one of the first STW owners who sold his irrigation 
equipment to a group. He explains that the reasons for this were economic: lower 
irrigation costs and the possibility of irrigating fields where no single landowner 
would have bought a STW. Malik treats a bank loan as a *one-ofF handout, 
which does not need to be paid back. For Saidur the banks are a means to obtain 
capital inputs on a regular basis and therefore - so he says - he complies with 
their repayment rules. Saidur works inside the framework of the state 
bureaucracy and channels the resources it provides to himself and other village 
households. His attitude, which is also that of a group of other villagers around 
the jubok samiti (see III.4.1) is that "If we all work together we all gain". It 
carries the day in Samitigram at present and is one of the reasons why the 
organisation of irrigated agriculture in Samitigram has in productivity and 
distributional terms been more positive than in other areas (see Ch. VI).
As hard as it is to pinpoint the causes behind this clash in rationales, it 
is here that the fundamental factor for the variety of distributional and 
productivity outcomes of irrigation is rooted.A generational difference plays a 
role. Saidur and his generation are better educated than Malik’s.The younger 
leaders have learnt to understand and use the state bureaucracy for themselves 
and to connect into the wider exchange networks which reach out to Samitigram.
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They have witnessed the birth of Bangladesh as a new nation and carry over some 
enthusiasm from that period. Significantly, it was the ’youth cooperative* (jubok 
samiti) at independence, which started the changes in Samitigram. Things have 
moved on from there.Today, young leaders have taken over and the spirit of 
’cooperation rather than exploitation* is recognizable in the village as a whole. 
An exposure to the development rhetorics in politics and media may also have 
played a part in this change (see the T.V. samiti, III.4.2).
It is not argued here that distribution is equitable, nor that there are no 
poor and disadvantaged households or no exploitative uses of power in 
Samitigram. However, resources are generally not withheld by those who have 
the power to command them when there is a choice between cooperation with - 
differently sized - gains for everyone and exploitative extraction through the 
denial of access to productive resources. This raises the question whether this 
type of ’rationale’ is an exception or whether it can be regarded as part of future 
agrarian developments in Bangladesh (see VIII.2).
Irrigated agriculture in Samitigram is developing towards productivity 
and away from extraction-oriented agrarian relationships. The differences 
between Malik’s private command area and the group formed by Saidur in 
reaction to Malik’s extractive pricing of water (Nos. 22 and 33, Map III.3), the 
differences between the private and the group command areas on village lands 
(see III.5) and the differences between Samitigram and the ’seven villages* in the 
irrigation sector (VI.2 below) result from different types of household strategies, 
based on different perceptions of economic opportunity.
By virtue of belonging to the village ’rich’, Malik and Saidur share 
certain opportunities, which arise from the introduction of mechanised irrigation. 
Both households sell STW fuel from their roadside shops. Both make large gains 
from  trade with the substantially larger volumes of paddy yielded by the
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irrigated boro crop through their own and their sharecroppers’ cultivation. The 
fact that the paddy trading group, which Saidur belongs to, buys Malik’s spoilt 
paddy to adulterate produce which is then passed on to long-distance traders 
shows some of the complexity of relationships in the village, which affect the 
generation and distribution of irrigation-related income in Samitigram. It also 
demonstrates how village alliances overlap and indicates the fragility of the 
productivity-oriented ’populist* interest alliance, led by the young village leaders. 
The opportunities from new technologies which are captured by Samitigram’s 
poorer households depend on the continued adherence of this new elite to the 
groups and the rationale behind them.
If the young leaders turn to more extractive modes of appropriation 
once their position in the village is consolidated, the present relatively favourable 
situation for small irrigator-cultivators could turn out to be temporary. In future 
it may be replaced by an interest alliance of ’the rich’ which leaves small 
cultivators excluded. On the other hand, as is argued here (see Ch.VIII), the ’new 
rationale* in Samitigram’s irrigated cultivation could be the starting point of a 
larger process of transformation in production processes, relationships and value 
systems.
IV .2.2 The ’Well-Off*: Adorn and Mujibur 
ADOM
1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
With 21 members, Adom’s household is the largest in Samitigram. There 
are four brothers, their wives, 12 children and their paternal grandmother. Three 
married sisters have left the household. Three wives come from slightly better- 
o ff families in villages a few miles away and one wife is the daughter of a 
’well-off* Samitigram household from  the ’irrigation group-manager circle* (see
III.5). Adorn is the second oldest son and, since he is considered the most able 
son, he has been household head since his father died. The accounts of the 
household are joint and even the proceeds from the sale of wives* jewellery flow 
into the common fund.
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2. MAIN A SSE TS
They live in a substantial two-storey mud building with a small 
courtyard closed o ff by a wall of jute sticks and mud. They own two bullocks, 
three cows and three calves. These are kept in jute stick shelters outside the 
homestead. There are seven goats, seven ducks and eight chickens. A small LLP is 
used for irrigation of low beel land from the household’s own fishpond. The third 
brother, Alum owns an assortment of tools for his work as a mechanic. The 
family has two wooden country boats.
3. LAND
Since the death of Adom’s father six years ago they managed to buy 2.3 
acres so that they now own 6 acres in total. They have never sold any land. In 
addition to cultivating their own land they sharecrop-in around 5.3 acres almost 
all of which belongs to residents of other villages. Their sharecropped plots are 
large, between one and two acres, and sharecropping contracts are secure and 
long-term . Sharecropping-in is an essential component of the household’s 
economic strategy and of their recently achieved economic improvements. One 
bigha (0.33 acres) of low fertility amon land has been sharecropped out to a poor 
household of Samitigram for the last eight years. A son of this household is 
employed by Adom’s family. No land is mortgaged out, but one of Adom’s sister- 
in-laws holds a small plot of land in another village in mortgage and has it 
cultivated by a relative.
4. EDUCATION
The best educated member of the family is the third brother, Alum, 
who studied up to class 10 (S.S.C.). The remaining three brothers studied up to 
between class 5 and 8. All the children are sent to school.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
Two brothers are involved in farming full-tim e. The third brother, 
Alum, trained as a STW mechanic by working in various private workshops in 
different areas of the country. He recently learned how to repair electrical STWs. 
The oldest brother acquired some of the mechanical skills from  him and helps in
the mechanics business. In 1986 Alum had 52 seasonal contracts for the
maintenance of STWs in Samitigram and the neighbouring villages. He receives a 
seasonal fee of between 300 and 500 Taka per contract. In exchange he 
guarantees prompt repairs throughout the irrigation season. Spare parts are 
provided by the customer so that he earns a profit of 20.000 to 25.000 Taka per
season. Alum planned to open a shop for STW spare parts.
During the rainy season the youngest brother fishes in the beel to cover 
family consumption and to sell some of the catch in the daily bazar. He realizes 
between 50 and 100 Taka daily through this. With a fishing season of three
months this comes to about 7000 Taka annually. The sale from  the household’s
fishpond brings about 15.000 Taka per year.
The women of the family realize some income through goat and poultry
raising. Some, but not all of this income flows into the common household fund.
6. CULTIVATION
The household cultivated 10 acres of winter boro in 1985/86. Of this 
5.6 acres were their own land and 4.4 acres were rented in. O f the rented land 
2.5 acres were in fixed in-kind rent on a five year contract from Faruque, an 
absentee landowner resident in Singra town. This land yielded 82 maunds per 
acre. Average yields on their own land are 68 maunds per acre. The fertility of 
their sharecropping lands is therefore high.
Cultivation costs come to an extremely low 2010 Taka per acre
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(compare Malik and Saidur with over 3300 Taka per acre). There are several 
reasons for this. No cash costs arise for boro transplanting as labour exchange 
(gata; see V.3 below) is used. For rented and sharecropped land no capital cost 
for the STW is paid and the small amount of hired labour, which the household 
uses for boro cultivation is the cheapest kind, seasonal live-in labour (see 
Chapter V.3). As the land they cultivate is low and fertile, little fertilizer is 
required. During the 1985/86 season the household also cultivated 2.3 acres of 
b.amon. They received 50 maunds of amon paddy and 500 maunds of boro from  
their own cultivation. They consume about 150 maunds per year and around 400 
maunds are sold. A total annual cultivation cost of 22050 Taka leaves an 
approximate annual profit of Taka 48.000 from paddy cultivation. They sell part 
of their surplus paddy in a large hat about five miles away. This involves a 
transport fee of Taka 5 unless they use their own two buffaloes and a m arket-tax 
of Taka 0.5 per maund. No significant gains from storage and sales during 
high-price periods are realized. They also sell some of their paddy to Saidur’s 
paddy trading group.
One bigha (0.33 acres) of wheat and 0.5 bigha of sesame is grown for 
home consumption.
7. LABOUR USE
The household employs two seasonal live-in labourers from Samitigram 
and from the neighbouring village. They use own labour and gata (labour 
exchange) to sow and transplant boro. Seasonal live-in labour and occasional day 
labour is used to sow and transplant the boro. The harvest is carried out by a 
migrant labour group of about 20 members who stay in the homestead for about 
one month.
B.amon is cultivated by household labour with the assistance of the 
seasonal live-in labourers during the harvest. After the paddy is separated from 
the straw by the migrant labour gang, parboiling and drying is done by the 
women of the household. No female labour is ever employed by Adom’s family.
8. CREDIT
The household has had loans from all possible formal sources, the local 
commercial bank, the BKB and the Farmers’ Cooperative (KSS). In 1985/86 they 
took a six-monthly loan of Taka 4000 at 16% annual interest from the local 
commercial bank and a loan of 18500 at 19% annual interest from the KSS. They 
give occasional loans of money or paddy inside the village. Rice, oil and salt is 
loaned between the women of the family and neighbours. This occurs on a 
mutual, no-interest basis.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
Adorn and his four brothers are an integral part of the village’s various 
samitis and one of them is usually found at every meeting. They assume mostly a 
participatory rather than a leading role. Through their marriage connection to 
another ’w ell-o ff family and their labour-exchange connection with their next 
door neighbour, Saidur, they have influence on village politics but rely on 
mediators for any connections beyond the village.
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
The household cultivates land in 9 of the village’s 31 command areas. Akram, the 
oldest brother and Alum, the mechanic, manage three command areas. Two of 
these are irrigation groups (Nos. 10 & 16Map III.3). The land and the STW of the 
third command area are owned by Faruque, the absentee landowner. Over half of 
the household’s cultivated land is in these three command areas. They own land in
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one of the command areas, and sharecrop or rent land in all of them. They hold 
a plot of 2.6 acres in Faruque’s command area. This is 30% of the total command 
area and the largest plot rented out by Faruque in this command area. Their 
access to rented land is at least partly due to the household's control over water. 
The presence of a STW mechanic in the household also contributed. Interviews 
with the respective landowners in the command areas confirmed this. With a STW 
mechanic and an irrigation group manager, the household has clear advantages in 
the production of irrigated boro. It is therefore able to obtain fertile 
sharecropping lands which have become one of the economic mainstays of the 
household.
Irrigation is an important vehicle for economic improvement for 
Adom’s household in several other ways. Through his work as a mechanic the 
third brother Alum contributes about one quarter of the household income. In 
1985 he took some training as an electrician, which will increase the number of 
his seasonal contracts. With electrification on the increase in Samitigram and the 
area, his additional training will be a profitable asset in the future. By opening 
the spare parts shop, the family adds another irrigation-related aspect to their 
portfolio of activities and increases the variety of ways in which they are taking 




Mujibur is about 65 years old. His household has 14 members, his wife, 
three o f his four married sons, their wives, children and a fifth, young 
unmarried son, who live together. His oldest son recently separated from the 
family and lives elsewhere in the village. He works as an agricultural labourer.
Mujibur’s daughters-in-law are all from nearby villages and come from 
households which are better off than Mujibur’s.
Although Mujibur has passed the management of the household to his 
second oldest son Hekmut, he still keeps some control over all the decisions, 
though.
2. A SSE TS
The household had just completed the construction of a brick house 
when I arrived in the village. It leads onto a small courtyard and is closed off 
by a mud wall on the other side. They own four bullocks, a cow, five sheep, 
seven ducks and eight chickens. There is a radio in the house. All of the assets 
are in Mujibur’s name. Neither his wife nor his sons or daughters-in-law admit 
to owning anything in their own name in his presence.
3. LAND
Mujibur now owns about 15 acres. His own father owned 1.7 acres in 
his youth and 5 acres when he died. Mujibur inherited 3.7 acres from his father 
about 25 years ago. He has never sold any land and buys new land every year 
nowadays. Since his father died he acquired a large orchard (3.6 acres) and over 
5 acres of bamboo grove. The family’s other land is gradually being consolidated 
in one area around their own STW (No 30, Map III.3). Recently Mujibur 
exchanged some of Faruque’s land near this STW for some of his land in another 
area and bought a further plot in his command area from a poorer villager. The 
STW is situated next to a pond, which also belongs to Mujibur’s family.
Mujibur is not involved in any sharecropping relationships. He used to 
mortgage in 0.66 acres of land from a poorer villager but returned the land
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because he needed money to build the new brick house. His son attempted but 
failed to obtain land around their STW in sharecrop. This land, formerly irrigated 
from M ujibur’s STW and cultivated with wheat by its owners is not irrigated any 
more because of quarrels in the former irrigation group.
4. EDUCATION
Neither Mujibur nor his wife ever went to school. All their children 
and grandchildren did and their 25 year-old son, Hekmut studied up to class 10 
and passed his S.S.C. None of his siblings went beyond a few years of primary 
school.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
Mujibur and his sons are farmers. The second son, Hekmut has some 
skills in housebuilding and works in the village and the area during the slack 
agricultural season. About 20.000 Taka annually are realized from the sale of 
bamboo and about 15.000 Taka per year from the sale of fish from their pond.
6. CULTIVATION
In 1986, Mujibur cultivated 6.4 acres of irrigated winter boro. In 
addition he had 10 acres under b.amon. A total yield of 400 maunds of boro and 
150 maunds of amon and an annual household consumption of about 90 maunds 
leaves around 360 maunds of paddy for sale. Their boro cultivation cost is low 
with 2610 Taka per acre and their b.amon cultivation cost is also very low (480 
Taka per acre) because mainly own labour and seeds are used. A total cultivation 
cost of 16758 Taka fo r boro and around 2250 for b.amon results. When I talked 
to them a few weeks after the harvest, 120 maunds of paddy had been sold at the 
low post-harvest price of 145 Taka, which gave them a cash return of 17400 
Taka, just enough to cover cultivation costs. Taking into account the returns from 
the paddy sales during the rest of the year, their profits from paddy cultivation 
are approximately 42.000 Taka.
The household also has about 1.3 acres under wheat and cultivates some 
sesame and mustard seed for home consumption.
7. LABOUR USE
They employ two seasonal live-in labourers who return to their own, 
neighbouring village for the rainy season. In order to sow, transplant and weed 
the boro own, seasonal live-in and day labour is used. The boro is harvested by a 
migrant labour gang of 10 to 15 men who stay in a house near the family’s pond 
but eat in M ujibur’s household. The wives parboil, dry and store the paddy. 
Female labour is not employed. The amon paddy is sown by their own labour and 
weeded by hired labour. A labour gang from the next upazila  did the weeding 
working 1986. Labour is also hired for the amon harvest.
8. CREDIT
The household takes regular cultivation loans from  the local commercial 
bank and the Farmers’ Cooperative (KSS). In 1985/86 they took a bank loan of
21.000 Taka. They reported that they neither give nor take informal loans in the 
village. In 1981 M ujibur took a STW loan for 20.300 Taka bank loan for an 
irrigation group of which his son Hekmut was the manager.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
No-one in the household represents a major influence in local politics 
nor is anyone member of a political party. One of M ujibur’s nephews, his older 
brother’s son, is a member of the union parishad , though, so that there is a
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connection to the local institutional system and a possible way for M ujibur’s 
household to link into the resource flows which are accessible through the state.
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
The household owns land in 6 STW command areas. Two of these are on 
lands of the neighbouring village, three are Samitigram irrigation groups and one 
is a STW, which now irrigates Mujibur’s own land only. Initially an irrigation 
group was formed in this command area and 10 acres belonging to six different 
parties were irrigated. Quarrels about correct water distribution and the payments 
of the instalments for the STW ensued. In retrospect it was difficult to get the 
story right. The outcome was that all form er group members are not receiving 
irrigation water any more. Hekmut, M ujibur’s son who used to be the manager of 
this irrigation group, failed to obtain sharecropping rights to the form er group 
members* command area land. Wheat and some sesame is now cultivated on these 
plots. However, M ujibur was able to exchange some of his other land for one 
acre in this command area. He also bought a further small plot so that he now
has 4 acres of his own land irrigated from this STW.
Mujibur and Hekmut are not part of the circle around the jubok samiti
(see III.4). Although Hekmut tried to form an irrigation group and did not
commit greater misdemeanours than for example Malik’s son (see IV.2.1 part 
10)), — e.g. misappropriation of bank instalments - -  his position did not allow 
him the same practices. Because he managed to consolidate a substantial amount 
of his land in the command area, Mujibur does not need to operate an irrigation 
group. He makes some profits from irrigated boro paddy even from a command 
area of only 4 acres and he is likely to have defaulted on his STW bank loan.
IV.2.2.1 The ’Well-Off*: Strategies and Change
Some of the differences between Adom’s and Mujibur’s strategies 
correspond to those between Malik’s and Saidur’s. Whereas Adom’s household is 
using all the possibilities offered by the various groups in Samitigram, M ujibur’s 
household increases its income mainly by extracting as much as possible in any 
situation where they command power. While Adom’s family diversify their 
occupations into various irrigation-related activities, Mujibur’s household only 
uses irrigation as a way to increase returns from cultivation to a limited extent. 
They cultivate irrigated boro profitably but do not use the STW to its full 
income-generating potential. Adom, like Saidur, maximises returns by using his 
advantages to increase his share of the overall increased productivity and output 
brought about by irrigation. Mujibur, like Malik increases his own returns by 
extracting the surplus of other households in the process of blocking their access
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to water.
Adom and his brothers manage three command areas. Mujibur’s son 
Hekmut’s irrigation group broke up because neither the members nor the group 
manager cooperated to allow gains for others. Saidur and Adom use new 
opportunities for themselves which arise in the process of increasing production 
and income for the majority of villagers. Malik and Mujibur regard gains for 
others as a threat. To Saidur and Adom, productivity increases are a major means 
for their individual improvement, to Malik and Mujibur the use of extractive 
power is the main path to get rich.
To some extent, this difference in perceptions and strategies may be a 
function of the age and education of the household head. Like most villages in 
Bangladesh, Samitigram is becoming more involved in structures and networks 
which extend far beyond the village. A household’s economic fortunes depend to 
an increasing extent on the knowledge of how to use these connections. People 
like Saidur, who have some formal education and who are trusted by most 
villagers become the mediators between the village and outside business and 
government offices. People like Adom, with fewer resources to fall back upon, 
use their education to link into new income-generating activities and so to 
decrease their reliance on cultivation. Mujibur, like Malik, on the other hand is 
of an older generation for whom the ’zero-sum-game mentality’ (Foster 1973) 
remains the frame of reference. This may be a transitional, generational issue. 
Although Mujibur lacks sufficient formal education to take advantage of new 
opportunities and retains his old strategies, his son’s education provides the 
family with an avenue out of sole reliance on cultivation. Through their 
fish-breeding activities, undertaken with the assistance of the extension office of 
the Ministry of Fisheries and through the bamboo business, they realize some of 
this potential.
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A prominent feature of the ’w ell-off’ is their diversity of occupations and 
income sources. Particular occupations, which arose with the introduction of 
irrigation, are found predominantly among *w ell-ofr households. Adom is an 
example of how irrigation can decrease reliance on cultivation. Several other 
such households exist in and around Samitigram. For them, irrigation-related 
diversification does not merely defer pauperisation until the person/land ratio has 
deteriiorated further, but it initiates a move away from the predominance of land 
as an income source (see also V.1.1). With multiple inheritance and high 
population growth, this is their only alternative to impoverishment in the longer 
term.
The case is different with Mujibur. At present, his household has some 
diversity of income sources and their economic security is not in immediate 
danger. Irrigation has an only supplementary role in their economic strategies. 
However, when the household land is subdivided among the next generation of 
heirs, the household’s present extractive strategies will become less viable. 
Mujibur’s family may well maintain itself increasingly by income from 
fish-breeding in the future.
For both ’the w ell-o ff and ’the rich’ of Samitigram, irrigated boro 
cultivation has assumed a central position in their income generation strategies. 
For these households (unlike for some of ’the coping* and ’the poor’; see below), 
boro has taken over from b.amon as the main crop. Amon> the previous main 
crop, on the other hand, has turned into an additional ’bonus crop*, which may be 
consumed by the household as its taste is preferred, but upon which the main 
annual budget of the family does not depend on any more.
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IV .2.3 The ’Coping*: All and Toslin 
ALI
1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
With over 35 members Ali’s household was the largest in the village 
until late 1985. Since his father died and Ali is now not only economically and 
residentially separate from his three brothers, but also one of his own sons, 
Ahmed, has formed an independent economic unit with his wife. Although they 
still live in the same house, Ahmed and his wife eat and keep all accounts 
separately.
The household as an economic unit (i.e. excluding Ahmed) now has ten 
members. Ali, who is about 50 years old, his wife and two married sons with 
their families. There are a further three unmarried sons aged 12 to 18 in the 
household. Ali and his wife have no surviving daughters. His wife and 
daughters-in-law are all from homes of about equal economic standing to his 
own in villages a few miles away from Samitigram. Ahmed and his wife, who are 
part of the residential unit, spend part of the week in her parents* house to - as 
they say - eat there and thus save money to buy their own land.
2. ASSE TS
They live in a small, low-built mud house with a tin roof and own 
four cows, two calves, two goats, a duck and a chicken. They also sharetend in a 
sheep from Malik. This has recently added a lamb to the household.
3. LAND
Ali’s father owned 4.3 acres. Ali now has 2.2 acres. Of this, 0.7 acres 
were inherited. After a successful boro crop in 1985, one bigha (0.33 acres) of 
land was bought in for 11.000 Taka (see B, 10) and a further two bighas (0.66 
acres) for 15.000 Taka each. They sold a water buffalo and used part of the 
youngest wife’s dowry to raise the money for this land. There is conflict between 
the four sons who remain economically joint to their father’s household and 
Ahmed, who separated, about the ownership and inheritance rights to this newly 
purchased land.
Ali’s household sharecrops in 5 acres of land under agreements with two 
absentee landowners and with Malik. These agreements have lasted between 2 and 
6 years so far. They stem from the period when Ali’s household was comfortably 
in the group of the ’w ell-off’. It remains to be seen whether they will last under 
present straightened circumstances or whether the household will join the ranks 
of the seasonal sharecroppers with little or no permanent tenancy on any land. 
During my fieldwork period the household was not involved in any mortgage 
relationships. When I left, Ahmed took 0.4 acres of his father Ali’s land in 
khaikalashi mortgage (see V.1.4).
4. EDUCATION
Ali studied up to class 4. One of his sons has studied up to class 3. 
After failing his second year exam Ali’s youngest son of about 11 years of age 
had to leave school because his older brothers refuse to pay for his books.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
All male household members work predominantly in cultivation. One 
son engages in seasonal rice business with one of his cousins from the village. 
They buy paddy, take it to a rice mill and resell it at a profit of about 20 Taka
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per maund. The household sells cows* milk in the bazar and earns about 25 Taka 
daily through this.
6. CULTIVATION
The household cultivated 5.7 acres of boro paddy in 1985/86. Of this 5 
acres were sharecropped in and 0.7 acres were own land. Average yield per acre 
was 77 maunds for the sharecropped land and 81 maunds per acre fo r their own 
land. The lower yield for the sharecropped land was caused by an engine 
breakdown, which affected the water supply for one acre of land. Generally the 
yield of the household*s sharecropped land is higher than that of their own land 
because of differences in land quality. The household obtained a total of 250 
maunds of boro paddy. They sold about 200 maunds to the village paddy trading 
group. With an average cultivation cost of 2760 Taka per acre they realized about 
19150 Taka profit from boro cultivation. Ali also cultivated 6.6 acres of b.amon 
of which 4.6 acres were sharecropped in and 2 acres his own land. If the amon 
crop succeeded the household met their annual consumption needs fully through 
this crop. The year before only 30 maunds of amon could be harvested, and they 
had to eat some of their boro crop.
0.4 acres of sesame and 0.7 acres of wheat are cultivated for the 
household*s own consumption. All but 0.1 acres of this land is sharecropped in. 
There is also a small bamboo plot and a vegetable garden for household 
consumption.
7. LABOUR USE
Neither annual nor seasonal labour is hired in. All boro cultivation 
except the harvest is done by the household and gata labour exchange with a 
cousin’s household. For the harvest a group of 10 to 12 migrant labourers stays in 
the household for about two weeks. The cultivation of amon is also mainly 
undertaken with household labour. Only very occasionally is local day labour 
hired in. The household never hires female labour.
8. CREDIT
During the 1985/86 season the household had 6700 Taka of loans. Of 
this, 1200 Taka were from two private sources in the village, whose identity Ali 
would not disclose. 100% and 200% annual interest was taken by these two village 
households. Ali also received 1800 Taka from the credit samiti at 45% annual 
interest, 2200 Taka from the KSS at 18% p.a. and 1600 Taka from the local 
commercial bank at 16% annual interest. These are of central importance for his 
HYV boro cultivation. He had to pay a total of 1320 Taka in interest for the 
whole boro season. Of this 1000 Taka (76%) went to private moneylenders for 
only 45% of the total loan. Ali*s involvement in the credit market is complex and 
carefully arranged to support his household’s cultivation activities. Although he 
does have some access to cheaper bank loans and to the credit samiti, he is forced 
to resort to informal high-interest loans to maintain liquidity for boro 
cultivation.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
Since he is neither a member of a political party nor obviously among 
the followers of any of the local *big men*, Ali and his household hold a 
marginal role in local political life. Furthermore, after the recent multiple 
household subdivisions in the family. Ali can no longer fall back on the strength 
of the joint household. A running deafness among the men of the family does not 
help matters either (nor does it facilitate the researcher’s task...)
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10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
The household cultivates land in 5 STW command areas. In two of these 
all their land is rented, in one command area some of their land is sharecropped 
and some is their own, and in the remaining two command areas all the land they 
cultivate is owned by Ali’s household. Jointly with one of their relations in the 
village they cultivate one entire command area of 4 acres under a fixed-in-kind 
rent agreement. The land and the STW is owned by Faruque, an absentee 
landowner. In 1986, Faruque announced his intention to convert his diesel STW to 
electricity. This would have reduced irrigation costs by about fifty percent. His 
tenant Ali expected his land rent to be raised as a consequence and therefore to 
be neither better nor worse off as a result. Ali is also a member of Malik’s son’s 
’pseudo-group’ (see III.5) about which he comments: "...there is never a meeting 
fo r that group and nobody will say anything because they (Malik’s household) are 
big people." Ali has repeatedly found himself faced with the alternative to either 
pay the instalments for a STW as a sharecropper, which is against the rules of the 
irrigation groups, or to lose his sharecropping land to another, more willing 
tenant. Ali’s household does not have an influential position in the village’s 
irrigation groups. It is tempting but not sufficient to explain this by the chronic 
hearing problems among its men. The break-up of the former large joint 
household after the death of Ali’s father brought a decline of his socio-political 
standing. It is probably not a coincidence that Ali’s younger brother was divested 
of his manager post in one of the STW groups only a few months after the 
break-up of their joint household.
TOSLIN
1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
Toslin and his wife have three sons between the ages of one and eight. 
Toslin is about 30 years old, a child of his father’s second wife and hardly 
acknowledged by his five older, wealthier half-brothers. His wife is from the 
neighbouring village. She has fifteen brothers and sisters from her father’s three 
wives. Her mother, the oldest wife was divorced. As a result neither Toslin nor 
his wife can fall back on any support from their family. They set up their own 
household as soon as they were married.
2. ASSE TS
They live in a tiny one-room mud house. There is a partly sheltered 
cooking area. It is built on raised land, slightly removed from the rest of the 
village. During the rainy season it is only accessible by boat to all but the next 
door neighbours. Toslin’s household owns a boat, six chickens, one cockerel and 
two ducks. They sold their bullocks and plough a few years ag6 to redeem some 
mortgaged land. There are also some nets and other fishing implements in the 
household.
3. LAND
Toslin’s father was wealthy with more than 36 acres. Toslin inherited 
3.3 acres about seven years ago. Since then he sold land several times so that he 
has less than 1.5 acres left. Some of this land has been mortgaged out in little 
pieces over time to cover the household’s recurrent shortages of cash.
Toslin used to sharecrop in land, but has done so only occasionally since 
he sold his hal (a pair of bullocks and plough). His sharecropping contracts, some 
of which are with his wealthier half brothers are all short-term , rarely longer 
than a season or two. Toslin says that with the cost of renting a hal it is no 
longer profitable for him to sharecrop in land.
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4. EDUCATION
Toslin has attended primary school up to class 3. His wife never went to 
school. They are sending their eight-year old son to school but say the child has 
no interest in it and does not usually go there.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
As soon as there is enough water from the monsoon rains Toslin goes 
fishing in the beel. The family eats some of the catch, but most of it is sold in 
the daily bazar to provide for their cash needs. He gets an average of 75 Taka 
per day for three to four months per year. These earnings, 7000 to 8500 Taka 
annually, are central to the family’s economic planning and survival. Without 
them Toslin could not pay back his cultivation credits.
Toslin’s wife sometimes sells chicken or duck eggs or a few vegetables 
grown on a vegetable frame in their homestead.
6. CULTIVATION
In 1985/86 Toslin cultivated 0.7 acres of his own land with HYV boro. 
Of this, 0.6 acres were irrigated by STW and achieved a total yield of 47 maunds. 
Toslin also irrigated a small plot (0.1 acres) with the traditional seti (swing 
bucket) and received another 5 maunds. 0.33 acres of b.amott cover consumption 
requirements unless the crop is spoilt by the monsoon floods, as it often is. They 
consume about 25 maunds per year but had to sell 40 maunds immediately after 
the harvest to cover cultivation costs. In 1985, when their amon harvest failed, 
household paddy supplies ran out two months after the harvest although initial 
stocks were almost twice as high as annual requirements.
Toslin’s cultivation cost is 2985 Taka per acre for STW irrigated boro 
land. The total cultivation cost of his 0.7 acres of boro land came to 2140 Taka. 
From the post-harvest sale of boro he realized 5600 gross (3460 Taka net of 
costs). Fishing is thus his main income source.
7. LABOUR USE
The household neither sells labour nor does it hire in any live-in or 
adult day labour. Occasionally Toslin’s wife calls in the ten-year old daughter of 
the destitute widow of a landless labourer (Sahera) to work in exchange for a 
meal.
Seedbed-making, transplanting and weeding of Toslin’s boro crop is 
done through labour exchange with three other village families. Only at harvest 
time will an outside labour group work on Toslin’s crops for a short time before 
moving on to harvest for other small landholders in Samitigram. His migrant 
labourers are usually from neighbouring villages rather than from other upazilas 
as are the migrant gangs which work for the richer households of the village.
For the cultivation of his amon Toslin works alone in his fields until 
the harvest. He then hires day labour because as he says "everyone is busy for the 
amon harvest and no one is interested in labour exchange".
8. CREDIT
To cover cultivation costs (food for group labour, day labour, material 
inputs, irrigation costs) Toslin is dependent on credit. For the 1985/86 boro 
season he took 1000 Taka from the local commercial bank and 1000 Taka from a 
private source in the village. He paid back 1600 Taka to the private moneylender 
but defaulted on the loan to the bank. This means that in the coming year he will 
be totally dependent on the expensive private moneylenders unless he can 
somehow manage to repay the bank loan through his income from fishing during 
the rainy season. If he has to rely totally on private moneylending sources he will
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in all likelihood have to mortgage out some more of his land with an even 
smaller chance of obtaining the money to recover it.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
Toslin does not appear to be involved in party politics at all. He is a 
member of a KSS and once received a loan through it. He does not attend 
meetings.
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
Toslin owns land in four irrigation group command areas but only 
cultivates himself in three of these. His land in the fourth command area is 
mortgaged out. His irrigation costs are high because as a landowner he has to pay 
both the water charge and the seasonal instalment. If he does not pay the STW 
instalments for his mortgaged out land, it may be paid by the mortgagee and 
added on to the total sum repayable by Toslin. This makes it even more difficult 
fo r Toslin to recover his mortgaged land.
Toslin hardly ever participates in irrigation group meetings. He does not 
seem to distrust the proceedings in the meetings but says "I have things to do. 
They don’t need me there.*' His household is caught up in a downward economic 
spiral. This can be partly attributed to Toslin’s particular economic strategies, 
which turned out to be a disadvantageous choice. After the sale of his hal, 
Toslin’s cultivation costs rose to the extent that he did not consider sharecropping 
worthwhile any more. Nor is he likely to obtain much sharecropping land without 
owning a hal. With the fall in the general water table in the area, his returns 
from  open-water fishing are decreasing, and the higher yields from his small 
amount of boro cultivation do not cover his cultivation costs and other cash 
needs. Indirectly irrigation is the cause for Toslin’s decreased fish catch as it has 
caused the fall in the general water level. The method of paying for irrigation in 
Samitigram is costly to a small landowner like Toslin who has land mortgaged 
out. Nonetheless, the household’s situation is also the result of his choice of 
economic strategies under a new set of conditions, rather than of the absence of 
opportunities for Toslin in the new, irrigated situation. For reasons of status 
Toslin does not sell his labour, and because he decided to sell his hal he can no 
longer profitably sharecrop in land. Although irrigation may not have improved 
the opportunities open to Toslin’s household, it has not been the sole or even 
main cause of its economic decline.
IV.2.3.1 The ’Coping’: Strategies and Change
The nuclear or a truncated form of the joint family household is the 
rule among the ’coping*. In Ali’s case the break-up of the joint household 
precipitated some economic decline for all the successor households. A joint rice 
business between Ali and his brothers was discontinued. Economies of scale in 
cultivation for household consumption, division of labour in the fields and 
between the women inside the house were lost.
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Toslin, on the other hand, (because of the internal structure of his 
father’s household - -  two wives and conflict between their offspring) never had 
a joint household with his brothers. He thus never had some of the opportunities 
which Ali and his household had and still have as a result of their former 
position. Ali’s household is able to sharecrop in 5 acres of good-quality land on 
long-term contracts. This is retained from their *w ell-ofr position of the time 
before the household divided. Even after the division, Ali’s household is still 
large enough to pool resources in order to buy land.
Toslin, in comparison, is unable to obtain any longer-term  contracts. He 
used to sharecrop in under temporary agreements and eventually gave it up 
completely. Since the children are very young, Toslin’s household is at an 
economically difficult stage. When his sons start to work in the fields, cultivation 
will be less expensive for Toslin. It is doubtful, though that he will still own any 
land then.
Ali’s and Toslin’s household are at opposite extremes of the category of 
the ’coping*. What they have in common is that they are both in an unstable 
transitory position. Ali’s household has recently emerged from a large joint 
family household, where activities extended into various economic and political 
spheres. Some of these activities (e.g. long-term land tenancy and rice business) 
have been retained or taken up again in an altered form in the smaller successor 
households. These may provide the momentum to tip the precarious balance of 
household fortunes towards improvement.
Toslin’s household has also suffered economic deterioration over the last 
few years. Toslin’s father was very much better off than Ali’s father and Toslin 
inherited more land than Ali did. As a nuclear household with little labour supply 
and no important kinship or political connections to fall back on, Toslin’s 
possibilities to engage in profitable cultivation are limited. His decision to sell his
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hal and to abandon sharecropping altogether leaves him with an even less promising 
set of options: Open water fishing in a situation of declining water table and fish 
population and in competition with fast expanding sales of pond-bred fish. It seems 
only a matter of time that his family joins the ranks of ’the Poor’.
For both households, education has played a minor role. Neither puts much 
emphasis on school attendance for their children. Ali’s older sons are hardly literate 
and his youngest son was even taken out of school against his wishes. Toslin is of the 
same generation as Saidur and Adom. Unlike them he has not had, or sometimes not 
recognised, the possibilities which have opened up in recent years. Lack of education 
plays a role in this although, as Kamal’s case (IV.2.4 below) demonstrates, education 
is not necessarily the decisive factor for flexible adjustment to new opportunity 
conditions. Individual characteristics, family history and household structure play a 
role in how new situations are approached and strategies devised.
Ali’s household has carefully pieced together loans from all available formal and 
informal sources. Through the credit samiti their total costs for credit are lowered 
considerably. In order to cultivate irrigated boro they have had to get deeply 
involved in the formal and informal credit markets and incur considerable costs. 
Toslin was also pushed into taking credit. If he continues unable to repay his bank 
loans the expensive informal village loans will probably lead to the eventual loss of 
his land. Both households borrow from the village’s moneylenders in order to 
cultivate irrigated boro.
Both Ali’s and Toslin’s household need to sell their paddy at post-harvest low 
prices and Ali sometimes and Toslin always have to buy back at high prices later in 
the year to cover their families’ consumption needs. This circular annual buying and 
selling process involves a transfer of surplus value to the paddy traders of the 
village. Ali’s household tries to link into this resource by running their own small 
seasonal rice business.
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As the productivity of irrigated cultivation increases, households like Ali’s and 
Toslin’s find that most of the extra surplus value created does not reach them. A cost 
reduction of fifty percent through the electrification of a STW simply means that Ali 
has to pay higher rent to the owner of his sharecropped holding. The appropriation 
of increased surplus by the owner of productive assets, rather than by those who 
actually produce, manifests itself in other areas, too. For example, sharecropping for 
irrigated land in Samitigram gives a smaller crop share to the tenant than in most 
other villages in the area (see V.1.3). Due to exceptionally high yields in Samitigram 
(see V.4), this still means about the same absolute returns for Samitigram 
sharecroppers as for those of other villages. The landowners of Samitigram, 
however, are able to appropriate much higher absolute, and higher relative crop 
shares than those of other villages. Households like Ali’s are able to cope with the 
help of sharecropping contracts but they have not increased their relative gains 
inside such contracts (see VI.3 for the distributional issues around land tenancy).
The ’coping’ are in a transient situation. Strategies, which ’just make ends meet’ 
only work for a limited period of time. The two case studies here have outlined some 
of the factors which combine to determine which way the scales turn for any one 
household.
V.2.4 The ’Poor’: Kamal and YussuPs Sons 
KAMAL
1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
Kamal’s household has seven members, himself, his wife and five sons between 
the ages of sixteen and one. A further three of their children died. Kamal’s wife 
Shuki is from the village. She is the half-sister of Saidur’s wife (IV.2.1). Kamal has 
no brothers or sisters but his family are from Samitigram.
2. A SSE T S
Two cows, two calves and two chickens form the household’s animal stock. They 
also own a plough and a country boat. Their one-room house is made of mud and 
has a small verandah. Shuki cooks in front of the house in an unsheltered position.
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3. LAND
Today the household owns 0.66 acres of land. Kamal inherited no land because 
his father predeceased his paternal grandfather so that he was not legally entitled to 
any land inheritance. His uncle, who lives next door, received his father’s share. His 
wife Shuki inherited 2.3 acres about fifteen years ago. Of this they sold 1.7 acres to 
Malik (IV.2.1) and Faruque, an absentee landowner, after a failed b.amon crop. This 
was about 13 years ago, before the introduction of STW irrigation in Samitigram. 
Soon after their marriage Kamal sold Shuki’s jewellery to buy 0.4 acres of land. 
Later this land was sold again to a wealthy relative "to feed the family” as Kamal 
says.
Kamal now sometimes sharecrops in the land that he and his wife used to own. 
When he cultivates the land that he once sold to his rich relative, an engineer who 
works in a different part of the country, he does not have to give any crop share. He 
does not get access to this land very often, though. His sharecropping contracts are 
short-term , rarely longer than one or two seasons. None of the 0.66 acres of boro 
land which he sharecropped in 1985 are among the 1.3 acres which he sharecropped 
in 1986. In 1986 he also sowed 4 acres of b.amon land. Sharecropping is one of the 
mainstays of Kamal’s economic strategies. Nonetheless he has no long-term 
agreements with any landowner and thus faces a new round of negotiations and 
insecurity before every season.
The household’s own land has been entirely mortgaged out to and cultivated by 
Saidur fo r the last three years. For the money obtained through the mortgage Kamal 
bought a hal (two cows and plough), which he now uses to cultivate sharecropped 
land. He also rents out himself and his hal to plough other people’s land.
4. EDUCATION
Kamal never went to school. His wife attended the village primary school for 
two years. Their oldest son studied up to class 5 but had to give up in order to work.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
Kamal ploughs land for others with his hal. He also works as a day labourer 
whenever someone calls him. At big village functions he is usually among the paid 
helpers. Once he attempted to set up a business with oil, salt and dry goods but gave 
it up after a few weeks.
Kamal’ oldest son occasionally joins a labour gang to look for work in the 
towns or in other areas with different cropping seasons. The second son, about 11 
years old, works as a servant in wealthier village households for his food and a 
monthly wage of about 30 Taka. He usually works in the same household for eight 
months and returns home for the rainy season. During the 1985/86 period he worked 
fo r Saidur’s (IV.2.1) household. A third son, aged eight, works as a cowherd for 
other village households and receives his food from them in return. Shuki used to 
work for other village households before she fell ill and had her children.
6. CULTIVATION
The household’s main economic strategy centres around the decision to mortgage 
out their 0.66 acres of land in order to buy a hal. With the hal they have 
sharecropped in 1.2 acres of land during the 1986 boro season. This is twice the 
amount they own. On the current i / i  sharecropping terms this leaves them with 
roughly the same annual crop they would have received from their own land. In 
addition, Kamal is able to sharecrop in large amounts of low land during the b.amon 
season with the hal. With the 4 acres he sowed during the 1986 amon season, Kamal 
hopes to recover his mortgaged land. If, as is often the case fo r the low land, the 
floods spoil the crops, Kamal will sell a cow to redeem his mortgaged land. The two 
cows he originally bought as part of the hal have borne two calves so that his
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cultivation activities would not be undermined. Risks are high, though. Any 
unexpected occurrence such as his wife’s recent cholera attacks and his children’s 
persistent fever, which incurred medical costs of over 500 Taka, unbalances the 
precarious planning.
For his 1.3 acres of sharecropped boro land Kamal incurred a total cultivation 
cost of 3550 Taka. He achieved a below average yield of 53 maunds per acre. This 
was partly due to low fertilizer application and partly to water refusal to Kamal’s 
land in one command area (see below). He received 29 maunds of paddy as his crop 
share. Of this he had to sell 5 maunds immediately after the harvest to cover labour 
costs. He realized 625 Taka (125 Taka per maund), the very lowest annual paddy 
price. Two months later, when Kamal had nothing left to sell, paddy prices had risen 
to 200 Taka per maund. He makes up the remainder of his cultivation costs and 
about half the household’s annual food requirements by renting out his labour and his 
hal.
7. LABOUR USE
The sale of labour makes up a large part of household income. But in order to 
cultivate boro Kamal also hires day labour. The transplantation and harvest of boro 
are done by Kamal with occasional hired day labour. Kamal also weeds the boro and 
cultivates the b.amon with some help from his sons. Kamal is one of the few 
cultivators in Samitigram who does not use a labour group (cf. V.3.1.1) for the boro 
harvest. As Kamal’s wife Shuki is chronically ill and cannot cook for large numbers 
of people and because they do not have the space to accommodate large numbers of 
people, he has to incur cash costs for the harvest day labourers rather than paying in 
crop shares as is done with the labour groups.
No annual or seasonal labour is ever employed by the household. Shuki, her 
mother and one of her sisters, who is married into a poorer Samitigram household 
help each other with the more arduous household tasks.
8. CREDIT
Kamal took no form al or informal loans in 1985/86. In the past, they had two 
loans from the MSS and the Krishi Bank both of which they defaulted on. Formal 
loan sources are now closed o ff to Kamal. Through very tight planning and almost 
unceasing work he has been able to meet the cash requirements of the household and 
its cultivation activities without taking any credit in 1985/86.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
Since he is neither a member of any political party nor a Farmers’ Cooperative 
(KSS), Kamal keeps a low profile in village politics. Union politics is hardly open to 
him as an illiterate, poor man without shoes and in ragged clothes. Through Saidur, 
his wife’s half-sister’s husband, he occasionally gains some information and maybe a 
channel of access to the union and upazila bureaucracy. Another of his wife’s sisters 
holds a prominent position in one of the two Women’s Cooperatives (MSS) in 
Samitigram. Their MSS loans may have been obtained through this connection in the 
past. After defaulting an MSS loan, this connection does not help them any more.
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
Kamal irrigates 0.8 acres of sharecropped land in two STW command areas and 
a further 0.4 acres by the traditional seti (swing bucket). His own land is all irrigated 
and distributed across a further three command areas.
In the last boro season Kamal was refused water on half of his sharecropped 
STW-irrigated land (0.4 acres) because the land owner had failed to pay his water 
dues for the previous year. Kamal, unaware of this when he entered the 
sharecropping agreement, was left with only about 60% of the expected yield from
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the land after investing fully into the cultivation of it. As he had received no water, 
he refused to pay any water charges to the manager of the command area, Ashraf, 
Malik’s son (IV.2.1). As a result, he lost another plot of sharecropping land in the 
following season, which he used to share in from Malik. The land was given to 
someone else after the dispute about the water payments.
Kamal’s strategy is to sharecrop in as much land as he can get for the b.amon 
season. He regards the high risk of crop failure as the evil which accompanies the 
opportunity to achieve a good crop with minimum cash outlays. This strategy is only 
possible since the wealthier households have centred their economic strategies around 
the cultivation of irrigated boro crops so that they are not willing any more to take 
the high risk of crop failure for the lower-yielding b.amon crop. As Kamal neither 
hires in labour nor applies fertilizer to the amon crop it is only his own labour and 
the cost of the home-produced seeds, which he would lose if the crops fail.
Thus Kamal’s household has improved its situation through the introduction of 
STW irrigation in an indirect way. They have gained greater access to sharecropping 
land during the amon season. They do not make large gains as Malik and Saidur, but 
they do stand a chance to make occasional good profits. A failed amon crop no 
longer means land loss and hunger. Employment in irrigated agriculture and other 
areas (house construction, transport) is available to Kamal and his sons. Their limited 
access to boro sharecropping land is an addition to amon cultivation rather than the 
central element in their cultivation planning. Kamal has also successfully converted 
the increased demand for tillage into an income source for himself. He mortgaged 
his land to invest in two cows, which although less good for ploughing purposes give 
his family some milk and through the new calves a further productive asset which
carries the possibility to retrieve their land from mortgage. A hard and precarious
but not hopeless future lies ahead of the household. When Kamal’s sons grow up 
there may be further improvement but this also depends on whether they manage to 
maintain a joint household.
YUSSUFS SONS: HAKIM, HANIF AND RAHMAN
1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
Yussuf is an old man and his sons are all married and have separate nuclear 
households. His oldest son Hakim is around forty years old. He separated from 
YussuPs household 15 years ago. He and his wife have four children between eleven 
and three years of age and one married daughter. Hanif, Yussufs second son 
separated from his parents* household 10 years ago. He and his wife have three 
children between six and two. YussuPs youngest son Rahman separated four years 
ago before his wife had their two children. Yussuf also has two married daughters.
The oldest is married to his older brothers* son and lives in the village in another
para. The younger daughter, Mukhi, is married to a deedwriter in the next town. She 
is w ell-off now and provides economic support to her parents. She often comes to 
stay in her parents house with her husband.
Yussuf is not one of *the poor*. His father owned 12 acres of which Yussuf 
inherited 4.3 acres. Throughout his life various shortages forced him to sell 3.3 acres 
of which 2.3 acres went to to Malik (A). Today he owns one acre of land and he and 
his wife live of the proceeds of this and his seasonal fishing income. Yussuf used to 
sharecrop in land with his sons but now they have their separate households and 
Yussuf is too old to take in any land by himself. He never sold his labour. In this 
research he belongs to the category of *the coping*.
YussuPs three sons* households fall among *the poor* in the village. The whole 
family lives in the same homestead in different rooms which are assembled in a 
haphazard fashion around two little courtyards connected by a narrow path. The
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homestead land belongs to Yussuf but each nuclear family has ’their space’ in it and 
all the cooking and other work is done separately.
2. A SSE TS
The oldest brother, Hakim owns a plough and one bullock. Since his other 
bullock died he has shared a hal (two bullocks and a plough) with his main employer, 
one of the ’well-off* of the village. He does not own a boat as do his brothers.
The middle brother, Hanif owns two cows and a country boat. For the rainy 
season the cows are given to a relative because Hanif cannot feed them, and his 
children are too young to graze them.
Rahman, the youngest merely owns a boat, two fishing nets and six chickens.
3. LAND
None of the brothers has inherited any land yet. They can expect about 0.3 acres 
each if their father does not sell any more land. Hakim bought a small plot (0.17 
acres) with the proceeds from the sale of his wife’s land which was located in 
another village. He has sharecropped in 0.5 acres from Malik (IV.2.1) for the last 
four years. Recently he has taken a small plot (0.08 acres) of boro land in 
khaikalashi mortgage from Toslin (IV.2.3).
Hanif also owns 0.17 acres, bought with the proceeds from his wife’s jewellery. 
As he owns a hal, he sharecrops in 1.3 acres of land from one of ’the Rich*, Malik’s 
brother-in-law , the *ex-member* of the union parishad for Samitigram. This 
agreement has lasted for four years. A few years back Hanif took 0.3 acres of land 
in mortgage from Malik (IV.2.1) in exchange for a vote. Now Malik has taken this 
land back.
Rahman also owns 0.17 acres acquired with his wife’s jewellery. He sharecrops 
in 0.4 acres from Malik (IV.2.1)) and used to share in 0.25 acres of land from his 
widowed m other-in-law  who lives in the neighbourhood. Later she gave the land to 
someone else for cultivation but she has taken Rahman’s and her daughter’s oldest 
child to stay and eat with her on a permanent basis.
4. EDUCATION
Only the oldest brother, Hakim, went to school. He studied up to class 5. Hanif 
and Rahman did not go to school at all and are illiterate as their parents are.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
Hakim works as a labourer in the village most o f the year. He is the sardar 
(leader) of a group of young ’poor* men of Samitigram, who hire themselves out as 
construction workers in the area throughout the year and as agricultural labour in 
the village for the boro harvest (see V.3.1.1). He also farms his own and his 
sharecropped land. During the rainy season he completely relies on employment with 
the labour gang or as an individual day labourer. He does not go fishing in the beel 
like his brothers.
Hanif mainly works as a day labourer. He is not member of a labour gang. 
During the rainy season his main income source is the sale of fish from the beel. 
Even at harvest time Hanif does not work in a labour gang. He hires himself out 
individually for ancillary harvesting tasks (e.g. haystacking) instead. He gets paid a 
higher daily rate for this work than the members of the harvesting gangs receive. 
This arrangement also leaves him enough flexibility to cultivate his own crops. He 
rents out himself and his hal to plough the land of others.
Rahman is the sardar of the other labour group in Samitigram. The two groups 
do not work together. Like his brothers, Rahman also farms his own plot and his 
sharecropped land. Some of his household’s paddy is processed into rice by his wife
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and exchanged for household provisions in the hat when cash runs short. Rahman 
also fishes and sells the catch twice daily during the rainy season.
6. CULTIVATION
Hakim cultivated a total of 0.6 acres in 1986 of which only 0.17 acres are his 
own. He reported his boro yields as between 60 and 90 maunds per acre on STW- 
irrigated land, and as 24 maunds per acre on a small plot irrigated by a small 
surface lift pump (fu tfu ti) rented at twice the price of STW water. In 1986 he kept 
38 maunds out of his total harvest of 61 maunds. He sold 10 maunds to cover 
cultivation costs and the cost of attending weddings and giving the usual presents. 
The household eats 50 maunds per year. He had sown all the boro land with b.amon 
in 1986. If this crop succeeded the household would have been able to eat its own 
produce all year. If the crop failed, as in 1985, they had to buy in paddy for about 
six months of the year. This Hakim has to finance through hiring out his labour. In 
1986 he also received 15 maunds for his work in constructing a house in the village.
Hanif cultivated a total of 1.2 acres in the 1986 boro season. He harvested 79 
maunds and received 40 maunds as his crop share. His boro yields are high, between 
72 and 90 maunds per acre. Like his older brothers*, his cultivation costs are high, at 
over 1100 Taka per bigha (3330 Taka per acre). His total boro cultivation costs came 
to 4750 Taka in 1985. From the sale of 10 maunds of paddy he realized 1700 Taka. 
The rest of the cultivation costs have to be made up by day and group labour, 
fishing and renting out his hal throughout the year. He also needs to sell another 8 
maunds of his crop share to cover wedding attendance expenses and to repay a loan 
(see point 8). He sowed 0.66 acres of amon in 1986 of which he received 16 maunds 
of paddy if the harvest succeeded.
Rahman cultivated 0.7 acres of boro land in 1986 with a yield of just under 60 
maunds per acre. His crop share was 19 maunds of which he sold 4 maunds very 
soon after the harvest. His household consumes about 15 maunds per year. As the 
household also uses rice as a means of payment in the hat they have use up their 
crops before the next harvest and have to buy paddy for at least two months of the 
year. Rahman did not sow any amon in 1986 because all his amon was flooded and 
spoilt the year before.
7. LABOUR USE
Hakim and Hanif only do the weeding for their boro and b.amon by themselves. 
They hire labour for all other cultivation tasks. For the boro harvest they use dots 
(labour groups). They do not engage in labour exchange with each other or anyone 
else.
Rahman does all his cultivation by himself and thus incurs no cash labour costs 
at all.
8. CREDIT
Hakim says he "does not need any credit". He engages in mutual interest-free 
loans in the village and finances the little cultivation he does with his income as a 
labourer.
HaniFs and Rahman’s wives are members of the Women’s Cooperative (MSS). 
They save 5 Taka weekly and have received loans of 1200 and 800 Taka 
respectively. Their husbands used this money to cover cultivation costs and intended 
to repay it with their profits from fishing during the rainy season.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL PO LITICS
Hakim is a follower of one of the village’s *well-ofF farmers who, in turn, is a 
firm  supporter of Faruque, one of Samitigram’s absentee landowners. Faruque is 
involved in upazila politics and especially the BRDB (see IV.2.1 point 9). Hakim is a
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member of one of a KSS but never received a KSS loan.
Hanif claims that ’he does not understand politics'. He displayed an astute 
understanding of politics though when he exchanged his vote for a plot of mortgaged 
land from Malik.
Rahman does not seem connected with local politics at all and is not a member 
of a KSS. His relatively long-standing sharecropping contract with Malik may be an 
indication that he provides political support.
As sardars of the village s two labour gangs, Hakim and Rahman hold a position 
of some respect in the village. Hakim carries himself with an authority unusual for a 
practically landless man and he appears to command some influence in Samitigram.
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
Yussuf and his sons only started STW irrigation three to four years ago when 
Samitigram’s ’well-off* and ’rich* had been using STWs for several years. Like other 
’poor' cultivators they were absorbed into command areas after the better-off 
villagers had initiated groups.
All three brothers have some sharecropping land in Malik’s son AshraPs 
’pseudo-group* (No. 1 Map III.3 & III.5). Recently, Malik took one plot of 
sharecropping land in this command area back from Hakim. Hakim also used to 
sharecrop some land in a group command area (No.24 Map III.3), but the land is now 
cultivated its owner. Besides, Hakim irrigates 0.2 acres of boro land with Saidur's 
(IV.2.1) small LLP, which he rents at an hourly rate of 30 Taka. The irrigation costs 
for this land come to about twice as much as the average STW irrigation price in 
Samitigram. As Hakim sharecrops in the land, his cultivation profits from it are 
small.
Hanif cultivates land in two command areas which are managed by Ashraf. Like 
many others he says that group members in these command areas pay the STW 
instalments although they know that Ashraf misappropriates the money.
Rahman is in the same situation since he also cultivates land in AshraPs 
command areas. At the time of my departure from the village he had also started 
cultivating some of his father’s boro land in one group command area (No.4 Map
III.3).
IV.2.4.1 The ’Poor’: Strategies and Change
The situation of YussuPs sons is very different from his own a generation 
earlier. In terms of landownership their position has worsened enormously. However, 
since land is an increasingly unlikely means to retain economic security in 
Bangladesh today, different household categories develop different complementary 
strategies. 'The poor* have their own particular room for manoeuvre and have 
developed a corresponding set of strategies. In accordance, the debate on rural 
development in Bangladesh increasingly needs to ask which of these non-land based 
strategies can become a viable income source for the increasing numbers of land-
and assetless in future.
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The four ’poor’ households in this section vary in their central economic 
strategies in several ways.
Kamal has seized the chance of obtaining amon land. At considerable 
risk to their few assets he has invested in a hal to cultivate and to increase the 
price of his own labour by renting himself out with his hal. In Samitigram a man 
needs to work two days to make up for one day’s rent o f a hal.
Hakim has made labour in its various forms his main economic support. 
He is one of the most educated people among Samitigram’s ’poor* and has used 
his potential in the labour market well. As the sardar of a labour gang he 
negotiates with the wealthier households in the village from a position of more 
strength than he could command as an individual labourer. His education may 
well have helped him to gain this position. Own cultivation takes a very 
secondary role in Hakim’s economic strategies. Sometimes he cultivates some land 
to feed his family and he owns a cow and a plough. However, he does not take 
any cultivation credit. Most of the time he is seen engaged in negotiations and 
working for others. Furthermore, he does not fish. This may be a reflection of 
his recognition that fish yields are falling or simply a personal distaste for the 
occupation. It adds up to a high reliance on employment. The availability of this 
employment (cultivation and construction) is closely connected to the introduction 
of irrigated boro into Samitigram (cf. III.3 & VII). Neither Hakim nor any of his 
brothers engage in the traditional gata labour exchange. This indicates a high 
degree of monetisation of exchange relationships.
In contrast to his brothers, Hanif does not work in a labour group. He 
cultivates quite a large amount of land, works as a day labourer and fishes. His 
strategies are similar to Kamal’s although less purposefully planned and less 
energetically executed.
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Rahman is the youngest and poorest among the ’poor’ household heads 
introduced here. His household is at an economically very difficult stage with 
only one income earner and several small children. Due to his young age Rahman 
is not yet as able as his older brother to take advantage of his position as a sardar 
in a society where age determines status to a large extent. Rahman’s household 
relies on the support of his m other-in-law. She provides it despite severe quarrels 
with Rahman in recognition of the tight economic circumstances of her 
daughter’s household. This is one of the few instances of non-monetized in ter­
household family support I encountered among the ’poor’. It is perhaps significant 
that it is given by a woman, who is much less, if at all, involved in monetized 
exchange relationships and more reliant on her "good relationships" or "social 
capital" (see White 1988) as a subsistence insurance. Her conduct shows some 
similarities with that o f YussuPs daughter Mukhi and differs significantly from 
that of his sons.
Boro cultivation is not a main strategy of the ’poor’. Limited access to 
boro land, higher cultivation costs, limited access to formal, cheaper credit and 
lack of own tillage capacity reduce the potential profit from irrigated agriculture 
for ’poor’ cultivators like Kamal and Hanif. So they divert their attention to the 
form er main crop of the area, rainfed b.amon. The effect of the highly likely 
event of amon failure is softened by the availability of employment on the land 
of those who do cultivate boro and in new occupations (construction, transport) 
which have expanded in the area (see VII).
Other ’poor’ households take a conscious decision to move away from 
the ideal of producing enough paddy to meet household consumption needs and 
enter the labour market on a full scale. Among the ’poor’ it may well be these 
households who gain most through irrigation. It is they who are the leaders and 
organisers of the labour groups in the village and it is they who can therefore
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use the new position of strength which labourers can find now themselves during 
parts of the boro seasons in after the intensification of agriculture through 
irrigated HYV boro in Samitigram (cf. V.3).
IV .2.5 ... and the Destitute: Sahera and her Children
The ’destitute* are the poorest of the ’poor*, those who have practically 
no assets to lose. Female-headed or very old single-person households form the 
majority of the destitute. The case of Sahera shows how some of those most in 
need arrange for their survival and what changes are taking place for them.
1. HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
Sahera is a widow. She is about forty years old. Her two daughters of 
ten and seven years and a baby son are living with her. A married daughter is in 
a village about ten miles away. Sahera’s husband Mahmud died in March 1986, 
during my stay in Samitigram and half-w ay through the interviews fo r this study. 
He was a landless labourer and had come to Samitigram to stay with Sahera’s 
parents as a ghor jam ai in 1972. They lived in Samitigram because of better 
prospects for work and better wages for Mahmud there.
Today Sahera’s parents and her husband are dead. She has four 
half-brothers, who are landless labourers and several more distant relatives in the 
village.
Even before Mahmud’s death the household was one of the three poorest 
in the village. Now Sahera and her children are the poorest household of 
Samitigram.
2. ASSETS
They never owned any cattle nor a hal. There is no boat. Even the land 
on which their hut is built does not belong to the household but is khas 
(government) land. Their hut is made of dried jute sticks and mud. It is too low 
to stand up in. Sahera has two chickens and there are some clay pots in the house.
3. LAND
There has been no land in Sahera’s or Mahmud’s households of origin 
fo r the last two generations. They have never sharecropped or mortgaged in any 
land. Mahmud said that he never had enough money to afford to cultivate.
4. EDUCATION
No-one in the household ever went to school.
5. OCCUPATIONS /  INCOME GENERATION
Sahera has a variety of ways to meet their daily needs. She sharetends 
chickens and eventually acquired her own two chickens from this. With these she 
sometimes earns some cash by selling eggs or chicks. During the harvest period 
she sometimes helps with the crop processing for a wealthier household, often for
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Malik’s (IV.2.1) for one or two months in exchange for daily food, one maund of 
paddy and maybe also a new sari at the end. In 1986 she spent two months 
gleaning the fields of the ’rich* of the village after the boro harvest and obtained 
2± maunds of paddy this way. She does occasional day labour in the households 
of her better-o ff relatives in the village. Sometimes her ten-year old daughter 
works in other village households such as Toslin’s (IV.2.3) in exchange for a 
meal. This daughter also once worked for a family in a nearby town but returned 
home after a short time. Often Sahera does not have enough food in the house to 
feed her children. She and her daughters usually only eat one meal of rice and a 
little curry a day, but she feeds her little son twice a day. Sahera’s husband 
Mahmud used to work with one of the village labour groups until he collapsed in 
the field and died one day.
After his death Sahera has often had to beg for food. When they do not 
have anything to eat, she goes to her relatives or to other village households. 
Sometimes, she works in exchange for food, sometimes she simply asks for it. 
There are twelve households in Samitigram who are taking turns to help her and 
her children when they are in need. Some but not all of them are her relatives. 
Saidur (IV.2.1) is one of those who occasionally helps her. He comments with 
some pride "In our village we have no beggars because we take care of our 
people. That is why there are no thieves either". There indeed appeared to be no- 
one in Samitigram who went begging elsewhere, but a string of outside beggars 
regularly visited Samitigram.
6. CULTIVATION
The household does not cultivate any land. Mahmud’s wages as an 
agricultural labourer used to be its main income.
7. LABOUR USE
The household never employed anyone.
8. CREDIT
When Mahmud was alive he used to take loans from other village 
households to tide his family over lean periods. The going rate was 10 days work 
to repay a loan of 100 Taka. At a daily wage rate of 20 to 25 Taka, Mahmud 
would thus need at least twice as many days* income to repay a loan than it 
would have taken him to earn the same amount. Sahera does not take any loans. 
The chances that she would be able to repay and feed her children and herself at 
the same time are extremely slim, so that no-one in the village gives her a loan.
9. RELATION TO REGIONAL POLITICS
Mahmud was not member of any of the samitis or political parties. 
Sahera is not member of the MSS but relies totally on support from her relatives, 
employers and patrons.
10. THE ROLE OF IRRIGATION
Shallow tubewells brought an additional cropping season and a 
substantial increase in the demand for employment to Samitigram. Like several 
other long-term landless men, Mahmud came to the village to take up these new 
employment opportunities. Some brought their families. Mahmud married a 
woman from Samitigram. After a few years in Mahmud’s home village, the 
family came back to Samitigram and Mahmud settled down as a ghor jamai. 
Mahmud and Sahera said that their situation became better in Samitigram than it 
used to be in his village, because he could always find work in Samitigram. It is 
hard to imagine what Mahmud’s household’s situation would have been like
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without the irrigated boro crop. Perhaps a spontaneous comment by one of the 
other landless men expresses it best "W ithout th e  boro  we would a l l  have 
d i e d . . . "
IV .2.5.1 The Destitute: Strategies and Change
By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that Mahmud’s household 
was prospering before he died. He was landless, sometimes working with a labour 
group and sometimes on his own. He was in a subservient, client position towards 
several village households who occasionally employed him. His age (around 55) 
and lack of education made it difficult for him to act along anything but the 
traditional strong patron versus weak, dependent client framework. He relied on 
usurious consumption loans and had no access to any external resources.
After Mahmud’s death Sahera is locked into the female labour market 
with little chance of cash payment for her work. All she can hope for is to 
provide subsistence for herself and her children. In order to marry her daughters 
she will need help with the dowry. Sahera cannot earn cash except by selling 
poultry or eggs, and even for this she needs male intermediaries if she wants to 
sell in the hat or bazar. Some of her income-generation activities such as 
post-harvest processing and field gleaning are an upshot of the introduction of 
irrigated boro. Even the fact that Sahera receives help from other village 
households may be connected with the increase in prosperity that followed the 
introduction of HYV boro in these households.
Sahera’s hopes are with her baby son. As women, she and her daughter 
have been excluded from the cash nexus of the labour market. At present this 
means that women like Sahera become less willing to work for only food in 
exchange. As Sahera says
NI can glean the  f i e l d s  for  a meal, I don ' t  have to 
work for  anyone fo r  t h a t " .
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As a consequence a scarcity of female labour may be developing. It is 
possible that the female labour market is on the way to monetisation and that 
opportunities for Sahera and her daughters to earn cash incomes increase in 
future.
When he is older, Sahera’s son will bring in some cash income as an 
agricultural labourer, or more if he manages to acquire and use some education. 
However, the household has no great future to look forward to whatever absolute 
positive effects irrigation may have had for them.
IV.3 Some Indicators of Change
STW irrigation has brought a number of changes in Samitigram. An 
additional crop with higher yields than the previous main crop (see V.4) has 
taken over the agricultural cycle. Cultivation costs have risen (see Tables V.13 &
V.14) and additional labour for cultivation is needed (see III.3 and V.3). With 
irrigated cultivation, new types of inputs are required (fertilizer, seeds, bank 
loans etc.) and connections to state bureaucracy and markets outside the village 
have become more diverse and frequent (see VII).
All this has gone hand in hand with a shift in the attributes of the 
village leaders. The new younger leaders can be distinguished by their higher 
level of formal education and their ability to function in spheres outside the 
village.
Finally, the formation of groups in the village (see III.4-5) is an 
important element in the way agricultural production has changed. This has 
particularly affected the quantity and direction of resource flows from irrigated 
cultivation. The village’s irrigation groups are clearly the most important 
determinant of who gains how much from irrigation in Samitigram.
The consequences of these irrigation-related changes have been
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different for each of the four household categories. The case studies in this 
chapter indicated some of the category specific changes and, more importantly, 
they showed how the different aspects of a household's resources, status and 
strategies are interdependent and cumulative in their effects. The changes in the 
context and meaning of different agrarian production and exchange relations for 
the four household categories are taken up in more detail, and based on the 
larger number of households in the village survey, in chapters V to VII. This 
chapter concludes with a summary of irrigation related changes for the four 
household categories, which is based on both case study and survey material.
Higher yields and crop security have meant the largest absolute 
increases in income to ’rich’ case study households. This has allowed for 
investment in non-cultivation activities, such as shops and rice mills but also 
particularly in education. Some diversification of income sources has alleviated 
pressures on land. With higher crop security for boro, longer term fixed-rent 
tenancy contracts provide the opportunity for wealthy absentee landowners such 
as Faruque to sever connections to their land while still deriving income from 
land. Faruque is thus able to eliminate his cultivation supervision time and costs 
and to concentrate on other activities.
Irrigation is a new source of patronage for some of the ’rich’. Irrigation 
command areas such as Malik's (IV.2.1) form part of unequal relations in 
interlinked markets which bind poorer households to the 'rich '. On the other 
hand, the irrigation groups have curtailed 'rich ' households’ ability to employ 
extractive practices. If particular production or exchange relationships around 
irrigated cultivation are examined in more detail, it usually emerges that most of 
the additional surplus created is appropriated by the 'rich '. The changes in the 
terms of sharecropping contracts and the incidence of various types of land 
tenancy with irrigation by household category in Samitigram (see V.1.4) are a
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case in point.
Every ’rich* household in Samitigram dominates at least one STW 
command area. The private STWs in the command area study (see Table II. 1) are 
all owned by the ’rich*. A ’rich* household also usually owns a small LLP (locally 
called fu tfu ti), which is used to irrigate very low beel land from excavated fish 
tanks. Renting out the LLP to other fishbreeders provides a good income as does 
the sale of the fish in the nearby towns.
On average a ’rich* household has land in 12 (between 6 & 18) of the 
31 surveyed village command areas.
The ’well-off* have probably undergone most of the occupational 
diversification among all household types. Occupations such as that of mechanic 
and spare parts dealer are a direct consequence of mechanised irrigation. The 
position of irrigation group manager, although unpaid, provides many 
opportunities for financial and political gains. In Samitigram it is almost 
exclusively occupied by ’well-off* young men.
As they have a lower margin of economic security and less land to fall 
back upon than the ’rich*, the ’w e ll-o ff need to make greater efforts at 
diversification and increased agricultural productivity. The highest yields are 
found among these households, and it is the often more productivity-conscious 
’w e ll-o ff and ’coping* households which obtain the longer-term fixed-rent and 
’new* sharecropping contracts for larger plots of land from the ’rich’ (see
V .l.4.2-4). Cases such as Adom (C) demonstrate this, and show the central 
importance that irrigation has in providing an avenue out of cultivation for 
’w e ll-o ff households. Education is a main resource in this new context.
The ’w e ll-o ff of Samitigram have land in an average of 6 (between 2 
and 11) of the village’s 31 STW command areas. The great majority of STW 
managers come from the ranks of the ’w ell-off’ complemented by some younger
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men from among the ’rich* (see III.4-5). Many of the STW operators are also 
recruited from the ’w ell-off’. For these households, irrigation has meant an 
opportunity to branch out into new non-agricultural occupations.
’Coping* and ’poor* cultivators generally gained access to STW irrigation 
with the formation of irrigation groups in Samitigram. The ’well-off* and the 
’rich* started irrigating some years earlier with their own STWs. For a number of 
the ’coping* increased yields have staved off the need to sell labour. On the other 
hand, ’coping* and ’poor* households, who possess a hal (two oxen and plough) 
often enter the labour market with this equipment to respond to increased 
ploughing needs. The possession of a hal has turned into an important 
determinant for the type of involvement a household has in irrigated cultivation. 
As has been found elsewhere in Bangladesh, (c.f. Hamid 1982) the occupation of 
’ploughman*, i.e. the renting out of oneself and one’s plough to work the land of 
others is becoming more important in irrigated areas. With a hal, a day’s work 
brings more than twice the income of an agricultural labourer.
Even quite poor cultivators employ labour for the boro harvest season. 
This and other cash requirements for boro cultivation create new credit needs 
among the ’coping* which involve households more intensively in formal and 
sometimes also informal credit relations (e.g. Ali, 1V.2.3).
All ’coping* households own or sharecrop some land irrigated by STW. 
On average ’coping* households cultivate land in four command areas. For a large 
number of these households the higher yields and greater crop security achieved 
with irrigated cultivation has - so far - obviated their reliance on labour sale.
For both the ’coping* and the ’poor*, access to sharecropping land 
during the amon season has increased considerably since many of the wealthier 
households now concentrate on irrigated boro and are no longer willing to take 
the risk of crop failure through flooding. This provides both a chance and a risk
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fo r poorer households. People like Kamal (IV.2.4) are able to develop a strategy 
which carefully calculates and takes the risks involved. Others borrow and invest 
into amon cultivation only to lose their crops to the early rains.
The main change for the ’poor* is on the labour market. Quite a large 
number of ’poor* households moved to Samitigram because of the good 
employment opportunities there. A number of men came to the village to live in 
their parents-in-law ’s houses for this reason since STW irrigation started. Many 
of the adult men of ’poor* households of Samitigram are organised in the village’s 
two labour groups and, similar to the migrant labour groups which arrive for the 
boro harvest, they command some strength in the negotiations on remuneration 
(see V.3).
An indirect but important change for the ’poor’ comes with the fall in 
the general water table through irrigation. The decrease in the water table 
endangers the essential seasonal income from open-water fishing. This is likely to 
enforce the client status and exposure to extractive market interlinkages of ’poor* 
households and has potentially very serious consequences for their survival 
chances during the latter part of the rainy season from  August to October, when 
employment is scarce.
Finally, a change in work patterns fo r ’poor* women is also 
recognizable. Rice husking with the dheki used to be the only opportunities to 
earn cash income for the women of the poorest households. With the emergence 
of mechanised rice mills to manage the larger crop quantities, a decrease in dheki 
work has occurred. This has been observed in many parts of Bangladesh (see 
DeVylder 1982; Greeley 1984; McCarthy & Feldman 1983). Simultaneously an 
increase in other types of female work such as parboiling and winnowing has 
occurred. A further part of crop processing (i.e. husking) has thus been absorbed 
by the male monetized sector while increased crop volumes continue to occupy
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poor women in low-paid and largely non-monetized employment relationships.
The changes indicated by the case studies and the village survey will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters V to VII.
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CHAPTER V: IRRIGATED CULTIVATION AND ACCUMULATION
This chapter constitutes the main part of the thesis. It analyses production and 
exchange relationships around cultivation and relates changes to the introduction of STW 
irrigation. Survey findings on relationships for the three main production inputs into 
cultivation, land, credit and labour are presented.
Section V.l analyses the land market. The relative importance of land for the 
economic position of different types of household is demonstrated (V.1.1), the incidence 
and meanings of land sales for different household categories (V.1.3), and the changes in 
price structure and price level for different types of land with irrigation are discussed 
(V.1.3). Sections V.1.4 (land tenancy) and V .l.5 (land mortgaging) examine changes in 
production relations around land. Section V .l.6 relates these changes to the introduction 
of STW irrigation.
Section V.2 examines changes in formal and informal credit with irrigated 
cultivation. The role of credit relationships in the agrarian structure, in particular their 
distributional impact and their impact on agricultural productivity is examined.
Section V.3 presents the complexities in meanings and functions of Samitigram 
labour relations.
Section V.4 collates the main elements which affect cultivation costs and crop 
returns at household level. Returning to some of the case studies of chapter IV, 
examples of cultivation cost differentials between householders of different categories 
fo r the main irrigated and rainfed crops in the village are discussed.
Two main findings emerge from the chapter.
Firstly, in the context of more secure higher yields, irrigated cultivation in 
Samitigram has passed a threshold beyond which surplus appropriation by producers and 
rentiers alike relies on output and productivity increases. Agrarian relationships are thus 
becoming increasingly subject to the considerations of productivity.
Secondly, the emergence of more productivity-oriented agrarian relations under
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irrigated conditions has not displaced market interlinkages and patron-client 
relationships. Rather, patron-client relations have adapted so as to promote agricultural 
productivity while allowing some increased ’room for manoeuvre* for the poor and 
maintaining the advantages of the powerful through market interlinkages.
This chapter is concerned with changes in agrarian relationships and with the way 
these changes affect the development chances of different household categories. The 
analysis refers specifically to the introduction of STWs. However, rather than attempting 
to ’isolate* irrigation entirely, the discussion sets it in the context of other factors of 
rural change.
\
V .l The Land Market
V.1.1 Land Holding and Household Category
National statistics for Bangladesh usually describe the rural household through
some measure of its landholding. Many of the academic studies also use some form of
landholding as a measure of relative and absolute household position. A village level
study over a relatively long period of time offers the opportunity to go beyond the
limitations of the land-centred approach to household classification. I have presented a
picture of household position as composed of a variety of elements of changing
centrality, one of which is landholding (see Table IV. 1). The relative importance of
these composite elements of household type varies between households in one category,
between household categories, and over time.
In this section, landholding is introduced in terms of its importance for different
household categories and for individual households within categories. On the one hand,
this expresses the economic and demographic realities which necessitate alternatives to
land as the major economic base for the population in Bangladesh. On the other hand it
expresses a concern to
. . .  explore  the  pa r t  played by land in the ope ra t io n  of 
types of household economy (own e m ph as i s ) . . .  One would
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expect to  f i nd  a wide range of poss i b le  pa t t e rn s  * from 
a s i t u a t i o n  where the  household p lo t  c o n s t i t u t e s  the 
major source of income for  the family to one where land 
becomes subo rd ina te  as a source of income in r e l a t i o n  
to  var ious  non*ag r ic u l t ur a l  a c t i v i t i e s . . . t h e s e  two 
s i t u a t i o n s  may be i d e n t i c a l  in terms of the s i z e  and 
q u a l i t y  of t h e i r  land base and in terms of the 
demographic and labour composition of the households,  
ye t n e v e r th e l e s s  represen t  d i f f e r e n t  l ive l ih ood  
s o l u t i o n s .
(Long 1984 p . 7)
Figures V .l and V.2 show the ranges of owned land and effective landholding (for
definition see II.4.3) of households of the four categories in Samitigram
It is shown that within categories, households own and derive crops as landowners 
or tenants from a wide range of landholding sizes. As household category rises, the 
width of its landholding range increases. The importance of land for household position 
thus varies more inside the household category for better off households. This indicates 
that land has lost its central importance as a base of wealth for wealthier more than for 
poorer households.
The landholding ranges of the bottom three household categories, the ’poor’, the 
’coping* and the ’well-off* overlap. Apart from the ’rich’ for whom tenancy relations 
reduce effective landholding compared to owned land (cf. Tables V.5 & V.6), 
landholding ranges by household category do not vary much between owned and
effective landholding (cf. Figures V.l & V.2).
The examination below of the factors which determine the position of households 
with landholding sizes at the extreme ends of their category’s ranges, shows the variable 
effect of land on household position. With obvious exception of some of the ’poor* (for 
whom there is no lower household category), the households at the bottom end of their 
category’s landholding range always have at least one strong advantage in another area 
to outweigh their relatively low landholding size.
Figures V.l and V.2 
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The 'rich ' are in a landholding ’class* of their own. There is a substantial 
difference between the smallest landholding among the ’rich* and the largest landholding 
among the ’w e ll-o ff. The landholding range of the ’rich* is the only one which does not 
overlap with that of any of the other household categories. All five ’rich’ households in 
Samitigram have managed to increase household land over the last generation. Only for 
the ’rich* is land still an adequate shortcut to distinguish the household category because 
only the ’rich* still have the capacity to transform household surplus into land purchases 
on a regular basis.
Thus the ’rich* household with the lowest landholding inside its category (Saidur
IV.2.1 with 18.5 acres) had a diversity of income sources (fish-breeding, long-distance 
paddy trade, a roadside shop). The household head, Saidur is a leading figure in the 
village samitis from which he derives a variety of material advantages, which can only 
be partially quantified but not determined precisely through interviews and observation.
The 'w e ll-o ff  household with the lowest landholding (1.65 acres) belonged to a 
strong faction of brothers, which included the village’s union parishad member. A 
variety of extractive practices by this alliance of brothers appeared to furnish 
considerable income to this household. Akbar, the head of this most ’land-poor* 
’w e ll-o ff household, was the manager of an irrigation group, which broke up over his 
alleged misappropriation of group funds. The shalish (village court) which was convened 
to judge on the dispute between the manager and the group members was dominated by 
Akbar and his brothers. Eventually Akbar kept the money from the sale of the group’s 
STW, which had been bought on a bank loan. The implications of this for the question of 
accumulation through irrigation are taken up elsewhere (V.2). Surplus appropriation 
through irrigation is one of the material expressions of Akbar’s strong position in local 
politics. Eventually, but not necessarily, his gains may manifest themselves in land. 
Nonetheless, his kinship network and his relatively high level of education (class 10) and 
not land are the basis for Akbar’s economic position.
-  171 -
The ’coping* household with the lowest holding only owns 0.33 acres, not enough 
to feed the nine household members and considerably less than the 2.65 acres of the 
most ’land-rich* ’poor* household. The household head, Djomshed is the brother of 
Faruque, the village’s absentee landowner. Faruque lives in the upazila headquarters and 
is one of Samitigram’s central links to the outside. Through his brother, Djomshed has a 
certain status in the village. Djomshed also works as a ’deedwriter* in land mortgaging 
and sale transactions. The income he realizes from this depends at least in part on his 
connections to the bureaucracy through his brother Faruque. The total situation of 
Djomshed’s household locates it comfortably within the ’coping* rather than among the 
poorest of the village where conventional statistical measures of landholding or asset 
structure would have placed it.
For the households at the top end of their category’s range of landholding the 
question of why a household is not considered part of the next higher household 
category becomes relevant. For these households one or several of the factors, which 
make up composite household position represented a considerable disadvantage which 
outweighs the household’s relatively large landholding.
The three ’well-off* households with the highest landholding inside their category 
all have 10 acres. This separates them from the lowest landholding size among the ’rich’ 
(18.5 acres) anyway. But further factors outweigh these households* relatively high 
landholding sizes and make their households’ positions more similar to those of the 
smaller landholders inside their category than to those of the ’rich*. In all three cases the 
household head is illiterate and old and has not ceded the leadership of the household to 
a son. The households* income is almost exclusively derived from  cultivation. None of 
them is more than marginally involved in the village’s samitis and all three households 
are marginal or hostile to Samitigram’s dominant factions.
The ’coping* household with the highest landholding in its category owns 4.6 acres, 
more than twice as much as the ’well-off* household with least land. This household has
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10 members, only three of whom do agricultural work. Village kinship connections are 
weak as the male household head only came to Samitigram through marriage. The 
household has to rent all draught animals. Although land is available, both labour and 
other inputs thus present considerable problems. Only about 9 months of paddy 
consumption requirements are covered by the household’s own harvest and during the 
lean seasons the men occasionally hire out their labour. Only one household member 
ever attended school, where he barely learnt to read and write. Should the household 
split up into its constituent three nuclear families these would be firmly located among 
the ’poor* of the village as few advantages other than land are available to the present 
joint household.
The ’poor* household with the highest landholding in its category has 2.65 acres. 
This clearly takes it out of the landholding categories which conventionally describe the 
poorest among the rural population of Bangladesh. However, a more thorough look at 
this household’s total situation brings to light the poverty o f its circumstances. The 
household is residentially and economically joint, a very unusual occurrence in its 
category. It consists of four nuclear families with a total of 14 members. Only three of 
these are adult males who are able to work on the land and to hire out their labour. The 
household has to purchase its paddy requirements for at least two months of the year. 
There is a history of infant death and nutrition deficiencies in the household. None of 
the household members has ever gone to school so that their potential involvement in 
new income-generating activities and participation in village samitis is restricted.
On the whole, the variations in the relation between landholding and household 
category show that it is no longer adequate to use a single factor, even one as central as 
landholding, in whichever form, as an indicator of the economic position and mobility 
of Bangladeshi rural households.
V .l.2 Land Purchases and Sales
Land transfers and land use affect a household’s economic position and security in
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a major way. Table V.l gives some indication of how land transfers over the last 
generation of household heads have influenced the land endowment of Samitigram’s four 
m ajor household categories.
TABLE V.l: Land Transfers and Changes in Holding Sizes (% of Household 
Category)
Rich Well-Off Coping Poor
1. Land Sale 0% 36% 48% 32%
2. Land Purchase 100% 92% 45% 23%
3. Less Land than
under previous 0% 64% 67% 63%
household head
a)'  p r esen t  household heads
Table V.l shows that some households from all categories except the ’rich* sold 
land during the present generation of household heads (line 1). Most land sales occurred 
from the ’coping’ to the ’well-off* and ’rich* households. Two types of land sales by the 
’coping* can be differentiated. The first and main one is part of a movement towards 
landlessness, which eventually propels the seller into the category of the ’poor* as land 
fragmentation, and a cluster of disadvantages reinforce each other (see Toslin IV.2.3 for 
a case example).
The second type of land sale is part of a land selling and purchasing cycle, which 
stretches across a generation and is mainly determined by changes in the household 
labour/consumer ratio and its expenses and incomes from dowries. In one such case, a 
farm er who started with two bigha (0.66 acres) of land managed to buy a further six 
bigha after his wedding and then had to sell six bigha throughout his life in order to 
provide dowries for his seven daughters. In his old age he is back to the two bigha of 
his youth. However, similarly high rates of land sales and purchases among the ’coping*
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(Table V .l) do not necessarily indicate the cyclical recurrence of land purchases and 
sales in line with Chayanovian arguments. In Samitigram, land sale and purchase cycles 
over the last generation are more an indication of the particularly transient character of 
the situation of ’coping’ households where land is either sold or purchased as the 
direction of household mobility becomes clear.
Only 16% of Samitigram’s ’coping’ households had experienced a circular land sale 
and purchase process in the last generation. Over half o f these had achieved income 
increases through the introduction of irrigated boro. This contributed the essential 
economic momentum to repurchase land after previous sales. It is not a longer term 
stability in the socio-economic structure of Samitigram in the Chayanovian tradition (see 
Harrison 1977 for a critique) which is implied by most of the cyclical land sale and 
purchasing processes in Samitigram over the last generation. Rather, STW irrigation has 
brought a one-off increase in cultivation incomes (see V.4) which combined with 
favourable stages in the demographic cycle has maintained the socio-economic position 
of some ’coping’ households over one household life cycle. These unique circumstances 
cannot be repeated in the absence of continued ’injections* of productivity-raising 
elements into the agrarian structure. At best a postponement of the eventual loss of land 
rather than the crossing of the threshold towards some degree of security of household 
position through income from land is the effect of irrigated cultivation for the majority 
of ’coping* households. Even high productivity increases in cultivation cannot avert a 
decrease in the role of land both as income source and as repository for accumulated 
surplus fo r the rural majority in Bangladesh.
There are two important points to be made about land sales. Firstly, until the 
introduction of irrigated boro, most of the present ’rich’ households purchased land from 
less wealthy households during periods of economic distress after the frequent failures 
of the amon harvest due to the vagaries of the monsoon. With the more secure irrigated 
boroy such "ratchet type" distress sales which used to leave the seller of land in an
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irreversibly worse position have decreased substantially. The decrease o f distress land 
sales (as opposed to land sales with other reasons) as a result of reduced risk with 
irrigated cultivation has important development implications. It also emphasizes the point 
that before the quantitative incidence of an element of the agrarian structure is 
determined, its meaning for the actor household and for the agrarian structure needs to 
be investigated.
There seems to be a relatively low percentage of land sales by the ’poor* (i.e. 32% 
of category). However, over 50% of the ’poor’, (17.5% of all village households), owned 
no agricultural land and thus had no land to sell. Land sales from the "poor" occurred 
because of food shortages, daughters1 weddings, diseases, the death of a main income 
earner and litigation expenses. One "poor" household sold land in order to buy a fishing 
boat and nets. The land purchases by the ’poor’ were mainly restricted to residential land 
bought by newcomers to Samitigram, who had sold their assets elsewhere in order to 
find employment in Samitigram (see V.3 on labour market conditions). Only very small 
plots of agricultural land were purchased by the "poor1 of Samitigram. These purchases 
were without exception financed through non-cultivation income sources such as pump 
operating, fish sale and trading (see table VII. 1). A degree of land accumulation still 
occurs among some of the "poor1 not through irrigated cultivation directly but possibly 
through some of its "upstream1 or "downstream" implications in exchange and non­
cultivation production activities (see Ch. VII).
Land sales by the "well-off" bear yet a different character from the sales by "poor" 
and "coping" households. The 36% of "well-off" households, which sold land over the 
current generation of household heads may at first appear surprisingly high. The 
rationale with which land is sold by many "well-off" households throws some light on 
this. While there were a few distress sales due to failed harvests before the introduction 
of STWs, most of the more recent land sales by the "well-off" occurred in conjunction 
with land purchases in other areas and achieved a consolidation of landholdings around
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irrigation command areas. Some straight land exchanges, not recorded as purchases and 
sales in Table V .l, also occurred among the ’w e ll-o ff and ’rich’. Land consolidation 
around STW command areas was a major feature of land transfers to and from the 
’well-off*. Some marginal, lower fertility land was also sold by the ’w e ll-o ff  in this 
process.
The function of land sales for the ’w e ll-o ff is thus one of rationalising farm 
production structures, or of re-allocating investment funds into more profitable non- 
agricultural channels such as a shop for electrical spare parts in one case. It is not, as 
fo r the ’poor’ and ’coping*, a means to provide for consumption and life cycle 
requirements. Table V.l shows relatively equal proportions of land sellers among the 
three bottom household categories. It is now clear that this needs to be seen in 
conjunction with the specific meaning of these land sales for each household category.
92% of ’w e ll-o ff households bought land. Although land is not the only means to 
Increase household income, land purchase is still a main way of Investing household 
income. Only for the ’rich*, (i.e. under 5% of all households in Samitigram), has 
landownership remained at or above the level of the previous generation of household 
heads (see Table V .l). For the future, other indicators of accumulated wealth will gain 
importance and may replace investment in land. The often rather uncritical equation 
between land sales on the one hand, and pauperisation on the other, in much of the 
literature on rural Bangladesh does not always help to distinguish rural mobility patterns 
which are increasingly determined by occupational diversification out of cultivation, and 
the use of land sales and mortgages as a way to raise finance.
As an enforcement to the argument, it needs to be stated that the total absence of 
land sales by the ’rich* (Table V .l) is not equivalent to an absence of land transfers from 
the ’rich*. There were a number of land exchanges between the ’rich*, which were 
undertaken to consolidate irrigation command areas. These land exchanges, often 
accompanied by cash payments in order to compensate for differences in plot sizes and
- 177 -
land quality, also occurred between Samitigram ’rich* and inhabitants of other villages. 
"They don’t give us water properly over there" was the most frequent reason given for 
these land exchanges. In contrast to earlier findings (Patnaik 1972 a&b; Wood 1981 on 
antediluvian uses of capital), we thus find the clearest association between land transfers 
and productivity increases among the ’rich* and ’well-off*.
Samitigram villagers tended to regard land sales as an expression of need. Those 
who had not sold land state this with pride. Those who did sell land in order to 
restructure household investment or production tended to explain this at length. ’Rich* 
household heads said they had not sold land because they had "no need to". A household 
which does not sell land maintains status in the village. Similar patterns were found for 
sharecropping and mortgaging (see V.1.3 & V.1.4).
However, in the context of STW irrigation, land sales and exchanges were also 
consolidating fragmented landholdings for the wealthier landowners. Samitigram 
cultivators of all household categories consolidated their operated holdings and realized 
economies of scale around STW command areas through land sales and exchanges (the 
’rich* mainly) or tenancy or mortgaging arrangements (see V .l.3-4).
Another parallel change appeared among smaller landowning households at the 
point of inheritance and household nucleatiom When amort was the main crop, the heirs 
to a farm used to subdivide every one of the farm’s plots. This was done to distribute 
the risk of crop failure between heirs and to take into account variations in land fertility 
between plots. With irrigated HYV cultivation, the risk of crop failure diminishes. As a 
consequence, the heirs of farms with irrigated land in Samitigram started to allocate full 
plots to individual households rather than subdividing every single plot of land amongst 
all inheriting parties. Like the productivity-oriented land sales and exchanges of the 
’rich*, this slows down the land fragmentation process.
In contrast to Lipton’s (1968) postulated choice between low-risk, low-yield 
production and higher-risk, higher-yield production production options for near
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subsistence farmers. In Samitigram the introduction of STW irrigated boro brought the 
new option of lower-risk, higher-yield production. Farm production structures are thus 
changing from multiple rainfed plots in different areas, which in line with Lipton’s 
argument minimized the farm 's risk of total crop failure, to fewer and larger blocks of 
land centred around irrigation command areas. Productivity increases and economies of 
scale are thus realized by many Samitigram cultivators.
Access to water is essential for this. Samitigram’s irrigation groups facilitate 
water access for poorer households in particular (see Table III.2). Without this secure 
access to water, the agricultural production structure and its influence on household 
level accumulation processes can take very different forms. This is shown for the ’seven 
villages* in Chapter VI.
All Samitigram ’rich* bought land regularly (Table V.l). One household, which 
used to belong to the ’rich’ in the previous generation, split into eight separate 
households, two of which are now among the *well-ofF, four among the ’coping* and 
two among the ’poor*. In all other previously ’rich* households, net land purchases were 
possible with the maintenance of the joint fam ily household. Time and resources did not 
allow for an investigation of per capita changes in landholding size over time in 
Samitigram. Fewer children per couple compared to the previous generation combined 
with the increases in total household land are likely to mean a substantial increase in per 
capita landholding among the ’rich* and a decrease for other household categories
Income sources leading to land purchase are clearly becoming more diverse for all 
household categories. Only one of Samitigram’s ’rich* households relied exclusively on 
cultivation. Occupational diversification into trading, rice-milling and the service sector 
has become an essential element of upward mobility for all households. At present, land 
ownership still indicates economic security and status. However, differences in land sales 
and purchases between household types increasingly reflect returns from diversification 
out of cultivation rather than income from land only (see Ch. VII).
Figure V.3
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Clearly land purchases and sales also m irror the direct effect of irrigated 
cultivation. While smaller ’coping* and ’poor* landholders increased their economic 
resilience and avoided selling their labour through STW irrigated production (although 
tem porarily in the absence of other income sources), larger landholders realized 
sufficient additional income from irrigated cultivation to purchase more land and thus to 
expand the productive base of their farms.
V.1.3 Land prices
The approximate development of land prices over the 45 years up to 1985/86 is 
shown in Figure V.3. Information was collected by asking household heads about past 
purchases of land in present irrigation command areas. For each point in time an 
average land price was then calculated. Although some recall problems may remain, it 
was found that the importance of land in the economic life of a household is such that 
the participants in a land sale are able to recall the terms of the transaction in great 
detail over decades.
In the mid-seventies, five to ten years after the first introduction of STW 
irrigation in Samitigram a steep rise in land prices occurred. This happened at a time 
when inflation was high. Although there can be no monocausal connection, an increase 
of at least 300% in paddy yields and output with the introduction of irrigated HYV boro 
(see Tables V.14 & V .l5) cannot have failed to exert some upward pressure on 
Samitigram land prices.
Not only the level but also the structure of land prices altered with mechanised 
irrigation. Elevation determines land price in Singra’s beel areas. Until the 1970s, the 
higher a plot of land, the higher would be its price. The lowest land, which was flooded 
for several months of the year, was mainly useful for communal fishing with no 
particular advantage to its owners. Higher land carried a single floodprone high-risk, 
low-yield b.amon crop and sometimes a winter rabi crop of vegetables..
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Today most of this land carries boro paddy. At least 75% of Samitigram lands 
were under irrigated HYY boro cultivation in 1985/86. Irrigation brought a fall in the 
general water table. Irrigation costs increase with land elevation as pumping costs rise 
with the distance between aquifer and surface and because higher land dries up first and 
thus needs more water per irrigation season. As irrigated boro cultivation has assumed 
the dominant role in the annual crop cycle (see Ch.III), high land commands a lower 
price than lower land in Samitigram today.
This recent reversal of the land price structure may explain why the private 
command areas of Samitigram’s ’rich* are on higher, ’worse* land than the command 
areas with a more mixed membership of all household categories. It appears that the 
distribution of high quality land was skewed in favour of the ’rich* households before 
the 1970s but that the reversal in the criteria for land price has not been followed by an 
appropriation of the high fertility-low , irrigation cost command areas by the village 
'rich*. The availability of irrigation water to most households in Samitigram through 
Samitigram’s irrigation groups has prevented this so far. In other villages in the area (see 
Ch. VI), land which appreciated through STW irrigation has been appropriated by the 
rich elites via their control over water. At present, much of the low land in Samitigram 
remains in the hands of poorer households because reversals in land productivity and 
land price structure have been accompanied by relatively favourable access conditions to 
water. Regular land buying by the ’rich* is likely to reverse ownership patterns if the 
initial economic resilience gained by poorer owners of high-fertility low land is lost 
through demographic growth and lack of opportunities for occupational diversification 
out of cultivation.
Land sales and purchases in Samitigram are of a distinctly seasonal nature 
determined by the cash requirements for the cultivation of irrigated boro and the timing 
and returns from its harvest. Between transplantation in January and the harvest in 
M ay/June, land sales are very low. In 1986, it was difficult to sell even high quality
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land as cultivators were using their funds to purchase cultivation inputs and to 
cover the cost of labour. During the post-harvest period in July and August, on 
the other hand, land sales and land on offer are the constant topic of 
conversation. Any villager willing to sell land then faces no shortage of offers.
Reliable survey information on the amounts and seasonality of land 
sales in the period before irrigation was difficult to obtain. The low level of 
production cost fo r the form er main crop (b.amon; see Table V .l5) leads one to 
suspect that the seasonal nature of land sales in response to production 
requirements is a new phenomenon. According to a number of village informants, 
land sales in the pre-irrigation  period ^  peaked after failed harvests. Economic 
distress, rather than the agricultural production were the rationale of this earlier 
type of land sale seasonality. As another expression of the increased emphasis on 
productivity rather than on extractive appropriation disassociated from the 
agricultural production process itself, a new type of land sale seasonality has thus 
appeared. It is determined by the requirements of irrigated cultivation rather than 
by the distress needs o f the poor and the extractive practices of the wealthy.
In this context the ’untimely’ offer of a plot of land to one ’rich’ 
household, which occurred in my presence, is a case in point. The ’rich* potential 
buyer replied to the offer that all money was needed for the cultivation of boro 
at present and added "I’d rather cultivate my land well than have another plot of 
’dead’ land now". Here, the aim to use available resources productively appears to 
be superseding ’antediluvian* accumulation objectives. It is argued here that a 
transformation of household strategies and agrarian relations in this direction is 
occurring in the context of productivity and output increases under irrigated 
conditions.
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V .l .4 Tenancy
Not only ownership, but also land use determines accumulation patterns 
from  cultivation. This section introduces and discusses the three forms of land 
tenancy identified in Samitigram It is argued that with irrigated HYV 
cultivation land tenancy agreements vary not only in contractual form but also in 
their function in the agrarian structure and in the rationale of the parties 
involved in the agreements. Differences in rationale between mostly rainfed 
’traditional* and ’new* sharecropping agreements for irrigated land ^  are shown 
to be reflected in landowners’ choice of tenants, in the more general patterns of 
landowner-tenant relationships, and in variables such as input use and yields of 
sharecropped land (see V.4 Table V .l3).
Approximately 18% of all cultivated land owned by Samitigram 
households and 16% of STW irrigated land in all the 31 surveyed command areas 
were cultivated under sharecropping or fixed-rent tenancy 
agreements.
Various combinations of the following led Samitigram landowners to 
sharecrop ou t
— Not enough household labour
(" I  d o n ' t  want to  h as s l e  with h i r ing  labour;  ' r i c h ' ) ;
( MI am too  old t o  work, so my sons sharecrop the  land” ; ' w e l l - o f f ' ) ;
- -  Sharecropping as part of the agreement on a land sale
C I  bought the  land from them so now I give i t  to  them for  sharecropping for  a
w h i l e . " ;  ' r i c h ' ) ;
- -  Provision of income to ’poor* households tied to the landowner in other ways
("1 pay him a l i t t l e  wages and he sharecrops t h i s  p iece  of  land so they can e a t . 11; 
• r i c h ' ) ;
( "La s t  year  he sharecropped my land, t h i s  year  I employ him as a labourer . " ;  ' r i c h ' ) ;  
- -  Alternative occupations
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("My shop keeps me busy ." ;  ' w e l l - o f f ' ) ;
Many ’poor* and ’coping* households reported not to sharecrop in 
because no land was available to them. For those who did sharecrop in, the 
following factors appeared important for their successful access to sharecropping 
lands:
— The availability of family labour and draught animals
— Particularly good chances to cultivate securely and productively (water and 
credit access, specific skills)
- -  Kinship connection to the landowner
Sharecropping contracts in the beel area around Samitigram vary. In one 
nearby village, the sharecropper of irrigated land bears full input costs and 
receives two thirds of the crop. In Samitigram, all cultivation costs, including 
water charges but not STW capital cost, are born by the sharecropper, and the 
crop is shared on a half and half basis between landowner and tenant. As yields 
in Samitigram are higher than in most other beel villages, and as irrigation 
charges are much lower than usual in the area, Samitigram sharecroppers realise 
approximately the same absolute gains as the sharecroppers in the village where 
two thirds of the crop go to the tenant. Surplus extraction from the tenants of 
irrigated land is thus higher in Samitigram than in the other village. Absolute 
returns to the tenants of both villages are about equal but profit shares of 
Samitigram landowners are much higher.
With the increasing dominance of irrigated boro cultivation in the 
annual cropping cycle, three types of land tenancy have evolved in Samitigram. 
These were investigated in detail in the main part and the follow up study in the 
village survey (see Table II. 1). The differences in the contractual form and in the 
role of different tenancy contracts and the strategies of landlords and tenants are 
identified below.
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V .l.4. ’Traditional* Sharecropping
Agreements cover small plots, mostly with land of low fertility or high 
cultivation costs. Sharecropping contracts are short-term, renewed and 
renegotiated seasonally or annually. A sharecropper rarely cultivates the same 
plot for longer than one or two years.
The parties to such sharecropping agreements are of very unequal social 
and economic standing and the sharecropper tends to depend on the landlord in 
multiple ways. Often an employer supplements the wages of his local labourers 
with small plots of low quality land for the labourer to sharecrop. One 
permanently employed labourer said that during some years he was employed by 
a particular ’rich* household and in other years, at the convenience of his ’rich* 
patron, he sharecropped in a little land from the same household. After a 
wealthier household bought land from a poorer one, the land was often 
sharecropped out to the former owner for some time after the sale as an informal 
part of the sale agreement. This helps the seller to adjust to the loss of the land 
as an income source over a longer period of time. It is at the same time the 
expression of a continuing or beginning relationship of dependence of a poorer 
(land-selling, sharecropping) household on a richer household expressed through 
market interlinkages.
Short-term ’traditional* sharecropping contracts are most frequent in the 
b.amon season in Samitigram (May to October). While, on the whole, HYV boro 
has assumed the dominant position in the village’s annual cycle, a number of 
’poor’ and ’coping* households rely mainly on short-term  sharecropping of amon 
(low yield, low cultivation cost)(see Tables V .l3 & 14). These households try to 
obtain as much land during the amon season as possible. With a continuation of 
amon cultivation on most land and presently at least 75% of agricultural land 
under an additional crop of irrigated boro there has been a large addition to
- 186 -
Samitigram’s gross cultivated area. As the ’rich* and ’w ell-off’ are concentrating 
crop  production efforts on boro, much of the more floodprone amon land is now 
available to ’poor* and ’coping* households under short-term  ’traditional’ 
sharecropping agreements. This brings a shift in cultivation risks to the poorer 
’’traditional’ tenants. It also means potential economic improvement for those 
tenants for whom luck and careful balancing of the risks of sharecropping amon 
sometimes provides sufficient resources to expand the household’s asset base. 
K am al’s example (IV.2.4) shows some of the hazards of such a strategy. 
Advantages like preferential treatment by a ’rich’ village household and the 
absence of diseases and deaths in the household are necessary for success. In the 
long run, the majority of short-term sharecroppers will have to rely on hiring 
out household labour as a main income source. For most poorer households, the 
small plots of irrigated land during the boro season or floodprone amon land,
which are usually sharecropped in under short-term  contracts, achieve at best a
postponement of the need to hire out labour.
18 % of ’poor’ village households did not cultivate any land at all in 
1985/86 and therefore did not obtain any of the larger amounts of amon 
sharecropping land. The majority of these households reported to be hiring out 
household labour because of their inability to obtain sharecropping land.
Short-term ’traditional* sharecropping relationships have been a
well-known phenomenon on the Indian subcontinent for decades (see Bhaduri
1973). Byres writes:
a p a r t i c u l a r  se t  of backward s oc ia l  r e l a t i o n s  (c en t r in g  
on sharecropping and ' t h e  web of dependency* of which 
i t  i s  an i n te g ra l  p a r t ) " .  In t h i s  framework 
" t r a d i t i o n a l "  sharecropping r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  seen as
an express ion  of and cause of the  absence of t echnica l
pr ogr ess .
(Byres 1983 p . 19)
The ’traditional’ sharecropping relationship is a form of extractive
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appropriation by landlords from tenants which operates through market 
interlinkages. Sharecropping land is distributed among sharecroppers in small 
plots and large landowners often rent continuous plots of amon land out in small 
pieces to several tenants rather than in one piece, as might be expected under 
purely productivity-oriented decision making patterns.
V .I.2. ’New* Sharecropping
This kind o f share tenancy in Samitigram is closely connected with the 
emergence of HYV cultivation and the introduction of STWs. Sharecropping 
contracts are longer term  (3-10 years) and not re-negotiated annually. 
Landowners are often resident in nearby villages or have moved to service sector 
or government jobs, which prevent them from cultivating their land. 
Sharecropped land can be good quality and is often more fertile than the 
sharecroppers* own land. Land tends to be sharecropped out in larger plots and 
fo r the whole year rather than seasonally as for the ’traditional* sharecropping 
agreements.
A different kind of sharecropper has appeared in this context. The 
multiple ties of power and dependence between landowner and sharecropper 
typical for ’traditional’ sharecropping were fewer and weaker in the ’new* 
agreements. The tenants were upwardly dynamic ’well-off* or ’coping* households 
whose access to sharecropping land was perceived to depend on their own 
favourable production factor endowment or better access to cultivation inputs. 
Landowners gave sharecropping land to STW mechanics because they would 
ensure STW maintenance with their own crops are at risk and to irrigation group 
managers because they would ensure water supply to their own crops. Knowledge 
of HYV production techniques and access to sources of fertilizer and seeds were 
other incentives which attracted landowners to particular tenants. This may not be
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an entirely new development. Abdullah, Hossain & Nations (1976 p .211) found 
that between 1960 and 1967, the overall size of tenant farms increased especially 
fo r farms of 7.5 acres and over.
For some ’well-off* households, longer-term sharecropping contracts 
were part of a move towards a more secure economic position (Adorn IV.2.2). 
These households could be described as an intermediate "sharecropper elite" (see 
also Wood 1981; Rahman 1984), which is neither ’rich’ nor on the margins of 
poverty like the ’coping* and ’poor’ sharecroppers. This "sharecropper elite" 
treated sharecropping as a single-market relationship under which the landowner 
benefits from the sharecropper’s capacity to achieve high and secure yields, and 
the sharecropper obtains land because of his ^  prospects of producing a good 
crop. The rationale of sharecropping relationships under conditions of increased 
productivity potential can thus change. Through its more secure, higher yields, 
irrigated cultivation has crossed a threshold in Samitigram past which landowners 
and sharecroppers alike can rely on productivity and output levels rather than on 
multiple extractive relations of power and dependency as the underlying rationale 
fo r their production relations and strategies.
Other studies have found lower levels of fertiliser application on 
sharecropped land and attributed this to a productivity-inhibiting function 
associated with sharecropping (Marshall 1961; Hossain 1977). In Samitigram a 
number of sharecroppers of the ’new* type said they applied more fertilizer to 
sharecropped land than to their own land in order to retain their hold on the 
sharecropped land. Sharecropping can thus also facilitate increased agricultural 
productivity. This is especially so when there is competition for sharecropping 
land so that the sharecropper is under some compulsion to satisfy the landowner 
with good crop returns. This point emerged repeatedly during fieldwork 
interviews. Although it does not imply equally free choices for tenants and
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landlords (as assumed by Cheung 1969), it supports Cheung’s rejection of a view 
of sharecropping as an impediment to efficient resource allocation in agricultural 
production. The frequency with which irrigated holdings were consolidated 
through sharecropping in the research area, enforces the point.
The predominance of longer-term  productivity-oriented tenancy 
relationships with wealthier tenants on irrigated land, and the fact that less boro 
than amort land was sharecropped means that poorer households had in fact little 
access to boro sharecropping land. This was enforced by the new practice of 
some Samitigram landowners to demand a sum of money (300-600 Taka per acre) 
as a "security" for sharecropping land.
Productivity-oriented longer-term  ’new* sharecropping has not 
displaced patron-client relationships and the role ’traditional’ sharecropping of 
small plots of irrigated boro and amort land plays in these. ’New’ sharecropping 
remains largely restricted to an ’intermediate elite’ of upwardly mobile ’coping* 
and ’well-off* households. As a result, sharecropping implies a double role for 
’rich* households. On the one hand, ’traditional’ tenancy relationships make them 
powerful patrons towards a number of ’poor’ or ’coping’ households. On the other 
hand ’rich* households may be party - as landowner or tenant (cf. Ch VI) - to 
more single-stranded, productivity-oriented ’new’ sharecropping contracts with 
other households. In the Indian context such householders have been described as 
"ambidextrous individuals" (Beteille, 1974), or "rural hybrids" (Rudra 1978) who 
are able to be simultaneously involved in two sets of agrarian relations to their 
advantage.
V.I.3 Fixed In-Kind Rent
Fixed in-kind rent tenancy has only evolved over the last few years in 
Samitigram. It is common in the Singra beel and a main form of land tenancy in 
several of the seven villages (Ch VI). In Samitigram, it was only practised by one
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absentee landowner (Faruque, see Saidur IV.2.1 point 10). Although the terms for 
fixed-rent tenancy differ drastically from sharecropping agreements, the same 
local term, borga, was used for both types of tenancy. Fixed in-kind tenancy in 
Samitigram is a direct product of irrigated cultivation and has to be understood 
as such.
Most of the land under fixed in-kind tenancy in Samitigram was rented 
in under a five-year agreement by one ’well-off* (Adom IV.2.2) and two ’coping’ 
(Ali IV.2.3 and one other) households in return for a fixed amount of paddy per 
bigha (0.33 acres) to the owner. The level of this rent was determined by land 
quality and cultivation costs which vary with the amounts of water and fertilizer 
required. Per acre rents fall between 24 and 30 maunds of paddy. As yields are 
between 60 and 75 maunds per acre, rents leave the tenant with more than half 
the crop before costs, which is more than Samitigram ’new’ sharecroppers receive 
(see also Table VI.2). Faruque’s land in Samitigram was entirely rented out and 
mostly consolidated in two STW command areas (Map III.3 Nos. 13 & 29) of a 
total of 13 acres. Both these STWs are owned by Faruque. Faruque also had fixed 
in-kind rent agreements with other Samitigram households fo r the land, which he 
owns in other command areas. During the amon season Faruque’s tenants 
sharecropped the plots which they held in fixed-rent during the boro season and 
received two thirds of the crop, more than the half shares common for amon and 
boro in Samitigram. All cultivators regarded fixed in-kind rent as preferable to 
sharecropping agreements for irrigated boro land but not fo r rainfed amon land 
because of the risk of crop failure.
The advantages for the involved parties under fixed rent differ from 
sharecropping in several ways. With fixed rent, the landowner saves supervision 
costs as harvest and crop division do not need to be supervised. Samitigram’s 
absentee landowner Faruque, who grew up in the village, had not come there for
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several years by 1986. The amon harvest and crop division used to be supervised 
by Faruque’s wife. For the irrigated boro crop, tenants delivered their rent to 
Faruque’s house in the upazila headquarters. Although Faruque received fewer 
crops under fixed rent than he would from a sharecropping agreement, he had 
freed himself from supervisory involvement with his irrigated land. With the 
cultivation of high-yield paddy on his land, the rent he receives is still higher 
than the sale value of the entire previous rainfed amon yield from the land. 
However, Faruque could not set up fixed rent agreements for the amon season. 
As the risk of crop failure is high, tenants need a tie between yield and rental 
obligation who in order to free her husband for more profitable pursuits was 
released from Islamic restrictions on female mobility. In his tenants Faruque has 
firm allies and sources of information about village politics.
As Faruque’s tenants for irrigated boro land are cultivating command 
areas under their own management, and as he (as the well-owner) is easily able 
to provide inputs and help in case of machine breakdown, the risk of crop failure 
is low and a fixed rent agreement can be entered without too much risk to the 
tenant. Rent payment is in kind, so tenants will not run into cash shortages due to 
their rent obligations. As under sharecropping no instalments for the capital cost 
of the irrigation equipment is paid by the tenant. Faruque’s main fixed rent 
tenants, who are also the managers of his STWs were able to appropriate any 
differential between water cost and the price charged to other cultivators in the 
command area.
Fixed tenancy allows the tenant to appropriate all productivity increases 
above the rent. It does not carry the stigma of inhibiting productivity (see 
Hossain 1977; Ahmed in Khan & Zaffarullah, 1981) On the other hand 
landowners under fixed tenancy can invest and then increase rent levels in order 
to increase their returns from rented-out land. During my stay, Faruque decided
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to convert one of his STWs from diesel to electricity. This halved pumping costs 
at 1985/86 prices. The tenants of the command area in question explained that 
this would increase their rental obligation so that their profit would remain the 
same (see Ali IV.2.3 point 10). As found for sharecropping in Samitigram above, 
productivity increases raise the rate of surplus extraction from tenants and the 
relative gains of landowners. The interpretation of sharecropping and other forms 
of land tenancy as primarily a form of appropriation of labour surplus (see 
Pearce in Byres 1983) thus becomes more plausible with technical progress in 
agriculture. Whether this means the eventual displacement of sharecropping by 
owner cultivation or its transformation to a form of fixed rent, is determined by 
m icro-level conditions (c.f. VI.2.2.1).
V .I.4.4 Tenancy, Distribution and Change
How then have the distributional effects of land tenancy on different 
household types in Samitigram changed in the context of STW irrigation?
Clearly, not all tenancy relationships are explicable purely in terms of 
economic and political exchange relationships. In particular among the 'coping* 
and the 'poor*, supportive arrangements among relatives were often expressed 
through sharecropping. Old parents sharecropped out to sons, sisters to brothers, 
often without claiming their share of the crop, and richer brothers to poorer 
ones. Often those who sharecropped out did not realize their full potential income 
from  the sharecropped land. Sharecropping out allows households to transfer 
income to family members without letting go of land ownership. Thus an 
explanation of sharecropping in purely economic terms and the pinpointing of its 
relationship to the introduction of irrigation is difficult. Unquantifiables such as 
family cohesion play a role. The element of voluntary humanitarian action, which 
most would claim in themselves to some extent, is ignored in the literature which
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abounds with structural, environmental, historical and economic explanations of 
sharecropping.
TABLE V.2: Land Sharecropped in and out per Household Category
(acres)









Poor 20.51 1.03 1.65 1.65
Coping 29.58 1.47 1.32 0.66
Well-Off 26.73 2.43 24.75 4.95
Rich 0 0 33.67 8.42
Total a) 76.83 61.39
a )
7 Di ffe rences  between t o t a l s  
o u t s i d e r s  and sharecropping out
sharecropped in and 
of some land twice
out due to  tenancy r e l a t i o n s  i 
per  y ea r ,  which was not taken
account during i n i t i a l  survey










Nonetheless, tenancy relationships clearly redistributed land 
for cultivation from richer to poorer households except where a 
poorer household could not cultivate because of lack of agricultural
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labour due to old age, disability or gender. In Samitigram, 29% of 
all the land owned by the 'rich' was cultivated by poorer households. 
6%, 36% and 52% of the land cultivated by 'well-off', 'coping' and 
'poor' households was not owned by the household . This calculation 
contains the counteractive effect of mortgaging For 'coping' and 
'poor' households, land mortgaged out exceeded land mortgaged in (see 
V.1.5 below). Therefore the redistribution of operated land from 
wealthier to poorer households through tenancy is even higher than 
indicated by the difference between owned and cultivated land.
Tables V.2 and V.3 show how sharecropping reallocates owned 
land for cultivation in Samitigram. 55% of total sharecropped land 
(amon and boro) belonged to four 'rich' households. A further 40% of 
sharecropped land belonged to five 'well-off' households. All but 5% 
of the sharecropped land was thus owned by nine of the wealthiest 
households of the village. The single 'poor' household, which 
sharecropped out, was without male labour and thus unable to carry 
out work in the fields according to cultural norms. One 'coping' 
household, which sharecropped out, is among the better-off in its 
category and sharecropped out a small plot to a poorer relative.
Relatively equal total amounts of land were sharecropped in 
by the 'poor', 'coping' and 'well-off' (Table V.2 column 1). However, 
column 2 shows that land sharecropped in per household is much less 
for 'poor' and 'coping' tenants. The 'coping' and 'poor' tenants used 
returns from sharecropping mainly to supplement food requirements. 
For 'well-off' tenants, on the other hand, the renting of larger 
amounts of land was part of a strategy to achieve longer-term 
economic improvements. No 'well-off' household sharecropped in and
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out. Sharecropping was either part of a strategy to maximise income 
from irrigated cultivation, and cultivation was carried out at least 
as productively and efficiently as on own land; or land was 
sharecropped out because the household concentrated on another 
activity to generate income or had no male labour.
Some farm consolidation was achieved as households, 
especially the 'well-off', tended to sharecrop in boro land in those 
command areas where they also had own land (32% of all tenancy 
relations in Samitigram's command areas).
In contrast to the seven villages (see Ch. VI), no 'rich' 
Samitigram household sharecropped in so that a consolidation of 
'rich' STW owners' irrigated land through tenancy did not occur. 
However, the 'rich' used other instruments such as mortgaging 
(V.1.5), land exchanges and land purchases (V.1.2) for the 
consolidation of their irrigated holdings.
Sharecropping was still viewed as a means to transfer 
subsistence income to the poor and as a source of patronage. The 
perception that sharecropping is only resorted to by poor and 
downwardly mobile households was still strong in Samitigram. This is 
the apparent reason that not all Samitigram households adopted 
sharecropping to consolidate farms and achieve economies of scale.
Although Samitigram's 'rich' claimed that to sharecrop was 
below their status, the continued 'traditional' attitude towards land 
tenancy could also be due to constrained choices. As smaller 
landowners are able to obtain irrigation water through the group 
system (see III.5), they are not compelled to sharecrop out their 
land, and due to land scarcity and lack of alternative incomes would
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hardly choose to (cf. Baluabasua VI. 1 for a contrary case). Other 
village studies in Bangladesh (e.g. Jansen's Bhaimara, 1986), found 
that even the richest households sharecropped in. The group 
organisation of irrigation in Samitigram thus operates through 
sharecropping to make accumulation patterns from cultivation less 
unequal. The maintenance of the traditional view of sharecropping-in 
as "a thing for the poor" may in this context stem from the inability 
of the 'rich' to appropriate the land of the 'poor' through tenancy.
Contrary to what may be expected in view of the productivity 
enhancing function of 'new' sharecropping relationships (see 
V.l.4.2), no-one in Samitigram rented land in and out at the same 
time. This may be due to land scarcity. A cultivator would attempt to 
rent in land to consolidate holding structure while land scarcity 
means that all own land would also be kept for own cultivation.
Due to an increase of about 75% in gross cropped area and 
lower risk and higher profit chances for irrigated boro (cf. Table 
V.13 & 14), the amount of amon land available to poorer Samitigram 
sharecroppers has increased. On the other hand, boro sharecropping 
lands is less accessible to poorer households since they have less 
draught power and finance for cultivation at their disposal. There 
was also increasing substitution of hired labour for sharecropping on 
boro lands. Nonetheless, in comparison to the period before STW- 
irrigation, there is a larger amount of land available for 
sharecropping in Samitigram. This has enabled poorer households to 
achieve some improvement through sharecropping high-risk, low-yield 
amon cultivation, which richer landowners are turning away from.
It was difficult to determine how the risk of flooding to
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amon has changed with irrigation. On the one hand, the general fall 
in the water table has made more of the beel low land available for 
cultivation and decreased the risk of flooding. On the other hand, 
boro cultivation pushed amon further into the rainy season (cf. 
Figure III.l) and thus increases the risk of flooding forthe amon 
crop.
Sharecropping may eventually be displaced by fixed-rent which 
leaves landowners free for other activities. In Samitigram, one 
'rich' landowner rented out at fixed rents to concentrate his 
activities elsewhere. In other villages (see Ch. VI), fixed tenancy 
transferred cultivation income from poorer landowners to wealthier 
STW owner-cum-tenants, and pushed small landowners into the labour 
market. In both cases the transformation of sharecropping into fixed 
tenancy means a dissolution of ties to own land for a part of the 
rural population. However, the distributional implications are very 
different. In Samitigram, fixed tenancy means that some poorer 
households obtain more profitable conditions than available under 
sharecropping agreements. In some of the 'seven villages', on the 
other hand, fixed tenancy ousts poorer landowners from the 
cultivation of their own land and compels them to hire out their 
labour or engage in petty trade.
With continuing population pressure reliance on land as an 
income source needs to decrease. The questions of which rural classes 
lose their access to income from land, and of how much scope there is 
in the labour market and in the diversification of occupations out of 
cultivation to absorb this population are crucial. Some issues around 
occupational diversification are taken up in Ch VII.
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Share tenancy has been classed as "semifeudal" (Bhaduri, 1973), 
"transitional" (Pearce in Byres, 1983), "precapitalist" (Bell, 1977) and "capitalist" 
(Rudra 1978). Its disappearance with the ’green revolution* has been reported for 
the Indian subcontinent (Byres 1981; Bardhan and Rudra 1980). On the other 
hand, sharecropping has shown remarkable persistence even in rural economies 
such as Spain, Italy and France (Byres 1983 pp.21).
The picture in Samitigram has been a transformation of the function 
and meaning of share tenancy under new production conditions in irrigated 
agriculture. At the same time, traditional forms of share tenancy continue to exist 
largely for rainfed paddy cultivation.
With irrigated cultivation, longer-term  ’new* tenancy agreements where 
the tenants* production conditions determine access to sharecropping land have 
become predominant. Larger plot sizes, more secure contracts and pressures on 
the tenant to achieve high crop yields to ensure the continuation of the tenancy 
relationship all exercise a positive influence on productivity.
Finally, the increasing importance of agricultural wage labour and signs 
of a possible incipient transformation of sharecropping into fixed tenancy 
contracts indicate that in the longer term, share tenancy in Samitigram may 
indeed be replaced by more direct forms of appropriation of labour.
V.1.5 Mortgaging
This section introduces the two main types of mortgaging in Samitigram. 
It is shown how the form and function of mortgages has diversified with 
irrigation. It is argued that under conditions of higher productivity, surplus 
appropriation through land mortgages has shifted from extraction through 
usurious interest into the cultivation process itself. For the mortgagee, the 
mortgage is no longer a form of access to interest payments, but has turned into 
an avenue of access to income from cultivation. Although mortgagors still lose
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land, this is more a part of overall household dynamics rather than the central 
function of mortgages in the strategies of mortgagees.
41% of all households in Samitigram reported to be involved in 
mortgage relationships. Of these, 22% mortgaged in and 19% mortgaged out. 
Land was not mortgaged in and out simultaneously, although the same households 
did mortgage land in and out in quick succession in response to temporary 
financial needs and surpluses. Land mortgages took two basic forms in 
Samitigram.
Under the first type of mortgage, khaikalashi, a sum of money is lent 
by the mortgagee to a poorer landowner (mortgagor). The mortgagee then 
cultivates the mortgaged land. Each year the principal of the loan is reduced so 
that, depending on the size of the mortgage and the agreed annual reduction, the 
land reverts to its owner automatically after 10 to 20 years. Earlier return of the 
land is possible if the principal is repaid at any point during the period of 
amortisation. Although traditionally known in the research area (see also 1.2.2), 
was used for irrigated land mainly.
Under the second form of mortgage, bondhok, the full original sum of 
the loan has to be repaid to the mortgagee before cultivation rights revert to the 
landowner and there is no automatic annual reduction of the loan. As long as the 
principal has not been repaid in full the mortgagee retains cultivation rights to 
the land. The bondhok mortgage was predominantly used for rainfed amon land.
Either form of mortgage did not require interest in Samitigram. 
Khaikalashi even reduced the repayable principal annually through the usufruct 
o f the mortgaged land. Notwithstanding a variety of means for richer mortgagees 
to retain control over land in disregard of the contents of a mortgage agreement, 
there is thus an inbuilt mechanism to ensure that the mortgagor has an automatic 
right to reclaim the land after a period of time even if no repayments have been
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made. In contrast, under bondhok the full loan has to be repaid or the land does 
not revert to its owner. The usufruct of land under bondhok is thus equivalent to 
interest payments. Mortgage in Samitigram resulted in relatively low rates of land 
loss by mortgagors. This contrasts with other areas of Bangladesh (cf. Wood’s 
Bondokgram in Comilla, 1978) where compound interest combined with usufruct 
of mortgaged land leaves mortgagors little chance of recovering mortgaged land. 
In Samitigram, a number of functions other than land transfer were associated 
with mortgages.
In the past, mortgage relationships in Samitigram were entered by 
verbal agreement. Now the engagement of a paid ’deedwriter’ to formalize 
contracts has become the more usual arrangement. By fixing the mortgage terms 
in writing, mortgagors attempt to ensure the eventual return of their land. Stories 
of how mortgagees refused to return mortgaged land, even after repayment of 
the full loan, are recounted by villagers. The formalisation of mortgage contracts 
reduces the capacity o f richer mortgagees to use their power in other markets to 
appropriate mortgaged land. It is also an expression of changes in the function of 
mortgages.
Usually in Samitigram mortgaged land is cultivated by the mortgagee 
until no more of the original loan is owed. In a few cases, however, the land 
continues to be cultivated by the owner (mortgagor) throughout the duration of 
the mortgage. Under this combined mortgage-sharecropping agreement, the loan 
per acre is lower than under simple mortgages (6000 rather than 7500 to 12000 
Taka), and the also mortgagee receives half the annual crop. Only some of 
Samitigram’s ’rich’ and a few absentee landowners leave their mortgagors to 
cultivate under mortgage-sharecropping contracts. With an average yield of 60- 
75 maunds of paddy per acre (see V.4) and the 1985 average sale price of 175 
Taka per maund, the seasonal income for the mortgagee in this case is between
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5250 and 6600 Taka. The mortgagee can thus recover the original sum of the
mortgage or more in one boro cropping season with the sale returns of half the
crop yield. In the more usual case of cultivation by the mortgagee, the
recuperation of a mortgage loan would also take approximately one boro season 
10)
Thus in Samitigram, the mortgaging in of irrigated land has become an 
avenue of access to income from cultivation rather than to the ownership of land 
or to income through usurious interest rates. The cultivation of mortgaged land 
can provide the mortgagee with a secure crop and a cultivation income of 10 to 
20 times the original sum of the mortgage during the 10 to 15 years duration of 
the mortgage. In Samitigram, surplus appropriation through mortgage 
relationships on irrigated land has thus become firmly connected with the 
productive utilisation of land.
A disaggregation of the incidence and functions of mortgage 
relationships by household category (Table V.4) shows that the total amounts of 
land involved in mortgage relationships in Samitigram are small. However, 
mortgages are a delicate subject, regarded as quite a private matter. It is 
therefore possible that there was underreporting both by mortgagors and 
mortgagees. Similarly, it proved very difficult to get more than very general 
statements on changes in the incidence of mortgaging over time. It appears that, 
mediated by class-biases in access to formal credit, land mortgages and one-to- 
one forms of informal credit (as opposed to the credit samiti, see III.4.6 & V.2) 
in Samitigram lost importance with the expansion of the formal credit sector. 
This appears to be the case despite expanded credit needs for HYV cultivation. 
The credit samiti provided finance to village households who might otherwise 
have mortgaged out land.
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TABLE V.4: Land M ortgaged in  and ou t by Household Category (a c re s )
m ortgaged in  no o f h /h o ld s  m ortgaged ou t no o f h /h o ld s
Poor 1 .75  4 3 .96 7
Coping 2 .97 5 2 .64  8
W ell-O ff 5 .78  11 1 .24  4
R ich 1 .65  2 0 0
T o ta l a > 12.15 22 7 .84  19
a  ^
'  D iffe rences  of t o t a l s  of land mortgaged in and out due to  mortgage r e la t io n sh ip s  
with o u ts id e rs
s58sssss8ssssss888sss88sssss:ssrs8ssss:ss:ssssss8:s:s::s:s:s:ss:sss:8sssss:sss:83::sss
Most mortgaged land belonged to the ’poor*. In most cases consumption 
and emergency needs prompted a ’poor* household to take a mortgage. 
Households with several small plots mortgaged out at different points in time 
were typically involved in a process of asset disaccumulation. At the end of such 
a period of household decline, the sale of the land may follow as the household is 
again in need of funds but without further land to mortgage out. It is important 
here to distinguish this process from situations where land loss is built into the 
structure of the mortgage itself (c.f. Wood 1978 on Bondokgram).
Most ’coping* and ’poor’ households mortgaged out to more than one 
household. This may be a safety device against conferring too much power on 
one mortgagee and thus an insurance against loss of the mortgaged land as well 
as unwanted linkages to other markets (e.g. labour, water, land tenancy).
Among the ’coping* it was considered desirable to mortgage in a plot of 
land, especially from  a ’poor’ owner. In the context of ongoing processes of land 
and asset disaccumulation, in which the mortgage relationship itself does not 
necessarily play a central role, the transfer of land ownership from ’poor’ to 
’coping’ households through mortgages was not uncommon in Samitigram. Next to 
access to cultivation income, land transfer was an important incentive for the
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’coping’ to mortgage in land.
No household mortgaged in and out at the same time but almost the 
same amount of land was mortgaged in and out by the ’coping* (Table V.4). 
Random and life-cycle needs such as medical expenses and daughters’ dowries 
were the usual reported reason for ’coping* households to take out land
mortgages. Here mortgagors regarded the mortgage as an intermediary means of 
finance, the lesser evil compared to actual land sale. Although the loss of income 
to the mortgagor is the same as with a sale and he only receives 15 to 30% of the 
sale price of the land from a mortgage, he does retain the claim of ownership 
over the land and can recover it at a more favourable stage in the household life 
cycle.
Most mortgage relationships in Samitigram at the time of my survey had 
existed only two to three years, and a large number of households reported to 
have returned or received back mortgaged land recently. In particular for
’coping’ households, the mortgage thus served to raise cash from land while 
retaining land ownership throughout periods when household monetary needs 
surpass income. At other times in the household life-cycle, the mortgage makes
land available for cultivation and may open up the possibility of expansion of
land ownership.
Almost half of all mortgaged land was mortgaged in and cultivated by 
’well-off* households (see Table V.4). The function of mortgages to make more 
land for cultivation available to the household was clearest in this household 
category. As through sharecropping, the ’well-off* gain access to cultivation 
income through mortgaging. The mortgage here has become part of a strategy to 
increase income from agricultural (irrigated) production.
Mortgages between ’well-off* households were also used to finance 
further land purchases. Lower quality land was temporarily mortgaged out by
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wealthy households in order to buy better land. An increase of income from 
cultivation through the acquisition of fertile land, and not the expropriation of 
the mortgagor through extractive mechanisms inside the structure of the mortgage 
relationship itself, is thus the primary function of these mortgages between 
’w e ll-o ff  households. A parallel between the functions of this type of mortgage 
and the functions of the long-term  ’new’ sharecropping agreements for ’w e ll-o ff 
and some ’coping* households becomes clear. With irrigated cultivation, a 
productivity threshold has been passed. This enables some households to transfer 
new meanings onto apparently traditional agrarian relations.
Mortgages could have yet a different function in the strategies of ’rich’ 
households. Malik, the head of the wealthiest ’rich’ household in Samitigram 
commented: "I don’t mortgage in land. I just buy it directly." (see IV.2.1). Like 
sharecropping, mortgaging has retained its "traditional" extractive function for 
this household. In view of the increasing formalisation of mortgaging 
relationships (employment of ’deedwriter*; see above) it has, however, become a 
more insecure way to gain access to land ownership.
Interestingly, Malik has passed on small plots of his own boro and amon 
land to ’poor* households in the village under mortgage agreements in return for 
political support and votes. While his chances of losing the ownership of this 
land through the mortgage are nil, he has given up income from land in return 
fo r political power. The reasoning behind this type of mortgage resembles closely 
that behind short-term ’traditional* sharecropping discussed above (V.1.3). Income 
from  land is given up to sustain a position of more general influence and power. 
It is clear that although agrarian relations (e.g. sharecropping and mortgaging) 
bear the same designation, they d iffer in form, in the motivational and material 
context of their application and in their effects on the involved households. Not 
the formal position inside the mortgage or tenancy agreement but the attendant
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power relation and strategic rationale of the involved parties influence 
household-level accumulation and development.
In Samitigram, mortgages taken therefore have two basic functions. 
F irstly, mortgaging out raises finances in order to improve the productive base of 
a  household through investment in land or other productive assets. The rich 
absentee landowner Faruque temporarily mortgaged out some of his village lands 
in order to raise business capital. There was usually no danger of land loss for 
mortgagors in these kinds of agreements. Another example is Kamal’s ’poor’ 
household. The household mortgaged out its two bigha (0.66 acres) in order to 
buy cattle. By using this cattle on his sharecropped land and as a ’ploughman* on 
the land of others, Kamal intended to redeem the mortgaged land and eventually 
achieve economic improvement (see IV.2.4). Not only inter-household differences 
in the rationale of using mortgages but also differences in the opportunity 
situation of different households affect the outcome of a mortgage relationship. 
While Faruque is safe in the ownership of his mortgaged land, Kamal needs some 
luck to avoid losing his mortgaged land.
Secondly, mortgaging out fulfils poor households* consumption and 
life-cycle needs. Land loss often follows for the mortgagor. This may be due to 
continued financial need after reserves of mortgageable land have been 
exhausted, or it may be the result of a number of pressures to which ’poor* and 
’coping* households are especially exposed due to their vulnerable position in 
rural society where markets tend to be linked through multi-stranded 
relationships between unequal parties. Thus if a ’poor* householder were to use a 
land mortgage to raise capital for some other income-generating undertaking he 
may well find himself forced to give up the claim to land despite his ability to 
repay the mortgage in order to secure other aspects of his economic survival.
Mortgages given gain access to land for cultivation. Household
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strategies aimed at increasing income from irrigated cultivation include land 
mortgages as one way of gaining access to land. It was clear that in Samitigram 
land mortgaged in is valued for the cultivation income it provides even if the 
land is retained only fo r a few years before the loan is paid back.
Mortgages are also entered into to cement political power of either
mortgagee or mortgagor. The example of Malik (IV.2.1) shows how political 
power objectives can determine the content of a mortgage relationship and the 
choice of mortgagee or mortgagor. More commonly than the example of ’reverse 
mortgaging* cited here, a poorer household mortgaged out to a richer household 
and through this relationship added to a web of multiple ties which cemented the 
dominant position of the mortgagee household.
What then are the interactions between land mortgaging and STW
irrigation? Samitigram households of all four categories mortgaged in STW 
irrigated boro land **). Irrigated land was in all but one case mortgaged in in 
command areas where the mortgagee already cultivated land. Farm consolidation, 
economies of scale and increased cultivation efficiency under irrigated
cultivation were thus achieved through mortgaging. In Samitigram irrigated HYV 
cultivation has increased yields sufficiently to make mortgaging in an attractive 
proposal in return for the cultivation income from mortgaged land.
It proved especially difficult to establish a picture of longer-term  
change for land mortgages. Mortgaging/moneylending increasingly competed with 
other investment opportunities (e.g. HYV cultivation, trade). The increase in cash 
cultivation costs (see V.4 Tables V.12 and V.13) coincided with an expansion of 
formal credit so that the number of mortgaging relationships had not increased. 
What emerged clearly is that mortgages had acquired a greater complexity of 
functions and meanings. Some of these indicate a change to household strategies 
which are more based on targets of production and productivity than under
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non-irrigated conditions where, at a lower level of productivity, households 
appropriated surplus through extractive practices.
V.1.6 Land, Cultivation and Irrigation
The final part of this section draws together the changes in agrarian 
relations around the ownership and use of land under STW irrigation in 
Samitigram.
TABLE V.5: Owned, O perated and E f fe c tiv e  Landholdings by Household 
C ategory  (T o ta l Acres Per C ategory)
owned o p era ted e f f e c t iv e
Poor 20.1 41 .4 31.3
Coping 62.4 97.5 78.3
W ell-O ff 142.2 152.8 150.6
Rich 114.8 81.5 97.0
For no tes  see Table V.6
TABLE V.6: Owned, O perated and E f fe c tiv e  
C ategory (Acres Per Household)
Landholding by Household
owned o p era ted  a ^ e f f e c t iv e  **)
Poor 0.49 1.01 0.76
Coping 2.01 3.15 3.01
W ell-O ff 5.47 5.87 5.79
Rich 22.97 16.30 19.40
'  operated  
land owned * 
+
landholding * 
land sharecropped and mortgaged out 
land sharecropped and mortgaged In
e f f e c t iv e  
land owned - 
♦
landholding *
Hi land sharecropped and (%) mortgaged out 
Hi land sharecropped and (%) mortgaged out
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Tables V.5 and V.6 indicate the impact of mortgaging and tenancy on 
the distribution of operated land production and cultivation profits. Differences 
between owned and operated land indicate how units of ownership and units of 
production differ. Clearly, the poorer the household category, the larger the size 
of its operated holding relative to its owned holding. Less than half the land 
operated by the ’poor’ is also owned by them. The ’coping’ own 64% of their 
operated land. The land owned by the ’well-off* amounts to 93% of their 
operated area. The ’rich* households of the village operated only 71% of their 
owned land. It is clear then that under irrigated conditions tenancy and 
mortgaging relationships in Samitigram increase the land available for cultivation 
to households at the bottom of the landownership scale. This is also found by 
Boyce (1987 p.224) in a comparison of operational and owned holdings at 
national level.
The ’coping* and the ’poor* thus operate considerably more land than 
they derive crop income from. Tenancy is the major explanation for this. As the 
’poor* forego half of the crop income from rented land, their production costs 
per unit of crop retained are much higher than those of owner cultivators. The 
opposite effect occurs for the ’rich* who receive crops from fa r more land than 
they operate. Tenancy involves far more land than mortgaging and it outweighs 
the counteractive effect of mortgaging (cf. Tables V.2 & V.4) on the ratio of 
total cultivation costs to total crop received.
It follows that the redistribution of land for cultivation, which occurs 
from the wealthier to the poorer households of Samitigram through land tenancy 
is mitigated by counteractive effects on production cost/crop return ratios. The 
ratio of total cultivation costs incurred to total crop received is 0.38 for the 
’poor*, 0.36 for the ’coping*, 0.29 for the ’w e ll-o fr and 0.24 for the ’rich*
This is not the end of the story. Inter-household differences in
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cultivation costs per unit of operated land have to be examined for possible 
systematic differences between household types. A discussion of credit structures 
(V.2) and the labour market (V.3) precedes my attempt to identify biases in the 
production conditions of the four household types in section V.4.
Finally, some aspects of the incidence of irrigation in the context of 
land ownership and cultivation by household category are summarised in Table 
V.7.
A comparison of rows 1 and 2 in Table V.7 shows again the 
concentration of the main productive asset, land in Samitigram. Although the use 
of the household unit exaggerates the concentration of land because wealthier 
households have more members (see row 6), the dividing line between ’rich* and 
*well-ofF on the one hand, and ’coping* and ’poor* on the other is still clear from 
the per head effective landholding in row 5.
TABLE V.7: Landownership and Irrigation in Samitigram
Household C ategory R ich W ell-O ff Coping Poor
1. P e rcen t o f  t o t a l  4.9% 25% 30% 40.1%
Households
2. P e rcen t o f  t o t a l  34% 42% 18% 6%
c u l t iv a te d  land  owned
3. P e rcen t o f  i r r i g a t e d  34% 41% 19% 6%
lan d  owned
4. Per household  e f f e c t iv e  19 .4  5.79 3.01 0.76
lan d h o ld in g  (a c re s )
5. Per head e f f e c t iv e  1.57 0.72 0.42 0.11
lan d h o ld in g  (a c re s )
6. No. o f  household  members 12.36 8.04 7.17 6.91
A comparison of rows 2 and 3 shows that in Samitigram inequalities in 
land ownership are not exacerbated by the more obvious inequalities in access to
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irrigation water. The comparison of the dynamics around irrigated agriculture in 
Samitigram and the seven villages (see Ch. VI) will demonstrate that this is 
connected to the effect of the irrigation groups in Samitigram. While in 
Samitigram, groups, make
irrigation water available to smaller landowners and thus increase their resistance 
to the extractive practices of the larger landowners (see III.5 and IV.2.1 Malik), 
in the ’seven’ villages water is either refused or sold at extractive monopoly rates 
to non-owners of STWs. This has a polarising
effect on patterns of land use and returns from cultivation (cf. Table VI.2). There 
are further issues around water distribution inside command areas in Samitigram 
which can lead to bias in water distribution (e.g. tailender problems under water 
scarcity;see III.5). Much in contrast to other accounts on the effects of 
mechanised irrigation in Bangladesh (e.g. Jansen 1979, Hamid 1982; Chisholm 
1984; Howes 1985), in Samitigram access to irrigation water is largely 
proportional to landownership.
V.2 The Credit Market
A second essential production input is credit. It is demonstrated that 
while access to credit is widespread, its cost and terms vary with the debtor’s 
position in the rural hierarchy At the most general level, formal and 
inform al credit are distinguished here. However, some of the most interesting 
material with reference to STW irrigation (the credit samiti) appears at the 
boundaries of formal and informal credit.
Although a range of themes is touched upon in this section, the main 
argument is consistent with section V. 1. It is argued that with increased capital 
requirements for cultivation, formal credit has come to be conceptualised by most 
cultivators as necessary and recurrent, and that therefore it is repaid. This 
attitude was neither exclusive nor pervasive in Samitigram. It predominated
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amongst ’w ell-of F  and ’coping’ cultivators who concentrated on income 
generation from irrigated cultivation. At the same time, the continued existence 
of usurious informal credit prevented ’poor’ households from using their seasonal 
surplus productively, and systematic defaults on bank loans by ’rich’ borrowers 
represented a subsidy to village elites and local bureaucracies With increased 
loan dispersals to the agricultural sector (see 1.3.2) and with default rates on the 
increase from 28.3% in FY 1984 to 73% in FY 1986 (World Bank 1987 p.78), the 
effective subsidy to rural elites through loan defaults has also risen.
All but the very richest household in Samitigram depended on credit to 
cultivate boro. As was outlined in III.3, the six monthly boro cultivation cycle, 
which involves seasonal loan disbursals and repayment, has become an integral 
part of the agricultural year.
In Samitigram, formal credit can be obtained from the local commercial 
bank, though the KSS and MSS (see III.4.7-8) and from the Bangladesh Krishi 
Bank (BKB). Two main types of formal credit were taken by Samitigram 
villagers. The first, cultivation credit on a six-monthly basis, is repayable after 
the harvest of the irrigated boro crop in June. The second, credit for the 
purchase of STWs, is repayable in annual instalments. According to local reports 
annual interest rates for these loans varied between 18% and 22% in 1986
Informal credit was taken on a mutual, no interest basis or on an 
extractive, high interest basis. The following high interest credit arrangements 
existed:
1) One maund of paddy loaned and repaid 2 to 3 months later, H  to 2 maunds 
taken back by the creditor.
2) 100 to 150 Taka loaned and repaid 2 to 3 months later with one maund of 
paddy. The resale value of this is about 200 Taka per maund during the high 
price period.
3) 100 Taka loaned in the difficult pre-harvest month, and 150 Taka repaid one
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month later, after the harvest.
4) Loans from a moneylender (mohajon) for which labour is provided (digging 
up of bamboo shoots for sale as fuel material). The daily income of these 
labourers was roughly the same as the going wage rate in the village and 
presumably were at least in part used to repay loans to employers.
Recalculated as interest, the profits from usurious informal lending are 
between 50% and 100% for the usual three month loan period. Differences in the 
length of time a loan actually remains outstanding and in the conditions from 
case to case would make a more precise statement arbitrary.
There was a clear difference between high interest loans and the second 
type of informal loan, the mutual no interest loan. The latter are consumption 
loans exchanged between friends or relatives of similar economic status. Thus 
women of similar economic status maintained mutual support systems with loans 
of rice, oil, vegetables and small sums of money. Some no interest loans were 
also given by wealthier households to poorer relatives.
V.2.1 Credit, Distribution and Change
What then are the dynamics in the formal and informal credit sector of 
Samitigram in the context of irrigated cultivation? Table V.8 shows a very high 
involvement of all household categories in credit markets. As mortgage loans are 
not included (see V.1.5 and Table V.5), involvement in loan transactions is even 
higher than indicated in Table V.8.
Only five households said they took no loans at all. Of these, three were 
landless or near landless, and met their financial needs through labour and 
seasonal fish sales or raised finance by mortgaging out a small piece of land. 
Two of these ’poor’ households were headed by old men who claimed to "have no 
need" for loans. One of these households had low cultivation costs as it 
concentrated on b.amon and only cultivated very little irrigated boro (c.f. Tables 
V.13 and V.14).
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Table V.8: Credit taken by Household Category (% of total Category)
Informal only Formal onlya  ^ Formal and informal Total 
Poor 26% 41% 26% 93%
Coping 3% 58% 39% 100%
W ell-off 0 53% 42% 95%
Rich 0 100% 0 100%
a ) c r e d i t  sam iti  loans are  counted as formal loans f i r s t l y  because funds a re  obtained
by the  sam iti  as formal bank loans on the  s e c u r i ty  of a sam iti deposit  account with a
loca l  bank (see  111.4 .6 )  and secondly because in c o n trac tu a l  cond it ions  and in  impact
a t  household and farm level sam iti loans a re  c lo s e r  to  formal loans than to  e i th e r
type of informal loan.
In Samitigram, as in other parts of Bangladesh (see White 1988 on 
Tanore; Rahman 1979a & b on Phulpur and Comilla), more prosperous 
households took higher formal loans from more loan sources. All ’rich* 
households of Samitigram took several bank and KSS loans. It was less the need 
for credit but that "loans are cheap" as was repeatedly explained, which prompted 
’rich* households to take formal credit. As Herring (1977 p.34) outlines for India, 
formal bank credit tends to reflect social and economic structures, since credit 
availability is conditional on land ownership. As a result, tenant producers hardly 
have access to formal credit and resort to more expensive informal types of 
finance (see McGregor 1987 p.2). When the landowner, rather than the cultivator, 
has access to cultivation credit, agricultural productivity is likely to suffer.
The above suggests major leakages of formal credit to relatively land- 
rich, joint households in Bangladesh. The records of local and upazila level bank 
managers, to which I was granted access, revealed that loan default rates are 
higher among the ’rich* of Samitigram than among the poorer households. These 
patterns of loan default result from the variety of roles formal credit plays in the 
economic strategies of different households. While default is a one-off income
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source for the ’rich*, other cultivators need recurrent cultivation loans and 
therefore repay. Default patterns also reflect how household structure is used by 
mostly ’rich* joint-fam ily households. The more members of an economically 
joint household have land registered in their different names, the more bank 
loans that household can obtain. These loans are then defaulted on without any 
sanction to the defaulter household. As long as one household member retains a 
good repayment record, loan sources will not dry up
Moreover ’rich* households - -  to whom the above argument applies 
predominantly — are least dependent on seasonal cultivation loans and loans to 
finance other investments. A usual answer about what would happen if  the bank 
refused any further loans after a default on a STW loan was "I’d just buy it cash". 
With loans for irrigation equipment, the opportunities for ’rich’ joint households 
to accumulate through the formal credit market have increased, and default is the 
central mechanism for this.
There is an active market in secondhand STWs in Singra. New STWs are 
bought with bank loans which the debtor subsequently defaults on. My interviews 
and conversations confirmed that these defaults are common. The equipment, 
which often never reaches the fields of the original ’irrigation scheme*, is then 
usually resold. Defaults on STW loans have turned into a cash subsidy to wealthy 
village elites (c.f. Bottrall 1983).
If STWs are never paid for, their inefficient utilisation becomes possible 
for ’rich* households. Table III.2 reflects this through the difference in size of 
command area between individually-owned and group- owned STWs in 
Samitigram.
There is a further possible variation on STW default. ’Rich* households, 
local bank managers and agents for the STW manufacturers are reputed to take 
out ’fake STW loans* for which machinery is never delivered and then to divide 
the loan, which is defaulted upon, between themselves. Although it is extremely
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difficult to trace such cases individually, the practice is discussed among villagers 
and known among government officials and equipment traders. The Dhaka 
manager of a major STW importing agency, which operates in Singra was able to 
describe local case examples to me in informed detail. He estimated the incidence 
of ’fake loan cases* as 50% of total STW loans disbursed (interview, September 
1986). While this figure might be regarded with some caution, an analysis of STW 
related patterns of accumulation and change must not overlook the element of 
cash subsidy to village elites and local level bureaucrats through the abuse of 
STW credit systems.
Default patterns on the loans disbursed for the 31 STWs surveyed in this 
study reveal a strong element of subsidy to ’rich* individual STW owners. The 
largest defaulter with the Singra bank is Faruque, the village’s absentee 
landowner who had two STW loans outstanding for several years and had paid 
back nothing in 1986. Interestingly, Faruque reverted to village-level mortgages 
to raise funds fo r one of his town enterprises. Possibly his bank record had 
eventually prevented further loans to him. His example illustrates how elements 
of the agrarian structure, like mortgaging, apparently persist but actually acquire 
new meanings at household level in the course of agrarian strange. For Faruque, 
the taking of a mortgage was a one-stranded business operation which did not 
involve him in any of the multiplex dependency relations or the process of 
gradual asset loss, which has been traditionally associated with mortgages (see 
V.1.5). Like Faruque, many other ’rich’ households from Samitigram and 
surrounding villages with private STWs had also paid back nothing or had 
overdue payments on their STW loans.
Samitigram STW groups, on the other hand, tended to perform well on 
loan repayment. The two groups which disintegrated (see III.5) did so in a quarrel 
over the misappropriation of funds for loan repayment. However, the irrigation 
groups did not eliminate appropriation through loans by the ’rich’. As seen in two
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irrigation groups (the ’pseudo-groups’, see III.5), the ’rich* STW manager was 
openly appropriating members’ loan repayments. On the other hand, irrigation 
groups with a relatively wealthy or mixed socio-economic composition of 
members had better repayment records than groups with great internal disparities 
of wealth and power. Mixed groups also had the largest command areas and the 
largest number of members. It would be interesting to examine the differences in 
input structures and productivity fo r these different types of command areas. The 
financial and time scale of this research did not allow for this.
Most seasonal cultivation loans for boro paddy in Samitigram were 
taken out by ’well-off* and ’coping* households. The annual sequence of loan 
application, disbursement and repayment after the harvest was most firmly 
established among these households. As mentioned above, loan defaults were less 
common as the refusal of a cultivation loan after a default would endanger 
cultivation in subsequent years or force the household into the much more 
expensive informal credit market. For households who neither had sufficient 
capital nor a joint household to take out loans in the names of different 
household members, default becomes a serious danger to future income from 
irrigated HYV boro cultivation.
The idea of a bank loan as recurrent and therefore necessarily 
repayable is relatively new in Samitigram. Informal credit has traditionally been 
one element in a multi-stranded relationship of power and dependence. 
Repayment was therefore not always expected and often functional to neither 
creditor nor debtor (see Breman 1974 p.59/60).
Samitigram’s overall good record of cultivation loan repayments with 
the local banks is clearly linked to the relatively high degree of access to 
irrigation water through the irrigation groups. If a group fails through lack of 
access to irrigation water, as is common in the Singra beel as a whole, a 
cultivator will not repay his cultivation loan. He will then not receive any further
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bank loans and will have to spend most of his profits on high interest informal 
loans or cultivate HYV crops. Nuclear households are more exposed to these risks 
than joint households. As has been shown in III.5, the poorer nuclear households 
in particular gain access to water through irrigation groups compared to non­
group situations. A large number of those households have been able to integrate 
the seasonal disbursement and repayment of form al credit into their household 
and agricultural production budgets on a regular and relatively secure basis.
The effects of secure access to water and to other agricultural inputs 
such as credit are thus mutually reinforcing. In Samitigram, irrigation groups 
became an option as access to water, credit and other HYV inputs improved. Now 
groups ensure the continuation of favourable access conditions in Samitigram.
A majority of the Samitigram ’poor* (67%, see Table V.8) had taken 
formal loans under the current household head. A minority of these households 
then defaulted on their loans and at the time of the interviews no longer had 
access to formal loans. For these and other ’poor* and ’coping’ households, the 
credit samiti was an important avenue of access to cultivation loans (see III.4.5). 
Although credit samiti loans are not direct formal sector loans, loan conditions 
and interest rates (according to the manager 25% for members and 30% for non­
members of the samiti) correspond more closely to formal than to informal loans. 
The credit samiti has made boro cultivation possible for a number of poorer 
Samitigram households, who would be unable to cultivate profitably if they had 
to rely on the informal market.
The good repayment record of credit samiti loans is a result of the way 
the samiti is integrated into the village’s socio-political and economic 
relationships. A default on a debt to the credit samiti might have consequences 
for a variety of relationships in the village, which are important for the debtor’s 
household strategies. The information that "credit samiti loans are guaranteed by 
the jubok samiti* offered to me by one group manager indicates that there is a
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recognition and institutionalisation of the forces of socio-economic cohesion in 
the village through the samitis Through the samiti structure a new, more 
educated village elite has asserted its leadership. At present, this has created 
sufficiently secure access conditions to water and credit for a number of ’coping’ 
and ’poor’ households to enable them to engage in irrigated cultivation.
Household heads were reluctant to admit to giving informal loans, 
especially high interest loans. Nonetheless, it became clear throughout the 
fieldwork that all of Samitigram’s ’rich* households and many ’w ell-ofP  gave 
informal high interest loans. There were at least two mohajons (moneylenders) in 
the village, who came from ’well ofF cultivator households. Neither admitted to 
moneylending but I obtained accounts of loans and loan conditions from  a 
number of their debtors. An approximate distribution between high interest and 
no-interest ’friendly’ informal loans in Samitigram is shown in Table V.9.
Column 1 of Table V.9 demonstrates the degree to which household 
categories lost through high interest credit. While 23 ’poor* households (23% of 
the ’poor’) took informal loans, 16 ’poor’ households (39% of the ’poor*), took 
high interest loans. From the conditions of high interest loans it was clear that 
the great majority were consumption loans.
TABLE V.9: Types o f Inform al Loans Taken by Household C ategory
High i n t e r e s t  
Poor 16
Coping 5
W e ll-o ff  0
Rich 0





'  Total household numbers are  h igher than sum of rows, as some households took 
informal loans of both types.
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S evera l 'p o o r ' household  who took h igh  i n t e r e s t  in form al 
lo a n s  had some lan d  a v a i la b le  as c o l l a t e r a l  and could  have tak en  out 
bank lo a n s . One 'p o o r ' h o u seh o ld e r, when qu estio n ed  as to  why he d id  
n o t t r y  fo r  a  bank lo a n  r e p l ie d
A loan from a neighbour ( a t  25X i n t e r e s t  per month) is
so much le ss  t ro u b le  than a bank loan th a t  I can earn
the  e x t r a  cash requ ired  fo r  the  v i l l a g e  loan in  the
18)time i t  takes me to  get the  bank loan.
Clearly there are access problems in the formal credit sector for 
illiterate ’poor* households, who are unfamiliar with bureaucratic procedures. 
Schaffer, Lamb and others (1974; 1975) first addressed issues around access to 
institutionally administered resources. McGregor (1987 and forthcoming) deals 
with the problem in the Bangladesh context. Initial bribes may be needed to gain 
access to bank loans. The small loan size needed by poorer households to tide 
over lean seasons makes loan processing in the formal sector expensive. The 
formal banking and credit sector leaves 39% of Samitigram’s ’poor* households in 
at least partial dependence on high interest consumption loans. Thus some of 
these households* surplus continues to be extracted by wealthier village 
households through usurious informal credit relationships.
There are three lines of credit, which alleviate the regressive impact of 
credit in Samitigram. Firstly, the extension of mutual no- interest credit between 
relatives and friends of similar economic status is a safety mechanism for poorer 
households to protect themselves against income transfers to the wealthier classes. 
Among the ’well-off*, mutual loans mostly alleviated temporary cash flow 
problems.
A second credit line of great importance for the ’poor* are the loans 
extended to members of the BRDB women’s cooperative MSS (see III.4.8). These 
loans are officially intended to promote women’s income generation through 
activities such as poultry raising. In Samitigram, MSS loans were almost without
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exception appropriated by members* husbands and used for cultivation. Most MSS 
members were women from ’poor* households For these households, access to 
the MSS loan is a vital deployment of gender to obtain finance for irrigated 
cultivation. The one exception, where an MSS loan was not appropriated by the 
male members of the household is that of a ’rich* household (Saidur IV.2.1). The 
women of this household did start raising poultry and realising cash income with 
the help of MSS loans. At the time of the field research, they required no further 
loans for their poultry business and had started to disburse high-interest loans to 
poor households out of the MSS loans, which they still obtained annually.
Thus in Samitigram, the attempted institutional targeting of loans to 
poor women has brought finance to another group of potential development 
’targets*, the poor rural cultivators who are their husbands. In Singra upazila, the 
redirection of loans to women to the male sphere is well known and accepted by 
the BRDB local bureaucracy. We thus have a case of ’relabelling* (see Wood 
1985) by the target group household in the context of unequal relationships inside 
the loan-receiving household, which were not taken into account in the design of 
the loan scheme. Fortunately, the redirected MSS credit here turns out to be a 
precondition for the cultivation operations of poor households which are not 
reached by any other credit programmes. However, the need to take into account 
women’s positions within the household and their consequent chances of access to 
externally administered assets, and the need to consider the ’target* household as a 
whole are highlighted by this example (see White 1988).
The third element which alleviates the regressive impact of formal 
credit is the credit samiti (II.4.6). Indirectly, it provides access to formal credit 
for a number of ’poor* and ’coping* households and thus gives them the 
opportunity to engage in occupations which, as repayment records prove, 
generate sufficient income to repay the loans.
Like irrigation, credit is a necessary condition for HYV boro
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cultivation. Under conditions of relative security of water access, Samitigram’s 
informal credit sector has evolved better access conditions for a number of 
poorer households through the credit samiti. Marginal households (e.g. Toslin,
IV.2.3) do get pushed into taking high-interest informal credit, and high interest 
consumption loans prevent a large number of the ’poor* from using their own 
seasonal economic surplus productively. Although the exploitative features of 
informal credit have been partially supplanted, credit as a whole is still a 
bottleneck factor for ’poor* households in Samitigram and remains a means of 
extractive appropriation for richer villagers.
With irrigated HYV cultivation formal credit has expanded. For joint 
’rich* households this has meant a new income source through selective default on 
bank loans. Among less wealthy households in Samitigram, default is rarer and 
caused by inability rather unwillingness to repay. For nuclear ’poor*, ’coping* and 
’w ell-ofF households default usually forces reliance on high interest informal 
loans, which reduces or eliminates the profitability of irrigated cultivation (see
V.4 on cultivation costs and returns). Under conditions of relatively secure access 
to essential cultivation inputs as in Samitigram, ’well-off*, ’coping* and ’poor* 
households show good repayment records. The other side of the coin is that loan 
stoppages, as implemented by commercial banks in Singra upazila in 1986, either 
force cultivators into high-interest informal loans or out of cultivation into 
renting their land to wealthier households who can raise the cash for cultivation.
Access to credit, default patterns and stoppages of form al credit thus 
show clear regressive distributional results. This should not distract from the 
productivity-enhancing role of recurrent cultivation loans and from  the increase 
in the numbers of those who can cultivate irrigated boro through the impact of 
the credit samiti in Samitigram. The credit samiti is locally initiated and enhances 
productivity and output of those with insufficient access to formal credit.
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Although it is integrated into local patron-client relationships, and although the 
price of loans is differentiated according to household category and client status, 
the example of the credit samiti shows that informal rural credit relationships 
need not necessarily be merely an extractive instrument of the rural elites. Credit 
in Samitigram is also coming to be regarded as a precondition for surplus 
appropriation from irrigated cultivation. As has been shown for tenancy and 
mortgaging relations (c.f.V.4-V.5), the reasoning behind an informal loan can be 
the facilitation of production which expands the exploitable base of surplus 
potential rather than the extractive appropriation of surplus from outside the 
production process.
V.3 The Labour Market
Section III.3 discussed how increased crop volumes and changed 
cultivation methods for HYV paddy have created new types of agricultural work 
and increased the demand for agricultural labour in Singra. The changes in the 
labour market which this increase in the demand for labour has created are the 
topic o f this section.
In Samitigram, different groups of workers have experienced different 
types of change as a result of the introduction of STW-irrigated boro cultivation. 
There are now differences between migrant and local labourers, different wages 
are paid fo r the same work and different workers* bargaining power has changed 
to d ifferent degrees.
The introduction to the sections of the Samitigram labour market which 
follows below explores the implications of STW-irrigated cultivation for the 
position of agricultural labourers in Samitigram.
V.3.1 Organisational Forms of Labour
Depending on the type of work, time of the year and the economic 
situation o f the cultivator, agricultural labour in Samitigram is done either by
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members of the household, by inter-household labour exchange (gata) without 
cash payment or by a form of hired labour.
Table V.10 introduces the different organisational forms of hired labour 
in Samitigram. Labourers are distinguished by their place of origin and
permanent residence and by the organisational form under which they provide 
labour.
Samitigram labour market sections are interdependent but can be 
distinguished by different internal operating principles.
Table V.10 Forms of Hired Labour in Samitigram
v i l l a g e  lo c a l  (b e e l) m igran t
1. Group ** ***
2. In d iv id u a l 
(d a y /c a su a l)  ***
(seaso n a l/an n u a l) * **
******** degree of r e l a t iv e  frequency of labour type
V .3.1.1 The Labour Groups (Dols)
The bulk of Samitigram’s boro harvest is carried out by migrant labour 
groups who started coming to the Singra when irrigated boro cultivation 
increased. Local labour also forms dols for boro harvest work. Dols have a leader 
(sardar) who conducts negotiations with prospective employers for the group.
During the initial years of boro cultivation in Samitigram, dols were
paid a fixed sum per bigha (0.33 acres) of land harvested. Today almost all
harvesting work is paid by crop share. This has established a direct link between 
harvested volumes and returns to labour and stands in direct contrast to the 
displacement of in-kind crop shares by cash payments observed in many other 
parts of Bangladesh (Clay 1976; Jansen 1983; Rahman 1984. Only some of the
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poorest cultivators who hire day labour in addition to their own household labour 
fo r the boro harvest, paid in cash for harvest work. These poorer cultivators also 
tended to have access problems to harvest labour groups since dols move from 
the lands of wealthier to that of poorer cultivators. This exposes poorer 
cultivators to a higher risk of crop loss through early rains.
Dols are paid with a share of the harvested crop. The size of this crop 
share depends crucially on the arrival of the monsoon. In years with early rains, 
labour groups were reported to have been paid as much as 30% of the harvested 
paddy (12 of every 40 seer^  for cutting and threshing the paddy). In such years 
employers travel to the migrant workers* villages or to the bus and train station 
in Singra or Natore where migrant dols arrive, in order to secure labour. In 
normal years and when the rains arrive late, groups come to employers and 
harvest labour was reported to be paid 6-9% of the crop (2±-3 seer per maund) 
depending on the distance between field and employers’ homestead where the 
crop is carried by the labourers. In early June, at the end of the four to five 
weeks of boro harvest, the migrant dols return to their home villages with the 
paddy they have earned. Groups of workers sometimes rent lorries in order to 
transport their paddy home.
There were two local dols in Samitigram in 1985/86. They work mainly 
during the boro transplanting and harvest seasons but also for the amon harvest 
or in the construction of village houses outside the agricultural seasons. Local 
dols have six to eight members each and are relatively uniform in the age and 
physical strength of group members. Labourers who are old, very young, sick or 
physically weak and those who are stronger and work harder than average do not 
belong to the dols. While the former are not admitted because "they cannot pull 
their weight", the latter said they did not join dols in order to use their physical 
strength for their individual benefit. As will be shown below, the "weak" and the 
"strong" individual (i.e. non-group) labourers rely on different forms of day,
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annual and seasonal labour with very different levels of return (cf. Figure V.4).
For work other than the harvesting of boro, such as weeding, harvesting 
amon or the construction of village houses, dols are paid piece rates. Payment is 
negotiated between sardar and employer and shared by group members.
The addition of boro cultivation to the annual agricultural cycle (cf. 
Figure III. 1) has brought new dimensions to the bargaining process in the 
Samitigram agricultural labour market. A larger total number of agricultural 
operations during the year requires more accurate timing. Greater investment in 
boro cultivation (cf. Tables V.13 & V.14) means that a departure from the 
required sequence and timing of agricultural operations risks greater economic 
losses for the cultivator.
This greater complexity of the agricultural system created by an added 
cropping season shifts relative bargaining powers in the agricultural labour 
market. At boro harvest time, this can operate in favour of agricultural 
labourers. Employers* increased need for well-timed and promptly executed 
harvest operations makes them more vulnerable to the demands of agricultural 
labourers. If the boro harvest is carried out too late and caught by the arrival of 
the monsoon, the crop will be unfit for storage and will need to be sold 
immediately at very low prices. The rains may then also have raised the water 
level in the fields too high to sow (broadcast) amon and the cultivator will suffer 
further losses in the next season. During the annual peak period of labour 
demand, the boro harvest, the dols thus have the advantage of considerable 
systemic pressure for the timely execution of agricultural tasks. As shown above, 
this raises the payments to harvest labour in years with early monsoons. 
Somewhat in contrast to this, Brammer and Clay (1987) ^  argue that the 
direction of change of Bangladeshi agricultural systems means the reproduction 
of poverty of the agricultural labour force on whose continued work at very low 
returns the maintenance of dynamics of the system depends.
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The organisation of labourers into groups counteracts the power- 
dependence relation between labourer and employer which operates through 
market interlinkages and can affect wage negotiations in favour of the employer. 
This is expressed in Adnan’s (1984 p.86) model of
. . . i n t e r l o c k i n g  t r a n s a c t io n s  in  severa l  markets 
imposed by one agent upon an o th e r .
The dols loosen linkages between the market for boro harvest labour 
and other markets. As a reflection of the labour power they control the sardars 
have come to be accorded special status by agricultural employers. This is 
reflected in symbolic gestures such as the offering of a chair and food and drink 
during negotiations and in matters such as how a sardar is addressed and treated. 
On the other hand, it was apparent that if  a sardar were found by his dol to have 
accepted a low payment in order to secure advantages in other markets for 
himself, his position in the group would be endangered. The dols thus take some 
sections of the agricultural labour market out of the context o f interlinked 
markets and confine the boundaries of the negotiations more closely to the work- 
wage exchange.
Since most harvest labourers in Samitigram are seasonal migrants, 
relationships between labourer and employer in other markets are less frequent 
and therefore less likely to counteract the systemic pressure for higher harvest 
wages. A mechanisation of harvesting operations which would eliminate labour’s 
bargaining power during the boro harvest in Samitigram is unlikely in the near 
future due to the ecological conditions in the swampy beel
Clearly, it is not argued here that poor migrant labourers who come 
from  areas of low labour demand and need to maintain home dependants, are in a 
position to withhold their labour in order to press for higher wages. Demographic 
growth and increasing landlessness will also increasingly tilt the balance against 
labour. Nonetheless, subject to climatic circumstances during the boro harvest,
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agricultural employers in the Singra beel have become seekers of labour and are 
vulnerable to increased wage demands.
Under new production conditions with mechanised irrigation, the dols 
have thus created a degree of "room for manoeuvre" (Clay and Schaffer 1984) 
fo r labour to press for higher returns from the boro harvest (cf. Figure V.4). 
However, there are differences between migrant and local dols. Migrant dols tend 
to be employed by the ’rich’ and ’well-off* while the local dols work for the 
’coping’ and ’poor* cultivators This enables wealthy employers to segregate 
boro harvest employment relationships with migrant dols from continuing patron- 
client relationships with local labourers in other markets and other segments of 
the labour market. As other such "ambidextrous" strategies of wealthy households 
this shows that patron-client relations in interlinked markets are not 
necessarily displaced by new, more productivity-oriented production 
relationships. Continuing patron-client relations in other seasons and other market 
segments may articulate with new production structures so that the rural elites 
can continue some forms of extractive appropriation.
There is another new, but much smaller section of the group labour 
market in Samitigram. Households which have insufficient own labour employ 
groups of women or young boys in order to transplant paddy. These groups are 
paid piece rates which amount to a fraction of the male agricultural wage of the 
season (see Figure V.4). The creation of a labour market section which which 
employs lower paid women and children thus reduces the share of labour in the 
surplus created through irrigated boro cultivation. This has also been observed by 
Jansen (1983) and Rahman (1984).
V .3.1.2 Day Labour
For most Samitigram labourers agricultural day labour is a seasonal 
occupation which is combined with other income generation activities in order to 
meet annual household needs. The majority of landless and land-poor households
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rely on open-water fishing in communal waters and fish sale during the latter 
part of the rainy season between August and early October (cf. Table VII. 1). 
Incomes from  fishing are much higher than incomes from day labour during this 
period (cf. Figure V.4). The seasonal low in demand for agricultural labour 
during the monsoon is thus conveniently offset by a peak in fishing incomes. 
This reduces the risk that labourers get indebted through informal, high-interest 
credit (cf. V.2) and become dependent on employers and thus weakened in their 
peak-demand wage negotiations through credit-labour market interlinkages. In 
Samitigram, open-water fishing clearly constitutes an essential supplementary 
income source for households who cannot rely on cultivation alone
Levels of remuneration for day labour vary by gender, by season, by 
type of work and with the strength and skill of the labourer. Women day 
labourers receive only daily meals for themselves and their youngest children. 
The lowest wage for male day labourers (5-8 Taka per day) is paid in the rainy 
season between August and September when there is little agricultural work. As 
fishing incomes peak during this period, few local labourers seek work in 
Samitigram, and most of these find work in wealthier village households. 
Throughout the amon harvest and the boro transplantation period from October 
1985 to February 1986, 15 Taka per day was paid to male day labourers. 
Between m id-February and mid-April, just before the boro harvest, there is a 
low in the demand for agricultural labour and wage levels fell to 10 Taka per 
day in 1986. Some increase in labour demand occurred through the Food-for- 
Work and Cash-for-W ork programmes fo r road and culvert construction in the 
union. Eventually, the highest wages for the agricultural year, 20 to 40 Taka per 
day fo r ancillary harvest operations such as haystacking, are paid during the boro 
harvest from May to early June (cf. Figure V.4).
Day labourers in Samitigram are from the village itself. The strongest 
young men from ’poor* households perform  the better paid types of boro harvest
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labour for the ’rich* village households who do not use household labour for 
these tasks. It was not always clear how the scarce opportunities for better paid 
day labour were allocated. Both the physical strength and skill of a labourer and 
his local connections played a role. It could be argued that the few better paid 
day labour contracts available from Samitigram’s ’rich* agricultural employers 
create a segment of "strong clients" and thus reduce the potential strength of 
Samitigram’s agricultural labour force as a whole. The example of Yussuf’s sons 
(cf. IV.2.4), two of whom work in labour gangs and a third relies on better paid 
day labour, illustrates how the potential bargaining strength of local labour at 
times when labour inputs are crucial to employers can be lost through the 
organisational fragmentation of the labour force.
In comparison to the labour groups (dols), individual day labourers
maintain more intensive connections with employers in other markets. These are
important to their households* resource strategies and ensure subsistence in a 
high-risk environment. As a result of such market interlinkages, individual
labourers tended to be less able to use their occasional bargaining advantages in
the labour market.
V .3.1.3 Seasonal and Annual Labour
For eight months of the year, from the amon harvest in October till 
after the boro harvest in June, seasonal labourers from  Samitigram and 
surrounding villages live in their employers’ households. They receive a monthly 
wage, daily food and sometimes a new lungi. When the monsoon arrives in about 
July, they return to their own households. A few ’rich* Samitigram households 
also employ labourers under annual contracts.
Seasonal and annual labourers (chakors) are men from  other villages in 
the area or young boys who are as yet unable to work in dols. Their monthly 
wages varied between 30 Taka (for cowherd boys) and 180 to 300 Taka for adult 
male labourers. Only the richest household of Samitigram employs a women on
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an annual agreement. This kajer mee (literally; girl for work) is not paid but only 
given daily meals and two saris per year. It emerged from a number of 
interviews that if  their earning potential elsewhere increases (e.g. as a result o f 
fieldgleaning after the boro harvest) poor women are becoming increasingly 
unwilling to work as domestic servants for daily food only (cf. IV.2.5 & White 
1988).
Both in the male and in the female labour market, total annual income 
fo r seasonal and annual labour is lower than fo r day labour (cf. also Figure V.4). 
While in other areas of the country a lower number of days worked may result in 
lower incomes for day labour despite higher wages, the general consensus in 
Samitigram was that because there are enough work opportunities throughout the 
year it is better to work as a day labourer than as a chakor.
While most local labourers relied on their social and kin connections to 
obtain continuous work as day or group labourers (cf. Table V.12 below), most 
seasonal and annual labourers came from other villages and could only achieve 
security of employment by accepting longer-term , less well-paid employment. As 
Samitigram wage levels are somewhat higher than in the surrounding villages, 
lower paid employment in Samitigram is still a desirable choice for the non-local 
labourers.
The employment relations between local chakors and employers often 
coincided with credit, tenancy or mortgaging relations and were part of a m ulti­
stranded dependence of the labourer on the employer. In these cases employment 
as a chakor was clearly regarded as interchangeable with sharecropping or credit 
relations between patron and client household. The rationale of the total patron- 
client relationship here centres less on the economics in a single market (e.g. 
tenancy or employment) and more around the assurance of subsistence in a high- 
risk environment to the client household in exchange for extractive appropriation 
in interlinked markets by the patron household.
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Most of Samitigram’s child labour market is part of the seasonal and
annual labour market. ’Poor* boys from about 8 years of age onward work as
chakors in ’rich* and ’well-off* households in exchange for daily food and a small
monthly payment. White (1988) also finds a labour market for female children in
Tanore, a more Hindu area. In order to support their parental households, ’poor*
children* drop out of school and remain illiterate. One boy chakor aged about
eleven told me proudly
I s t a r t e d  to  learn how to  read and wr i te  but I had to 
g ive  up and work a f t e r  the vowels
While ’rich* children study, often with tutors to overcome the 
shortcomings of the primary school system, ’poor* children forego formal 
education to work. New, lower-paid labour market segments in the wake of 
mechanised irrigation such as for the transplantation of irrigated boro (cf. 
V .3.1.1) not only decrease the return to labour in the aggregate but may also 
increase the incidence of child labour.
Formal education increasingly determines people’s ability to benefit 
from  structural and technological change in Bangladesh (cf. also III.5.3). If the 
response to irrigation-related increased labour requirements in agriculture is the 
increasing employment of ’poor’ children (cf. also Rahman 1984), the level of 
literacy and the development prospects of the children of today’s ’poor* will be 
further reduced.
Clearly, the present primary school system is insufficient to reach the 
’poor*. Also, a closer look at the importance of child labour in the household 
economy (cf. Cain 1977; Kabeer 1986) and at the possibilities to reduce or 
replace the economic importance of children in the ’poor* household would be 
needed.
V .3 .1.4 Household Labour and Labour Exchange (Gata)
All Samitigram households with healthy men of working ability work in
Figure V.4 












Jan Feb Mar Oct Nov DecJun Jul
day labour ( 'weak1)
day labour ( ' s t r o n g ' )
dols (»ale  adult)
paddy process ing ( f ena le )
donest ic (boys)
seasonal and annual (nale adult)
(open water f i sh in g )
-  233 -
own cultivation. In line with Chayanovian arguments, the degree to which 
household labour is used in own cultivation depends on the stage of the household 
life cycle and its related consumer-worker ratio. Beyond a household’s age and 
gender structure, its wealth and occupational diversity give some scope for choice 
between using household labour and hired labour in own cultivation. Although all 
Samitigram cultivators used household labour, the intensity of use in cultivation 
decreased with increasing household wealth ^ . As discussed in Chapter VII, 
occupational diversification only tended to take members of the wealthiest village 
households entirely out of cultivation work. For ’coping* and ’poor* households, 
occupational diversification complements, rather than substitutes for labour in 
own cultivation. This indicates the higher degree of self-exploitation of 
household labour (i.e. working longer hours) for poor households.
Inter-household labour exchange, gata, has been practised in Samitigram 
fo r a long time. It is the origin of today’s labour groups (dols). Those of the local 
dol labourers who also cultivate for themselves, transform their dol into a gata 
group for their own boro harvest. This temporary transformation of dol labour 
into exchanged household labour among poor labourer-cum-cultivators saves 
expenses for hired labour. With decreasing economic status gata was used more 
explicitly to reduce the cash cost for labour. Thus household self-exploitation 
strategies become more elaborate as the economic position of the household 
worsens.
While only the ’poor* labourer-cum-cultivators used gata for their boro 
harvest, ’coping*, ’w ell-o ff and one ’rich* household used gata for the 
transplantation of boro and the weeding of amon. Here, gata uses household 
labour outside the peak periods of agricultural work and thus saves expenses for 
hired labour. At the same time, the social status of the household is not 
endangered as the cultivator does not hire out his labour. The only ’rich* 
household who used gata in Samitigram employed hired labour in addition to
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household labour inside the gata agreement. Here, most clearly, gata increases the 
use and productivity of household labour under the constraints imposed by status- 
related rigidities in the agricultural labour market. The other four ’rich* 
Samitigram households cultivated with some own household labour and hired 
labour. Thus it is clear that with increasing economic wealth of the cultivator the 
proportion of hired labour and, assuming constant labour intensity per acre across 
household category, the amount of hired labour per unit of land cultivated 
increases.
V.3.2 Household Categories and the Labour Market
Figure V.4 illustrates the wage differentials between the different 
sections of the agricultural labour market introduced above. The differentiation 
of the labour market by labour type and by season stand out clearly. The 
separation of Samitigram day labourers into ’weak* and ’strong* is also clear. In 
order to demonstrate their importance for the operation of the agricultural labour 
market, seasonal incomes from open-water fishing have been included in Figure 
V.4.
One of the most striking changes after the introduction of irrigated 
boro cultivation in Samitigram is that now the majority of Samitigram cultivators 
(including 44% of the ’poor’) hire labour at some time of the year. In 1986, 65% 
of village households employed dols for the boro harvest. Only the 9% of 
households who had no own cultivation on own or rented land and a further 26% 
of ’poor* and ’coping* households who cultivated mostly rainfed amon, did not 
hire dols but used household labour and labour exchange for cultivation. Three 
I *well-ofP households sharecropped out all their land and thus did not hire any
| labour.
As Table V .ll and the preceding discussion show, annual and seasonal
i
J labourers work mainly for the ’rich* and ’well-off* households. One reason for
this is that the employment of seasonal and even more so of annual labourers
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Table V .l l :  Use of Types of Hired Labour By Samitigram Households 
(% of household category)
Annual Seasonal Group Day
'Rich' 100 100 100 100
'Well-off' 50 65 77 n.a.
'Coping' 6 34 52 n.a.
'Poor' 0 2 44 n.a.
requires larger cash outlays, space to accommodate labour and an uninterrupted 
work load to occupy the labourer throughout the year. Thus only two ’coping* 
households (6% in Table V .ll)  employed annual labourers. One employed a man 
from a poorer village in the deeper beel who worked in the household’s snack 
stall and assisted its only working male in agricultural work. The other ’coping* 
household employed a boy labourer while one of the household’s sons was 
attending school. Here, the employment of an annual labourer is an investment in 
the education of a household member.
The ’rich’ employ all types of hired labour, and the greatest amounts 
per household. Migrant harvest dols of thirty or more members, male and female 
day labour and several seasonal and one or two male annual labourers worked in 
each of the rich households. The richest Samitigram household, Malik (IV. 1.2) 
also employed female seasonal and day labour. The ’rich* thus continue to enforce 
their local positions of power through longer-term  labour contracts which are 
used interchangeably or in conjunction with contracts in other markets such as 
credit or tenancy. Thus, a sharecropping agreement could bind a tenant-labourer 
to pledge his labour to his landlord, or a debtor would repay a loan by providing 
his labour below the market rate. In 1986 with an average wage rate of 15 Taka 
per day, 7 to 10 days of labour were the rate for a loan of 100 Taka in
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Samitigram.
At the same time, ’rich* households employ migrant rather than local 
dols. This to some extent avoids the clash of the exploitative interlinkages of 
their local labour, credit and tenancy relations with their productivity objectives 
in the cultivation of irrigated boro in times of seasonal labour shortage. On the 
whole, hired labour is cheapest for the ’rich’ in Samitigram since they employ the 
greatest proportion of annual and seasonal labour and use market interlinkages to 
their advantage most frequently.
’W ell-off households have somewhat more diverse patterns of labour 
use than the ’rich’. One household, with five working men, supplements household 
labour with the hire of occasional day labour only. Another operates a sawmill 
and electrical goods stall in the Borogram bazar (cf. Map III.l) and employs an 
annual labourer for agricultural and shop work.
The ’rich* and ’w e ll-o ff are Samitigram’s main employers. ’Poor* and 
’coping* households hardly enter the labour market as employers, other than for 
the boro harvest. A minority of ’coping* households employ young boys on 
seasonal or annual agreements in exchange for food, clothing and few, if  any, 
wages.
The main form of labour employed by ’coping’ and ’poor’ cultivators is 
group labour (cf. Table V .ll) . As discussed above, group labour involves more 
single-market employment relations than individual forms of hired labour. 
Agricultural employers in Samitigram can thus be distinguished by the type of 
labour they employ and their consequent degree of bargaining power in the 
labour and other markets.
Table V.12 shows the quantitative dimension of the divisions among 
Samitigram labourers. Only just over a quarter of the 41 ’poor* households and 
only one ’coping* household work in labour groups. Labour groups are thus
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clearly not the main form of employment relation between local labourers and 
employers.
The majority of group labourers are migrants who are employed by
Table V.12: Types of Hired Labour Performed by Samitigram Households 
(% of household category)
Annual & Seasonal Group Day (STW operator)
Rich 0 0 0 40
Well-off 0 0 0 50
Coping 3 3 14 10
Poor 16 26 80 2
the ’rich* and ’coping’ cultivators of Samitigram. Labour relations between local 
labourers, who work in groups, and employers have thus changed because a new, 
poorer type of employer has entered the agricultural labour market for the boro 
harvest.
On the other hand, new types of agriculture-related work have 
appeared in the labour market. The occupation of STW operator (cf. VII) is not 
significantly better paid than cultivation labour in the same season, but it has 
drawn wealthier households into the Samitigram labour market (cf. Table V.12; 
see also Lewis forthcoming). Clearly, control over water distribution rather than 
the wage returns, is the major incentive which draws wealthy cultivator 
households into the occupation of STW operator.
On the whole, the changes in the labour market have increased the 
absolute returns to labour from cultivation. This was universally acknowledged by 
Samitigram labourers. Some Samitigram households who were entirely relying on 
the sale of their agricultural labour also appeared to be better off than those who 
were subsisting on the cultivation of small pieces of land.
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My question to Samitigram labourers about what had been the most 
important changes for them was either responded to with positive comments about 
the constant availability of work, or with the resigned remark that "nothing has 
got worse, but nothing has got better either". The subdivisions of the Samitigram 
labour market introduced in this chapter bear out this division of opinion.
V.4 Cultivation Costs, Output and Accumulation
This section brings together the main elements which influence costs 
and crop returns of STW-irrigated cultivation in Samitigram. The point of central 
interest here is whether irrigation has introduced or increased biases by 
household category in the cost and output value (net of cost) of cultivation. The 
pre-irrigation period in Samitigram is thus our point of departure. As pointed out 
earlier (V.1.3) higher land, which brought more secure returns of the pre­
irrigation main crop b.amon% is mainly owned by the ’rich*. In the pre-irrigation 
period, the risk of amon failure through flooding was thus lowest for ’rich* 
households. The reversal in land quality criteria with the fall of the water table 
and the emergence of irrigated boro as the main crop has now made high land 
less valuable as it requires more water and more fertilizer for boro cultivation 
than lower land. The STW command areas of Samitigram today still show a 
concentration of higher land, which has greater input requirements for boro 
cultivation, among the ’rich*.
Chapter III discussed changes in cultivation processes which arise from 
irrigation. These brought or enforced a variety of cultivation cost biases.
Cultivation costs for rainfed amon and for irrigated boro which were 
collected in detail for ten of the case study households of Chapter IV, are 
presented in Tables V.13 & V.14 below. The tables should be regarded as 
illustrative of rather than representative of cultivation cost biases. More extensive
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survey work, beyond the scope of this research, would be needed to obtain 
statistically reliable results.
Three points should be noted on Tables V.13 & V.14. Firstly, shadow 
prices for household labour were not used. This reflects labour market rigidities 
under which the majority of cultivators do not sell their labour for status reasons 
(confirmed by Ahmed 1981; Boyce 1987). Bharadwaj (1974 p.61) suggests that 
gross output net of paid out cost is the relevant measure of cultivation 
performance Along similar lines, Adnan (1984 p. 177) argues that peasant 
households balance their external accounts and thus do not cost household labour. 
However, the 'external accounts' costing method, which I also use here, does 
underestimate cultivation cost for households whose cultivating members also 
work as agricultural labourers. The underestimate is unlikely to amount to the 
full market cost of labour used in conventional accounting procedures, though, 
since the increased use of household labour in peak periods stems from 'se lf­
exploitation' of household labour beyond what would be available in the labour 
market. This includes 'overwork' by household members who also hire out their 
labour and cultivation work by household members who are excluded from the 
labour market (women and children; see White 1988; this corresponds to Adnan's 
(1984) undervaluation of "internal sector resources"). Nonetheless, 'poor' and 
'coping* labourer households have some real opportunity costs for household 
labour used in own cultivation which are not taken into account here.
Secondly, due to methodological difficulties in determining for how 
particular types of credit were eventually used, cultivation credit was not 
included the calculation of cultivation costs in Tables V.13 & V.14. This biases 
cost estimates downwards, in particular for 'poor' cultivators who take the main 
bulk of informal high-interest loans (see V.2). Additional calculations (see V.4.2 
c) examine the importance of credit as an element of cultivation costs for
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different household categories.
Thirdly, household-produced seeds were costed at the price of the 
paddy raw material and in-kind payments at the seasonal average price of paddy 
(175 Taka per maund).
Tables V.13 and V.14 highlight a number of points on yields, 
cultivation costs for owner-cultivators and tenants and on net output values 
obtained by cultivators from different household categories in irrigated and 
rainfed cultivation.
V.4.1 Yields
With an average of over 70 maunds per acre (2.6 tons per acre) 
Samitigram irrigated boro yields are far above the average 0.97 tons per acre for 
Bangladesh and the average 1.1 tons per acre for Singra These high yield 
potentials are likely to have facilitated the formation of irrigation groups in 
Samitigram. Yields declined with household category in the case studies (see 
column B), but a more broadly based survey would be needed to substantiate the 
significant of this finding.
V.4.2 Cultivation Costs (All Cultivators)
Cash cultivation costs for b .amon came to between Taka 360 and 825 
Taka per acre. Depending on the level of water at harvest time which was 
favourably low in the period of investigation, up to 1200 Taka cultivation cost 
were reported for amon The cash cultivation costs for irrigated boro ranged 
from  Taka 2010 to 4445 per acre. Boro cultivation costs varied for the following 
reasons:
Rental charges for hals (cattle, plough and labour of equipment owner) added as 
much as 300 Taka per acre when cultivators did not own a hal.
The preparation of boro seedbeds in December and January requires
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TABLE V.13: Cultivation Costs and Returns: Irrigated Boro










Malik 3435 76.5 44.9 995 3.9
Saidur 3360 75 44.8 9765 3.9
Well-off
Adorn 2010 78 25.8 11640 4815 6.8 3.3
Mujibur 2610 62.1 42.0 8258 4.2
Cooing
Ali 2760 75.9 36.4 10523 4.8
Tosl in 2985 72 41.5 9615 4.2
Poor
Kama I 2685 53 50.7 6569 1953 3.5 1.7
Hakim 4445 64.5 68.9 6843 1199 2.5 1.3
Hanif 3495 78.9 44.3 10313 3409 4.0 1.9
Rahman 3540 57 62.1 6435 1448 2.8 1.4
TABLE V.14: Cultivation Costs and Returns: Rainfed Amon
======== ii u n n ii H it ii H ii ii H II N H II II H II II II H II II II II II II II ’ H










Malik 645 33 19.6 5130 9.0
Saidur 360 24 15.0 3840 11.7
Weil-off
Adorn 495 21 23.5 3180 7.4
Muj ibur 480 18 26.7 2670 6.6
CoDing
Ali - 16.5 - - -
Toslin 645 27 23.9 4080 7.3
Poor
Kama I 510 27 18.9 4215 1853 9.3 4 .6
Hakim - * • - -
Hanif 375 22.5 16.7 3563 1594 10.5 5.3
Rahman 825 21 39.3 2850 1013 4.5 2.2
a \
Cost /Yie ld  * Cost per un i t  of output
NOV = Net Output Value * Yield a t  average seasonal  s a l e  p r ic e  (Tk 175) minus
c u l t i v a t i o n  cos t  (Tk/acre) .  For tenants  c a lc u la te d  with the  crop rece ived  (ft of Yield)  c ) NVO/cost = re turn  per Taka invested ( y i e ld  * s a l e  p r i ce  (175Tk/maund) over cost  
(Tk/acre)
- 242 -
plots of high land since these dry up first after the monsoon. The lack of such 
land, and insecurity among ’poor’ and ’coping* sharecroppers about whether boro 
land will be available to them in any particular season often forces these 
households to buy seedlings ready for transplantation. This added Taka 300 to 
600 to per acre to cultivation costs.
Loans taken showed a clear predominance of more expensive credit 
forms for ’poor* households (see V.2 Tables V.8 and V.9). Although high-interest 
informal credit concentrated among ’poor* landless households, a number of 
’coping’ small owner and tenant cultivators also relied on high interest credit (see 
Table V.9). In 1985/86 a credit of 3000 Taka to cultivate one acre of boro paddy 
would cost 180 Taka in interest for a formal six-month cultivation loan from a 
bank and 1500 Taka in interest for an informal three-month village loan. Poorer 
cultivators tended to borrow informally to rent cattle and plough and to feed and 
pay labourers during the harvest period. No-one in Samitigram relied entirely on 
high-interest informal loans. There is no doubt, though, that poorer cultivators 
financed a part of cultivation costs through informal credit and this reduced their 
profit margins. As column F in Tables V.13 & V.14 indicates, the cash cost for 
irrigated boro cultivation is a higher proportion of boro output value than the 
cash cost for amon cultivation is of amon output value. In order to achieve the 
greatly increased returns to land and absolute returns (cf. Table V.14 & V.15 
columns B & D), almost all Samitigram cultivators have come to depend on 
cultivation credit.
Irrigation is a main cost factor in HYV boro cultivation. The seasonal 
charge for water (300 to 900 Taka per acre) and the annual instalment (300 to 
900 Taka per acre) for the capital cost of the STW, make up irrigation cost in 
Samitigram. Tenant cultivators in irrigation groups only pay water costs while 
STW instalments are covered by the landowner/irrigation group member.
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Compared to owner/cultivators, this leads to a 300 to 600 Taka per acre 
reduction in cultivation costs for sharecroppers. Irrigation costs increase with 
land level and irrigation group charges m irror this.
The cost of irrigation for users of individually owned STWs was higher 
than the cost for STW group members for two reasons: Firstly, the generally 
higher level of land in command areas irrigated by individually owned STWs 
(owned by ’rich* households) meant that more water was needed per unit of land. 
Secondly, the smaller command area size of individually owned STWs (see Table 
III.2) led to a higher level of fixed costs per unit of land. On the other hand, 
higher variable costs are likely to be more than outweighed by the tendency of 
’rich* STW owners to decrease fixed costs by defaulting on STW loans. Many 
private STWs in and around Samitigram were bought with bank loans in the 
names of female household members who had land registered in their names for 
tax purposes. Default on these loans was usual and carried no sanctions for the 
household (see also V.2).
Hired labour represents cash costs between 600 and 1650 per acre 
(excluding the cost of feeding the labourers). In very rare cases a ’poor*
Table V.15: Market Cost of Labour for Boro (per acre)a^
Seedbed p re p a ra t io n  Taka 300
tra n s p la n t in g  420
f e r t i l i s i n g  150
weeding 300
h a rv e s t______________________________ 600
TOTAL 
1 case study averages
1650
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cultivator with very little land would do even the harvesting work by himself or 
with small amounts of day labour. In these cases (.e.g. Rahman IV.2.4), cash cost 
fo r labour was zero. The market cost of hiring labour for all boro cultivation 
operations in Samitigram in 1985/86 is given in Table V.15.
As has been shown in V.3 (Table V.10) the inputs of hired labour (as 
opposed to household labour) increase with the socio-economic position of a 
household. This is due to a higher amount of cultivation supervision and leisure 
time taken by wealthier cultivators and to the greater concentration of non­
cultivation occupations among 'w e ll-o ff  and 'rich'. Although agricultural labour 
carries a social stigma in Samitigram, cultivation work on own land only does to 
a much smaller extent than agricultural employment. There is some labour input 
into own cultivation by the majority of households from all categories. The 
amount of hired labour employed is thus a function of the age and gender 
composition of the cultivator household as well as of its socio-economic 
category. Wealthier households reduce their per acre cultivation costs by 
employing greater amounts of cheaper seasonal and annual labour (see Table 
V . l l ) .
V.4.3 Cultivation Costs (Tenants)
Sharecropping and fixed tenancy display much narrower profit margins 
than owner cultivation (see Tables V.13 & V.14 columns D-G). Assuming 
cultivation costs of 2700 Taka per acre ^  and a yield of 60 to 75 maunds, a 
sharecropper is left with a profit of between 2550 and 3860 Taka per acre. An 
owner cultivator under the same conditions is left with between 7500 and 10125 
Taka. By assuming no bias in either credit cost or the received prices for sold 
crops (see Table VII.2 for a modification of the latter), these calculations 
overestimate sharecroppers* profits. The lowest reported post-harvest price for 
paddy of 125 Taka per maund leaves a sharecropper with a profit of only 1050
- 245 -
to 1990 Taka per acre. The lower end of this profit range will turn negative if 
cultivation is financed through informal high-interest credit. Irrigated cultivation 
under Samitigram’s i / i  crop sharing agreements is thus crucially dependent on 
the availability of formal cultivation credit and water access. Among the ’poor* 
and 'coping' sharecroppers credit could constitute a problem. A higher water 
charge to sharecroppers - as enforced by Malik (IV.2.1) for his private STW; a 
’security’ payment of 300 to 600 Taka per acre exacted from ’poor* and ’coping' 
sharecroppers of irrigated land in Samitigram; or a tenant’s absolute reliance on 
informal high-interest credit renders irrigated cultivation unprofitable even 
under the favourable conditions of high-productivity and water access through 
irrigation groups which exist in Samitigram.
Terms for fixed in-kind tenants are more favourable. Assuming equal 
cultivation costs and marketing returns, a tenant on fixed rent is left with an at 
least 50% higher profit per acre than a sharecropper.
V.4.4 Net Output Values
Column C in Tables V.13 and V.14 shows that with HYV boro, the cost per unit 
of paddy produced has increased. However, as column D demonstrates, all 
cultivators realise higher net output values from boro cultivation than from amon 
cultivation. This is the case even for cultivators with little household labour and 
without a hal such as Hanif and Rahman. Despite higher cultivation costs and a 
lower return per Taka invested (column F) for boro, per acre yields resulted in 
higher net output values for boro than for amon in all cases. A comparison of 
Tables V.13 and V.14 (columns C & F) also shows that in Samitigram boro 
cultivation required higher absolute and relative investment levels per unit of 
yield than amon. Lower returns to capital (return per Taka invested; see column 
F) for irrigated cultivation than for rainfed cultivation have also been found by 
Hossain (1986 xvii). It is clear then that the efficient use of agricultural
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TABLE V.16: Cost Breakdown of Boro Cultivation (Taka per Acre)
Saidur Adorn Toslin Kamal Hakim
(Rich Well-Off Coping Poor Poor
seeds 150 150 330 750 150 *
fertiliser 750 450 375 300 750 b
pump charge 600 450 600 600 900 c
instalment 600 paid 600 - 900 d
transplanting 300 gata 300 435 600 ®
weeding 300 270 hhold hhold hhold f
harvesting 660 600 600 600 845 S
nlouphing - 90 180 . 300 h
TOTAL 3360 2010 2985 2685 4445
a  \
Seeds: Household-produced seeds only cost  Tk 150 per acre ,  seeds bought s h o r t l y  
before  sowing cos t  330 Tk per acre .  KamaI, who had no land to r a i s e  seed l ing s ,  had to  
buy se edl in gs  a t  Tk 750 per acre .
k* Fertj_l_iser: F e r t i l i s e r  input decreases  with increas ing  land qu a l i ty .  Farmers agreed 
t h a t  "higher land i s  more sandy so t h a t  you need to  work more, i r r i g a t e  more and put 
more f e r t i l i s e r  and you s t i l l  won't get  as good y i e l d s .  On lower land you need l i t t l e  
water and f e r t i l i s e r ,  the ploughing i s  e a s i e r  and you get  b e t t e r  y ie ld s" .
c 1 Pump cha rg e : Water charges r i s e  with land l e v e l s .  Hakim's sharecropped land i s  high 
and had high water charges.  I t  i s  a l so  in Mal ik ' s  s o n ' s  p r iv a te  command area ,  where 
water charges were higher than average above c o s t s .
^  In s t a lm en ts : In l ine  with the ru le s  of  Samit igram's i r r i g a t i o n  groups, Kamal does 
not pay STU instalments as a sharecropper .  Hakim, on the  other hand, f inds  himsel f 
forced to  pay STU instalments even as a sharecropper .  His a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  not to ob ta in  
sharecropping land. Saidur pays h i s  ins ta lments  as group member. The STU Adorn 
i r r i g a t e d  from had been paid so tha t  ins ta lments  payments had f i n i shed .
e) Transplan t ing :  Saidur used gata complemented by seasonal  h ired labour.  Kamal 
employed day labourers and worked with them. Tos l in  worked in a dol with h i s  
neighbours,  which he paid for  the work on h is  land.  Hakim employed a dol but did not 
work with them.
Weeding; The smaller  c u l t i v a t o r s  used household labour while la rger  landowner h i r e d  
labour.
Harves t ing : The cost  of harvest  labour increased  with the  d i s tance  the paddy has to 
be t r a n sp o r te d  to  the employer 's homestead.
^  Ploughing; Saidur and Kamal used t h e i r  own hal and incur red no d i r e c t  cash c o s t s .  
Adorn h i r ed  labour for ploughing. Tosl in and Hakim had to  h i r e  a plough and a t tached  
'ploughman' .
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productivity potential for irrigated HYV cultivation requires a higher intensity of 
capital use and implies an increased role for formal credit in agricultural 
development. If credit is scarce, the less productive and less secure amon crop 
remains the more appropriate and profitable crop for the poor.
Table V.16 gives the crop budgets of five case study households in more 
detail in order to illustrate the combined effect of some of the inter-household 
differences in boro cultivation costs and returns.
Thus there are a number of biases in the level of cultivation costs 
between household categories. Most, though not all of these biases increase the 
cultivation costs of poorer households. Small owner-cultivators or ’poor' landless 
sharecroppers like Hakim, - (even though he may have exaggerated some of his 
costs to the foreign investigator) - can incur substantially higher cultivation costs 
than be tter-o ff households due to a number of factors inherent in the structure 
and material and social resource endowment of households. Sharecroppers then 
have to finance cultivation from their half share of the yield. Hakim is thus left 
with under 1200 Taka in net return from his cultivation efforts (excluding credit 
costs). On the other hand, a ’well-off* sharecropper like Adorn keeps a net return 
of over 4800 Taka per acre, more than three times as much as Hakim per acre 
and almost three times as much per Taka invested (cf. Tables V.13 & V.14). 
Adorn also has access to cheaper formal credit, his cultivation costs are less than 
half o f Hakim’s and his yields are over 20% higher. Sharecropping agreements 
thus do not only differ between irrigated boro and rainfed amont as outlined in
V.1.4 but also between households who engage in irrigated cultivation. Variations 
in crop budgets and net output values from irrigated cultivation between a 
’traditional’ sharecropper like Hakim and a longer-term ’new* type o f ’well-off* 
sharecropper like Adorn are a result of cultivators* differing positions in factor 
markets and the different degrees to which factor markets are contractually
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linked to the disadvantage of the cultivator under ’traditional’ and ’new’ land 
tenancy agreements for irrigated crops.
The value of crop returns is not equivalent to the final household 
returns from cultivation. Household returns are further polarised by exchange 
structures. These are introduced in Chapter VII. The structure of direct returns 
from cultivation, which is the main focus of this thesis, is only one part of the 
analysis of irrigation-related household accumulation.
NOTES
1) The except ion here i s  S a id u r s ' s  household ( IV.2 .1)  which lo s t  through mismanagement 
under the  previous household head but was in the  process  of rega ining the los t  land.
2) Reports about the f i r s t  appearance of STUs in Samitigram remained con t r ad i c to ry .  As 
STWs were f i r s t  int roduced  on a p r iv a te  (bazar)  b a s i s ,  no ac c e ss ib l e  records ex is te d .
3) The term ' p r e - i r r i g a t i o n  p e r io d 1 i s  used as a shor t  form for  the per iod before the  
in t ro duc t io n  of mechanised i r r i g a t i o n  in t h i s  t h e s i s .  T ra d i t io na l  forms of manual 
i r r i g a t i o n  (doon, s e t i )  thus f a l l  in to  the  ' p r e * i r r i g a t i o n '  per iod .
4) A four th form of land tenancy ' r e v e r s e  f ixed r e n t '  found for  STU-ir rigated 
c u l t i v a t i o n  in the  seven v i l l a g e s  i s  di scussed in Ch. VI.
5) The terms ' t r a d i t i o n a l '  and 'new' d i s t in g u is h  types of sharecropping by degree of 
recency both in the  research area and in the tenancy l i t e r a t u r e .  An as so c ia t io n  with 
the  ' t r a d i t io n a l - m o d e rn '  pa t t e rn  v a r ia b le s  of the s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  l i t e r a t u r e  
i s  not intended.
6) Bangladeshi women work the f i e l d s  only in the  r a r e s t  cases  ( c f .  Uhite 1988) and do 
not become sharecroppers .
7) However, as i s  argued here,  sharecropping i s  not n e c e s s a r i l y  an impediment to 
pro d u c t i v i t y  ( c f .  Cheung 1969; Rudra 1978).
8) Calcula ted from v i l l a g e  survey da ta .
9) Mortgagees tended to  be wealthie r  than mortgagors and used mortgages as an avenue 
of access to  land fo r  c u l t i v a t i o n .  Therefore the  impact of mortgages on the  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of operated land i s  regres s iv e  in Samitigram (s ee  a l so  V.1.5) .
10) Assuming c u l t i v a t i o n  cos t s  of Taka 3000 per acre  ( see Table V.14),  a mortgage of 
7500 to 12000 Taka here  br ings a p r o f i t  of 7500 to  10130 Taka per season from the 
c u l t i v a t i o n  of boro.  Addi tional  gains for  the mortgagee from the c u l t i v a t i o n  of amon 
are  a l so  po ss i b le .
11) Derived from Table V.4 complemented by o ther  survey d a t a .
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12) Calcu l a t ion s  assumed c u l t i v a t i o n  co s t s  of Taka 3000 per acre and a s a l e  p r ic e  of 
Taka 175 per  maund of paddy. Var ia t ions  by household category in c u l t i v a t i o n  c o s t s  and 
marketing r e tu rn s  were not taken in to  account here  ( see Tables V.13 & 14 and Table 
VI1.2 for  these  I ssue s) .
13) See a l so  Herring (1977) who sees  a p a r a l l e l i t y  and causal  connection between rank 
in the  landownership h ie ra rchy  and debt  p o s i t i o n .
14) Collusion between bank o f f i c i a l s ,  p a r a s t a t a l  o f f i c e r s ,  p r iv a te  s e c t o r  employees 
and farmers over 'bad'  loans was repor ted  to  involve i l l i c i t  f in anc ia l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  
( in te rv iews  in Singra,  Rajshahi and Dhaka).
15) The r e g i s t r a t i o n  of land in the name of female household members i s  a common 
deployment of subordina te  gender p o s i t i o n  in the household in the  i n t e r e s t  of the  
household as a whole ( see a l so  the  example of the  MSS loans below).
16) This was reported by Singra c u l t i v a t o r s .  I t  s tands  in cont ra s t  to  lower o f f i c i a l  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and may involve 'h idden'  co s t s  to  the  borrower.
17) Other forms of in te g r a t i o n  of c r e d i t  in to  s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l  s t r u c t u r e s  f a c i l i t a t e  
non-repayment ( e .g .  d e fa u l t  p a t t e r n s  of ' r i c h '  j o i n t  households on bank loans in  the  
names of individua l  household members; see McGregor forthcoming).
18) See a l s o  Wood (1977) for  a s im i l a r  observa t ion  on c r e d i t  in Kosi, Bihar.
19) Wealthier  households tended to exe r t  more contro l  over the a c t i v i t i e s  of t h e i r  
women. In p a r t i c u l a r  those who could a f fo rd  i t  f i n a n c i a l l y ,  r e s t r i c t e d  women's 
a c t i v i t i e s  ou ts ide  the household according to  the  motto "The honour of the  household 
i s  t h a t  of i t s  women".
20) One maund i s  40 s e e r s .
21) Paper presented a t  conference on contemporary Bangladesh a t  SOAS, London on 
February 25th 1987. But compare my d i sc u s s io n  on the p o s s i b i l i t y  of a ' r e p ro d u c t io n  of 
poverty* through hand tubewells (MOSTIs) with the assumption of low to  zero wage r a t e s  
( 1 . 4 . 1 ) .
22) The beel i s  too new and swampy to  ope ra te  and s to r e  t r a c t o r s  for  most of th e  year .
23) This e l imina ted the  need for  poorer  employers to  provide accommodation fo r  the 
group during the  period of employment.
24) Note the p a r a l l e l  on the tenancy market where wealthie r  households a re  ab le  to be 
involved in ' t r a d i t i o n a l '  and 'new' sharecropping  re la t io n sh ip s  a t  the  same t ime thus 
mainta ining power-dependence s t r u c t u r e s  t o  t h e i r  advantage while a l s o  achieving  
p ro d u c t iv i t y  o b j ec t iv e s ,  ( see a l so  Rudra 1978 on ' r u r a l  hybr ids '  & B e t e i l l e  (1974) on 
'ambidextrous i n d i v i d u a l s ' .
25) As opposed to  pond f i s h e ry  which i s  an expanding income source of the weal thy and 
th re a te n s  to  d i sp lace  incomes of the  'p o o r '  from open water f i sh ing  ( see  a l s o  Table 
V I I . 1, Figure V.4 t  d i scus s io n  in V I I . 1 .2 ) .
26) Next to  degree of occupat ional  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ,  preference  for  l e i s u r e  appeared to 
pay a r o l e  in t h i s .
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27) Bharadwaj (1974 p . 61) observes th a t  In Indian Farm Management Surveys the 
c a l c u l a t i o n  of p r o f i t s  ne t  of a l l  cos t s  ( Inc luding Imputed ones) r e s u l t s  In 'negat ive 
p r o f i t s '  fo r  a ma jor i ty  of holdings.  He th e ref o re  suggests  th a t  ' p r o f i t '  in the 
convent iona l sense  i s  not the re levant  ca tegory,  but th a t  ' g ros s  output  ne t ted  for  
paid out c o s t s '  may be more appropr ia te .  In h i s  model of peasant  product ion Adnan 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between the  household in te rn a l  (non*market) s e c t o r  and the exte rnal  
(market s e c t o r )  in t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  ro l e  for  the  production d e c is io ns  and accounting 
methods of c u l t i v a t o r s .
28) BBS (January  85 & May 86) & Asaduzzaman (1984).  I d iscussed  the except iona l ly  high 
y i e l d  le v e ls  of Samitigram a t  length with farmers and with an agronomist (K 
Bentve lsen,  Dhaka). Yield leve ls  were a l so  found confirmed by a research  team which 
c o l l e c t e d  survey informat ion in Samitigram for  some days during my fieldwork period 
( see Timberg Ju ly  1986).
29) I f  the  monsoon waters have receded, paddy can be harves ted by walking through the 
f i e l d s  and c u t t i n g  i t .  In deeper waters wading up to  hip depth i s  necessary.  I f  the 
waters remain very deep a t  harvest  time (up to  10 foot  around Samitigram),  harvest ing 
opera t ion s  have to  be c a r r i e d  out from boats or f l o a t i n g  c l ay  v e s s e l s .  The l a t t e r  two 
cases  a re  more expensive and time consuming. Boat ren t  increase s  ha rves t ing  cos ts  for  
those who do not own boa ts .
30) The average of 3000 minus Taka 300 for  STU insta lments  paid by the  landowner.
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CHAPTER VI: IRRIGATION AND CHANGE IN SEVEN OTHER VILLAGES
Concentration on one microcosm is necessary in order to achieve some 
understanding of the meanings and functions of different agrarian relationships at 
the household level. It requires personal contacts and a degree of familiarity and 
mutual trust between researcher and village household to uncover some of the 
layers of reasoning and reality behind household strategies and choices. At the 
same time, the typical one-village study is also limiting. An investigation in one 
village only can lead one to assume as constant a number of factors, which may 
vary even between neighbouring villages. Unwarranted generalisations may be the 
result. The connections between economic, social and environmental variables are 
manifold and influence household strategies and the mechanisms and patterns of 
household-level resource accumulation.
This chapter widens the research horizon by including a further seven 
villages all o f which are located within six miles of Samitigram. The chance to 
carry out investigations in this wider context on a limited financial and time 
budget was provided through a study carried out in 1976, Qadir, Chowdury, 
Emmert and Dey (1978). This study contains basic information on household 
numbers, distribution of households by landholding size and a variety of other 
village characteristics. My ’revisits* 10 years later to each of the villages follow 
up some of this data. Section VI. 1 presents aspects of environmental and 
economic change over the 1976-86 period in the seven villages in general, and of 
irrigated cultivation in particular. Sections VI.2 and VI.3 link these findings to 
the main arguments of the thesis. VI.2 shows how different access conditions to 
irrigation water, result in different patterns of accumulation and change in the 
seven villages than in Samitigram. It is then demonstrated in VI.3 how the 
presence of one irrigation technology (STWs) results in fundamentally different
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patterns of surplus distribution in different villages, and it is examined how such 
different dynamics can arise.
VI. 1 Village Profiles
This section introduces individually each of the ’seven villages’ (see 
Map II. 1) under four headings. This somewhat lengthy procedure is used in order 
to illustrate the micro-level detail, which affects irrigation-related patterns of 
change. The ’Village Profiles* concentrate on four themes for each of the seven 
villages. It is shown that socio-economic change in reaction to the same 
technology is not uni-directional, even among neighbouring villages and that, in 
the context of technical change, agrarian relations, such as tenancy, have diverse 
meanings and functions for the direction of rural change.
Figure VI. 1 below indicates changes in household numbers and in the 
distribution of households by landholding size in the 1976-86 period. Due to 
limitations of time, only the top and bottom landholding categories of the larger 
villages were investigated while the smaller villages could be entirely covered. At 
the time of the investigation, household categories (see II.5.2 & IV. 1) had not 
been developed. Therefore, and in order to obtain a picture of change over the 
1976-86 period, the landholding categories of the 1976 study were retained in 
Figure VI. 1.
Combined with the discussion of inter-village differences in the
incidence and diversity of non-cultivation income sources in VI. 1, the
landholding data of Table VI. 1 shows how very similar patterns of landholding
distribution can be part of very dissimilar overall economic positions and
processes of change.
FIGURE VI, I 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BV LANDHOLDING SIZE 1076-86
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VI.1.1. Ninguin Ghun Para
1. Environmental/general change
Ninguin is situated about one mile from the Samitigram road junction 
(see Map III. 1). It is about I mile from the metalled road and two miles from 
Singra upazila headquarters. The number of households have increased by 44% 
from  59 to 85. There is a high school and a primary school. Student numbers 
rose from 125 to 175 and from 200 to 410 respectively between 1976 and 1986. 
There were no stalls or shops in the village 10 years ago. Now there are four 
shops by the roadside selling dry foods, tea and basic household items. A 
blacksmith has established his stall just outside the village a few years ago. In 
1986 the first cinema hall in the area was built by the road just outside the 
village.
2. Land
Figure VI. 1 indicates that in terms of landholding a general 
pauperisation has taken place. From my interviews it was clear that the lower 
landholding categories experience household nucleation at an earlier stage of the 
household life cycle, while the ownership of larger amounts of land was the main 
reason for the maintenance of the joint family households. Both the increase in 
village size (measured by household numbers) and pauperisation (in terms of 
household landholding) are thus to some extent a product of household nucleation 
which leads to fewer members per household among the increasing numbers of 
landless and land-poor. Land transfers from the poorer household classes took 
place, however. Among the 28 landless households identified in Ninguin, 12 lost 
land through family crises (disease etc.), wedding costs and in disputes with 
relatives over the previous two to three decades.
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3. Occupations/income generation
Proximity to the road and to Singra town brought increased 
occupational diversification. Among the landless or near-landless, occupations 
included construction and coolie work, ricksaw driving, local small-scale rice 
trading, agricultural day labour and fishing. There was an electrician in the 
village who worked fo r the BADC in Singra upazila headquarters. Among the 
larger landholders, there was an unusually high number of teachers, some of 
whom worked in the local schools and some of whom travelled to other areas 
daily using bicycles and buses on the nearby road.
The rich families of the village predominantly kept the joint family 
structure. One of the wealthiest families consisted of eight brothers whose 
occupations were: 1) prim ary school headmaster 2) Low -lift pump manager and 
farm supervisor 3) student of law 4) engineer (resident in town) 5) homoeopathic 
doctor 6) imam  (Muslim religious office) and 7), 8) two students still at school. 
Diversification away from  cultivation was a deliberate strategy among the 
wealthy and the poor alike. The proximity of a metalled road enabled households 
to maintain involvement in agriculture through own cultivation or through 
tenancy agreements while at the same time engaging in non-cultivation income 
generation activities (e.g. teaching, trading, transport).
4. Irrigation
Irrigation was mainly by low-lift-pump (LLP). The village’s one LLP 
scheme covered 44 acres and had 73 members. With the drying up of the region’s 
rivers ^  crops suffered in recent years (e.g. 1983). In line with the BADC’s 
privatisation policy, the LLP was being purchased by some of the members of the 
former rental scheme. A second LLP scheme in the village had broken up several 
years ago in a factional struggle and cultivators in the command area switched to 
wheat. LLP irrigation in 1986 cost 300 Taka per acre for water and 600 Taka per
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acre for the cost of purchasing the LLP. With privatisation many small 
landowners found themselves unable to afford the capital cost of the LLP and 
resorted to sharing or renting out their land to wealthier households. The 
payment of the LLP capital cost by a wealthier sharecropper gave the 
sharecropper the right to cultivate the land for at least 3 to 4 consecutive years. 
As a rule if  a landowner took his land back earlier, he had to refund to the 
sharecropper any capital payments made for the LLP. This meant that wealthier 
cultivators tended to retain long-term control over irrigated land rented from 
poorer landowners.
Two or three wealthier villagers had bought a STW to ensure water for 
their crops. No STW groups existed. Water was only occasionally sold by STW 
owners at a rate of 1500 Taka per acre, substantially higher than the 300 to 900 
Taka per acre rate in neighbouring Samitigram. As the agricultural lands of 
Ninguin are at a higher elevation than those of Samitigram and because Ninguin 
was not connected to electricity lines, the higher water charges represent an 
element of real cost differential. Ninguin STW owners irrigated mainly their own 
land and took some land in sharecropping agreements (the landowner paid 
half the water cost) or in fixed rent of 18 maunds per acre from smaller 
landowners. STW command areas in Ninguin were small, about 3 to 4 acres each 
as compared to the 9.5 acres in Samitigram (see Table III. 1).
Some wealthier villagers also owned small LLPs, locally called fu tfu ti 
from which they irrigated own land and others* land for a per acre charge of 
1800 Taka. Access to irrigation water in Ninguin was clearly biased in favour of 
wealthier households. The LLP scheme with its high risk of drying up was 
cheapest and most accessible to poorer households. To a greater extent than the 
LLP but along the same lines, more expensive STW and fu tfu ti irrigation was
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used by wealthy village households to expand their effective landholding and thus 
their income from land.
V I.I.2 Baluabasua
1. Environment /general change
Baluabasua is located immediately east of the Natore-Bogra road which 
is the eastern boundary of the small town of Singra upazila headquarters. Due to 
its location it is hardly recognisable as a separate village, Household numbers 
rose by 89% from 37 to 70 between 1976 and 1986. There was a tea stall and a 
dak bungalow (accommodation) for the Department of Construction and Building 
adjoining the village.
2. Land
In 1976 Baluabasua had the lowest mean and median landholdings and 
the highest proportion of households (36%) in the lowest landholding category 
among the seven villages. By 1986 the proportion of households in the lowest 
landholding category (0-0.33 acres) had risen further to 43% while the 
proportion of households in the highest landholding group (over 7.5 acres) had 
increased from 11% to 13%. Thus Baluabasua represents a case of landholding 
polarisation. As argued before (V.1.1) land wealth and the total economic position 
of households cannot simply be equated any more. Non-cultivation income and 
non-agricultural income sources alter the picture.
3. Occupations/income generation
Proximity to the road and to Singra town means a relative diversity of 
income sources. Since the road was metalled about 10 years ago, non-cultivation 
income sources increased. Among the upper household categories there were 
long-distance paddy traders, cloth merchants, teachers who worked in other areas 
and people with office jobs in the adjoining town. Many landless and
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near-landless worked in low-paid service sector occupations in Singra town.
4. Irrigation
Relations o f production and exchange surrounding irrigation in the 
village bear out the polarisation in land wealth. Baluabasua’s 15 STWs were all 
privately owned. Larger landholders owned up to 3 or 4 STWs per household. As 
a rule, a STW owner situated the well on his land and took surrounding land in 
fixed in-kind rent. Baluabasua STW owners preferred to take each other’s land in 
fixed-rent rather than sell water to each other. STW ownership had become a line 
of business for wealthier households, which was pursued by one of several male 
household members. Others in the household engaged in rice-m illing or trading 
of construction materials, cloth, fertiliser or paddy. Control over land and 
cultivation income as well as profits on water charges were the main returns 
from STW ownership. Baluabasua STW owners had a strong record of recent land 
purchases and clearly related these to the profits from their control over 
irrigation water. Most clearly among all the villages in this study, for Baluabasua 
control over water implied increased control over land. Section VI.3 below 
illustrates how differences in the structural role of STW irrigation between 
Baluabasua and Samitigram manifest themselves as resource flows from 
cultivation to d ifferent household categories.
Small and medium Baluabasua landholders, whose plots were surrounded 
by irrigated land, had the choice to either sell the land, leave it fallow, or rent it 
to well-owners. The latter option was mainly adopted and involuntary ’landlords’ 
received 18 maunds out of a yield of 70 to 75 maunds per acre. The majority of 
small and medium landowners were forced to rent out their land in fixed in-kind 
rent for the boro season, but often cultivated it themselves for the rainfed 
b.amon season. These households then needed to take work as agricultural labour 
or in neighbouring Singra town as coolie, office messenger or ricksaw driver to
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complement household income outside the amort season.
The landholding threshold at which households started selling labour 
was much higher in Baluabasua than in Samitigram (2 acres rather than about 0.7 
acres). This was connected to the lower income from irrigated boro cultivation 
derived by poorer households in Baluabasua who tended to lack access to 
irrigation water. In Samitigram, an acre of boro land brought an after-cost profit 
of TK 7000 to 10.500 to its typical ’poor* or ’coping’ owner-cultivator who is a 
member of an irrigation group (see Table V.14). In Baluabasua, where lack of 
access to irrigation - and in the absence of functioning farmers’ cooperatives 
(KSS groups) also to other inputs such as cultivation credit - forced many small 
landowners to rent out their land for the boro season, their profit from an acre 
of land came to Taka 3150 (18 maunds at TK 175 per maund; see Table VI. 1). In 
contrast to Samitigram, there was no access to boro sharecropping land for 
households without control over water in Baluabasua.
There was also some water sale by STW owners in Baluabasua. The 
water charge of between 2400 and 3000 Taka per acre was up to five times 
higher than the water charge about four miles away in Samitigram. Baluabasua’s 
irrigation charges clearly excluded smallholders from access to water. Only very 
few households, all large and medium wealthy landowners purchased water at 
these prices. The majority were unable to engage in irrigated cultivation and 
were forced to rent out their land to those who controlled the water.
VI. 1.3 Solakura
1. Environment/general change
The village lies by the Atrai river about one mile to the east of Singra 
town. There were no shops or stalls. Villagers attended the twice-weekly hat
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(market) in Singra. Between 1976 and 1986 household numbers rose by 34% from 
38 to 51.
2. Land
Due to the small size of the village and the helpfulness of informants a 
fu ll inventory of landholding sizes was possible. Qadir et al (1978 p.21) write for 
Solakura in 1976
Most of the  land i s  d i s t r i b u t e d  among the  households in the  th ree  
middle landounership c a te g o r ie s .  Only 8X of households have over 7.5 
a c r e s . . .  But the negative  p a r t  of the  Solakura p ic tu re  i s  th a t  the re  
i s  s t i l l  (emphasis added) a f a i r l y  su b s ta n t ia l  percent (18X) of 
la n d le ss  or marginal households.
In 1986 43% of Solakura’s households were landless and marginal. 10% 
of households are now in the top landholding category of over 7.5 acres. As 
Figure VI. 1 shows the top two of the three middle landownership ranges have 
declined substantially so that now the landholding picture is far more polarised 
than in 1976.
3. Occupations/income generation
Occupations in Solakura are relatively diverse through the influence of 
the nearby Singra town. As the village’s agricultural land is of mixed elevation, 
cropping patterns spread agricultural labour requirements over the year and 
reduce peaks of labour demand and employment scarcity. Probably as a result, 
survival strategies of the landless households tended to focus on cultivation and 
display a lesser degree of diversification out of agriculture and less orientation 
towards the town than in other villages.
4. Irrigation
There are several private STWs and one DTW operated by a KSS in 
Solakura. Until recently there was also an LLP which is now defunct because of 
water level problems. Water costs for the LLP and DTW were 1200 Taka per 
acre. The charge for the privately owned STWs was 2400 Taka per acre. Water
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sale from the STWs was frequent. In addition to water sales the fixed-rent system 
(borga) was used by STW owners to gain access to the land of poorer households 
in their command areas. Interestingly, while under LLP irrigation the ±/± 
sharecropping system, common for non-irrigated crops, remained in use, STW 
irrigation brought in the fixed-rent system of land tenancy. This may be 
connected with the smaller scale of STWs which allows individual households to 
devise strategies of surplus appropriation which centre on total command area 
control. These strategies may then take into account altered relative positions of 
power and changed cultivation risks through the change from sharecropping to 
the fixed rent system.
Several examples of smallholders working for STW owners in exchange 
for irrigation water existed in Solakura. Access to irrigation water by some small 
landowners through water sales from STWs and the DTW meant that some poorer 




The village lies by the Atrai river just across from Solakura and about 
H  miles from Singra town. Household numbers in the 1976-86 period rose by 
41% from 39 to 55. There is a major regional traffic junction half a mile south 
with the main bus stop and loading points for ships and boats conveying paddy, 
jute and different agricultural products to other parts of the country. Motorized 
ferries carry vehicles travelling between the North of Bangladesh and the centre 
and South and wooden boats convey foot passengers across. In September 1986 
the construction of a major concrete bridge across the Atrai river at Patkole was 




Figure VI. 1 shows that there has been a movement towards the lower 
end of the landholding scale. Relative numbers in the bottom two categories 
taken together have remained the same but there has been an internal shift 
towards the lowest (0-0.33 acres) group. Absolute and relative numbers of the top 
two landholding categories declined. However, with the prominence of trade and 
service occupations in Patkole, land is a particularly inaccurate indicator of 
wealth. The term "pauperisation" does not catch the reality of the village bustling 
with non-cultivation income-generating activity of various kinds. At least four 
poor households moved to the village in 1985 because of the relatively good 
economic prospects there.
3. Occupations/income generation
Patkole borders on a number of tea and food stalls and shops along the 
Natore-Bogra road. Most of these are run by village households. Almost everyone 
in the village is involved in some kind of trade or service, which attracts income 
from  outside the village. Agricultural day labour as a main occupation is rare. 
Possibly because of the predominance of service sector occupations for poorer 
households in Patkolo, labourers did not work in dols (labour teams) as in all the 
other villages. This may also be connected to the fact that although Patkole was a 
small village, its Muslim community was divided into two sam aj, which 
worshipped and celebrated separately.
4. Irrigation
Irrigation in Patkole was mainly through one LLP. There were the same 
drying up problems with the river as in the whole area. The LLP, which covered 
50 acres belonging to 45 households until 1985, only covered 34 acres in 1986. 
The reduction in command area may be caused by several factors. Firstly, after
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the LLP was purchased from BADC under the privatisation programme, irrigation 
costs rose to include the purchase price of the pump. Higher irrigation costs 
drove a number of poorer households into the cultivation of rainfed crops 
Cb.amoriy wheat, pulses). Secondly, some large landholders pulled out of the LLP 
scheme and acquired their own STWs to avoid drying up problems. Access to LLP 
irrigation in Patkole presented a problem in terms of surface water availability 
and the cost of capital cost payments for the poorer cultivator households. 
Households who sharecrop out land because they are unable to afford the 
instalment cost for the LLP, receive half of their land’s boro crop from wealthier 
sharecroppers rather than the two thirds, which was reported as the norm for 
irrigated land in Patkole. Some STW owners and owners of small fu tfu ti LLPs 
also took land in fixed rent for 15 maunds per acre.
The land tenancy market in Patkole was particularly fragmented with a 
variety of rent and cropshare levels for different crops and irrigation 
technologies. As in the other villages, the fixed in-kind rent system had only 
been used since the introduction of STWs. Water sale from STWs was also 
common in Patkole at Taka 1200-2400 per acre. Although still twice as high as 
fo r irrigation groups in Samitigram, these costs could come to as little as half of 
what was charged by STW owners in Baluabasua two miles down the road. The 
fact that there were alternative irrigation forms (LLP and traditional methods) 
and the environmental conditions to cultivate unirrigated crops, some scope for 
non-cultivation income generation and quite a high flexibility in the tenancy 
market, provide some explanation of the difference in water charges in 
comparison with Baluabasua.
Patkole had the closest approximation to Samitigram’s group structure 
(see III.4 & III.5). There were only two LLP groups in all the surrounding beel 
villages which were still functioning in 1985. One of these was in Patkole. A
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better knowledge of the internal workings of this irrigation group is needed than 
I could obtain in my short ’revisit’. However, it was clear that there was 
considerably more access to irrigation water for poorer cultivators in Patkole 
than in the other LLP scheme in Ninguin (village 1). In Patkole, those who were 
forced to rent out their boro land because of high LLP water cost received a 
higher crop share than in Ninguin. One reason for the lesser degree of extractive 
pressure in the land, tenancy and water markets in Patkole may be its higher 
outward orientation of economic activities which is due to its central location for 
regional and national traffic. Thus, for example, several wealthy households in 
Patkole, some of them long-distance paddy and jute traders, had jointly formed a 
"truck-samiti", which rented and eventually aimed to buy lorries for their 
expanding transport business. It appears that village-level surplus extraction 
operated through the village power structure declines as income potential from 
external sources increases (see also McGregor forthcoming).
VI.1.5 Shagarbari and Koyrabari
1. Environment/general change
Among the seven villages Shagarbari and Koyrabari are the least 
accessible. For six months of the year, they can only be reached by country boat 
through the deep areas of the Chalan beel. For the rest of the year, a 4-5 mile 
walk along a raised footpath and through the fields, wading through various deep 
parts of the swampy land and climbing across single-pole bamboo bridges leads 
to the villages which stand out from the low beel like islands. Koyrabari is about 
half a mile east of Shagarbari.
2. Land
Household numbers in Shagarbari increased by 19% from 75 to 89 in 
the 1976/86 period. There has been quite a drastic increase both in landless and
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marginal household numbers (from 19% to 29%) and in households with more 
than 10 acres of land (from 12% to 28%). According to conventional land-centred 
terminology, Shagarbari is a case of polarisation.
From 1976 to 1986 Koyrabari household numbers increased by 24% 
from  117 to 145. Figure VI. 1 indicates an increase in landless and marginal 
households (less than 0.66 acres) by 6% and a decrease in households with over 
10 acres by 2% Thus we have an indication, rather than significant results, that 
in terms of household landholdings pauperisation may have occurred.
3. Occupations/income generation
The reasons behind this difference between the two villages were not 
immediately obvious. Household survival strategies among the poor in both 
villages relied on fishing, boat transport to the road and agricultural labour. 
However, larger landowners in Koyrabari seemed to have diversified their non­
cultivation activities more than those of Shagarbari. There was a STW mechanic, 
two ricemills run on STW engines a spare parts dealer for STWs and a 
representative for a commercial STW distributor in Koyrabari. In Shagarbari 
there was only a fertiliser dealer and a few paddy and cloth traders among the 
top landholders. A lesser degree of occupational and income source 
diversification among wealthy households in Shagarbari may have meant that 
more of the surplus from irrigated cultivation was channelled into land purchases 
than in Koyrabari. The polarisation in landholdings in Shagarbari compared to 
the pauperisation in Koyrabari may thus reflect a difference in the direction of 
surplus investment rather than a difference in the creation or primary distribution 
of surplus from irrigated cultivation.
4. Irrigation
In Koyrabari and Shagarbari, STW irrigation was the only form of 
mechanised irrigation. It started at the end of the seventies, several years later
- 266 -
than in any of the other villages. In contrast to the other five of the ’seven 
villages* (see Qadir et al 1978), neither Koyrabari nor Shagarbari had mechanised 
irrigation in 1976. Since then, STW irrigation changed the i / i  sharecropping 
system into fixed in-kind rent in both villages. In 1986 Shagarbari had an 
estimated 55 and Koyrabari 60 to 70 STWs. These large numbers of STWs may 
reflect the nature of the market for irrigation water (discussed below) and the 
absence of rain-fed cropping alternatives on land surrounding STWs, as well as 
the lack of major non-cultivation income sources in the two villages.
There were no irrigation groups in either village. Individual households 
with over 10 acres owned up to 4 STWs each. Irrigation charges were between 
Taka 1800 and 2100 per acre. One STW owner estimated actual costs as Taka 
1200 per acre. Most small landowners could not afford water charges and thus 
rented their land to STW owners for 15 to 18 maunds of paddy per acre. There 
was a great deal of land exchange (permanent transfers of ownership) between 
STW owners to consolidate command areas. Despite lower land elevation than in 
Samitigram, which allows for more irrigated area per STW, command areas were 
smaller. The average command area in Koyrabari was 6-7 acres. This is slightly 
above the average for individually owned STWs but not above the group and 
overall command area average in Samitigram (12.4 and 11.3 acres respectively). 
Due to the low level of agricultural land around the two villages, it was 
impossible to cultivate a second crop of amort on land under winter boro. 
Furtherm ore, villagers reported that plots of land surrounded by irrigated boro 
could not carry other crops when boro is standing in adjoining fields. This was 
said to  be due to unpredictable flooding and waterlogging interference from 
irrigated plots on unirrigated land. Therefore K oyrabari and Shagarbari 
households without their own STW, like their Baluabasua equivalents, had no 
choice but to rent out their land.
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Shagarbari and Koyrabari were most similar to Samitigram in terms of 
environmental and ecological conditions. All three villages are in the deeper parts 
of the beel on raised residential "islands". Land elevation in Koyrabari and 
Shagarbari is slightly lower than in Samitigram. As a result, the amort crop has 
been totally replaced by irrigated boro in Shagarbari and Koyrabari. There is 
thus no cultivation income at all for households who do not cultivate boro on 
their land. In Koyrabari and Shagarbari the i / i  sharecropping terms have 
disappeared with the displacement of amort cultivation, and fixed in-kind rent 
has emerged as an instrument for the STW owners to gain control over command 
area land which is owned by others. In Samitigram, where individual STW 
ownership is rare, the i / i  form of sharecropping has been retained for boro 
cultivation while fixed rent only exists as an exception and with a very different 
structural meaning than in Shagarbari and Koyrabari (see V. 1.4.3). The deeper 
land level in Koyrabari and Shagarbari also means that fishing is an annual 
rather than a seasonal income source as in Samitigram. While deeper land level 
results in less advantageous cultivation conditions for poorer Koyrabari and 
Shagarbari households, it also provides them with higher income potential from 
open water fishing.
Another important difference in relation to the outcomes of STW 
irrigation is the perception of cooperative activities in the villages. In contrast to 
Samitigram, labour exchange (gata) hardly exists in Koyrabari and Shagarbari. "It 
doesn’t work here. Groups break up. People quarrel too much." the villagers say. 
The absence of irrigation groups means that in Koyrabari and Shagarbari, water 
is controlled by the land-rich elites and is used by them to expand their power 
and wealth. In contrast, Samitigram groups have undermined the degree of social 
and economic control of traditional elites in a number of ways (credit, water, 
seeds; see III.4 & III.5; IV.2.1A point 10). The low level of water charges and the
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comparatively high degree of access to irrigation water by poor and medium 
households reflect this in Samitigram.
VI.I.6 M ahashandrapur
1. Environment/ general change
A great amount of my research time was spent on this village. 
Nonetheless, at least in quantitative terms, I obtained the least clear results. 
Mahashandrapur is located at the end of a footpath about three miles from Singra 
upazila headquarters. During the rainy season, several precarious bamboo poles 
have to be clambered over to get to the village by foot or a long upriver boat 
ride has to be embarked upon from Singra town. The village has no shops. Its 
primary school, which had 110 students in 1976 had 400 in 1986.
In 1976 Mahashandrapur was described as consisting of 39 households, 
none of which owned less than 0.33 acres (Qadir et al 1978). In 1986 the village 
was too large for me to attempt a complete enumeration. There were 190 
households according to the Singra statistical office and 250 to 300 households 
according to various estimates and calculations. Among these, a great number of 
households reported to have been landless for over a generation in each of the 
village’s four original paras (hamlets). Since 1976 a fifth para was formed by 
households from Pabna who arrived after they lost their land through river 
flooding.
2. Land
Landholding statistics for Mashandrapur were unsatisfactiory and not 
used for Figure VI. 1. Extensive interviewing in all five paras showed, however, 
that landless numbers increased greatly over the 1976/86 period.
3. Occupations/income generation
Occupation and income source diversity in Mahashandrapur was low. A few
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villagers worked in service sector occupations in Singra town. There was one 
STW mechanic employed by the BADC in Singra. A few poor households 
operated boats during the rainy season, and some realised a limited income by 
seasonal open water fishing or petty trading. Cultivation was predominant. The 
village's precarious connections to the outside during the monsoon made any 
income generation, which depends on continuous contact with the outside, 
difficult.
4. Irrigation
Irrigated agriculture in Mahashandrapur was dominated by the private 
STW. There were about 40 STWs on village lands, which tended to be owned by 
large landholders. Water was sold at the high charge o f Taka 2400 to 2700 per 
acre to a few households only. The majority of smaller landowners were forced 
to give their land in fixed-rent to STW owners for 15 to 18 maunds per acre. 
Households with higher land had the alternative to cultivate rainfed amon or 
wheat. There was an LLP group in Mahashandrapur earlier, which broke up due 
to quarrels and water level problems. The manager of this defunct LLP group 
was described by several villagers as samitir m alikt "the owner of the group". 
This creative use of language throws some light on the differences in perception 
of groups between Samitigram (see III.4 & III.5) and Mahashandrapur. There 
were no STW groups in Mahashandrapur. When questioned about this, villagers 
responded that after the - thus far unconcerned village - was connected to 
electricity lines, irrigation groups would be formed to take advantage of the 
lower costs of water pumping ^
After the LLP scheme broke up, fixed in-kind rent for STW-irrigated 
land was introduced. This was a change in contractual form and structural 
meaning of tenancy for Mahashandrapur. Sharecropping had been a means for 
poorer households to gain access to land for subsistence production. When
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wealthier STW owners started to use the fixed-rent form of land tenancy to 
increase their income from irrigated cultivation, poorer landowning households 
who would earlier have sharecropped-in additional land had to rent out their 
land to STW owners.
The new tenants of irrigable land in Mahashandrapur are the wealthiest 
households of the village. The economic advancement of these households over 
the last generation rested on two main pillars. Firstly, after a large number of 
Hindus had left Mahashandrapur for India in the wake of the communal troubles 
in 1971, the Hindu land (classed as "enemy property") was appropriated by 
wealthier Muslim households. In a few cases this caused drastic increases in 
landholding. Secondly, irrigated boro cultivation on own and rented land had 
become an important source of finance for land purchases by wealthier village 
households.
With the departure of the Hindus, supplies of sharecropping land for 
poorer households dried up in Mahashandrapur. The land was cultivated by its 
new Muslim owners who, in contrast to their Hindu predecessors, attach less 
stigma to cultivation work on own land.
As a reflection of the higher price and income generation potential of 
boro land (see V.1.4 & Tables V.13 & V.14), mortgages ( khaikalashi, see also
V.1.5) for boro land allowed for an annual reductionof loan principals. In 
contrast, loans on land without irrigation potential required full loan repayment 
without usufructary reduction. This indicates that, as in Samitigram, some 
agrarian relationships in Mahashandrapur were becoming more production- and 
productivity-oriented with lesser emphasis on extractive modes of appropriation.
Mahashandrapur land is less fertile than that of the other villages. 
Average yields were around 45 to 60 maunds per acre compared to 60 to 75 in
TABLE VI.1: Alternative Contexts of STff Irrigation and Vater Prices
V i l l a g e  Wo 1 1)
Ninguin Ghui Para Baluabasua Solakura Patkole Koyrabari Shagarbari Mahashandrapur Samitigram
1. household Nos 85
2. household No
increase (X) 44
3. polarisation a) b
4)or pauperlsatlonb)
4. level of external mediun
generation
2)5. tenancy for sc 8 fr
( ir r iga ted  land)
6. cropping
alternatives y

























































1) villages No 1-7 see VI.1; No 8 - Samitigram
2) sc - sharecropping; fr - fixed rent
3) TR - traditional non-mechanised irrigation
4) In terms of landholding only
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Samitigram. Due to higher irrigation prices and lower yields, cultivation profits 
were lower. However, despite lower cultivation profits the level of fixed in-kind 
rent for boro lands was the same as in the other villages. This suggests that fixed 
in-kind land rent acted as a ’wage equivalent* when wealthier land-cum-STW 
owner rented land from poorer households.
VI.2 Alternative Trajectories of Change
With the small amount of research time spent on the ’seven villages’, the 
picture remains fragmentary. Nonetheless, it shows that even between villages of 
the same ecologically relatively uniform region there are large differences in the 
process of agrarian change and in the role irrigation plays for households from 
different categories.
The following sections present the three main forms of water delivery 
in the ’seven villages* (VI.2.1-3) and then connect forms of water delivery to 
changes in land, credit and labour relations (VI.2.2). Section VI.3 then compares 
the distributional outcomes of STW irrigation in Samitigram to those in one of 
the seven villages, Baluabasua and concludes by examining the factors behind the 
identified differences.
Table VI. 1 collates some of the data on agrarian structure, 
environmental variables and STW irrigation in Samitigram and the seven villages. 
In conjunction with section VI. 1 it shows that neither structural, economic nor 
environmental factors explain the differences in the impact of STW irrigation 
between Samitigram and the seven villages.
VI.2.1 Organisational Forms of Irrigation
This section examines the organisational forms under which mechanised 
irrigation, and in particular STW irrigation, was used in the seven villages. This
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is done in order to explore the interaction of organisational alternatives for 
irrigation use with agrarian relations and structural change in the next sections 
(VI.2.2 & VI.3). The ’seven villages’ had three main forms of irrigation 
organisation, LLP groups, STW water sale and land renting by STW owners.
V I.2 .1.1 Low-Lift-Pump Groups
There were LLP groups in two villages, Ninguin Ghun Para and 
Patkole. In both villages a wider range of households received water than in 
exclusively STW-irri gated villages (with the exception of Samitigram). Also in 
both villages, a reduction in command area size and a higher concentration of 
control over command area land occurred due to the inclusion of capital costs 
into irrigation prices after the privatisation of form er BADC LLPs. The increased 
irrigation cost which resulted from this, and water level problems pushed small 
owner-cultivators into renting out their land. At the same time, wealthier 
landowners acquired STWs to ensure their water supply. Charges for LLP water 
were lower than for STW water in both villages. The availability of the LLP 
alternative to STW irrigation in Ninguin and Patkole is likely to have contributed 
to the more fragmented tenancy and water markets in these two villages. This left 
more scope for poorer cultivators to obtain some access to water and to irrigated 
sharecropping land.
V I.2 .1.2 Water Sale
Water sale was not the main form of irrigation in any of the villages. In 
all cases, water charges under sale arrangements were substantially (50-100%) 
above cost. This excluded small landowners from access to water for own 
cultivation and reduced profit margins for those few, mostly wealthier cultivators 
who bought irrigation water. In most cases, water sale resulted in disputes over 
the "proper" delivery of water, crop failures, the collapse of the agreement and 
often the decision of the ’water-less’ landowner to rent out the affected land for
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the next season, or to cultivate other crops. The highest water price under water 
sale arrangements was found in Baluabasua (village 2) where low land levels 
made alternative crops impossible on almost all agricultural land.
VI.2.1.3 Land Renting by STW Owners
The main organisational form of irrigated cultivation in the seven 
villages was fixed in-kind renting out o f land by small and medium land owners 
to larger land-cum-STW owners. With very few exceptions STW owners came 
from  the top 10 per cent of landowners. The consolidation and increase of 
command areas under their own cultivation increased the size of these households* 
effective landholding (for definition see II.5.2) and reduced that of smaller 
landowners without direct access to irrigation. In contrast to Samitigram, here 
control over irrigation water directly increased control over land.
The ability of STW owners to appropriate income from the land of 
others was reduced if alternatives for landowners who did not own a STW 
existed. Where other forms of irrigation, such as traditional manual surface-lift 
or low -lift pump were available, there was less economic necessity for small 
landowners to rent out their land to STW owners. Higher land level increased the 
feasibility of other cropping patterns on plots surrounded by irrigated land. There 
was also less pressure on smaller ’STW-less’ landowners to rent out their land in 
villages which were more integrated into wider exchange and production 
networks and thus less centred on cultivation activities. This is indicated under 
point 3 in Table VI. 1 above as the degree of ’external’ non-agricultural income 
generation. In a village like Patkole, located at a focal point for local and 
regional trade and national traffic, the increase of STW command areas through 
renting-in of land is only one - and not necessarily the most profitable - of 
several avenues to income and wealth for the better-off households. Some of the
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flexibility in Patkole’s tenancy system and water market may thus stem from the 
lesser degree of emphasis on irrigated cultivation as an income source.
V I.2.2 Agrarian Production Relations
How then does irrigation interact with agrarian production relations in 
the seven villages? The discussion of agrarian relations and factor market 
conditions in the seven villages below, presents a picture of change which differs 
substantially from that which has been described in much more detail for the 
main research village, Samitigram in chapters III-V.
V I.2.2.1 Land
Figure VI. 1 shows either polarisation or an across-the-board reduction 
in landholding sizes (pauperisation), as could be expected in a situation of 
continuing population growth and household nucleation. There is no clear 
relationship between the role of irrigation at household level and the direction of 
change in household landholding sizes. Too many other factors intervened, such 
as for example the absorption of the lands of emigrating Hindus into Muslim 
landholdings in Mahashandrapur or incomes from services and trade in Patkole. 
Most wealthy householders in the seven villages reported to have bought 
additional land with the gains made through STW ownership.
As a rule, the lower the level of land and thus the more limited 
alternative cropping patterns were, the more clearly control over irrigation water 
increased control over land for the STW owner. This control over land 
manifested itself prim arily as fixed-in-kind renting-in of command area land by 
STW owners. It also increased the likelihood of subsequent purchase of the rented 
command area land by the STW owners. The different dynamics on the similarly 
low land of Samitigram, however, show that economic, ecological or 
environmental variables do not necessarily explain inter-village variations in the
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structural role of mechanised irrigation.
The most important change in the land market of the seven villages with 
the appearance of STW irrigation is the transformation in form and meaning of 
borga (land tenancy). While the sharecropping (borga) arrangements of the 
pre-irrigation period were retained for unirrigated crops, the term borga came to 
mean a fixed in-kind rental agreement for irrigated boro in most cases.
This ’new’ type of borga is an example of ’reverse tenancy* (see 1.3.1.1) 
under which the allocation of formal roles (’landlord’ & tenant) and the 
distribution of relative returns differ fundamentally from those of more 
traditional rich-to-poor sharecropping relationships. The traditional 
sharecropping relationship (mborgam) uses a poor tenants’ labour to work the land 
assets of a wealthier landlord. The new fixed-rent ("borga") relationship, which 
has arisen with STW irrigation, helps a wealthy tenant to appropriate income 
from the land assets of a poorer household. The contractual terms of the new 
borga ensure that the rich tenant receives a greater share of the total profit than 
the poor tenant under the old "sharecropping" borga arrangements (up to over 
70% rather than around 40% (see also Table VI.2). In Baluabasua, a STW owner 
gained after-cost profits of at least Taka 6500 per acre from the land rented-in 
in his own command area This combines returns from water control and 
cultivation and is thus higher than profits from selling water at a maximum 
charge Taka 3000 per acre (before cost). A small landowner renting out because 
of lack of access to irrigation water in Baluabasua, on the other hand, received 
18 maunds of paddy of the value of Taka 3150. An equivalent small landowner in 
Samitigram was likely to cultivate irrigated boro as a member of an irrigation 
group and gain 7000 to 11000 Taka after-cost profits per acre.
Various mechanisms increased the duration of fixed rent and 
sharecropping arrangements which maintained wealthier households’ control over
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irrigated land in the seven villages. Ninguin landowners who could not pay the 
capital instalments fo r the newly privatised LLP were forced to commit their 
land to wealthier sharecroppers for several consecutive years. These involuntary 
’landlords’ of STW command area land were in some cases employed as 
agricultural labourers by their tenant, the STW owner. Thus STW irrigation 
enforced power and dependence relationships in the seven villages. In contrast, a 
loosening of interlinkages between land, labour and credit markets, and the 
partial emergence of single-stranded, single-market relationships was found in 
Samitigram’s irrigated agriculture (see V.1-V.3). In the seven villages, the 
gradual encroachment of STW owner-cum-tenants on the land they rent from 
households without access to STW water is the next step. As poor involuntary 
’landlords* are forced to turn to agricultural or service employment, they lose 
cultivation ties with their land. Eventually land sale to the STW owner may ensue.
STW technology separates control and ownership of land for landowners 
without access to water in the seven villages. The separation of ownership and 
control over ’old* assets through the effects of new technology has been found 
elsewhere (see Redclift, 1984). A further step may be the transfer of the 
ownership of ’old’ assets through control over new technology. That this is not a 
necessary development is shown by the changes in Samitigram where irrigation 
groups brought at least a temporary slackening of disaccumulation processes 
among relatively land-poor cultivators.
Mortgages for irrigated land in the seven villages take the khaikalashi 
form under which the repayable sum decreases annually in return for the 
usufruct of land. For rainfed land, the older bondhok form is used. Under this, 
the full loan has to be repaid irrespective of the time the land was cultivated by 
the mortgagee (see V.1.5). As in Samitigram, a less extractive form of mortgage 
has thus evolved for the more productive irrigated land. Khaikalashi mortgages
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have become a means of access to land for cultivation. As paddy yields have 
increased with irrigation, the old extractive bondhok form of mortgage has 
become an outmoded form of surplus extraction both in Samitigram and in the 
seven villages.
V I.2 .2.2 Credit
In the seven villages, a greater dependence of poor households on high- 
interest informal credit appeared to exist than in Samitigram The absence of 
any source of cultivation credit without land collateral similar to Samitigram’s 
credit samiti (see III.4 and V.2) may account for this. A stoppage of formal 
cultivation credit by commercial banks in 1986 forced many poorer households to 
rent out their land and concentrated irrigated cultivation further among wealthy 
tenant-cum-STW owners with cash at their disposal. Credit stoppages thus enabled 
wealthy households, (the main defaulters on formal cred it see V.2), to rent-in 
the land of poorer landowners who depend on bank loans for cultivation. Thus 
the major defaulters, the wealthy, benefit from the sanctions on their non- 
repayment of loans. This is an ironic contradiction between stated development 
objectives and achieved results in the credit sector. On top of their non­
repayment of bank loans such wealthy defaulters obtained between Taka 6500 to 
8500 of cultivation income per acre of land rented from cash-poor small 
landowners (see Table VI.2 below).
V I.2.2.3 Labour
HYV boro changed the Singra beel from a labour outmigration to a 
labour immigration area (see III.3). Occasionally, employers now find themselves 
the weaker party in employment negotiations at peak demand times such as the 
boro harvest. In section V.3 it was argued that in Samitigram organisational 
forms of labour and labour relationships have diversified with irrigated boro 
cultivation. Chapter VI. 1 demonstrated how, in the seven villages, boro
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cultivation has become the domain of large landowners through their control of 
STW irrigation and their privileged access to other inputs such as credit. This 
concentration of cultivation activities among large land-cum-STW owners in the 
seven villages has had its effect on the labour market. In Samitigram, households 
of all categories entered the labour market as employers (see Table V.10). Even 
agricultural labourers turned into peak-time employers. In contrast, in the seven 
villages the employers were almost exclusively the more powerful large 
landowners. Smaller landowners and tenant-labourers did not cultivate boro and 
thus did not employ labour. On the contrary, small landowners were forced to 
sell their labour as their cultivation income from household land fell with the 
rise o f the fixed-rent system.
This difference between Samitigram and the seven villages in the 
composition of the group of agricultural employers affects the character of 
agricultural employment relations. In the seven villages, class interests and class 
boundaries in the labour market are clear. In Samitigram, divisions are more hazy 
and temporary..
In the seven villages, households who are forced to rent out their land 
during the boro season can experience an extra element of dependence (akin to 
earlier forms of labour bondage; see Patnaik & Dingwaney 1985). This is the 
case, for example, when a STW owning tenant-employer is able to refuse 
irrigation water while also not renting in a small landowner's land. Depending on 
land elevation, this can leave the small landowner without any income from the 
land. This scenario applies in particular when there are no cropping or irrigation 
alternatives as in Baluabasua. In these cases, the character of labour relations is 
unlikely to be substantially altered by a labourer's nominal ownership of land, 
which is permanently rented out to a STW owner-cum-employer.
The relative fixity of land rent levels in the seven villages irrespective
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of input cost and yields shows that small landowners in the seven villages were in 
effect powerless rentiers on their own land. It suggests that land rent may be 
treated as a wage-equivalent labour reproduction fund In Samitigram, where 
only one wealthy landowner (Faruque) rented out land for fixed-rent to less 
wealthy cultivators, fixed rents depended on input costs and land productivity. 
There, the tenancy relationship is a means for a wealthier landlord to extract 
production surplus from tenants (above labour reproduction requirements) rather 
than, as in the seven villages, a means to reproduce the labour of a small 
landowner fo r the benefit of a rich tenant/employer. Thus land rent varies with 
the size of production surplus in Samitigram but remains constant and much lower 
(see Table VI.2) in the seven villages.
With agricultural labourers and employers in discrete categories, 
objective class interests were more clearly discernible in the seven villages. Hire 
and sale of labour by the same household,as in Samitigram (V.3.3 see especially 
Table V.10), was not found in the seven villages.
One may wonder, at this point, whether the more obvious objective 
clashes in class interests in the seven villages have led to clearer class solidarity 
Only speculations can be made here. There was awareness of ongoing 
processes of concentration of rural power and land through control over water. 
The proverbial saying that "he who has the water has the wealth" was common in 
my conversations and interviews in the seven villages, but I did not hear it in 
Samitigram. The conditions to translate incipient class consciousness into 
class-based actions and organisations were not necessarily given though. Both at 
the m aterial and at the ideological level, class relations take the form  of patron- 
client relations (see Wood, 1981). In these, awareness of class divisions is not 
transferred into class-based thinking or action. If dominant moral norms and 
ideology relate to forms of vertical alignment such as kinship, caste or patron-
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client structures (see Bertocci 1972, 1979; Alavi 1973, Beteille 1974), this 
counteracts the transformation of class consciousness into class action (see also 
McGregor, forthcoming).
However, agrarian relations in interlinked markets upon which the poor 
rely, but the terms of which are determined by the wealthy, bind the poor at the 
material level. STW irrigation in the seven villages enforces elite control of land 
and water. Increased production surpluses are thus channelled into the hands of 
the established elites. Rather than creating additional 'room for manoeuvre* for 
landless and small landowners in the seven villages, the new irrigation technology 
supports existing land-based elites by enforcing established lines of control with 
new ones. Disaccumulation of assets and the subsistence level existence of 
increasing numbers of agricultural labourers and their dependants are the result. 
Similar accounts of the effects of the *green revolution* in India have been given 
by Patnaik and Dingwaney 1985, G riffin 1974.
Different factors mitigated the impact of village patron-client relations 
on agricultural production in different villages. Proximity to the upazila town, to 
the road or river provided alternative income sources for landless or land-poor 
households. Annual or seasonal income sources from fishing loosened some of the 
lines of dependence and control on agricultural labour and credit markets. 
Patkole*s location meant income potential in service, trade and transport. This 
weakened the elite*s power base within the village since poor households could 
derive income from ricksaw driving, employment on river ferries, office 
messenger work, coolie labour or small-scale trade and thus did not need to rely 
on agricultural employment and usurious credit. The degree of formal education 
of poorer households also mattered as education opened up employment 
possibilities outside agriculture, and provided more independence from local 
patronage structures for access to information of economic value.
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Such weakening of dependence does not necessarily foster class-based 
action. The sectoral diversification of income sources in Patkole brought a lesser 
degree of strategic emphasis on cultivation incomes on the part of the village 
elites and less need to rely on agricultural income for the poor. As a result of 
this and due to the ecological characteristics of Patkole (medium land elevation 
and resultant greater cropping alternatives), some smaller landowners were able 
to purchase water. These households then employed labour seasonally according 
to their cultivation timing for irrigated boro. These same poor cultivator 
households also hired out labour at other times of the year. Thus class boundaries 
between employers and labourers blurred. This, in combination with occupational 
diversification, which weakens class contradictions around cultivation, appeared 
to result in a lower degree of perceived class conflict in agriculture.
Significantly, Patkole was the only one among the eight villages where 
local agricultural labour did not form groups (dols). Some permeability of the 
water and land market through land renting and water sale combined with a 
number of class-specific new opportunities in cultivation and non-cultivation 
sectors (see Ch VII) enforced class-internal competition rather than class-based 
solidarity.
Thus the likelihood of class-based action by agricultural labour was low 
whether agrarian class contradictions are contained in mixed-class group 
structures as in Samitigram, suppressed by strengthening patron-client 
relationships as in Baluabasua, or mitigated through occupational diversification 
outside established patron-client relationships as in Patkole.
VI.3 Modes of Irrigation and Distribution
This final section of Chapter VI compares the distribution of irrigated 
cultivation profits between Samitigram and one of the seven villages, Baluabasua.
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It shows how alternative organisational forms of irrigated cultivation ^  affect 
different household categories* cultivation income and attempts to identify some 
of the reasons behind such differences.
In this section households are described as *sharecropper*t ’fixed tenant*, 
STW owner, large and small landowner. It must be remembered that these labels 
have different meanings and refer to households of different categories in 
Samitigram and the seven villages. In Samitigram, tenants are the landless, small 
or medium landowners from the ’poor*, ’coping* or ’w e ll-o ff categories whereas 
no ’rich* landowner rented-in land (see Table V.3). In the seven villages, on the 
other hand, only wealthy STW-cum-landowners rented-in irrigated land. Table 
VI.2 compares the financial gains which the majority of households of different 
categories derived from irrigated cultivation of their own and rented land in 
Samitigram and Baluabasua.
The landholding categories employed in Qadir et al (1978) and the 
composite household categories developed here are used as equivalents in Table 
VI.2. Section V.1.1 indicated the problems with using land as an indicator of 
household position. In order to avoid those shortcomings, only two categories, 
’the rich’ and ’the poorer cultivators* are used in Table VI.2 to compare resource 
flows in Samitigram and Baluabasua. As shown in Figure V.2, landholdings of 
these two categories (the ’rich* and ’w ell-off, coping and poor’) do not overlap. 
In terms of this simplified twofold categorisation, land is thus sufficient to 
differentiate household types.
Table VI.2 uses Baluabasua (village 2) only. To subsume all seven 
villages into one category would have led to an overly monolithic representation. 
Baluabasua contrasts most strongly with Samitigram in terms of the distributional 
effects of STW irrigation. In environmental terms the two villages are quite 
similar so that, without laying claim to strict ceteris paribus conditions here (cf.
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Table VI. 1 for some of the differences between the villages), some isolation of 
the irrigation element is possible.
In both Samitigram and Baluabasua, STWs are the only form of 
mechanised irrigation. The ’Village Profiles’ (VI. 1) showed that, to the user, 
STWs are the most expensive form of mechanised minor irrigation after LLPs and 
DTWs. This is partly due to the fact that STWs were most prone to private 
individual ownership and consequently to extractive water charges and land rents 
imposed by jSTW owners. This was especially the case in villages where neither 
alternative rainfed cropping patterns nor other forms of irrigation were 
available. Baluabasua and Samitigram are two such villages. In sections III.5 and 
IV.2 it was outlined how irrigation groups increase access to irrigation especially 
for poorer households in Samitigram. Section VI. 1 showed how individual 
ownership of STWs restricts access to water for cultivators who do not own STWs 
in Baluabasua.
Cultivation is affected by the alternative ways irrigation has come to be 
organised and integrated into the agricultural production structure in two 
villages.
Household categories for Samitigram and Baluabasua in Table VI.2 
cover slightly different ranges of households. Samitigram’s ’rich’ (5%) represent a 
smaller percentage of wealthier households than the ’over 7.5 acres’ category for 
Baluabasua (13%). Correspondingly, the ’poorer cultivators* for Samitigram cover 
a wider range of households than the ’under 2.5 acres* category for Baluabasua. 
Some of the larger absolute and relative returns from irrigated cultivation for the 
Samitigram ’poorer cultivators’ compared to the Baluabasua ’under 2.5 acres* 
category in Table VI.2 thus arise from the fact that different household 
classifications had to be used. However, interviews in the seven villages
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TABLE VI.2: Income Distribution from Irrigated Boro Cultivation in Samitigram 
and Baluabasua (Taka Per Acre net of Cultivation Costs)
Samitigram_______________Baluabasua
1. Owner-cultivator
2. Tenant (STW owner)
3. Landlord





The 'poorer cultivators' under 2.5 acres
4. Tenant 1200-3400 (30-37%) •
5. Owner-cultivator 7000-11.000 •
6. "landlord" (forced) - 3150 (27-33%)
bracketed  percentages in d ic a te  share  of to ta l  p r o f i t  obtained 
Values taken from case s tu d ie s  (Chs IV & VI)
indicated that fixed in-kind tenancy is the predominant mode of STW use there 
and leads to the patterns of extractive accumulation by STW owners from others’ 
land shown in Table VI.2. Nonetheless, Samitigram’s 5% ’rich* cover a somewhat 
narrower range of wealthy households than the 13% with over 7.5 acres who 
benefit from control of private STWs in the seven villages. Conversely, 
Samitigram’s ’poorer cultivators’ who on the whole had access to irrigation via 
the groups include households who are wealthier than the under 2.5 acre category 
in the seven villages. Nonetheless, Table VI.2 demonstrates clearly the differences 
in the distribution of production surpluses from STW irrigated agriculture under 
two alternative forms of organisation.
Table VI.2 shows the most common organisational forms of STW 
irrigation and associated distribution of cultivation returns. In both villages, STW
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irrigation led to the appearance of fixed in-kind rent, but fixed in-kind rent was 
common only in the seven villages. In Samitigram, fixed rent provided a 
continued income from land to one large landowner who had moved to a nearby 
town and shifted into non-cultivation activities (see V. 1.2.3).
In the seven villages, fixed in-kind renting out was the most frequent 
form of land use for irrigated cultivation with less than 2.5 acres (line 6 Table
VI.2). The comparable category of households in Samitigram are the owner- 
cultivators of line 5 in Table VI.2. These small landowners realized between Taka 
3850 and 7850 more per acre of own irrigated land than equivalent households in 
Baluabasua under the fixed-rent system (c.f. lines 5 for Samitigram and 6 for 
Baluabasua). Moreover, assuming equal yields in both villages, the comparison of 
the 3150 Taka per acre of fixed rent gained by a poor landowner from irrigated 
cultivation on their own land are likely to be less than his previous returns from 
rainfed cultivation on the same land
Line 1 o f Table VI.2 for Baluabasua shows that around 70% of after-cost profit 
from irrigated cultivation of the lands owned by the ’under 2.5 acre’ category 
was appropriated to rich STW-owner-cum-tenants through fixed-rent. In 
Samitigram, no ’poorer cultivators’ were not forced to rent out their irrigated 
land, since access to water through irrigation groups existed.
Under roughly equal ecological conditions and yields in Samitigram and 
Baluabasua, STW irrigation thus plays two very different roles. This raises the 
question of which factors determine the difference between patterns of 
distribution and agrarian change which have resulted from the introduction of the 
same irrigation technology in two so similar villages.
In view of the predominance of the "waterlord" situation in Bangladesh 
(see Jansen 1979, Chisholm 1984, Howes 1985), it is tempting to conclude that 
Samitigram’s relatively non-exploitative farmer-m anaged groups are exceptional. 
However, similar cases exist. Curtis comments on farmer-managed irrigation in
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the Dang Valley in Nepal
I t  is  worth dwelling upon . . .  so c ia l  s t ru c tu re  because i t s  c l e a r ly  
in e g a l i ta r ia n  p r in c ip l e s ,  as well as outcomes, c o n t r a s t  with the  
ra th e r  more e g a l i t a r i a n  p r in c ip le s  which c u r re n t ly  underly  t h e i r  
i r r i g a t io n  o rg a n isa t io n .
(C ur t is  1987 p .6 s i c )
Tarak comments on the same region
. . .  whether the  paddy c u l t i v a to r s  are  sharecroppers or s e l f -  
c u l t iv a to r s  or big landho lders ,  they do co n tr ib u te  t h e i r  labour in  
proportion  to  the  khet ( i r r i g a t e d  N.G.) land they c u l t i v a t e .  There 
i s  no concession on the  ground of cas te  or land ho ld ing , r a th e r  big 
land holders c o n tr ib u te  more p ro p o r t io n a l ly .
(Tarak 1986 p .47/48)
Further parallels to the Samitigram situation appear in the work of both 
authors on Dang valley surface water canal irrigation. Irrigators associations 
were formed without substantial interaction with government or external agencies 
and are operated by members* meetings as the main policy making body. Under 
the rotational system, the distribution of water is relatively equitable in times of 
scarcity. There are no written group constitutions but rules evolve over time. 
Irrigation groups are "dynamic, subject to constant stress and change" and group 
leaders can be disposed of by members (Curtis 1987 p.10, cf. III.5 in this thesis).
For Bangladesh, Maloney and Ahmed (1986) report that since about 
1980, informal groups (predominantly savings groups and "businessmen's groups") 
have been formed in many areas in Bangladesh. In 12 unions and 2 towns, 
Maloney and Ahmed found 329 informal groups with 6 to 150 members, and one 
group of 1800 members. With increasing distance to roads the number of groups 
decreased. As in Samitigram, many of these groups had been initiated by "youths" 
disaffected with their BRDB elders. All groups in a sample o f 24 were found 
to have social welfare/insurance functions for their members.
Van Schendel (1986) also notes the existence in rural Bangladesh of 
"neighbourhood or village associations", although he finds the positive impact of 
such schemes restricted to the better-off.
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Herbon (1988 pp.27-34) identifies a range of cooperative organisations 
such as school committees, savings clubs and pump groups initiated by younger 
villagers in Bogra, Bangladesh. He concludes that these groups are a response to 
the requirements of new technologies and increasing resource pressures in rural 
Bangladesh to which previous individualistic approaches are ill-suited.
In a study of 31 villages in neighbouring South India, Wade (1988 a &
b) finds 19 "corporate" villages, organised to the benefit of landowners, and 12
"non-corporate" villages. He suggests that institutions for collective action are
much more common in the Indian countryside than perceived by academics and
the state and concludes that
such I n s t i t u t i o n s  a re  l i k e ly  to be found where people 
have t h e i r  backs to  the  wall * where r i s k s  of so c ia l  
c o n f l i c t  and crop loss  on account of water s c a r c i t y  . . .  
a re  high.
(Uade 1988a p . 775)
Nonetheless, informal groups and farmer-managed irrigation systems of 
the ’Samitigram kind* are not always the outcome of resource pressures in 
Bangladesh. Although factors such as technology type and demographic or 
resource pressure can form part of the rationale for group formation, they fail to 
explain the differences between villages with the same degree of resource 
scarcity such as Samitigram and the seven villages.
An analysis of the reasons for non-cooperative behaviour in eleven 
West Bengal villages (Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen, 1988.) finds that poor 
households are less likely to have mutual help ties, and that there is a close 
correlation between the incidence of mutual help relations (as opposed to 
unilateral help in patron-client situations) and the occurrence of more 
institutional cooperative endeavours. This leads to the conclusion that the higher 
the degree of social and economic stratification, the less likely it is that 
cooperation will occur. This is confirmed by a number of irrigation studies in 
other countries (Nunberg 1983 p.28; Hutapea et al 1979; Lynch 1985 p.39). Sharp
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social and economic stratification patterns allow elites to earn income by 
extractive modes of appropriation such as water refusal or usurious 
moneylending. This creates the incentive for the elites to prevent forms of 
cooperation which could create greater economic security and thus remove the 
reason fo r dependence of those who are being exploited (e.g. forced 'landlords’ 
or debtors). Sociometric diagrams of the incidence and character of inter­
household help relations, as constructed by Bandyopadhyay and Von Eschen 
(1988) for each of their eleven villages, might have provided important clues on 
the difference between Samitigram and the seven villages. However, neither 
resources nor time were available for this so that, at this point, more ad hoc and 
indirect information has to suffice.
Among the eight villages of this study, Samitigram's distribution of 
landholding sizes in 1986 is among the least polarised ones with only 17% of 
households in the 0-0.33 acre category as opposed to 37, 43, 43, 27, 29 and 23% 
in six of the seven villages ^  (cf. Table VI. 1). However, less polarised 
landholdings could be a cause as well as a consequence of the organisational 
form, or mode, of irrigation. In view of the copmparative patterns of surplus 
distribution outlined in Table VI.2, it is clear though that polarised landholding 
structures are at least to some extent a consequence of the manner in which STW 
technology is used in the seven villages.
A more important point, also made by Wade (1988a p.776) may be that 
the likelihood of collective action depends on the relative power positions of the 
affected sub-groups. The weaker are those who are opposed to or can find 
alternatives to collective action, and the stronger are those who stand to benefit 
from collective action, the more likely is its successful occurrence.
The history of Samitigram groups fits this well. A powerful sub-group, 
the sons of medium and wealthy village households, adopted group formation in 
the course of their quest to take over village leadership from their elders. In the
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process, they weakened and split their own peer group, the village elite 
consisting of those with the option to obtain STW water on an individual basis.
As the new Samitigram leaders establish their position, their initial 
rationale for group formation, the drive for leadership, is lost. The question of 
whether the Samitigram groups have gained sufficient momentum to continue to 
function then arises. Increasing resource scarcity may well raise the incentive to 
cooperate. This point is made by Wade (1988 a & b) who finds that water scarcity 
in tail-end villages along irrigation canals stimulates cooperation. The same 
argument can be used in cases of land scarcity. In a study of tubewell utilisation 
in the Punjab, Jairath (1988 p. 105) finds that the extent of tubewell sharing 
increases as holding size decreases. In Samitigram, land is the scarce factor. Since 
groups in Samitigram function to increase the returns from land, the incentive to 
continue cooperation is growing. In this context, Samitigram groups may well 
continue to operate.
The location of the fieldwork for this research offered a rare 
opportunity to explore how self-initiated groups are formed and how they 
operate in a less than egalitarian, but still not predominantly exploitative way. 
The operation of Samitigram’s groups depended on a number of factors.
Trusted and able leaders ensured group cohesion and cooperation. 
Beyond the random personality factors which determine the character of group 
leadership, an important element in the functioning of Samitigram groups was a 
relatively high level of formal education (class 8 to 10) among a high percentage 
of group members. The importance of the education factor was repeatedly 
mentioned in fieldwork interviews. Education enables group members to 
understand and monitor managers. It also means that the group manager position 
could be assumed by more than one group member should the group decide to 
change manager. A minimum level of primary education enables group members 
to be involved in processes of problem-solving and decision-making in group
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meetings. The consequent understanding of the rationale for group decisions and 
procedures brought a degree of trust in the group manager in most Samitigram 
groups. This remained subject to a, somewhat cynical, tacit acknowledgement of 
the inherent ’perks’ of the manager position.
Member ability to comprehend the functioning of irrigation groups is 
also noted by Bagadion and Korten (1980 p.282) as a requirement for successful 
operation. In Samitigram and the seven villages, strong concentrations of wealth, 
political power or formal education within informal groups jeopardised the 
functioning of these groups in the interests of all members. In line with this, 
Alam (1984) finds that while education is of little significance for the adoption 
of tubewell irrigation, it is directly related to the type of organisation and 
management adopted. Primary education, in its role of improving the human 
capital assets, in particular of the materially poor plays, a central role fo r the 
internal monitoring and mutual control mechanisms of self-managed groups.
Another influence on the likelihood of successful collective action may 
lie in the incidence and character of kin or religious bonds. The comparison 
between Samitigram and the seven villages remains relatively inconclusive on 
this. If, in the absence of kinship data for all eight villages, village size is 
accepted as an indication of the density o f social and kin relations, Samitigram 
falls among the larger and therefore probably less densely integrated villages. 
Samitigram is also one, but not the only one, among the eight villages, which has 
an exclusively Muslim population. Extractive relations with the Hindu population 
of the neighbouring village were maintained by at least one Samitigram group 
(the MSS; see III.4.8). Therefore the presence of a common religion may be a 
necessary condition for collective action. Wider evidence would be needed on 
this.
Samitigram’s population was not only entirely Muslim but also belonged 
to one samaj and used the same mosque. In at least three of the seven villages,
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the Muslim population belonged to more than one samaj. Thus it may be 
tentatively concluded that kin and religious bonds facilitated the operation of 
Samitigram groups. However, as in Wade’s study (1988b), resource scarcity 
provides the underlying economic rationale for the operation of groups in 
Samitigram while an intergenerational conflict in the village which occurred at a 
historically unique point in time brought the momentum for their inception.
NOTES
1) Through the  dec l in e  in the general  water t a b l e  with i r r i g a t i o n ,  sur face  water 
sources  were no longer recharging f u l l y  during the monsoon.
2) The ope ra t ion  of r ic e m i l l s  and boats by STU engine has i n t e r e s t i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  
i m pl ic a t i on s .  Although some ana lys i s  of r i c e m i l l s  i s  given in Chapter VII ne i t h e r  was 
researched  in d e t a i l  for  t h i s  s tudy ( see Lewis forthcoming).
3) The r a t i o n a l e  behind t h i s  confirms the as so c ia t i o n  between increased  p ro duc t iv i ty  
p o t e n t i a l  and more p r o d u c t i v i t y  or ien ted  agra r i an  r e l a t i o n s  under condi t ions  of a 
d ec l i n in g  per c a p i t a  resource base,  which i s  one of the  main pr o p o s i t i o n s  of t h i s  
t h e s i s .
4) Average y i e l d  of 75 maunds a t  175 Taka per maund and 3600 Taka c u l t i v a t i o n  cost s 
per acr e  ( see Table VI .2 below)
5) This s ta tement  r e l i e s  on a number of interview r a th e r  than on a d e t a i l e d  survey on
c r e d i t  r e l a t i o n s  as time and resources did not allow for  t h i s .
6) i . e .  households in Baluabasua, Koyrabari ,  Shagarbari  and Mahashandrapur where land 
e l e v a t i o n  was too low to allow for  other crops and i r r i g a t i o n  a l t e r n a t i v e s  did not 
e x i s t .
7) This i s  a form of subsumption of agrar ian  r e l a t i o n s  under c a p i t a l  on the  bas i s  of 
the  fami ly farm. Wood (Dec. 86) suggests  t ha t  " the  disappearance  of the  Bangladesh 
farm" may r e s u l t  as ac to rs  in cont rol  of new technology take  over product ion or 
dec is ion-making .  Lewis (forthcoming) examines t h i s  hypothesi s  fo r  a range of 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  t echnologies  in Bangladesh.
8) see Marx 'The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* 1950 ed.
9) J a i r a t h  c a l l s  t h i s  "modes of i r r i g a t i o n " .  The term covers the  technical  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and the economic condi t ions of use for  an i r r i g a t i o n  source ( J a i r a th  
1988).
10) The somewhat shaky bas i s  of comparison here a re  the per  acre  r e tu r n s  from rainfed 
amon c u l t i v a t i o n  in Samitigram under i r r i g a t e d  condi t ions .  C le a r ly ,  d i f f e r e n c es  in 
y i e l d ,  both between v i l l a g e s  and over time as well as s h i f t s  in input  and output 
p r i c e s  could have a f fe c te d  t h i s .
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11) As observed by McCarthy (1984 p. 53) a "youth" in Bangladesh i s  someone who i s  
"educated or from a productive  farm fami ly,  aged between 15 and 36 and male".
12) No data for  Mahashandrapur ( see V I .1.7)
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CHAPTER VII: OCCUPATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION
An increasingly "symbiotic relationship" between agriculture and agro- 
industry in Bangladesh has been observed by recent research (Lewis 1987). This 
goes hand-in-hand with occupational diversification and the expansion of o ff- 
holding incomes in the rural areas.
The level of incomes from rural non-cultivation activities depends on 
effective rural demand. In agricultural countries such as Bangladesh, effective 
rural demand is centrally affected by the irrigation-led increases in agricultural 
productivity and incomes (Ishikawa 1967; Boyce, 1987). These have been 
discussed in the main part of this thesis. In this chapter, non-cultivation 
occupations taken up by Samitigram households from different categories are 
examined, and an attempt is made to relate occupational diversification and 
changes in the level and composition of off-holding incomes to the introduction 
of STW irrigation.
This raises an attribution problem (cf. II.4.2). Growth and 
diversification processes are clearly affected by a host of factors other than 
irrigation. It should be clear in the reader’s mind that monocausal attribution is 
not intended by the discussion of only the irrigation factor in this chapter. On the 
other hand, there is evidence that recent economic growth in Bangladesh is very 
closely related to irrigation (Boyce 1987, 1988).
Increased cultivation output and incomes have repercussions on the 
demand for many rural off-holding occupations. With increased agricultural 
yields, a larger percentage of a larger total crop will be marketed. This will 
increase the cash resources at the disposal of cultivators and the demand for 
goods and services. It would be desirable to have income elasticities fo r the 
different off-holding occupations which expand in response to irrigation-led 
agricultural output and income increases in Bangladesh. This was beyond the 
scope of this work and not available to me from other sources. Nonetheless, since
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off-holding patterns of occupational diversification are affected by and have 
effects on changes in agricultural production, they merit some discussion here.
The latter section of this chapter focuses on the two major off-holding 
activities paddy trade (VII. 1) and STW supply and services (VII.2) which are most 
directly connected with the introduction of STW irrigation.
V II.l Samitigram Income Source Diversification
A rough estimate of income increases in Samitigram as a result of 
irrigated boro cultivation may here serve as a starting point for the exploration 
of household-specific patterns of occupational diversification.
With an average net return of 3691 ^  Taka per acre of amon, the 1131 
acres of agricultural land which Samitigram households reported to own would 
have brought a net return of 4.174.521 Taka under rain-fed conditions. With 
about 50% of the rainfed amon crop displaced by irrigated HYV boro ^  and 
with boro cultivation on about 80% of Samitigram lands (see III.3) at a per acre 
net return of 8991 Taka net returns from Samitigram agricultural lands have 
increased to 10.222.317 Taka. In nominal terms, cultivation incomes have thus 
increased to 2.5 times their pre-irrigation level. This level of increase of 
effective demand has diversified the structure of o ff- and on-holding income 
sources.
Table VII.l gives an indication of Samitigram income sources by 
household category. In conjunction with data from the seven villages (cf.VI), this 
is here the point of reference for a discussion of some of the indirect 
consequences of irrigated cultivation in Samitigram.
Occupational diversification either takes the form of multiple 
occupations which are concurrent with or counterseasonal to agricultural work, 
or it can lead individuals or entire households to cut their ties with agriculture.
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Table VII.l: Samitigram: Income Sources by Household Category
PADDY CULTIVATION Rich Well-Off Coping
1. Cultivation 5 26 30
2. Casual labour - - 1
3. Permanent labour - - 2




6. Fish (open water) - - 10
7. Fish (ponds) 1 4 -
8. Milk - - 1
9. Eggs & Chicks 1 1 1
10.Vegetable/Fruit 1 1 1
11.Sweets - - -
12.Wood - - -
13.Cowdung Fuel - - 4
14.Date Molasses - 1 2




17.Paddy Trade 2 5 6
18.Provisions Shop 1 2 1
19.Snack Stall 
COTTAGE & RURAL INDUSTRY
- • 1
20.Mat & Net Making - - 2
21.Tailoring - 1 3
22.Quilt Sewing - - 2
23.Signpainting - - 1




26.Watch and Radio Repair - - 1
27.Mechanic - 2 -
28.STW operator 2 12 3
29.Mosque Caller - 1 -
30.Village Doctor - 1 1
31.Deedwriter - - 1
32.Village Police 2 - -




35.Bamboo Root Digging - - -
36.Domestic Service (female) - - -
37.Cattleherds (child) - - -
38.Construction (Food-for Work) - -
39.Pump Operator 2 2 3
40.Ferry Attendant 
OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME
* • *
41.STW Manager 3 7 2
42.Union Parishad Member - 1 -
43.KSS Chairman 1 2 -
44.Begging - - -




























In particular for poorer households in Samitigram, non-cultivation 
incomes follow a counterseasonal pattern to cultivation incomes. Similarly, 
Muqtada and Alam (1986 p.64) find that between 44 and 48 per cent of total 
annual household income in three areas of Bangladesh (in Faridpur, in 
Mymensingh and Dhaka district) is derived from counterseasonal non-agricultural 
sources..
Of all 103 Samitigram households, only two derived their income 
exclusively from non-cultivation sources. In particular ’poor’ and ’coping’ 
households, which had fewer members (see Table V.7), tended to change 
occupations seasonally so that they relied on different sources of income at 
different times of the year. In Samitigram, a range of small-scale, low-return 
occupations such as the sale of molasses, sweets, cowdung fuel, bamboo and jute 
products (mats, baskets) and handmade fishing nets and most centrally, income 
from  open-water fishing in the flooded beel are the main income sources for 
poorer households in August and September during the rainy season.
In contrast, occupational diversification in most ’w ell-ofF and ’rich’ 
Samitigram households leads individuals within the household to specialise on 
occupations which support or complement the cultivation activities of the rest of 
the household. Thus, for the better-off, the joint household pools resources, saves 
transaction costs and realises economies of scale from a range of functionally 
interlocking occupations (e.g. paddy trade, transport, rice milling, STW trade). 
The savings realised from the complementarity of such intra-household 
occupational diversification with cultivation and with each other are retained 
within the household.
The cultivation of irrigated HYV boro also brought a certain degree of 
specialisation in cultivation-related occupations. In response to increased needs 
fo r ploughing with care, the occupation of ’ploughman’, working with own cattle 
and plough (hal)y has turned into a central income source for a number of ’poor’
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households in Samitigram. Also through irrigated boro cultivation, the returns 
from field gleaning, which maintain the very poorest, often female-headed 
households have increased. ^  Service occupations such as STW mechanic become 
an integral part of cultivation and provide direct and indirect income 
opportunities.
During the rainy amon season and in particular before the floods recede 
sufficiently to put the new crops into the ground, open water fishing is an 
important income source for many ’coping* and ’poor* households in Samitigram 
(see Table VII.l line 6 and Fig. V.4). As pointed out before (IV.3), the fall in the 
water table which results from increased water use for irrigation has reduced fish 
populations in the beel. This endangers the annual budgeting strategies of poorer 
households. In future, it may make them more dependent on agricultural incomes 
and thus more exposed to extractive tenancy, employment or credit relations with 
wealthy landowners. However, so far, rising fish prices were reported to have 
counterbalanced the income-reducing effect of the decreased catch.
Recent increases in pond fishbreeding by ’rich* and ’w e ll-o ff 
households who have access to the necessary resources and government extension 
services (Table VII.l line 7) may in future reduce poorer households’ incomes 
from open-water fishing. This is then likely to have negative repercussions for 
the capacity of those poorer households to invest in boro cultivation.
Interviews with numerous petty producers, small traders and service 
sector workers in and around Samitigram confirmed that the demand for 
’agricultural’ (non-paddy) and cottage industry products of local origin has risen 
in response to increased incomes from irrigated cultivation. These local growth 
effects are clearly conditional on a range of economic and social factors at the 
national and international level and cannot be attributed solely to irrigation. 
There can be no detailed discussion of these issues here. However, one important 
factor is the degree to which increased rural incomes are spent on imported
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goods. Osmani & Deb (in Muqtada & Alam 1986) find that, at present income 
levels, the income elasticity of demand for the products of Bangladeshi rural 
industries is greater than one. This was confirmed in Samitigram by for example 
the reported increases in demand for products such as milk, eggs, sweets, wood 
and furniture products, bricks, ropes, nets, quilts, mats and baskets and for 
services such as watch and radio repair, ricksaw transport and signpainting.
These increases in local demand are reflected in a higher incidence of 
intermediary trade. A new bazar (Notunbazar, see Map III. 1) is forming near 
Samitigram as the number of shops, and the range and quantity of traded goods 
increases. Bazar stalls d iffer in their degree of involvement in regional and 
national marketing networks and in the range and quantity of the goods they 
trade.
On the one hand, there are what has been called "snack stalls" in Table 
V II.l. These are flimsy constructions run by poor households. They are at best 
equipped with a few jars of homemade snacks, betel leaves {pan) and, if the 
owner can afford to buy them, some teacups, plates, and kettle and burner to 
heat tea for customers. Items are sold in very small quantities (i.e. one biscuit or 
cigarette) as neither buyers nor traders can afford larger quantities.
On the other hand, there are "provisions shops" (Table VII.l line 18). 
These sell a wider range of goods, many of which are new to the locality and 
have often been bought by the wealthier shopkeeper in the district town or even 
in Dhaka. Many are luxury goods for the villagers and have been imported into 
the country. Others, such as STW fuel, are essential inputs into boro cultivation. 
Such shopis, run by ’rich’ villagers like Malik and Saidur (IV.2.1), are becoming 
the final outlets for marketing structures of foreign products which reach down 
to the village. In Notunbazar, there was olive oil from Spain which replaced local 
mustard oil, there were foreign cigarettes instead of local bidis, pre-packed 
biscuits rather than locally baked ones, there was plastic jewellery and cosmetics
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from Hongkong and Korea and the odd large tin of powdered milk, often a 
donation from abroad which somehow found its way to the shop.
For the owners of such shops, the marketing links to the towns often 
coincide with links to government bureaucracy. Provision shops are a focus for 
local politics and the shop owner is a point of access to external connections and 
resources for many villagers. Village factions in Samitigram are clearly 
distinguishable by the shop they frequent. By allowing clients to run up annual 
debts, repayable at the halkata function after the boro harvest, provision shop 
owners can influence their clients* ability to invest in boro cultivation. In the 
course of increasing commercialisation and monetisation, new forms of patron- 
client relationships are thus developing in the trade sector. For the ’rich* and 
*well-off*, provision shops are not only a source of income but also a political 
asset.
As agricultural land per capita decreases, non-cultivation employment 
gains importance. If non-agricultural employment increases, the level of 
agricultural wages and the character of labour relations are more likely to 
change to the advantage of agricultural labourers who constitute the great 
majority of Bangladeshi poor.
The bulk of non-agricultural employment in Samitigram is in 
construction and transport. Increased amounts of marketed paddy (cf. VII.2) and 
spin-off trading activities have created work for ricksaw drivers, porters, ferry 
workers, boatmen and oxcart drivers. Road construction on government and 
donor schemes (CARE, Food-for-W ork) provides increased counterseasonal 
employment for poorer households. "Tied" labour was infrequent in Samitigram. 
Under this employment or credit during the lean periods is provided by rich 
patrons in exchange for cheap labour from poor clients during the peak labour 
demand seasons. As also observed by Lewis in recent work on Chandina (1987 & 
forthcoming) and research on the IRWP (Wood 1983 a&b & December 1986), the
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availability of counterseasonal employment can increase the bargaining power of 
agricultural labourers and enable them to press for higher agricultural wages.
Finally, when discussing non-agricultural income sources in Bangladesh, 
politics and administration cannot be ignored (see J. Harriss 1980, BRAC 1980). 
Paid and unpaid executive and administrative positions in rural Bangladesh bring 
significant illegal, semi-clandestine incomes. A study of the power structure of 
ten villages (BRAC 1980) estimated that in the course of six months, each union 
parishad member derived 20.000 Taka through control over Food-For-W ork and 
food ration programmes
In Samitigram and the seven villages, the assumption of public office 
was invariably followed by the construction of more expensive pucca brick 
houses and land purchases by the officeholder. Access by the union parishad 
chairmen to dealer licenses for fertilisers, pesticides and their control over access 
to other agricultural inputs is often transformed into income from bribes (see 
Jensen 1981 and n.d). The amounts derived from input dealerships increase with 
the profit potential of the dealership or occupation. This operates according to 
what could almost be described as "market principles" under which the required 
bribe for access to an input, service or a license depends on the profit derivable 
from it, subject to the relative bargaining powers, and relations in other spheres 
and markets of the involved parties. Minor public office, such as that of KSS 
chairman, also brings illegal semi-clandestine incomes which are likely to have 
increased with the quantities of material (inputs, loans) handled.
VII.2 The Paddy Trade
A highly visible outcome of the increase in irrigated boro cultivation in 
the Singra beel is the increased volume of paddy which has transformed Singra 
into a grain surplus area. This brings Samitigram households into newly evolving 
paddy marketing structures. As a simple calculation demonstrates, the increase of
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at least 300% in paddy output from Samitigram lands has increased marketed 
paddy at an even higher rate. If, with one acre of land with the average amon 
yield of 25 maunds per acre, a household used to consume 5 maunds in the pre­
irrigation period, and if the same household now cultivates irrigated boro 
yielding 75 maunds per acre while retaining amon on half an acre, marketed 
surplus will have increased by over 400% to 83 maunds. Even if population 
growth and increased consumption levels by near-subsistence households are 
taken into account, the increase in marketed paddy remains high. Trade and 
processing structures for paddy have been subject to a number of changes as a 
result of the introduction of mechanised irrigation in Singra.
Samitigram households are involved in the paddy trade as buyers, sellers 
and in processing. The scale and character of involvement in paddy-related 
exchange and processing and the level of gain or loss per unit of processed or 
marketed paddy depend on a number of opportunities and constraints experienced 
by the household.
VII.2.1 Paddy Sellers
It is well known that in Bangladesh, paddy prices fluctuate seasonally 
and that poorer producers tend to sell in low-price seasons while wealthier 
cultivators are able to take advantage of high-price periods (cf. Rahman 1973; 
BRAC 1979). In Samitigram, ’poor* and ’coping* cultivators sell most of their 
boro, including some or all of that needed for annual household consumption, 
immediately after the harvest, at low prices. Cash requirements for formal and 
informal credit repayments, consumption needs and ceremonial obligations were 
given as the main reason for this. A a result of high post-harvest sales, ’poor* and 
’coping* households have to purchase or borrow paddy at high cost in the months 
preceding the next harvest. In contrast, ’rich’ and ’well-off* households, who can 
fall back on larger non-agricultural incomes (cf. Table VII.3) and on their 
accumulated wealth, purchase paddy in the post-harvest, low -price period and
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TABLE VII.2: Prices received by 5 Sellers of Boro Paddy in Samitigram
Household8* Taka/maund_________ Time /  Circumstances of Sale _______________
Saidur 200 own produce, shar ec roppers1 r en t  and purchased paddy
( ' R i c h ' )  (625 maunds +) sold on rad io  information and personal
contac ts  to regional  ha t  and na t io na l  wholesale 
cen t res  (Khulna and Dhaka)
Adorn 130-170 produce from own and sharecropped land (400 maunds)
( 'W e l l - O f f ' )  sold in bazar and Borohat
Mujibur 145-175 produce from own and sharecropped land, sold in s tages
( 'W e l l - O f f ' )  in Borohat
Tos l in 140 own produce (40 maunds) immediately a f t e r  harvest  in
( 'Co p in g ' )  Borohat
Kamal 125 produce of sharecropped land (5 maunds) sold in bazar
( ' P o o r ' )  immediately a f t e r  harves t  to  f inance  c u l t i v a t i o n  and
consumpt i on
a) From case s tu d ie s  in chapter  IV
resell it in the high-price period before the harvest. In this way, production 
surplus of poorer cultivators is appropriated by the ’rich* and ’well-off* through 
paddy marketing.
It is argued here that access to the different levels in a hierarchy of 
sale points determines the price which sellers obtain for paddy. Table VII.2 below 
describes the circumstances of paddy sales in 1985/86 for five Samitigram 
households.
Clearly, no statistically significant data is presented in Table VII.2. 
However, it is shown in which direction the results of the main part of this thesis 
(Chapter V) would be modified when the assumption of equal returns per crop 
unit is relaxed (cf. Tables V.13 & V.14). Farmers* incomes from irrigated boro 
cultivation are the result of both marketing and production conditions. In 
Samitigram, boro marketing conditions appeared to cause relatively larger in te r­
- 304 -
household income differentials than boro production. However, Samitigram 
cultivation conditions are somewhat special. Irrigation and other groups in 
Samitigram (cf. III.4-5) have created relatively favourable access conditions to 
agricultural inputs such as credit, water, seeds and fertilizer, for poorer 
cultivators. It was shown in Chapter VI for the seven villages that these access 
conditions do not necessarily represent the norm and that the greater part of 
inter-household income differentials from boro cultivation is often caused by 
extractive pricing (cf. water in Baluabasua; see VI. 1) which is enforced by those 
in control of essential cultivation inputs.
During the low-price period after the boro harvest in 1986, most ’rich’ 
and some ’well-off* households of Samitigram sold paddy to the government 
godown (granary) in Singra town at the intervention price of Taka 175 per 
maund. At that time of the year, the local open market price was between 120 
and 140 Taka per maund. Since ’poor* and ’coping* households had restricted or 
no access to government godowns at the time, they were forced to sell their 
paddy at the lower market price. Other studies (BRAC 1980) report collusion 
between godown managers and traders in which the difference between the price 
of paddy acquired by traders in the open market is split between trader and 
godown manager while the manager refuses to buy small cultivators* produce. 
V II.2 .2 Paddy Processing
After harvest, paddy is threshed, parboiled, dried and husked. As crop 
volumes have increased, processing methods and structures have changed. This 
has distributional implications at inter- and intra-household level.
Threshing technology varies with the amount of labour available at the 
time of threshing. Whereas the smaller quantities of amon harvested in late 
October and November are threshed with cattle and mechanical threshers, the 
much greater volumes of boro harvested in June are threshed manually on 
wooden slats by the harvest labour groups (dols).
- 305 -
Amon parboiling is done by the women of the cultivator household. In 
'rich ' households, female labour is sometimes employed to assist. The boro crop, 
on the other hand, is often taken to a parboiler business or a rice mill with par­
boiling facilities, in particular by households with large irrigated holdings.
Parboiling as a business appeared as a result of irrigated boro 
cultivation in the area. Since the harvested boro needs to be parboiled and dried 
before the monsoon rains start, speedy post-harvest operations for large crop 
volumes are needed. These transform the boro crop to a quality and moisture 
level at which it can be stored. A failure to achieve this forces the cultivator to 
sell the wet paddy immediately at low post-harvest prices.
A number of men from Samitigram ’poor’ and ’coping* households 
operated seasonal post-harvest parboiling sites where their own and other 
cultivators’ paddy was parboiled in huge pots over open fires in holes dug in the 
ground. The income from such temporary parboiling business was greater than 
that from agricultural day labour. Both with paddy parboiling and husking (see 
below), as the cash return potential from the occupation has risen, it has shifted 
from the female into the male sector.
There are two "permanent" parboiling businesses near Samitigram. One 
was started in 1983 by a poor household. With an outlay of 3000 Taka, reported 
to have been raised through day labour, the household constructed a cement floor 
for paddy drying. This is rented out for 2 Taka per maund of paddy if the client 
does the drying work, or for 5 Taka per maund if the parboiler business does the 
work. This business has become the main source of income for the household.
The second parboiling business is in Notunbazar (see Map III.l). It was 
started in 1984 by a young secondary school educated woman whose husband was 
stationed in Dhaka with the army. With an outlay of 15.000 Taka, a cement floor 
and parboiling equipment was installed. The business employs up to seven 
labourers, sometimes from Samitigram. Here too, 2 and 5 Taka per maund of
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paddy are charged. The workers receive 3 Taka per maund. The business can 
process up to 30 maunds daily but tended to reach 200-300 maunds per month, 
depending on the amount of rain. When it rains the open air drying floor is 
unusable.
One of the most discussed changes in paddy processing is the shift from 
dheki husking to ricemills. Bangladesh is the last South Asian country to undergo 
this change (Greeley 1982 p.2). A number of observers have expressed concern at 
the displacement of poor women from dheki husking, one of their few cash 
income sources (Adnan & Islam 1976; McCarthy & Feldman; DeVylder 1982; 
Nebelung 1986). Greeley estimates that waged rural women, the great m ajority
of whom belong to the poorest households, contribute 23% of household earnings,
nearly half of which is derived from paddy processing.
It was by no means clear that in Samitigram, the income of poor
households whose women had been displaced from dheki husking, had fallen as a
result. One farmer said
My wife and mother used to  husk on the  dheki .  Now I 
borrow paddy from my employer, take i t  to  the  r i c e  mill  
and s e l l  i t .  They work in o ther  peo p le ' s  houses now 
(domestic se rvants )  and earn some money t h a t  way.
All household members appeared to prefer the new arrangement. 
Similar developments are reported from elsewhere. Hamid et al (1982) mention 
"rice husking men" in Rajshahi. The disappearance of the dheki has clearly meant 
a shift of cash income from the female into the male sector. This does not 
necessarily impoverish poor households since the income shift may occur within 
the same household. For female-headed households, the picture looks bleaker. 
The expansion of alternative cash income sources, such as cottage industry, 
vegetable gardening and poultry raising through increases in effective rural 
demand, may provide a counterbalance to the contraction of dheki incomes. Also, 
the employment of women for parboiling operations by those who used small rice
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mills without parboiling facilities had become more common. There were thus a 
number of indications that in Singra expansion of female cash income potential 
occurred directly or indirectly as a result of expanded crop volumes. For more 
detailed work on gender specific effects see White (1988).
A number of small, diesel or electric ricemills, often run on STW 
engines appeared with mechanised irrigation in Singra. There are three ricemills 
in the Samitigram locality. One is located a mile from Samitigram. The owner, 
who also has two STWs and a substantial brick house, started the mill in 1982 
buying new equipment for cash. The electric engine can husk up to 200 maunds 
of paddy per day and bring a before cost income of Taka 1000 per day in the 
peak season. However, like the parboilers, this ricemill is dependent on the 
weather. When it rains, little paddy is brought. For good years, the owner reports 
a profit o f up to 30.000 Taka.
Another of the local ricemills is in Borogram. Its owner bought the 
Chinese engine for 17.000 Taka in 1980. The mill is used for paddy husking and 
wheat grinding and employs 6-9 labourers. In 1985, the ricemill owner also 
bought a sawmill in response to increased local demand for furniture. Ricemill 
and sawmill now form a working complex with complementary annual peak 
activity points.
The third local ricemill is about three miles from Samitigram by the 
Natore-Bogra road. Its Chinese engine was bought new for 10.500 Taka in 1982. 
The mill processes paddy, mustard oil and wheat and has drying and parboiling 
facilities. Unlike mills which process paddy only, this mill operates all year. It 
charges more per maund of paddy (6 Taka) than the other mills and, in addition, 
offered the whole process of parboiling, drying and husking for a charge of 12 
taka per maund. The mill only employs labourers from other parts of the country. 
They live on loans from the owner when work is short and have few connections 
in the locality.
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These three ricemills are used by the great majority of Samitigram 
cultivators. However, some ’rich* households and the paddy trading group (cf. 
III.4.10) use a ricemill in Natore. The Natore mill has the advantage of being 
located at a focal point for the long-distance paddy traders so that those 
households who can afford to transport their paddy the nine miles to Natore, 
obtain valuable price information and realise higher sale prices (cf. Table VII.2 
Saidur). This brings us to the discussion of the paddy traders.
V II.2 .3 Paddy Traders
Paddy traders buy and resell unprocessed paddy or processed rice. 
Samitigram households of all categories trade paddy (cf. Table VII.2 line 17). As 
in the rest of Bangladesh, the paddy trade in Singra takes place on a number of 
buying and selling levels. In accordance with their access to the different points 
in the marketing hierarchy, paddy traders realise different profits both per unit 
of paddy marketed and in absolute terms.
Sellers who cannot transport their paddy to market, sell to village 
traders. The village traders tend to be the local wealthier farmers who also 
engage in paddy trade.
The village bazar is the next level of the paddy trade. It consists of a 
number of permanent stalls, itinerant traders and local farmers who offer small 
amounts of agricultural produce. Samitigram’s bazars are Notunbazar by the road 
junction and the old bazar in the union headquarters. Less wealthy farmers sell 
small amounts of paddy and rice in the bazar in order to meet their temporary 
cash needs.
At the next level, there are the hats, once or twice weekly large 
markets, which serve a larger number of villages. Hat traders move between the 
hats of one area on a weekly rota (see Patel 1963). Different hats specialise in 
particular types of produce. The largest hat in the Samitigram area is Borohat. It
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specialises in paddy trade. Here, paddy trade is taxed at 0.5 Taka per maund of 
paddy by those who have obtained the hat management rights at an annual 
auction. The hat tax (kajna ) is collected from every trader by female hat 
employees. In Borohat, these women have recently formed a union. Borohat is 
about five miles from Samitigram. In order to take their paddy there, villagers 
need a lorry, an ox or buffalo cart, or for smaller quantities at least a cycle 
ricksaw. Those without access to transport cannot sell in Borohat.
Borohat is a collection point for long-distance paddy traders. These 
traders, who tend to come from other areas of the country, often employ poorer 
locals to buy paddy for them in the hat in return for a per maund commission. 
Another occupation which has expanded for poorer local men through the paddy 
trade in the hat is that of porter {coolie).
Associated with the long-distance paddy trade is the "truck" transport 
business. The possession of or access to a lorry is a valuable asset to a paddy 
trader. Samitigram’s paddy trading group which buys paddy in Samitigram and 
the surrounding villages, hires a lorry to transport the paddy to the Natore rice 
mill. There, it is processed under a contract between the mill owner and the 
group. The rice mill is an assembly point for long-distance paddy traders who 
buy the processed rice from local producers and traders. When the paddy price in 
the national wholesale markets of Khulna or Dhaka is particularly high, 
Samitigram’s paddy trading group sometimes rent a lorry to take their paddy to 
the wholesale markets themselves in order to obtain the higher sale price.
A member of the Samitigram paddy trading group estimated that each 
group member needed an initial outlay of 20.000 Taka per boro season for their 
business. The profits per group member in 1986 were reported as 28.000 Taka, at 
35 Taka per maund of paddy sold.
This stands in strong contrast to the small-scale, poorer paddytraders 
who, since they lack cash and storage space, buy small amounts of paddy, have it
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processed and resell it with only a few Taka of intermediary profit.
The formation of associations of paddy traders who jointly rent or 
purchase lorries to transport paddy to more distant markets where higher prices 
can be realised, is a strategy of those who have some capital. The formation of 
transport associations (e.g. the truck samiti in Patkole; cf. VI.I.4) which jointly 
rent and eventually buy lorries which are then hired to local traders, is another 
opportunity which was taken up by those with capital which arises from increased 
crop volumes.
In the absence of credit support to those who lack access to capital and 
other resources, new opportunities in trade and transport are being captured by 
the wealthy and are likely to exacerbate inequalities in the rural areas.
VII.3 STW Supply and Services
Beyond their direct effect on cultivation incomes, the activities 
connected with the supply, maintenance and repair of STWs have effects on rural 
occupational structures and incomes. This section discusses these effects for the 
research area.
V II.3 .1 Supply
The location of aid programmes determines private STW suppliers* 
markets within Bangladesh (see 1.4.3). The private STW supply sector in 
Bangladesh is therefore dependent on investment decisions and strategies of 
foreign donors and foreign business interests.
Singra is the upazila with most STWs in Bangladesh. It has been the 
location for a number of large irrigation programmes. These programmes have 
brought the development of differentiated networks of regional and local STW 
traders and agents.
Natore district town, nine miles from the Samitigram road junction 
(Map III. 1), is the centre for Singra’s STW trade. In the early eighties, at the
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outset of privatisation initiatives in the irrigation sector, at least eleven STW 
dealers operated in Natore. Natore dealers act as agents for or buy STWs from 
Dhaka-based importers or from wholesale traders of machinery which has been 
assembled in Bangladesh. Since 1986, the STW business in Singra has declined 
sharply due to the phasing out of the IDA 1147 programme (see 1.4.3). In 1984, 
at the peak of the local STW boom, the largest Natore dealer sold 250 STWs in 
Singra. In 1986, the same dealer sold less than 100 STWs in Singra, while eight of 
his competitors closed down completely. The contraction of sales as a result of 
the phasing out of irrigation programmes in the area occurred in the context of 
the not undisputed opinion (cf. Glaser October 1986), that STW demand is now 
saturated.
In 1986, only three of the eleven dealers were still operating in Natore. 
The elaborate marketing networks of the Natore STW dealers which without 
exception involved direct contact to the village end users, are all in a process of 
severe contraction or have disappeared. The largest STW dealer in Natore who 
had started to operate in 1975, employed a number of ’fieldmen* who toured 
villages on motorcycles to advertise STWs and to assist farmers in obtaining bank 
loans for STWs. In addition to six fieldmen, the business operated a branch in 
Singra upazila headquarters during the irrigation season. The Singra branch was 
closed in early 1986.
The first contact between local dealers and Dhaka STW suppliers was 
usually established through advertisements in national newspapers which local 
Natore businessmen responded to. For these businessmen, the STW dealership 
tended to be one of several lines of business taken up as a result of their ability 
to establish connections to higher levels of the national aid/trade sector. Large 
STW dealers operate a number of import agencies and dealerships and own lorry 
or bus transport companies.
A main marketing strategy of STW dealers is to employ a villager as the
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business representative or agent to work in a number of villages. Such agents are 
paid salaries or a commission per STW sold. They also gain through a variety of 
illegal transactions which involve farmers, the local bureaucracy and the banks. It 
was known for local agents and dealers to obtain subsidized 8ADC equipment by 
submitting fake applications in the names of local farmers. Local dealers were 
also reported to be recruiting farmers for STW loan applications to banks. After 
a small downpayment, the STW is then resold, the loan defaulted on and the 
proceeds split between dealer and farmer.
I had extensive discussions with one village representative and later 
with his Dhaka-based employer. It transpired not only that Mohammed, the 
village representative, had managed to purchase at least five acres of land ^  
through various illegal transactions around his STW agency but also that his 
employers were fully aware of these transactions and condoned them in order to 
realise their own, much larger profits from the STW trade. Mohammed’s Dhaka 
employer said
"At le a s t  50% of business  are fake loan cases and Mohammed never 
d e l i v e r s  the f u l l  length of p i p e . . .  because our company needs the
local  connect ions  we allow misappropr ia t ion by local  agents to
cont inue to a c e r t a i n  e x t en t . "
( In te rv iew,  Dhaka September 1986)
Variations of "fake loan cases" with or without the involvement of 
BADC equipment, bank or public officials and private dealers, are common in 
local STW supply networks in Bangladesh. In the villages, this means increased 
income and wealth for households with the level of education and the connections 
to business and bureaucracy which enable them to (ab)use bureaucratic systems.
The example of Mohammed illustrates that the gateway function of
these villagers enables actors at higher levels to gain access to village markets
and to extract even higher gains for themselves. On the other hand, their gateway 
function is a prime form of resource accumulation for privileged villagers and 
provides them with opportunities to decrease their reliance on cultivation.
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At the end of the IDA 1147 programme in 1986, Mohammed was 
dismissed from his STW agency and reverted to cultivation. He continued to earn 
some income from trading spare parts and second hand STWs after the loss of his 
agency income.
VII.3.2 Services
In 1982, DeVylder wrote
In the  v i l l a g e  there  i s  no organis a t ion  and no technica l  competence 
a v a i l a b l e  th a t  can handle the r e p a i r  and maintenance of the 
tubewel ls :  while the crop d r ie s  up, the  farmers have to  wait fo r  the  
a r r i v a l  of an outs ide  technic ian ,  who gene ra l ly  a t tends  to  the  
farmers who o f f e r  him the h ighest  rewards.  I ne f f ic ie ncy ,  co r rupt ion  
and crop d e s t ru c t i o n  are the r e s u l t s .
(De Vylder 1982 p . 137)
Today, most STWs in Borogram union are serviced and repaired by one 
of the eight local village mechanics. The majority of Samitigram STWs are under 
seasonal contract for the repair services provided by Adorn (cf. IV.2.2). For 
Adom’s household, as for several of the other local mechanics, STW repair has 
become a major part of total household income and the key to other income 
sources such as land renting, the position of STW group manager and the sale of 
spare parts. Adorn acquired his mechanical training by apprenticing himself in a 
diesel engine workshop in Jessore. He later complemented his skills by learning 
about electric STWs in an apprenticeship in another workshop. Although he does 
not have the officially required "license", Adom has become the recognised local 
authority on electric STWs. For the future, he planned to open a shop in the local 
bazar to sell spare parts.
The majority of the other local mechanics around Samitigram acquired 
their skills by working for the BADC (see 1.4.3) and later left BADC employment 
to work on their own. A number of these mechanics remain in close contact with 
the BADC and have access to spare parts from BADC stores. Adom travels the 30 
miles to Bogra by bus in order to buy spare parts in the market.
Village mechanics occupy a central position between STW users and
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suppliers. In some areas of the country, they work as marketing agents for STW 
traders. Lewis (1987 p.22) mentions that STW traders in Chandina town had over 
60 village mechanics "on their books*. Smaller STW dealers in Natore and Singra 
tended to integrate their trade in new and second-hand STWs with the provision 
of STW spare parts and repair services.
In the village, the occupation of STW mechanic carries prestige. 
Although to a lesser extent than the agents and traders, the mechanics benefit
from  their connections with local business and act as an entry point to village
markets for their wealthier business associates in the towns.
As a result of the privatisation of agricultural input provision, a local 
private sector now forms the final link in the chain between foreign suppliers 
and village cultivators. This does not mean that the interests behind the structures 
have changed. After subsidised aid/trade programmes have established the
demand for particular types of irrigation equipment and ensured a continued high 
level of demand for spare parts®\ the privatisation of the STW trade now brings 
a change in end point distributional structures only. This weakens the Bangladeshi 
state and makes end-point distribution structures more dependent on decisions not 
necessarily taken in the country.
As functions are devolved from the local state and parastatal
bureaucracy, occupations such as fertiliser dealer, STW trader or agent and spare 
parts dealer or mechanic appear in the private sector. As a result, occupational 
diversification occurs at the village level and the development opportunities for 
some of the rural population improve.
The development outcomes of such occupational diversification depend 
on who diversifies and under what conditions.
Table VII. 1 gave an indication of the diversity of income sources by 
household category in Samitigram. The above discussion has made clear that in 
the wake of STW irrigation, despite some contractions (e.g. open water fishing)
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the scope for non-cultivation income generation has expanded for all household 
categories. Whether the paddy trade, field gleaning or the production and sale of 
handicrafts and manufactured foods is considered, the level of income derived 
from these activities has increased. At least to some extent this is due to the 
irrigation-related rises in paddy output and effective local demand. My 
quantitative data on the levels of household non-cultivation incomes is confined 
to some case studies but was confirmed by many villagers' opinions expressed to 
me informally. Table VII.3 below presents some of the case study data. No 
income totals are given as there were a number of recall problems. Thus for 
some types of income, such as moneylending, there are strong religious and 
cultural disincentives so that a disclosure of income derived from such activities 
is rare and unreliable.
TABLE VII.3: Samitigram: Cultivation and Non-Cultivation Incomes
(Taka p.a.)
Non-Cultivation Income Cult Income Non Cult. /Cult. Income 
Saidur pond fish 30.000 129.000 43%
'Rich' paddy trade 25.000
lending n . a
Adom pond fish 15.000 48.000 98%
'W-Off' fishing 7.000
STW mechanic 25.000
Mujibur bamboo sale 20.000 42.000 83%
'W-Off' pond fish 15.000
Ali milk sale 4.500 19.150 23%
'Coping' paddy business n.a
Kamal domestic servant 240 3816
'Poor' day labour n.a. 4%
ploughman n.a. 2700
Data from case  s t u d i e s  Ch IV
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In the case studies, the ’well-off* had a higher ratio of non-cultivation 
income to cultivation income and a higher average number of non-cultivation 
income sources per household than the ’rich’. This indicates that the turning away 
from land as main income source - inside the prevailing class-biased opportunity 
structures - does not necessarily occur from the top down. Factors like education 
and age of the household head determine occupational diversification. Less land 
per head among the ’well-ofF than among the ’rich* also exerts some pressure 
towards diversification. The diversification patterns of ’poor’ and ’coping’ 
households are even more the outcome of decreasing person-land ratios but do 
not produce the same development outcomes because of capital constraints.
An examination of the direction of income source diversification in the 
village survey data reveals some interesting patterns. In response to the expansion 
of demand for the products of rural cottage industry, ’coping’ and ’poor* 
households have increased the production for sale of traditional items such as 
mats, fishnets, furniture or clothing. This intensification of cottage industry 
production takes place on a small-scale, low technology level and on a seasonal 
basis. It occurs in response to expanded local demand (see Islam & Muqtada 1986 
p. 167). ’Coping* and ’poor* households are also diversifying into small-scale 
intermediary trading activities and the cultivation of vegetables and fruits for 
sale.
As could be expected, the diversification of *well-ofF and ’rich* into 
intermediary trading occurred on a much larger scale than that of poorer 
households. While wealthy villagers trade truckloads of paddy poorer households 
deal in bags of paddy, often carried on foot to the ricemills and markets.
Diversification patterns into non-cultivation production look somewhat 
different. Poorer households expand cottage industry production in response to 
increased demand. Wealthier households only rarely cultivate crops other than 
paddy for sale. Their investment concentrates on activities such as paddy trading,
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local politics and transport. Beyond the village, the pattern seems to repeat itself. 
The elites of the district and divisional headquarters derive major parts of their 
income from trade and services and much less from productive activities. This is 
not the place to examine the constraints to industrial development in Bangladesh. 
However, despite some occupational diversification at village level at present 
income levels, the influence of foreign donors on the supply structure in 
Bangladesh and the import-orientation of those with higher incomes, demand 
structure, which is so far only slightly above subsistence, bodes ill for the 
development of national non-agricultural production in future.
Despite the differences in opportunities open to village households of 
different categories, factors like attitudes to risk and other personal 
characteristics also play a part in the explanation of diversification patterns (cf. 
Ch IV Kamal and Toslin). Personal characteristics thus determine the degree of 
use of the class-specific ’room for manoeuvre*, made by individual households.
In the final analysis, income source diversification patterns at village 
level require a complex set of explanatory variables. It appeared in this research 
that there is a certain ’room for manoeuvre* for productive expansion in the
traditional rural industries, and that this is mainly taken up by the poorer
households. On the other hand, the opportunities which have the largest scope for 
profitable involvement and which are taken up on a much larger scale by the 
rural elites are in the trade, crop processing and service sectors. This direction of 
income source diversification implies an increasing external dependence of the 
country’s economic structure and a strengthening of intermediary commercial and 
bureaucratic classes in the country in their function as facilitators of the
connection to foreign aid and trade interests.
NOTES
1) All y i e ld s  and net  re tu rn s  a re  averages ca lc u la t ed  from Tables V.13 & V.14.
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2) Boro d isp laced  amon on lower lands by pushing sowing da tes  f u r t h e r  in t o  the monsoon 
per iod  ( c f .  I I I . 3 ) .
3) Calcu la ted  from Table V.14.
4) On the  o ther  hand, the sh o r te r  s t a l k s  of the  boro caused a shortage  of fuel  and 
commoditised what was prev ious ly a f r e e  resource .  Poor households who do not own 
c a t t l e  now have to  purchase cooking f u e l .
5) A gr ic u l t u ra l  wages reach an average of Taka 15 per day.
6) This involves an ou t lay  of 180.000 Taka; see a l s o  footnote  5) .
7) The in v e s t i g a t i o n  of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  a t  the d i s t r i c t  level  was beyond the 
scope of t h i s  research but would c l e a r l y  provide important c lue s  to the  cha ra c t e r  of
economic t ransformation  in the count ry.  The expansion of such in te rmediary  import-
based a c t i v i t i e s  may well counteract  the  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  in the  production s e c t o r .
8) One Dhaka businessman commented s a r c a s t i c a l l y  "Aid means th a t  the  f i r s t  sample i s 
f r e e " .
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION - PEOPLE, TECHNOLOGY AND AGRARIAN 
CHANGE
Five major themes emerge from the research. These are introduced in section
VIII. 1.1-5. Section VIII.2 then relates these fieldwork findings to the debate on 
agrarian change introduced in Chapter I. In this research, the identification of 
household categories (see II.4 and IV. 1) and of patterns of accumulation by 
household category form the basis for further investigations on how and why 
people produce and take other resource management decisions.
V III.l Fieldwork Findings
VIII.1.1 Patterns of Accumulation
Land is the most prominent form of accumulation in rural Bangladesh. 
As a ’land-augmenting’ form of investment, irrigation increases land prices (see 
Figure V.3) and thus enforces inequalities between landless and landowning 
classes. In the research area, irrigation also caused a price reversal fo r high and 
low land. This raised the relative value of the lands of the ’poor’. However, since 
the Samitigram ’rich’ purchase land regularly (see Table V .l), they are in the 
process of appropriating the higher quality land.
Section V.4 (Table V .l3 and V.14) did not reveal strong differences in 
cultivation costs and output values between household categories in Samitigram. 
However, cultivation costs, in particular for ’poor’ households, have to be 
modified on two accounts.
Firstly, although the absence of shadow prices for household labour in 
the calculation of cultivation costs reflects correctly a situation in which the 
majority of cultivators do not hire out their labour (see V.4), it also 
underestimates cultivation costs for the ’poor* who do hire out their labour and
- 320 -
therefore do have real opportunity costs for some of the household labour used in 
own cultivation.
Secondly, the omission of credit cost biases cultivation cost values in 
V.4 downwards, again in particular for the ’poor* who take the more expensive 
forms of credit (see V.2). The cultivation costs and crop values net of cost in 
Tables V .l3 and V.14 have to be interpreted in this light. A bias of cultivation 
costs and net value of crop returns against ’poor* and ’coping* households can thus 
safely be assumed.
Patterns of accumulation in the various factor markets around 
cultivation in Samitigram (V .l-V .3) point in the same direction. All ’rich* 
households reported land purchases and none reported land sales other than as 
exchange of plots. The ’rich* also profited from the credit market through 
multiple borrowing and default on formal loans, informal lending and the 
recycling of formal loans into the higher-interest informal sector (see V.2). 
Lower paid types of labour were employed by wealthier households (V.3).
For the ’poor* and ’coping*, opportunities for accumulation are fewer 
and different in character. A majority of all but the ’rich* households had less 
land in 1985/6 than in the previous generation of household heads. Only among 
the ’rich* could land purchases still counterbalance the fragmenting effect of 
population growth, inheritance rules and household nucleation on landholding size 
per household (see Table V .l). With lower household category, access cost to 
credit also increased, and default on formal credit became a less likely avenue of 
accumulation. The labour market segmented, with equal work rewarded 
differently according to the season, the organisational form of labour and the 
gender and client status of the labourer (see Figure V.4). Group labour (dols, see 
V .3.1.1) in particular commanded increased bargaining strength at times of
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systemic and climatic pressure on harvest operations for irrigated paddy. The 
more detailed findings of the fieldwork are:
a) Cultivation costs per acre and output values (net of cash costs other than 
credit) rise with the introduction of irrigated boro (Table V .l3 & V.14). With 
declining household category of the cultivator, the returns net of opportunity 
costs for own labour and credit costs decrease.
b) Employment levels increase as new types of agricultural work appear (III.3). 
D ifferent bargaining conditions and rates of return result for different sections 
of the agricultural labour market under irrigated cultivation (V.3 & Figure V.4).
c) STW irrigation is associated with an absolute improvement and a relative 
polarisation of household positions in Samitigram *). In the ’seven villages*, small 
landowners are likely to have lost in absolute terms compared with previous 
incomes from rainfed cultivation (VI.3 & Table VI.2).
d) Beyond the direct effect of irrigated cultivation, structures of crop marketing 
further polarise relative household positions (VII.2 & Table VII.2).
e) The degree of polarisation of relative household positions through irrigation 
depends not only on technological and environmental variables but also on the 
features of social organisation at micro-level.
In the seven villages, the price of and access to irrigation water, the 
character of production relations (VII. 1-2) and consequently the distribution of 
returns from irrigated cultivation (VI.3) were much more biased against poorer 
households than in Samitigram. The central factor to account for this difference
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was the mode or organisational form  of irrigation.
V III.1.2 Patronage and Productivity
Patron-client relationships are a feature of rural society throughout the 
Indian subcontinent (see Eisenstadt and Roninger 1984 pp. 150). They can be 
distinguished by strong multiple links between "pairs of unequal standing" (e.g. 
land lord-tenant; labourer-employer; lender-debtor; father-son; see Beteille 1974, 
Frykenberg 1977 p.12).
Patron-client relations are the basis for factional politics. Conflict over 
resources occurs between alliances of mixed class origin rallying behind powerful 
local leaders who themselves are in a client position to regional politicians. These 
in turn, are attached to national parties (see Alavi 1973; Wood 1978). In 
contemporary Bangladesh patron-client relations are a prime resource allocation 
mechaanism. Increasing inflows of external resources which are mediated through 
patron-client structures enforce the power-dependence element of agrarian 
relationships and decrease the scope for independent organisation and action by 
the poor.
The agricultural productivity potential faciltitated by mechanical 
irrigation affects the objectives and outcomes of patron-client relationships in 
Samitigram and the seven villages. The specific findings of this research are:
a) Interlinked factor markets and power-dependency relationships retain 
importance in the agrarian structure under irrigated conditions, but to different 
degrees and in different forms depending on the organisational form of 
irrigation.
Chapter V showed how factor market relationships in irrigated 
agriculture in Samitigram changed to facilitate greater agricultural productivity.
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Land exchanges and sales, tenancy and mortgaging relationships changed under 
irrigated cultivation so as to achieve economies of scale and productivity 
increases. Yield expectations have become a factor in landowners* choice of 
tenants for irrigated land This has increased the performance of tenant 
cultivators, occasionally beyond that on own land (IY.2.2 Adom). In contrast to 
rainfed cultivation, levels of payment to some forms of labour in irrigated 
cultivation now increase with output and speed of work rather than being 
dependent on employer-labour relations in other markets (see V.3.1.1).
The influx of migrant labour groups, especially for the harvest of 
irrigated crops has removed some labour relations around irrigated cultivation 
from  the context of patron-client relationships. The bargaining process between a 
labour group (represented by its sardar) and an employer leaves group labourers 
at peak demand times less exposed to the pressures of unequal multi-stranded 
relationships in interlinked markets than individual labourers and labourers in 
cropping systems with less precise timing requirements. Like the migrant 
labourers, groups of local labourers have become able to press for higher returns 
at times of systemic pressure for speed of irrigated operations.
b) STW irrigation groups in Samitigram weakened, and individual ownership of 
STWs in the seven villages have enforced interlinkages between factor markets.
In Samitigram, relatively secure access to HYV seeds, fertiliser and 
water through groups (III.4-5) achieved increased agricultural productivity for 
the majority of cultivators. This provided some economic security to small 
landowners and decreased the extent and degree of success of extractive practices 
in interlinked markets. In the labour market, higher demand and the appearance 
o f poorer agricultural employers brought higher returns to migrant and group 
labourers whose employment relationships had fewer linkages to other markets.
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With individual STW ownership in the seven villages on the other hand, 
the lack of access to irrigation water forced small landowners to rent their land 
to wealthy land-cum-STW owners, and to enter the labour market even before 
the output potential of their own land fell below household requirements. Here, 
control over water through the ownership of irrigation equipment enforced elite 
control over small landowners. New linkages between factor markets appeared 
(e.g. water-land-labour; cf. VI.2.2.3) so that STW owner’s returns from other 
factor markets increased through their control over irrigation.
c) The enforcement of extractive factor market interlinkages in the seven villages 
had some negative effects on the efficiency of use of irrigation equipment and 
land (cf. command area size, Tables III. 1 & VI. 1). On the whole, under irrigated 
conditions, patron-client relationships and market interlinkages were used to 
affect the distribution of increased outputs rather than at the expense of 
agricultural productivity.
In Samitigram, wealthier households concentrate efforts on irrigated 
cultivation. As a result, poorer tenants have gained access to more sharecropping 
land during the low-yield rainfed amon season. These form part of multiple 
relations with wealthier households in interlinked markets .
d) New potential for patron-client relationships has arisen with technological 
change and increased dependence of the village on wider networks.
Some locally new areas for patronage were
- Informal loans for paddy business (husking of paddy at rice mill and resale 
(VII.2)
- credit from provision shops/input dealers to facilitate irrigated cultivation
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(VII. 1)
- employment in transport, trade, ricemills and as tubewell operator (VII. 1-3).
e) In Samitigram, the position of manager of irrigation, credit or other groups 
facilitates the exercise of patronage over a number of clients, conveniently 
aggregated in groups, in a situation where increasing scarcity of land and lack of 
alternative income sources requires a concern with agricultural productivity to 
ensure social peace and continued surplus appropriation from agriculture (cf. 
VIII. 1.3 a). The Samitigram groups demonstrate that one-to-one power- 
dependency relations are not necessary for the exercise of patronage (see also 
Adnan 1984 p.91). The group is a new unit for the exercise of patronage. This 
has also been examined by Nebelung (1988) who finds "non-exploitative patron- 
client relations" between NGO field staff and landless and land-poor groups of 
agricultural labourers.
V III.1.3 Factor Markets: Change and Continuity
The findings on the changes in agrarian relations under STW-irrigated 
cultivation are central to the argument and should be read in conjunction with 
the discussion in VIII.2.
a) Mechanised irrigation overcomes technological barriers to output growth in 
Bangladeshi agriculture. With present rates of demographic growth and without 
further reserves of cultivable land, the need to realise increased returns from 
land increasingly forces a concern with agricultural productivity rather than with 
surplus extraction only on the producers and non-producing appropriators of 
agricultural surplus.
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b) With this shift from an extractive approach to cultivation to one concerned 
with output and productivity, the functions and contractual forms of agrarian 
production relations have diversified.
c) Agrarian production relations also assumed different roles for households of 
different categories Different household categories were found to focus on 
different agrarian relationships for the expansion of their agricultural 
productivity and returns.
The diversification of agrarian relationships took different forms in the 
land, credit and labour markets for different household categories:
- -  While land sales took the form of exchanges for the ’rich’ and usually 
consolidated holdings, some ’well-off* sold land in order to invest in non- 
agricultural pursuits, or to buy more fertile land. ’Poor* and ’coping’ households, 
on the other hand, sold land mainly to finance life-cycle and consumption needs 
but made few land sales for income-generating investments.
- -  Distinguished by contractual form and structural meaning there were four 
types of land tenancy in Samitigram and the seven villages.
Firstly, there is ’traditional’ sharecropping (mainly for unirrigated 
paddy; V. 1.4.1). This is an integral and interchangeable part of a string of 
connections between a poorer and a better-off household all of which reproduce 
the dominant class position of the better-off and are essential to the economic 
survival of the poorer household. ’Traditional* sharecropping agreements tend to 
be contractually linked to other markets so that the unequal class position of 
landowner and tenant household is not only reflected in the tenancy agreement 
but also in employment, credit or water access conditions.
Secondly, there is ’new* sharecropping (for irrigated paddy; V .l.4.2).
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These contracts are entered more with agricultural output and productivity 
objectives as part of wider power-dependence relationships. Tenants tend to be 
chosen because of their particular cultivation skills or advantages in access to 
inputs rather than because of client status towards the landlord household For 
the landowner, the sharecropping contract functions to generate income from 
land without operational responsibilities. For the tenant, the sharing in of 
irrigated boro land is an opportunity for additional income from cultivation 
under the constraint of limited supplies of own land.
Thirdly, there is fixed in-kind rent (for irrigated land; V .l.4.3). This 
evolved from sharecropping and in Samitigram existed between one wealthier 
landowner and a number of poorer tenants in Samitigram. It allows the wealthy 
landowner to eliminate even his supervision of harvest and crop division while 
continuing to receive a regular income from his land. To the tenants, the fixed- 
rent agreement provides larger returns than sharecropping, and increases the 
incentive to increase production efficiency as all income above rent remains with 
the tenant-cultivator.
Fourthly, there is fixed ’reverse* tenancy (for irrigated land; VI.2.2.1). 
This prevailed between poor landowners and wealthy STW owner-cum-tenants 
fo r irrigated land in the seven villages and was the only form of tenancy for 
irrigated land in some of the villages (e.g. Baluabasua VI. 1 2). Here, the tenancy 
relationship allows a wealthier landowner-cum-tenant to consolidate his operated 
holding around his STW and so to realise income from the land of others through 
his control over water. In the longer term, the reverse tenancy relationship is 
likely to lead to the transfer of land ownership to the STW owner (VI.2.2.1).
- -  Land mortgages diversified in form and function both for mortgagors and 
mortgagees (see V.1.5).
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For mortgagors, a mortgage taken does not necessarily mean a pressing 
consumption or life-cycle need. Mortgages were also taken to improve the 
composition of household assets either by acquiring more land or agricultural 
inputs, or by investing in non-agricultural pursuits.
For mortgagees, the mortgaging in of irrigated land has become a 
means to gain access to productive land for cultivation under a less exploitative 
form of mortgage (khaikalashi; see V.1.5). The mortgaging in of less productive 
rainfed land, on the other hand, occurred under a more exploitative form of 
mortgage (bondhok; see V.1.5 & VI.2.2.1). Under irrigated cultivation, surplus 
appropriation thus is not inbuilt into the structure of the mortgage itself, but has 
become dependent on the productive cultivation of land which is temporarily 
acquired through the mortgage.
Credit in particular, illustrated the variable meaning of factor market 
relationships for different household categories. For the richest village 
households, formal credit tended to constitute a one-off income source through 
the mechanism of default. For ’w ell-off’, ’coping* and some ’poor* cultivators, 
formal credit has become a necessary HYV cultivation input and was therefore 
repaid. On the other hand, informal credit was taken by the ’coping* for larger 
life-cycle or unforeseen expenses. The ’poor’ took most high-interest informal 
loans for consumption requirements (V.2).
A new form of ’formal credit*, recycled informally by the credit samiti 
developed in Samitigram (see III.4.6). The absence of land collateral requirements 
for credit samiti loans improved the likelihood of profitable and efficient 
irrigated cultivation in particular for ’coping* and ’poor’ households.
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- -  Organisational forms of labour diversified with irrigated HYV cultivation. 
Under the lowest paid forms of male labour, (annual and seasonal labour), mostly 
individual, non-local and ’weak* local labourers worked in a situation of 
dependence, either through lack of local connections or through multi-stranded 
relationships in interlinked markets.
For group labour (dots, see V.3.1.1), levels of payment adjusted to 
labour market supply and demand without apparent wage-reducing effects of 
linkages to other markets and with a positive correlation between labour 
productivity and returns to labour.
Other new forms of agricultural labour (female and child work) 
commanded very low wages, prejudged the development chances of ’poor’ 
children and depressed overall returns to labour.
An ’elite* of Samitigram labourers appeared whose access to the most 
highly paid agricultural employment was due to their physical strength and their 
client position towards ’rich* households.
d) Depending on the mode of ownership and use of STWs, factor market 
interlinkages in agricultural production either weakened or strengthened.
With irrigation groups in Samitigram, relations in the land, labour, 
credit and water markets tended to become less interlinked and to focus more on 
output and productivity increases in the separate markets (V .l-V .3).
Under individual STW ownership in the seven villages, control over 
water increased STW owners* command over the land and labour of others so that 
extractive practices were not only enforced in the water market itself, but also in 
other, interlinked markets. This enforcement of market interlinkages had 
regressive distributional results (VI.3), but did seem to allow for productivity and
- 330 -
output increases for the elites through use of some agrarian relationships such as 
land exchange and reverse tenancy for command area consolidation
e) In Samitigram, group irrigation weakened market interlinkages but did not 
displace them. The coexistence of rainfed, low-yield, high-risk cultivation and 
irrigated, high-yield, lower-risk cultivation on the same plots of land at different 
times of the year (see III.3) allowed wealthier landowners the simultaneous 
engagement in productivity-oriented production relationships in the irrigated 
boro season, and the continuation of extractive relationships in interlinked factor 
markets in the rainfed amon season.
VIII.1.4 People, their Choices and Room for Manoeuvre
Sections VI. 1 and VI.2 identify a number of environmental and 
ecological factors which influence the distributional and structural impact of 
STWs in the eight villages studied (VI.1-2).
a) In the seven villages (cf. VI. 1), charges for STW water were lower on higher 
land because rainfed cropping alternatives existed. This was the case although 
irrigation costs increase with land elevation. On the other hand, there were 
higher water charges for lower land despite lower irrigation costs. This was due 
to the lack of rainfed cropping alternatives on lower land. This allowed for 
monopolistic water pricing by STW owners.
In Samitigram, on the other hand, irrigation cost was mirrored in 
irrigation charges.
b) The presence of alternatives to the STW such as LLP, DTW and traditional 
irrigation methods reduced the scope for those in control over STWs to extract
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high water charges. The highest water charges were found in Baluabasua (VI. 1.2) 
where there were no alternatives to STW irrigation, and where uniformly low 
land levels made rainfed crops within the reach of most operating STWs 
impossible.
On the other hand, on Samitigram lands irrigation charges reflected cost 
and were far below those in any of the seven villages although alternative 
cropping patterns or irrigation methods did not exist on most lands.
c) Proximity to sources of non-cultivation income (road, town, important traffic 
junction) contributed to more fragmented village markets, in which poorer, less 
powerful households were able to gain some access to water and sharecropping 
land.
It has been argued that an important effect of the increased productivity 
potential achieved through mechanised irrigation is the appearance of more 
productivity-oriented agrarian relationships (cf. VIII. 1.2 e & VIII. 1.3 a & b). This 
was found for Samitigram group irrigation and also fo r individual STW 
ownership in the seven villages. A polarisation of household positions through 
STW irrigation occurred in all villages. However, STW irrigation polarised 
household positions to a lesser extent (see Table VI.2) and was accompanied by a 
partial elimination rather than an enforcement of dependency structures in 
Samitigram.
d) Although environmental and ecological factors provide some indications to the 
difference in water prices and access conditions between the seven villages, they 
do not explain the difference between Samitigram and the seven villages (see 
Table VI. 1). Samitigram’s charges for STW water were only 20 to 60% of those in 
the seven villages and, in contrast to the seven villages, access to STW water
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existed for the great majority of Samitigram cultivators. However, none of the 
conditions which facilitated more favourable conditions for the poor in the seven 
villages (i.e. connection to sources of external income; medium to high 
agricultural land to allow for cropping alternatives; alternative mechanised 
irrigation; see Table VI. 1) were found in Samitigram.
e) It is clear then that changes in production structures and productivity, which 
follow the introduction of a new technology are not only determined by the 
inherent characteristics of that technology and by the physical and environmental 
conditions into which the technology is inserted.
The difference between Samitigram and the seven villages in the impact 
of STWs lies in the influence of STW groups and individual ownership of STWs 
on the structure and outcomes of agricultural production. Group irrigation in 
Samitigram increased land productivity and the efficiency of use of irrigation 
equipment to a greater extent than individual ownership in the seven villages and 
achieved greater benefits for poorer cultivators (cf. Table VI.2). Moreover, 
irrigation groups reduced the scope for individual STW owners in Samitigram to 
use control over water to extract monopoly rents and to increase their power in 
other factor markets (see III.5 and IV.2.1).
Samitigram villagers told me repeatedly and confidently: "We might 
fight on other things, but we are united in agriculture." People from 
neighbouring villages commented in a resigned fashion that in their village it was 
impossible to run a group because "people will fight".
Although the initial stimulus for group formation in Samitigram was the 
news about Comilla cooperatives in the seventies, which reached the village via a 
man from a neighbouring village, Samitigram irrigation and other groups (see 
III.4-5) were formed without any directed input into group organisation from
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outside, government or non-government agencies.
The question arises of why people chose to form groups in Samitigram 
and not in any of the other villages in the research area. I do not offer an 
explanation. However, a number of points arise from the research.
f) Samitigram groups have their common origin in a particular conjuncture of 
historical events. The war of independence and the subsequent enthusiasm fo r a 
better and more just society coincided with the brush between a number of young 
educated men from the village and the fraudulent union chairman (see III.4.1). 
This coincided with an intergenerational struggle for control between 
Samitigram’s old, traditional leaders and other younger w ell-off villagers, often 
their sons, who aspired to village leadership. The formation of groups served as a 
means to collect followers for these aspiring young leaders. Personality factors, 
which qualify the ’young men* of the early seventies as trusted and able leaders 
in the eyes of most villagers also contributed to the formation and continued 
functioning of Samitigram groups.
g) Increasing numbers of poor, potential *clients* on a decreasing per capita land 
base can no longer be contained in old-style, dyadic patron-client relationships. 
They thus present a potential threat to social peace. Moreover, under prevailing 
conditions of land fragmentation, the productive use of new agricultural 
technologies (wells, pumps, mills, tractors) can only be achieved through the 
formation of *user groups*. Group formation is thus one logical reaction to 
prevailing economic and social pressures and may well be a prototype for 
patron-client relations of the future.
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h) Section III. 4 demonstrated that Samitigram irrigation groups do not always 
produce equitable outcomes or apply rules irrespective of position and status . 
The *pseudo groups* (III.4), managed by a member of the richest household in 
Samitigram show most clearly that managers also use irrigation groups to extract 
agricultural surplus through interlinked markets. Most irrigation groups in 
Samitigram did not operate in such a straightforward manner, but group 
managers could derive benefits from their position through interlinkages to other 
markets (e.g. land: see IV .2.1 Saidur, point 10).
j) Like individual STW ownership, group irrigation in Samitigram can thus 
involve appropriation through market interlinkages. Nonetheless it was very clear 
that group irrigation in Samitigram leaves less powerful actors, such as tenants 
and small landowners, more ’room for manoeuvre* to engage in cultivation, to 
expand their profits from cultivation, and to establish a base - at least 
temporarily - for economic independence through irrigated cultivation. Irrigation 
groups thus weakened and changed, rather than eliminated extractive factor 
market linkages and patron-client relations in Samitigram. In the seven villages, 
on the other hand, STW irrigation has enforced unequal relations of power and 
dependence through old and new factor market linkages and is speeding up the 
transformation of small cultivators into effectively landless labourers.
k) A difference in rationale accompanied this. While in the seven villages, 
groups or factions were seen as in conflict over given resources, the members of 
at least some of the Samitigram groups understood themselves through their 
augmentation of resources through cooperation as a result, the opportunities 
from  groups open to households from various categories differed fundamentally. 
If poverty is defined as the degree of absence of choice (cf. White 1988), then
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the poor have become poorer in the seven villages, whereas in Samitigram their 
’room for manoeuvre* has increased through STW groups.
These findings show some interesting parallels with Nebelung*s work 
(1988) on NGO-facilitated small farmer and landless groups. Like Samitigram 
groups, NGO-facilitated groups for two major Bangladeshi NGO’s, Nijera Kori 
and Proshika, are found to be of mixed class origin, to create increased *room 
fo r manoeuvre* for the poor and to include an element of patronage between 
group members and manager/NGO facilitator. The open question in both cases 
remains whether group leaders, be they NGO staff or ’enlightened new elite 
managers* will consolidate their positions as patrons or whether ’client members* 
will be able to decrease their dependence and achieve self-sustaining forms of 
development.
V III.1.5 Limits to Diversification
In view of population/land ratios in Bangladesh, the increase in 
cultivation incomes, which results from the introduction of mechanised irrigation, 
at best stabilises the economic position of most cultivator households temporarily. 
A secure and sustainable diversification of income sources away from land-based 
occupations is needed for the future. Except in Chapter VII, this thesis has not 
focussed on diversification. Some findings and speculations can be presented 
nonetheless.
a) The degree of diversification out of cultivation affects production relations in 
cultivation (cf. VI.9 and Table VI. 1). Thus the availability of non-cultivation 
employment, mostly subject to proximity to a road, traffic junction or town (eg. 
Patkole VI. 1), and other rural income potential outside cultivation (such as from 
open-water fishing in Samitigram; see Table VII. 1 & Figure V.4) can enable local
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workers not to tie their labour and therefore make them able to be press for 
higher returns in peak periods of labour demand.
b) With mechanised irrigation, the scope for occupational diversification in the 
research area expanded (see VII. 1). However, patterns of diversification varied 
by household category.
’Poor’ and ’coping* households tended to derive non-cultivation incomes 
through a succession of seasonal occupations in production, trade and services. 
These were combined with cultivation to achieve a precarious but relatively 
continuous annual income. Seasonal occupations, which accounted for only a 
small fraction of total annual household income (e.g. netmaking, construction 
work), constituted the main or only household income for specific periods of the 
year.
On the other hand, individual members of some ’well-off* and the ’rich’ 
joint households tended to engage in non-cultivation activities on a full-time, 
year-round basis. Their occupations (produce trade, transport, local 
administration) were often related to or functionally interlocking with the 
cultivation activities of other household members and tended to increase 
household gains beyond those directly realised through the occupations of 
individual members.
c) Occupational diversification into crop processing, trade and service in the 
context of irrigated cultivation was found for all household categories and varied 
in scale according to household capital assets (cf. VII. 1-2).
d) Increased effective demand led to local growth effects in cottage industries 
and non-paddy farm production (e.g. mats, nets, quilts, pottery, clothes, eggs,
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fruits, sweets; see VII. 1). While ’poor* and ’coping* households increased 
traditional production, the ’w e ll-o ff and ’rich* responded to increased effective 
demand prim arily by increased processing and (import) trading activities. A 
diversification into non- agricultural production for sale did not occur among 
Samitigram’s ’rich*. This pattern of diversification indicates that growth of 
incomes and effective demand leads to a strengthening of the intermediary, 
commercial and bureaucratic elites in their function as facilitators of the external 
connection, and at most to the development of fragmented non-cultivation 
production structures. The character of the connection between Bangladesh and 
foreign industrial nations clearly limits the potential for sectoral diversification 
in Bangladesh from the village level upwards. Further research to substantiate 
these indications would be needed.
e) An examination of the STW sector (1.4.3 & VII.3) illustrated some of these 
points. Structures and processes at the various levels of STW supply and service 
networks in Bangladesh are affected by the connections to foreign capital. 
Constraints to the productive expansion of the STW sector in Bangladesh, and to a 
self-sustained growth of marketing networks can be traced to the objectives and 
activities of foreign suppliers and of associated, although often conflicting and 
heterogeneous, Bangladeshi commercial and administrative interests
f) Despite the externally imposed limitations on processes of growth and change 
in the STW sector, development (see p .l) does occur, although to different 
degrees for different household categories. Occupations such as STW mechanic, 
installer, spare parts producer, operator, agent and importer achievee some 
sectoral diversification and provide scope for economic advance households* 
formal education, socio-political role and material assets.
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V III.2 Which Way Change? Some Speculations
This section links fieldwork findings of VIII. 1 into the broader patterns 
of long-term structural change which were outlined under 1.2. This is combined 
with a discussion of other contemporary research findings.
Fieldwork findings revealed two different patterns of change in 
reaction to the same technology in one ecologically quite uniform micro-region 
in Bangladesh. On the other hand, there are common features in apparently very 
different trajectories of change in Samitigram and the seven villages.
Most importantly, with growing resource scarcity, the disassociation of 
agricultural production from the appropriation of agricultural surplus is 
becoming an increasingly unviable strategy (VIII. 1.3 a). Consequently, surplus 
appropriation is becoming more dependent on an expansionary ’capitalist’ 
rationale under which agrarian relations, whether they have clearly polarising 
effects as in the seven villages, or less inegalitarian outcomes as in Samitigram, 
are directed towards the increase of agricultural productivity and output.
The emergence of this capitalist rationale can occur in the context of 
agrarian relations which have not conventionally been categorised as capitalist 
(such as share tenancy, informal lending and land mortgaging). Banaji’s 
distinction between "forms of exploitation" (e.g. wage labour and share tenancy) 
and "modes of production" (e.g. capitalism and feudalism) (1971 p.2428; see also 
p. 13) and Adnan’s (1984 p. 108) "forms of market" versus "forms of production" 
conceptualise this. As both authors argue, forms of exploitation (or market) do 
not imply particular modes (or forms) of production. Thus new market 
interlinkages such as water-land-labour (see VI.2.2) can enable exploiters to take 
over production decisions and thus to increase agricultural production. On the 
other hand, the loosening of market interlinkages can also enable people to 
pursue common interests together in an expansionary capitalist mode (e.g.
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Samitigram’s irrigation groups). My focus on the contractual form and structural 
meaning of agrarian relationships does not presuppose the association of forms of 
agrarian relationships with particular structural meanings or modes of production.
Section 1.2 showed how the meaning of different agrarian relations has 
changed over time. Section 1.3 and VIII. 1 demonstrate that the meaning of 
agrarian relations is has changed and is continuing to change.
Thus up to the end of the Mughal period, land revenue was a form of 
parasitic surplus extraction and disassociated from the efficiency and outcomes of 
agricultural production. In the British period, land revenue became an outmoded 
form of surplus extraction and was replaced by debt relations (see p. 15). After 
the increases in agricultural productivity since the 1960s, a replacement of 
usurious debt relations by land rent as the major mechanism of surplus extraction 
from agriculture is again taking place (see p.33). However, land rent today is 
functionally different from the earlier, parasitic forms of land rent. Increased 
productivity potential and a reduced per capita land base compel producers and 
non-producing appropriators of agricultural surplus to incorporate productivity 
objectives into their use of land rent.
The changes over time in the forms and functions of land tenancy 
illustrate this. The original function of share tenancy in the Mughal period was
the expansion of cultivated area and the appropriation of food and tradeable
produce by non-cultivating elites. Here the appropriating ’parasitic* (in the sense 
of non-producing) landlords rather than the tenants were the initiator and driving
force behind the tenancy relationship (see p. 10). During the British period,
resource pressures were turned against the tenant cultivator (see pp. 12-18). As a 
result, tenants started to compete for sharecropping land to maintain basic 
subsistence levels while the relative importance of land rent as a vehicle for the 
extraction of agricultural surplus declined. At the same time, debt relations rose
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in importance. Until the arrival of "green revolution technologies", share tenancy 
tended to constitute an integral part of patron-client relations at the expense of 
productivity . or in conditions of low productivity potential and/or high risk of 
crop failure.
Mechanised irrigation and other HYV inputs have not displaced this 
type of "traditional" tenancy (see V. 1.4.1). However, new functions and meanings 
fo r land tenancy have appeared (see V .l.4.2-3 & VI.2.2.1). Under "entrepreneur 
renting" tenants* rationale for the tenancy relationship revolves around output and 
profit; 'reverse tenancy' has inverted the traditional roles of poor tenant and rich 
landlord; and landlords' selection of tenants for more fertile, irrigated land 
appears to depend more on expected crop returns and less on the relations in 
other markets.
Land mortgaging emerged during the British period as a consequence of 
the transformation of land property into an alienable right. Like usurious credit 
relations (see below), mortgages constituted a form of parasitic appropriation 
since the extraction of agricultural surplus was achieved through interest in 
isolation from  the agricultural production process. With HYV production, land 
mortgages are now used by mortgagees to gain access to productive land for 
cultivation. The difference in contractual form of mortgages for rainfed low- 
yield land ('extractive' bondhok) and for fertile irrigated land ’production- 
oriented' khaikalashi; see V .l.5 & VI.2.2) illustrates this. The converse change 
from  a less to a more exploitative form of land mortgage with the introduction 
of irrigated cultivation was observed by Howes (1985 p.64/65). This cautions 
against easy generalisations and underlines that not the form of exploitation 
(which is determined by varying political economy conditions), but the rationale 
behind agrarian relations is crucial for the identification of transformation 
processes. As does this research, Howes finds that while the mortgage used to
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serve as a disguised form of usurious moneylending the use of the land under 
present irrigated conditions passes to the moneylender until the original loan can 
be repaid (loc.cit). In both cases the rationale behind the mortgage has thus 
turned towards production objectives.
Other recent research in areas of irrigated HYV cultivation in 
Bangladesh describes khaikalashi mortgages as "a form of tenancy" (Rahman 
1986) "a system of intermediate land possession" (Mtiller 1988) or "a middle-term 
investment possibility" (RSder 1988 sic). Changes in the function of mortgages 
under HYV cultivation are thus clearly part of the transformation process under 
which surplus appropriation is coming to rely increasingly on the productive 
utilisation of assets rather than on the use of extractive power in disassociation 
from  the production process.
Usurious credit relations linked the rural cultivator to markets and 
replaced land revenue as the primary means of extraction from agriculture in the 
British period (pp. 15-18). Colonial surplus extraction from agriculture relied on 
the intensification of extractive practices through debt rather than on 
productivity increases. While extractive practices in the credit sector persist (see 
V.2), in recent years credit has also become a necessary precondition for 
production for the majority of HYV cultivators. Thus some credit relations have 
become an integral part of agricultural production relations. Rather than 
constitute a parasitic "fetter" on agricultural productivity, some types of credit 
relations are now engaged in by creditor and debtor in order to further the 
exploitation of latent agricultural productivity potential.
The origins of landless labour in Bengal have been traced back to forms 
of forced labour and predial slavery in the Mughal period (pp.10-11). With 
abundant land supplies, coercive forms of labour use were required to ensure 
agricultural surplus extraction by the non-producing classes. With the
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commercialisation of rights to land in the British period, slavery transformed into 
debt bondage. Tied indebted labour (i.e. the interlinkages between labour and 
credit markets) remained a feature of agrarian production relations during the 
British period. More contemporary village studies (Jansen 1983; 1986) note an 
increasing incidence of day labour and a loosening o f tied labour relations with 
growing numbers of landless since landowners no longer need to secure their 
labour supply. Forms of "tied" longer-term  labour today are rarer and are now 
often an assurance to the labourer of a certain permanence of employment at the 
cost of a reduction in wages (see V.3.1.3).
With continuing demographic pressure and increased agricultural 
productivity potential through irrigated HYV cultivation, the character of labour 
relations is diversifying. The eight villages of this study showed an increase in 
contracts for group labour. This brings an element of collective bargaining 
between employer and labour group into the agricultural labour market. Returns 
to some forms of labour varied with speed of work and labour productivity. 
Furthermore, the requirements of efficient agricultural production and labour 
market supply and demand conditions, rather than contractual interlinking of 
markets, determined the nature of some agricultural employment relationships. 
This was the case in particular when climatic or "systemic'' pressures for the 
prompt execution of agricultural tasks were high. Other research notes that with 
the intensification of rice farming, a change from day labour towards labour 
contracts for particular tasks occurs. Under the latter, the elimination of 
interlinked market has progressed furthest as the labourer becomes
a self -employed serv ice o f f e r e r  in a g r i c u l t u r e  working a t  . . . ( h i s  
H.G.) own r i s k  without any soc ia l  suppor t and s e c u r i t y .
(Piesch 1988 p . 122)
An analysis of agrarian change cannot confine itself to the cultivation 
sector. The evolution of the non-cultivation sector interacts closely with that of
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cultivation and determines the strategic "room for manoeuvre" for different 
groups of rural people. From a diverse base centred on local and regional Asian 
markets in the Mughal period, non-agricultural production in Bengal became 
almost exclusively bound for European markets. With the industrial revolution, 
markets for Bengali manufactures were closed. At the end of the British period, 
manufacturing was nearly extinct and Bengal had become the provider of raw 
materials for non-agricultural production elsewhere. The reversal to agriculture 
of formerly diverse production structures meant that a trading and intermediary 
but no industrial elite evolved. After the separation from India, and again at 
independence in 1971, the exodus of many Hindus meant a further contraction of 
non-agricultural production.
In contemporary Bangladesh, economic and social status are still mostly 
achieved through mediating positions for external capital or through state 
patronage. Independence from Pakistan was obtained almost without any 
industrial elite in Bangladesh and with a Bangladeshi state which had nationalised 
large Pakistani assets. The control of political and bureaucratic networks and 
state patronage thus remained the major avenue to wealth in Bangladesh. 
International trade and some forms of barely distinguishable "aid" have provided 
expanded opportunities to accumulate through intermediary activities (e.g. import 
and marketing of foreign products) and, more recently, to expand into production 
activities such as the garments industry under particular constraints imposed by 
foreign capital and associated internal vested interests.
The STW sector has illustrated this here (1.4.3 & VII.3). As a working 
hypothesis rather than as a research finding I suggest that the "switch to 
exploitation via expanded reproduction" in the STW sector, as in other non- 
agricultural production sectors in Bangladesh, is impeded by the limitations 
imposed by external interests and by the inability or unwillingness of internal
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adm inistrative and com mercial forces to resist.
This has repercussions for the rural sector. The type of irrigation 
technology supplied (cf. 1.4.1) and the character of supply and service systems 
reflect the objectives of external forces and of intermediary Bangladeshi elites. 
This poses constraints on the extent and direction of growth of non-cultivation 
incomes for the rural population and affects the development of agricultural 
production relations.
VIII.3 Outlook
Irrigation groups of the Samitigram type are one of the possible 
outcomes of current population pressures on land and of the organisational 
requirements of new, more productive cultivation methods in rural Bangladesh. 
The particular combination of circumstances which led to group formation in 
Samitigram (see VI.3) may not be the rule. On the other hand, in the absence of 
significant non-cultivation income sources only the wealthiest top few percent of 
Bangladeshi rural households can still rely on extractive practices in the 
cultivation sector. Villages with nearby non-cultivation income sources tend to 
have looser market interlinkages, less extensive extractive practices and a greater 
number of productivity-enhancing features in agricultural production relations.
This has policy and research implications. The stalemate around 
landownership and use ^  may be overcome by concentrating on new avenues to 
acquiring incomes and assets for land- and assetless groups which no longer 
depend on access to land. The production, use and trade of new agricultural 
technologies are some of the options, which have been investigated by recent 
research (Wood, Palmer-Jones and Ahmed forthcoming; Lewis forthcoming) and 
NGO activities (e.g BRAC & Proshika in Bangladesh).
One cannot predict whether Samitigram irrigation groups will continue
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to include most cultivators, or whether groups will be appropriated and used for 
’old-style* extraction when the new Samitigram leaders have consolidated their 
position.
However, if, as is argued here, the aggregation of cultivators into 
groups is the expression of a new economic rationale which is systematically 
necessitated by changed opportunities and constraints in the economy, Samitigram 
groups will continue to function and opportunities for the productive use of 
resources will remain available to the majority of cultivators in the village. With 
irrigation-led increased productivity potential, economic advancement in rural 
Bangladesh is no longer necessarily or exclusively equated with the exploitation 
of others. For the policymaker and "development practioner", this presents the 
challenge to improve the conditions for the functioning of self-sustaining 
technology-user and input-access groups of the Samitigram type. The discussion 
of this will have to be continued elsewhere.
Here, it remains to be said that if  defined as "a switch to exploitation 
via expanded reproduction" from a situation of extractive or "parasitic" 
exploitation (Adnan 1984 p.226; see also p. 5), the transformation to capitalism 
is clearly occurring in the area I studied.
NOTES
1) S i mi la r ly ,  Hamid e t  al  (1978) f ind th a t  mechanised minor i r r i g a t i o n  reduces the  per 
acre  ne t  income gap between small and large  farmers but widens the per household ne t  
income gap. Qadir e t  al  (1978) f ind for  the  seven v i l l a g e s  th a t  HYVs have turned 
smal le r  landholding ca tegor ies  in to  surplus  producers .
2) In a comparison of two tu b e w e l l - i r r i g a t e d  v i l l a g e s ,  Alam (1984 p . 113) re po r t s  two 
ca te g o r ie s  of t enants  who d i f f e r  in c a p i t a l  and labour endowment and f inds  the  
d i f f e r e n c e  more pronounced in the v i l l a g e  with b e t t e r  access to  HYV c u l t i v a t i o n  
input s .
3) For the  development of s t r u c t u r e s  of power and dependence around new technology in 
ru ra l  Bangladesh see Lewis ( forthcoming).
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4) Findings V I I I . 1.3 a) & b) der ive  from the f ieldwork mater ia l  of chapters  IV to  VI.
5) My resources  d id  not allow for  the c o l l e c t i o n  of much d e t a i l e d  c u l t i v a t i o n  cost  
and output  da ta  in the seven v i l l a g e s  (but see Table VI .2) .
6) Concluded from conversat ions and interviews in the research a r ea .
7) See Islam, Faaland & Parkinson 1981; Sobhan 1982 on the  fo re ig n  dependence of the 
Bangladesh s t a t e  and Rahman 1986 (ch 8) for  aspec ts  of dependence between "peasants 
and the  s t a t e " .
8) See Januzzi  & Peach (1980) for  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  un l ik e ly  method to  achieve land and 
tenancy reforms in Bangladesh.
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BENGALI TERMS




bazar local dally market
bebsha business




bongsho paternal line of family
bondhok land mortgage
borga sharecropping and other form of land renting
boro winter paddy (irrigated; February to June) also:
big, rich
boro lok influential, rich people
chakri employment contract of some permanence
chakor annually or seasonally employed labourer
chula cooking hearth
coolie porter
dele cowdung on jute sticks (fuel)




dol group, party (here: labour group)
doon canoe-shaped traditional water-lifting device
dorkasto application (to official institution)
gata labour exchange
ghor jamai man resident in in-laws' house
fokir faithealer, beggar
girbi form of land mortgage
goreeb manush lit: poor person
hal two cattle and plough
haj Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca
haji Muslim who went to Mecca
halkata annual entertainment of and debt collection from
business clients 
hat regional bi-weekly market




khaikalashi usufructary land mortgage
kham kata to sell one's labour
khas land government land (ex 'enemy property')
khesari poisonous lentil variety
khola threshing place for paddy
korbiraj homeopathic healer
kua dugwell or pond
lakh one hundred thousand
lungi male skirt-like garment




































seclusion of Muslim women 
winter vegetable and pulses crop
cycle-trolley for transport of humans and materials 





swing bucket (traditional water-lifting device
village court
form of land mortgage
government
secondary school exam (after about 10 years 
schooling)
smallest administrative unit 
local government council 




ADP Agricultural Development Programme
BADC Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation
BARC Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council
BARD Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development
BAU Bangladesh Agricultural University
BB Bangladesh Bank
BKB Bangladesh Krishi Bank
BRDB Bangladesh Rural Development Board
BDS Bangladesh Studies
BWDB Bangladesh Water Development Board
C.A. Command Area
DAE Department of Agricultural Extension
DTW Deep Tubewell
EPW Economic and Political Weekly
GoB Government of Bangladesh
GoB Government of India
HTW Hand Tubewell
IDA International Development Agency
IDS Institute of Development Studies
IRDP Integrated Rural Development Programme
IESHR Indian Economic and Social History Review
IRWP Integrated Rural Works Programme
JDS Journal of Development Studies
JoPS Journal of Peasant Studies
JoSS Journal of Social Studies
KSS Krishi Samabaya Samiti Farmers' Cooperative
MIWDFC Ministry of Water Development and Flood Control
MLGRDC Ministry of Local Government and Development Cooperation
MOA Ministry of Agriculture
MSS Mahila Samabaya Samiti Women's Cooperative
MOSTI Manually Operated Shallow Tubewell for Irrigation
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